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This  thesis  began  as  an  attempt  to  add  a  new  perspective  to  the 
literature  on  decision-making  in  magistrates'  courts  by  focussing 
not  so  much  on  the  personal  and  social  characteristics  and 
relationships  of  the  decision-makers  but  on  the  information  on 
which  they  may  legally  base  their  decision,  in  short  on  the  nature 
of  evidence  and  the  processes  that  lie  behind  it. 
In  particular  the  question  raised  is:  how,  given  the  ambiguities 
and  vagueness  that  surround  real-life  incidents,  are  'hard  facts' 
and  'clearcut.  cases'  built  up  in  court  to  such  a  degree  that  the 
decision-maker  is  'convinced  beyond  reasonable  doubt':  how  is 
'conviction'  in  that  sense  established?  Conviction  in  another 
sense  is  involved,  however,  for  statistically  the  vast  majority  of 
cases  result  in  a  finding  of  guilt:  how  then  is  evidence  routinely 
structured  to  convince  decision-makers  beyond  reasonable  doubt 
that  the  defendant  is  guilty? 
One  factor  which  emerged  in  the  course  of  research  as  significant 
but  unresearched,  is  the  structure  of  the  law  itself.  'Phis  study 
thus  focusses  on  the  structure  and  substance  of  the  tr  i  fi  7_,  criminal 
law  and  legal  procedure,  illustrates  their  impact  by  way  of  data 
collected  through  observation  in  court,  and  demonstrates  that 
although  the  legal  system  claims  to  be  weighted  in  favour  of  the 
accused,  it  is  in  fact  a  powerful  contributor  to  the  construction 
of  legal  guilt.  Despite  all  the  rhetoric  of  justice,  one  need  not 
look  to  the  foibles,  interaction  or  abuse  of  those  who  operate  the 
system  to  explain  why  the  reality  varies  so  dramatically  from  the 
rhetoric;  the  divergence  -  and  the  ability  to  simultaneously 
maintain  hoth  rhetoric  and  reality  -  is  endemic  in  the  structure V 
and  form  of  the  law  itself. 
In  probing  these  issues  the  research  has  necessarily  expanded 
from  examining  the  magistrates'  courts  alone  to  the  lower  courts 
in  general,  and  the  theoretical  implications  have  moved  beyond 
merely  offering  a  new  perspective  on  the  operation  of  criminal 
justice  to  the  macro-sociological  issues  of  the  ideology  of  the 
democratic  state  and  the  rule  of  law. Chapter  1.  INTI  )DUCTIQ'T 
This  thesis  began  as  a  study  of  the  routine  operation  of  the 
criminal  courts  but  has  become  a  study  of  how  the  state  rules 
through  1aw.  It  was  inevitably  led  in  this  direction  by  taking 
an  approach  unusual  for  a  sociological  study,  focussing  not  so 
much  on  the  routine  interaction  of  the  people  who  enforce  the 
law  but  on  the  structure,  substance  and  procedure  of  the  law 
itself.  Law  is  significant  not  just  as  the  book  of  rules  for 
criminal  justice;  it  is  also  the  means  by  which  the  democratic 
state  rules.  Law,  then,  provides  a  bridge  between  the  traditional 
micro-theoretical  concerns  of  criminal  justice  and  the  macro- 
theoretical  issues  of  the  state  and  dominant  ideology.  This 
study  is  thus  about  the  construction  of  justice  not  simply  at  the 
level  of  how  verdicts  are  routinely  accomplished  but  at  the  more 
fundamental  level  of  how  one  central  aspect  of  the  ideology  of 
the  democratic  state  works. 
Law  and  the  process  of  conviction 
i 
Behind  the  verdict  of  the  criminal  court  lies  a  process  of 
IL 
conviction  -  conviction  in  two  senses;  first  how 
, 
judges  or 
juries  carne  to  be  convinced  beyond  reasonable  doubt  of  the  appropriate 
verdict;  second  how  that  verdict  so  routinely,  according  to  the 
statistics,  comes  to  be  a  verdict  of  guilt.  The  verdict  is  the 
product  of  a  process  of  conviction  in  both  the  subjective  and  the 
legal  senses. 
The  conviction  process  in  the  legal  sense  poses  a  problem  for 
explanation  because  it  raises  a  strange  paradox.  All  the  rhetoric 
of  justice  we  are  so  familiar  with  presents  a  picture  of  a  system 2 
of  criminal  justice  bending  over  backwards  to  favour  the 
defendant  rather  than  the  prosecution.  Every  accused  has  the 
right  to  a  fair  trial.  He  is  innocent  till  proved  guilty;  it 
is  the  prosecutor  who  must  prove  his  . case.  What  is  riore,  the 
accused  has  a  right  to  silence,  he  is  not  a  compellable  witness 
and  he  need  not  incriminate  himself 
,  so  that  the  prosecutor  has 
to  be  able  to  prove  his  case  without  the  co-operation  of  the 
accused.  The  police  for  their  part  car,  not  arrest  or  search  on 
suspicion  to  find  evidence  but  only  in  relation  to  an  already 
specified  offence.  They  cannot  force  anyone  to  answer  questions 
and  must  give  a  caution  before  asking  them.  Evidence  for  the 
prosecution  case  cannot  therefore  be  collected  or  presented  by 
any  means  but  only  within  the  limits  set  by  law  to  safeguard  the 
citizen.  The  accused  need  prove  nothing,  but  can  choose  if  he 
wishes  to  establish  a  defence  case  to  counter  that  of  the  prose- 
cution  with  the  less  stringent  requirement  not  of  'proof'  but 
merely  of  raising  a  reasonable  doubt,  and  he  may  use  legal 
expertise  to  do  that.  The  whole  flavour  of  the  rhetoric  of 
justice  is  summed  up  in  the  idea  that  it  is  better  for  ten  guilty 
men  to  go  free  than  for  one  innocent  man  to  be  wrongly  convicted. 
Why  then  the  paradox  that  the  vast  majority  of  cases  processed 
through  a  criminal  justice  system  so  geared  to  favouring  the 
accused  results  in  a  finding  of  guilt  ? 
For  they  do.  According  to  . 
1978,  conviction  rates  were  as  follows: 
criminal  statistics  for 
90%  of  Scottish  cases  involving 
crimes,  95%  of  Scottish  cases  involving  offences,  84%  of  English  Crown 
Court  cases,  93%  of  indictable  cases,  95%  of  non-indictable  cases,  in  the 
3 
English  magistrates'  courts.  Sane  samples  show  even  higher  rates  -a  98.5% 
conviction  rate  for  magistrates'  courts  in  Sheffield.  (Bottcros  and  McClean 
1976)  Conviction  depends  in  court 3 
on  the  plea  or  the  verdict.  If  the  accused  pleads  guilty  to 
the  charge  against  him,  conviction  follows  as  a  matter  of 
routine.  If  he  pleads  not  guilty,  a  contested  trial  follows. 
According  to  Bottoms  and  McClean,  72.5%  of  those  contesting  the 
case  in  magistrates'  courts,  55%  of  those  choosing  jury  trials, 
and  71%  of  those  allocated  to  the  higher  courts  were  convicted 
on  some  or  all  counts  (1976  :  106,209).  In  the  rhetoric  of 
justice  everyone  is  entitled  to  a  fair  trial;  yet  most  defendants 
plead  guilty.  In  the  rhetoric  of  justice  any  reasonable  doubt 
should  result  in  acquittal;  yet  for  the  clear  majority  of  cases 
the  court  is  convinced  beyond  reasonable  doubt,  despite  all  the 
rhetorical  hamstrings  on  police  and  prosecution,  that  the  accused 
is  guilty.  Why? 
One  answer  might  be  quite  simply  t1N"t  the  defendants  are 
guilty,  the  case  against  them  is  too  strong  to  be  plausibly 
disputed;  the  facts  speak  for  themselves.  Sir  Robert  Mark  has 
suggested  indeed  that  the  very  limitations  placed  on  police  and 
prosecution  bringing  a  case  to  court  make  it  highly  probable  that 
only  the  indisputably  guilty  cores  through  the  process  at  all: 
The  procedural  safeguards  for  the  suspect  or  accused  in  our 
system  of  criminal  justice  are  such  that  caimittal  for 
-trial,  involving  the  participation  of  lawyers  and  bench, 
is  itself  an  indication  of  strong  probability  of  guilt 
(Alderson  19  73  :  16) 
But  this  is  where  we  cane  to  the  process  of  conviction  in  its 
other,  subjective,  sense.  Given  the  ambiguities  and  uncertainties 
that  dog  real  life  incidents  haw  are  clearcut  facts  of  the  case  and 
strong  case4produced?  How  do  judges  and  juries  come  to  be  persuaded 4 
beyond  reasonable  doubt  by  one  case  or  another?  Evidence,  the 
facts  of  the  case,  strong  and  weak  cases  are  not  simply  self- 
evident  absolutes;  they  are  the  end  product  of  a  process  which 
argunu  d  selects  the  available  '  facts'  and  constructs  cases  for 
and  in  the  courtroom.  Behind  the  facts  of  the  case  that  convince 
judges  or  juries  to  an  unambiguous  verdict  lies  a  process  of 
construction  and  a  structure  of  proof  that  need  to  be  probed  and 
analysed. 
Mark's  point  raises  another  question.  What  exactly  are  the 
procedures  of  criminal  justice  that  are  so  readily  assured  to 
protect  the  accused?  For  though  they  are  constantly  referred  to 
in  theory  and  in  practice  they  are  remarkably  little  investigated. 
Sociologists  have  taken  the  question,  of  how  the  criminal 
justice  process  works  in  relation  to  the  principles  of  law  by  inves- 
tigating  only  one  side  of  the  equation  the  operation  of  justice 
not  the  law  itself.  Explicity  or  implicitly  the  question  underlying 
sociological  analysis  of  the  criminal  justice  process  always  seems 
to  be  concerned  with  why  the  people  who  routinely  operate  the  law 
also  routinely  depart  from  the  principles  of  justice  -  depart  from 
them  in  either  or  both  of  two  ways  -  vio-l-ating  the  principle  of 
equality  before  the  law  bj  being  more  likely  arrest,  convict  or 
sentence  with  greater  severity  lower  rather  than  middle  or  upper 
class  people,  blacks  rather  than  whites,  men  rather  than  women; 
iplating  the  principle  of  a  criminal  justice  system  geared  to 
safeguarding  the  accused  by  routinely  subverting  the  rights 
surrounding  arrest.,  the  right  to  a  trial,  the  right  to  be  presuned 
innocent  till  proved  guilty. 
`1 
So  we  are  presented  with  a  picture  of  how  social  and  human  factors i 
c 
undermine  the  workings  of  a  criminal  justice  system  geared  to 
constraining  state  officials  and  favouring  the  accused.  One 
study  after  another  shows  up  class,  race  and  sex  prejudices  on 
the  part  of  magistrates  and  policemen;  bureaucratic  pressures 
pushing  the  police  into  acceptable  arrest  rates,  lawyers  into 
negotiating  pleas,  court  officials  into  a  speedy  rather  than  neces- 
sarily  a  just  throughput  of  cases;  personal  ambitions,  friendships 
enmities,  pressures  from  family  and  colleagues  affecting  the  way 
justice  is  adninistered.  The  fact  that  courts  and  police  stations 
are  not  just  legal  institutions  but  the  daily  work  places  of 
policemen,  lawyers,  clerks  of  court,  leads  to  the  development  of 
stereotypes,  networks  of  shared  understandings,  alliances  of 
alleged  adversaries,  techniques  for  routinising  the  work  of 
policing  or  processing  cases,  to  a  situation  where  the  suspect 
or  defendant  is  the  only  one  who  is  mt  part  of  the  routine,,  .s 
mystified  by  the  language,  bureaucracy  and  processes  of  justice. 
Interaction  on  the  beat,  information  games,  remedial  routines, 
degradation  ceremonies  in  court,  all  help  explain  in  fascinating 
and  colourful  detail  why  criminal  justice  operates  as  it  does. 
4 
What  is  barely  touched  on  is  the  nature  and  role  of  the  law 
itself.  In  a  way  it  is  not  surprising.  Law  like  so  many  of  our 
significant  institutions  does  not  in.  vi  study.  The  statutes 
written  in  the  dullest  and  most  convoluted  of  prose,  the  shelves 
and  shelves  of  dusty  law  reports,  and  the  maze  of  coinon  law  Lthey 
contain  can  hardly  raise  the  same  inmediate  interest  as  the 
fascination  of  observing  people  in  action,  policemen  ferrying  drunks 
Mane  from  carnivals  , 
lawyers  negotiating  and  string  pulling,  clerks 
j 
of  court  organising  cases  round  the  tea  break.  But  the  failure  to ýo 
investigate  the  law  is  based  on  more  theoretical  grounds  too,  on 
an  aversion  to  the  naive  role  theory  which  equated  formal  rules 
and  roles  or  how  people  should  behave  with  how  they  d.  o  .,  which 
confused  the  prescriptive  with  the  descriptive  and  presented 
people  as  passive  puppets.  Interactionist  studies  focussed  instead 
on  the  active  nature  of  human  beings,  on  the  interactive  processes 
by  which  the  working  of  any  institution  was  accarplished,  on  the 
personal  and  social  variables  which  intervene  between  how  institu- 
tions  should  work  and  how  they  do.  In  the  realm  of  criminal  justice 
the  formal  structures  and  rules  of  law  were  quite  simply  not 
a  relevant  subject  for  investigation. 
Ironically  however,  some  vague  notion  of  'the  law'  is  usually 
there  as  a  background  assertion,  as  a  vague  standard  from  which 
the  law  enforcers  under  study  are  assured  to  deviate.  The  same 
polarities  appear  again  and  again.  Me  criminal  justice  system  is 
seen  in  Parkers  tei  )as  modelled  on  '  due  process'  vA.  law  enforcement 
agencies  mak%r5it  veer  in  practice  towards  'crime  control  ;'  the  '  law 
e  ore  Se  ýý¢  a  0. 
inLbooks'  is  jsubverted  by  the  'law  in  action.  '  The  assumption  has 
been  in  effect  that  the  law  incorporates  rights  for  the  accused  and 
the  problem  has  been  simply  to  ask  why  and  how  the  police  and  courts 
subvert,  negate  or  abuse  them.  Thus  Skolnick  notes  that  the  purpose 
of  his  book  is 
not  to  reveal  that  the  police  violate  rules  and 
regulations  -  that  much  is  assumed  (1966,  p.  22) 
In  conventional  sociological  studies  of  criminal  justice  then,  'law' 
stands  merely  as  an  assumed  standard  from  which  the  enforcers  of  law 
routinely  deviate;  legal  procedures  are  simply  assumed  to  incorporate 
ýý 
ý. 
cv  JI  rights.  The  '  law  in  action'  is  scrutinised  but  what  the  'law 1 
OAC 
in  [books'  actually  says  is  simply  assumed  ;  it  remains  unprob  l  emat  ic 
and  unexplored. 
At  the  level  of  policy  rather  than  explanation  the  same 
assumption  is  made.  Throughout  the  debate  of  the  1970  S  both  those 
I- 
advocating  law  geared  more  to  crime  control,  like  Sir  Robert  Mark, 
or  his  successor  as  Metropolitan  Police  Commissioner,  Sir  David 
McNee,  and  those  advocating  more  effective  civil  rights,  like  the 
National  Council  for  Civil  Liberties,  tend  to  assume  that  the  law 
does  incorporate  safeguards  for  the  accused.  Hence  from  one  pers- 
pective  the  police  are  too  hamstrung  by  the  law  to  do  their  job 
and  the  guilty  go  free,  from  the  other,  the  law  does  not  work 
because  the  police  abuse  it  to  secure  convictions.  So  NOCL  wiitf  r 
note  : 
All  policemen  are  under  the  same  pressure;  bend  the  rules 
to  deliver  the  goods  in  the  form  of  convictions  .;. 
It 
is  the  abuse  of  police  powers  in  these  circumstances  - 
arrest,  search  and  questioning  -  that  has  created  the  roost 
intractible  police/civil  liberty  problem  in  recent  years 
(Cox  1975:  164,  my  emphasis) 
Likewise  the  Criminal  Law  Revision  Um  ittee's  proposals  to  rmdify 
the  right  to  silence  were  based  on  the  assumption  that  current  law 
does  incorporate  sonne  such  right,  while  its  critics  assume  the  same. 
So  the  liberal  lawyers  group,  Release,  could  say 
At  present,  the  only  protection  offered  by  the  law  to  a 
man  facing  accusations  from  the  police  or  other  officials 
is  his  right  to  remain  silent.  If,  as  so  often  happens, 
a  man  is  arrested  late  at  night,  taken  to  a  police 
station  and  interrogated  by  several  police  officers ý  ý. 
using  the  methods  that  we  have  already  described,  he 
has  the  right  to  say:  "I  wish  to  remain  silent,  I  will 
not  be  questioned.  I  will  not  be  intimidated  or  bullied. 
I  will  not  incriminate  myself  ,  rrmy  friends,  or  my  family 
as  you  wish  me  to  do.  "  He  is  entitled  to  say  this 
without  running  the  risk  of  anyone  at  a  later  stage  being 
able  to  argue  that  by  refusing  to  speak  when  questioned, 
he  showed  himself  to  be  guilty  of  the  accusation  against 
him. 
It  is  the  intention  of  the  CL}  to  remove  this  sole 
protection.  According  to  their  proposals,  failure  to 
mention  any  fact  later  relied  onjhis  defence,  would 
expose  the  defendant  to  "adverse  inferences"  in  court. 
In  other  words,  the  jury  or  magistrates  would  be 
entitled  to  regard  silence  as  evidence  of  guilt  (1973:  26) 
Champions,  critics  and  students  of  the  criminal  process  alikei  then 
base  their  arguments  on  assertions  about  the  law.  But  does  the  law 
incorporate  due  process,  safeguards  for  the  accused,  civil  rights? 
The  vague  notion  of  'due  process'  or  'the  law  in  the  books'  in  fact 
collapses  two  quite  distinct  aspects  of  law  into  one;  the  general 
principles  around  which  the  law  is  discussed-  the  rhetoric  of 
justice  -  and  the  actual  procedures  and  rules  by  which  justice  or 
legality  are  operationalised.  The  rhetoric  used  when  justice  is 
discussed  resounds  with  high  sounding  principles  but  does  the  law 
incorporate  the  rhetoric?  This  cannot  simply  be  assured;  the  law 
itself,  not  just  the  people  who  operate  it,  must  be  put  under  the 
microscope  for  analysis. 
This  is  the  approach  which  this  study  adapts.  It  focusses  not 
on  the  interaction  of  policeman  and  citizen,  lawyer  and  client, 1ý 
magistrate  and  defendant  per  se  but  on  the  legal  context  in 
which  that  interaction  takes  place.  It  supplements  the 
interactionist  approach  by  asking  a  different  question.  Instead 
of  showing  why  police,  magistrates,  lawyers  might  be  motivated 
or  pressurised  into  processing  people  as  they  do,  it  asks  why 
they  may  process  people  as  they  do.  That  involves  looking  not 
at  the  informal  rules  of  social  interaction  but  at  the  formal 
rules  of  the  law  itself,  at  what  is  permitted  or  prohibited  by 
statute,  at  what  judges  treat  as  acceptable  accountable 
or  sanctionable  police  and  court  practices. 
In  short,  this  study  approaches  the  paradox  of  a  high 
conviction  rate  in  a  legal  system  allegedly  geared  in  favour  of 
the  accused  by  scrutinising  the  legal  system  itself.  It  turns 
'  the  law'  from  a  background  assumption  of  interactionist  research 
'ý 
into  a  central  sociological  problem  in  itself.  It  does  so  for  k  \vzQ  r  ec.  S  . 
The  first  is  quite  simply  a  need  for  information. 
Both  theoretical*  and  policy  debate  in  the  area  of  criminal  justice 
are  based  on  an  assunption  about  the  law  which  may  be  false.  The 
second  is  the  potential  irj  fluence  of  the  law  on  its  enforcers. 
Interactionist  scepticism  those  who  equate  the  prescriptive  with 
the  descriptive  is  entirely  valid,  but  to  say  people  do  not 
necessarily  obey  the  rules  is  not  to  say  they  never  do.  The  law  can 
constrain  especially  when  it  is  public  and  subject  to  controls.  The 
law  itself  is  also  one  of  the  contextual  elements  of  decisions. 
Bureaucracy,  colleagues.  -L  do  not  have  a  monopoly  on  shaping 
decisions.  The  law  itself  may  incorporate  pressures  and  inducements 
which  motivate  decisions  by  policemen,  lawyers,  defendants.  'What 
is  more  the  rules  may  be  facilitative  as  well  as  prohibitive.  Law 
is  for  example  one  of  the  raw  materials  that  lawyers  work  with.  This `u 
book  is  full  of  illustrations  of  how  lawyers  use  the  l  my  in 
courts  to  score  points  for  their  own  case  or  against  their 
adversary's.  Clearly  they  act  upon  that  raw  material,  they  use 
it,  but  they  are  able  to  use  it  because  it  is  there,  able  to  use  it 
openly  because  it  is  legitimate,  because  they  may  make  their 
case  in  that  way  according  to  the  law.  The  role  of  formal  law 
in  how  the  process  of  conviction  is  achieved  should  not  be 
underplayed. 
The  third  reason  shifts  the  theoretical  ground  completely. 
Interactionist  studies  of  criminal  justice  have  scorned  the  study 
of  formal  rules  because  they  were  more  concerned  with  what  law 
enforcers  do  than  with  what  they  should  do:  what  they  should  do 
is  however,  from  a  quite  different  theoretical  perspective,  a 
legitimate  question  to  ask.  It  raises  issues  not  so  much  about 
the  operation,  as  about  the  politics  of  criminal  justice. 
Law,  the  state  and  dominant  ideology 
Studies  of  law-enforcement  so  far  have  in  fact  been  less 
about  the  law  than  about  occupational  groups  who  happen  to  operate 
the  law  and  incidentally  impinge  on  it,  a  significant  issue  but 
not  the  only  one.  Law  enforcement  analysed  instead  4co  the 
perspective  of  how  it  is  meant  to  operate  provides  a  more  direct 
entree  into  the  nature  of  the  law  itself  and  the  judicial  and 
political  elites  of  the  state  who  make  it.  Here  methods  scorned 
for  studying  how  the  police  and  courts  operate  become  vital  for 
studying  the  law.  Law  reports  may  not  tell  us  much  about  the 
actuality  of  police  and  courtroom  behaviour  but  they  do  tell  us 
what  kind  of  behaviour  is  acceptable  in  law.  Analysis  of  the 1ý 
"law  in  the  books"  does  not  tell  us  what  police  and  court  officials 
do  but  a  good  deal  about  what  they  are  legally  allowed  and  legally 
expected  to  do.  Law  enforcement,  in  short,  is  not  exclusively  an 
area  for  interactionist  study  at  the  micro  level;  it  is  also  an 
issue  in  the  politics  of  law  at  the  macro  level.  This  means  a 
change  of  focus,  shifting  attention  from  the  routine  activities  of 
petty  officials  of  the  state  to  the  top  of  the  judicial  and 
political  hierarchies  where  rules  are  made  and  sanctions  operated, 
switching  our  question  from  the  effectiveness  or  otherwise  of 
rules  and  sanctions  (assuming  they  were  intended  to  be  effective) 
to  the  intentions  themselves.  The  question  of  whether  the  law 
does  incorporate  civil  rights  as  in  the  ideology  of  legality  it 
should,  thus  takes  on  a  new  significance.  It  is  not  just  relevant 
to  the  structural  framework  within  which  petty  officials  routinely 
operate,  it  is  also  relevant  to  the  action,  the  intentions  of 
those  at  the  top  of  the  legal  hierarchy.  In  that  sense  the  micro- 
sociological  conception  of  people  and  analysis  of  action  is  simply 
moved  up  the  power  structure,  fron  those  who  administer  the  law  to 
those  who  make  it.  But  at  the  same  time  macro-sociological 
issues  are  raised  too.  Shifting  the  focus  to  the  political  and 
judicial  elites  also  shifts  the  focus  to  the  very  core  of  the 
operation  of  the  state. 
To  question  whether  the  law  incorporates  its  own  rhetoric  is 
to  ask  whether  deviation  from  standards  of  Just  and  legality 
are  not  merely  the  product  of  informalities  and  unintended 
consequences  at  the  level  of  petty  officials,  but  institutionalised 
in  the  formal  law  of  the  state.  This  has  implications  for  how 
the  state  rules.  One  of  the  essential  justifications  of  the \Z 
democratic  state  is  precisely  that  it  is  based  on  legality,  that 
the  relationship  between  the  state  and  the  individuals  of  civil 
society  is  one  governed  not  by  the  arbitrary  exercise  of  power 
but  by  power  exercised  within  the  constraints  of  law.  The 
criminal  justice  process  is  the  most  explicit  coercive  apparatus 
of  the  state  and  the  idea  that  police  and  courts  can  interfere 
with  the  liberties  of  citizens  only  under  known  law  and  by  means 
of  due  process  of  law  is  thus  a  crucial  element  in  the  ideology 
of  the  democratic  state.  To  question  whether  the  law  in  fact 
incorporates  the  rhetoric  of  justice  is  to  question  the  ideological 
foundations  of  the  state.  It  is  to  raise  the  possibility  of 
contradictions  within  dominant  ideology  and  questions  about  the 
mechanics  of  its  management.  It  is  to  raise  questions  about  what 
the  whole  idea  of  the  rule  of  law  means  and  how  it  operates. 
It  is  a  long  way  from  the  Saturday  night  affray  to  the  Law 
Lords;  a  world  of  meaning  separates  the  breach  of  the  peace  or 
burglary  or  assault  and  theories  of  how  the  state  rules.  Yet 
they  are  inextricably  interlinked.  This  study  tries  to  take 
one  small  step  to  brit  the  gap. 
Methods  and  Data 
This  research  began  as  an  observational  study  in  the  courts; 
the  nature  of  the  study  led  to  textbooks  on  the  rules  of  evidence 
and  procedure,  mainly  at  that  stage  as  background  information. 
They  in  turn  led  to  law  reports  and  statutes  in  a  naive  attept \,  -s 
to  pin  down  what  exactly  the  law  was,  and  the  law  of  criminal 
procedure  and  evidence  itself,  first  its  substance,  then  its  very 
form,  became  a  central  focus  of  analysis.  The  study  therefore 
draws  on  both  observed  empirical  data  and  analysis  of  law  reports, 
statutes,  conmittee  reports  and  legal  texts. 
Observation  was  conducted  from  the  public  benches  in  the 
Sheriff  Courts  and  District  Courts  in  Glasgow.  Two  stipendary 
magistrates,  i  lay  magistrates  or  bailies,  and  I  sheriffs 
sitting  alone  and  with  a  jury  were  observed,  along  with  11 
lawyers  and  12  procurators  ý%scq\ 
Notes  on  105  cases  were  collected.  These  were  randomly 
selected  over  a  long  period,  1973-75.  Cases  were  observed  fran 
the  public  benches  and  detailed  notes,  verbatim  or  virtually  so  - 
facilitated  by  slow  proceedings  and  my  own  version  of  shorthand  - 
were  taken.  These  provide  basic  illustrative  data. 
A  good  deal  of  time  at  court  is  spent  waiting  in  corridors 
with  defendants,  witnesses,  policemen,  lawyers  and  this  was 
used  mainly  for  observation  and  listening  (one  could  hardly  call 
it  eavesdropping  since  the  conversation  was  so  public  anyway) 
to  last  minute  consultations  between  lawyers  and  clients,  or 
participants  discussing  cases.  I  chose  mainly  a  passive  role 
but  necessarily  talked  in  the  course  of  all  this  to  score 
policemen,  lawyers  and  defendants,  and  though  I  have  rarely  drawn 
on  this  material  as  formal  data  it  did  provide  useful  leads. 1ý 
I  was  given  access  to  one  court's  files  and  took  a  random 
sample  of  100  cases  to  see  what  kind  of  information  was  available. 
For  the  purposes  of  this  thesis  there  was  not  a  great  deal  of 
direct  relevance  though  I  have  drawn  on  it,  noting  the  paucity 
of  the  sample,  in  two  ways  :  in  chapter  3,  discussing  the  noted 
replies  to  charges  (since  my  concern  is  with  the  presentation  of 
evidence  the  veracity  of  the  information  is  less  important  than 
how  it  is  used)  and  in  chapter  4,  to  suggest  sane  speculative 
questions  that  arise  from  adjournments. 
Much  of  the  data  used  here  is.  however%  documentary  in  the 
form  of  statute  and  particularly  case  law  as  found  in  the  Law 
Reports.  The  problem  with  using  case  law  is  where  to  stop,  and 
one  is  always  at  risk  of  having  some  other  unconsidered  case 
pulled  out  of  the  Reports  to  contradict  one's  conclusions. 
This  would  not  altogether  defeat  the  argent  of  the  book  since 
the  fact  remains  that  all  the  cases  cited  here  have  occurred  despite 
the  ideology  of  justice.  However  the  thesis  is  based  more 
securely  than  that  since  I  have  deliberately  not  looked  for  cases 
to  support  the  argument  but  been  guided  by  basic  textbooks  in 
criminal  evidence  and  procedure  on  what  are  deemed  in  law  to  be 
significant  cases  ,  and  of  course  on  the  cases  lawyers  actually 
learn  about. 
All  the  Reports  of  the  last  decade  by  commissions  and 
committees  on  procedural  reform  were  also  studied  and  media 
reports  of  contemporary  debates  over  procedure  through ýý 
official  police,  prosecution  and  NOCL  spokesmen  drawn  on. 
The  empirical  data  is  mainly  Scottish,  the  study  of 
law  ranges  over  both  Scots  and  English  law.  In  evidence, 
procedure,  the  structure  of  trial  and  prosecution  they  vary 
far  less  than  is  sometimes  supposed,  and  where  they  vary 
the  impact  is  not  always  significant.  This  is  not 
however  a  comparative  study.  It  simply  shows  how  both 
Scots  and  English  law  define  and  affect  the  conviction  process; 
where  there  are  marked  differences  they  are  noted  and  where 
a  point  specific  to  English  law  requires  empirical  illustration 
it  is  done  by  drawing  on  observation  in  English  courts  conducted 
in  the  course  of  a  more  recent  project. 
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Taking  the  approach  of  examining  law  and  the  legal  system 
itself  has  meant  taking  on  board  data  more  normally  associated 
with  "lawyers'  law"  than  with  sociology.  There  are  risks  in 
doing  this,  risks  of  being  accused  by  sociologists  of  being 
unsociological,  by  purists  of  being  eclectic,  risks 
particularly  of  criticism  by  lawyers.  The-sociologist  is 
an  amateur  in  the  field  of  law  and  risks  quite  simply  getting 
it  wrong.  Yet  the  law  is  not  such  a  mystical  area;  it  takes  time 
but  it  is  accessible.  Indeed  as  evidence  of  the  discourse  of 
the  powerful  it  provides  via  the  law  reports  a  veritable  bank  of  readily 'ýo 
available  data.  Sociologists  may,  in  pointing  out  how  defendants 
are  mystified  by  the  law,  also  have 
been  too  readily  deterred  by  the  mystique  themselves.  The  risks 
are  not  L_  worth  taking;  they  are  necessary  steps  if  the 
sociology  of  law  is  to  move  beyond  being  the  sociology  of  just 
another  set  of  occupational  groups  and  become  truly  a  sociology 
of  law. 
The  structure  of  the  thesis 
I 
Chapter.,  begins  in  very  general  terms  by  setting  the  process 
of  conviction  in  the  context  of  the  structure  and  meaning  of  legal 
proof  . 
Chapters 
.  to  (p  exanmine  in  detail  the  statutory 
rules  and  case  law  rulings  which  provide  the  legal  context  for  the 
guilty  plea,  define  the  methods  that  can  be  legitimately  used  by 
police,  lawyers,  and  judges,  and  set  out  the  legal  powers,  priv- 
ileges  and  prohibitions  involved  in  the  production,  preparation 
and  presentation  of  evidence  for  trial.  They  show  how  it  is 
legally  possible  for  the  prosecution  case  to  win  so  routinely 
despite  the  rhetoric  of  a  criminal  justice  system  bending  over 
backwards  to  constrain  the  prosecution  and  safeguard  the  accused. 
Chapter  -7  examines  the  structure  of  the  courts,  the  division 
into  first  and  second  class  tiers,  and  the  ideology  of  summary 
AI  to 
justice.  Throughout  ttiece 
.  are  suyf  Vws-%  k  how  the  gap 
'between  law  and  rhetoric  is  managed,  how  the  rhetoric  of  justice 
survives  its  routine  denial  in  law;  chapter  ,9.:  addresses  this 
question  more  explicitly  and  draws  out  the  implications  for  the 
whole  idea  of  the  rule  of  law  in  the  democratic  state. "I  \1 
CHAPTER  1 
1.  Some  of  the  problems  on  which  this  ýý-,  eSisbased  ýc,  va  \0 
raised  in  two  exploratory  articles  which  this  chapter  draws  on 
and  develops.  McBarnet  1976;  1978(a) 
2.  The  term  'judge'  is  used  loosely  here  to  cover  any  judge  of 
the  facts  other  than  the  jury,  e.  g.  a  strate,  or  sheriff. 
3.  HMSO  Cmnd.  7670,7676.  For  Scotland  see  the  siumary  at 
paragraph:  7.19.  For  England  see  table  4.8. 
4.  See,  for  example,  on  'prejudices'  and  variations,  Bottcrnley 
1973;  Hood  1962,1972.  On  the  police  see  Cain.  1971,1973; 
Skolnick  1966;  Piliavin  and  Briar  1964;  Young  1971.  On  lawyers 
see  Newman  1966;  Bltmnbert  1967;  Skolnick  1967;  Baldwin  and 
McConville  1977.  On  courts  see  Carlen  1976;  Garfinkel  1956; 
Bottorris  and  McClean  1976;  Hetzler  and  Kanter  1974. 
5.  A  study  of  the  Jury. \% 
CHAPTER  2  Convincing  the  Court:  The  Structure  of  Legal  Proof 
The  core  of  the  liberal  democratic  concept  of  criminal  justice 
is  that  a  person  is  innocent  until  proved  guilty.  Justice  does  not 
rule  out  punishment;  on  the  contrary  it  deals  in  "just  deserts.  " 
What  the  ideology  of  justice  is  opposed  to  is  arbitrary  punishment. 
The  important  criterion  in  dealing  out  "just  deserts"  is  that  the 
recipient  should  have  been  proved  guilty.  The  whim  of  kings,  the 
barbarism  of  joust,  the  mysticism  of  magic  should  be  replaced  by  a 
rational  method  of  proof.  The  trial  is  where  that  process  of  proof 
is  not  only  carried  out  but  put  on  public  display  -  where  justice 
has  not  only  to  be  done  but  be  seen  to  be  done.  The  plausibility 
of  the  trial  as  a  process  of  proving  the  accused  guilty  is  one 
criterion  by  which  the  ideology  of  justice  stands  or  falls. 
But,  the  trial  is  not  self-evidently  a  process  of  proof.  "What 
happened,  "  the  incident  under  investigation  or  in  dispute  cannot  be 
conceived  of  as  some  absolute  -  "truth"  or  "reality"  -  nor  as  a 
simple  objective  thing,  a  jigsaw  puzzle  that  can  be  taken  to  pieces 
and  reassembled  through  witnesses'  testimony  exactly  as  it  happened. 
First,  the  limits  are  not  so  clearly  defined,  for  how  is  reality 
bounded?  Where  of  all  the  events  going  on  continuously  and 
simultaneously  in  several  lives  did  'the  incident'  start  and  stop? 
Second,  the  pieces  do  not  fit  so  neatly  together.  Conceptions  of 
reality  vary.  'What  happened'  is  to  a  witness,  what  struck  hire  as 
happening,  how  he  made  sense  of  what  he  saw.  Different  witnesses  with 
different  perceptive  filters  may  be  struck  in  different  ways.  Truth 
and  realit-v  are  subjective  and  relative.  Third,  the  pieces  are 1ý 
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dynamic:  '  vvhat  happened'  is  to  a  witness  not  just  how  he  made 
sense  of  it  at  the  time  but  how  he  has  made  sense  of  it 
reconstructing  it  later,  not  just  how  well  but  how  he  rar  nbers 
it.  And  of  course  there  are  lies:  witnesses  may  have  vested 
interests  more  powerful  than  the  oath.  The  idea  of  proving  what 
happened  is  a  complicated  philosophical  problem. 
Not  that  the  law  acknits  to  this.  Witnesses  are  simply 
enjoined  to  "tell  the  truth  the  whole  truth  and  nothing  but  the 
truth,  "  a  fine  piece  of  rhetoric,  devastatingly  naive  and  blase, 
but  also  extremely  powerful.  In  -what  must  be  the  most  familiar 
of  all  courtroom  catchphrases  it  deftly  sweeps  all  the  philoso- 
phical  problems  neatly  under  the  carpet  of  mystique.  But 
analytically  the  problems  remain.  Indeed  when  one  adds  the  fact 
that  most  trials  take  place  months  if  not  years  after  the  incident 
in  question,  and  that  the  court  ;n  cc  adversary  system  is  presented 
with  two  conflicting  versions  of  that  incident,  it  becomes  incredible 
that  any  jury  or  magistrate  can  ever  feel  that  what  happened  has 
t1,  Q 
been  proved  beyond  question.  Yet  in  ývýs`ý  *ý)1311,1)jtrials  it  seems  they 
are.  The  philosophical  problem  of  how  one  reproduces  "reality"  thus 
becomes  a  sociological  one:  how  is  it  that  in  such  a  situation  of 
ambiguity,  conflict,  subjectivity,  fading  or  moulded  memories,  the 
judges  of  the  factc  can  so  readily  find  themselves  convinced  beyond 
reasonable  doubt? 
In  part  the  answer  lies  in  the  skills  of  advocacy,  "the  technique 
of  persuasion"  as  David  Napley  puts  it  (1975' 
; 
but  these  skills 
are  themselves  merely  adaptations  to  a  particular  structure  of  proof  . 
This  chapter  focusses  on  the  legal  concept  of  proof  and  the  legal  form 2® 
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of  proof  as  they  have  developed  in  the  corm-on  1  aw  countries  since 
the  seventeenth  century. 
The  Concept  of  Proof 
The  legal  system  copes  with  the  philosophical  prcblerrýs  of 
proof  by  redefining  it  into  more  manageable  proportions.  What  is 
involved  is  not  a  philosophical  or  scientific  concept  of  proof  but 
a  much  less  demanding  legal  concept.  As  David  Napley  puts  it  in 
teaching  the  techniques  of  the  advocate: 
ºVhilst  therefore  the  doctor  and  the  scientist  are 
engaged  in  an  inquisitional  pursuit  in  which  they  are 
seeking  the  truth,  the  lawyer  is  engaged  in  an  accusatorial 
pursuit  to  see  whether  a  limited  area  of  proof  has  been 
discharged.  (1975  :  30  ) 
The  justification  lies  not  in  any  idealism  that  "the  truth  the  whole 
truth  and  nothing  but  the  truth"  results,  but  in  pragmatics.  The 
courts  are  there  not  to  indulge  in  the  impossible  absolutes  of 
philosophy  or  science  but  to  reach  decisions  -  quickly: 
If  we  lived  for  a  thousand  years  instead  of  about 
sixty  or  seventy,  and  every  case  was  of  sufficient 
importance,  it  might  be  possible,  and  perhaps  proper... 
to  raise  every  possible  enquiry  as  to  the  truth  of 
statements  made  ... 
In  fact  mankind  finds  it 
irrpossible.  (Rolfe,  in  A-G  v  Hildicock  1847,  cited 
in  Cross  197'-  :  21) 
So  the  courts  have  drawn  a  line  at  what  will  do  as  proof. 
Prosecutors  do  not  have  to  prove  everything  a  jure  might  want  to 
know,  they  only  have  to  produce  a  sufficiency  of  evidence.  Juries 2\ 
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have  to  be  convinced  beyond  reasonable  doubt  -  but  they  cannot 
choose  the  issues  that  they  have  to  be  convinced  about  :  sufficiency 
and  credibility  are  distinguished  in  law.  The  law  defines  how 
AU 
much  evidence  constitutes  sufficient  to  prove  a  case  and  it  is 
the  judge's  role  to  decide  that  this  standard  has  been  met.  The 
jury's  role  is  to  decide  whether  they  believe  it.  But  the  legal 
demands  involved  in  "sufficiency"  are  often  rather  lower  than  one 
might  expect.  Indeed  from  judges'  surrming  up  addresses  it  seems 
clear  they  recognise  they  have  to  persuade  juries  -  whose  only 
knowledge  of  the  law  is  after  all  the  rhetoric  -  that  enough 
evidence  is  not  as  much  as  they  might  think. 
In  case  10  3  where  the  accused  was  charged  with  theft  but  the 
goods  were  still  alongside  the  car  they  had  been  stolen  from,  the 
judge  took  pains  to  point  out  this  was  not  mere  atterrpt  but 
legally  constituted  theft: 
But  note  this,  ladies  and  gentlemen,  (reading  from  a 
legal  text):  'it  is  sufficient  to  corrplete  the  crime 
of  theft  if  the  thing  be  removed  for  the  shortest  time 
and  (loudly)  but  a  small  distance'  ... 
(and  he  continued 
for  two  minutes  with  the  details). 
In  case  91  the  judge  addressed  the  jury: 
You  might  expect  you  would  need  an  eye  witness  for  proof, 
but  that  is  not  necessary  in  cases  of  theft.  There  are 
facts  and  circumstances  from  which  theft  can  be  inferred 
without  eye  witnesses.  Here  the  Crown  can  infer  theft 
according  to  the  doctrine  of  recent  possession  ... 
In  case  93,  where  one  of  the  charges  was  breach  of  the  'ease,  the 22 
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judge  (the  same  one  as  in  case  103)  again  read  from  a  law  book 
on  the  definition  of  the  offence  (having  prefaced  the  law  with 
the  corcment  that  this  was  a  common  but  fundamental  offence, 
I'  because  without  the  peace  there  is  no  order,  and  if  there  is  no 
order  there  is  certainly  no  civilisation  as  we  have  been  brought 
I 
up  to  know  it 
Breach  of  the  peace  is  behaviour  which  'might  reasonably 
be  expected  to  lead  to  lieges  being  upset.  '  Note  that 
might  be'  There  is  no  need  to  lead  evidence  that  anyone 
was  upset. 
He  continued  on  the  question  of  evidence  for  the  second  charge  of 
assault  with  an  ornamental  sword: 
It  was  perhaps  revealing  that  the  accused'  s  idea  of 
assault  was  an  idea  held  by  many  -  hitting  a  person. 
That  is  not  the  law.  An  assault  in  law  (and  out  ems 
the  book  again)  is  an  intentional  attack  on  the  person 
of  another  whether  it  injures  him  or  not.  To  aim  a  blow 
at  a  victim  is  an  assault  though  the  blow  never  lands,  to 
set  a  dog  on  someone,  to  make  a  gesture  of  violence  are  all 
assaults.  Disabuse  yourself  of  the  idea  that  there's  got 
to  be  blood,  got  to  be  bruises.  To  aim  a  blow,  a  fist,  a 
boot  (  pause  )a  sword,  (  pause  )  is  ass?  . alt  . 
Likewise  a  Scottish  jury  will  be  told  that  there  must  be  corro- 
boration  for  proof  of  a  case,  but  they  are  not  left  with  that  as  a 
minimum  requirement  to  work  from;  they  are  not  left  to  decide 
whether  the  general  idea  that  two  supporting  pieces  of  evidence 
constitutes  proof  is  valid;  they  are  told  it  is.  Corroboration 2l 
6 
equals  legal  sufficiency. 
whether  they  believe 
The  only  question  for  the  jury  is 
those  two  items  of  evidence,  whether 
they  are  convinced  by  the  evidence,  not  whether  they  are 
convinced  by  the  assumption  that  such  evidence  constitutes 
proof  . 
They  do  still  have  to  be  convinced  of  the  credibility  of  the 
evidence  of  course,  convinced  indeed  beyond  reasonable  doubt.  They 
need  not  all  be  convinced  though.  The  majority  verdict  institu- 
tionalises  ignoring  the  doubts  of  two  jurors  in  the  10-2  majority 
verdict  allowed  in  England,  seven  in  the  8-7  straight  majority 
allowed  in  Scotland.  Nor  indeed  do  all  doubts  the  juror  may  have 
count  per  se  as  "reasonable  doubts.  "  English  judges  have  now  been 
advised  it  is  safer  not  to  try  and  define  a  reasonable  doubt  but 
Scottish  juries  are  warned  in  the  judges'  sing  up  that  they  cannot 
fail  to  convict  because  of  "frivolous"  doubts  or  because  of  the 
"strained  or  fanciful  acceptance  of  remote  possibilities"  (Irving  v 
Mi  n,  of  J',  1945,  In  case  91  the  judge  warned  that  "beyond 
reasonable  doubt"  meant  : 
not  a  philosophical  doubt  but  a  reasonable  doubt 
In  case  103  the  jury  was  told  that  proof  beyond  reasonable  doubt  : 
does  not  mean  proved  to  a  mathematical  nicety  because  if 
that  was  so  no  case  would  ever  be  proved.  Nor  either  does 
it  mean  a  capricious  doubt.  It  means  doubt  based  on 
substance,  and  reason  on  the  evidence  before  you.  (And 
the  judge  thumped  the  table  in  emphasis.  )  If  such  a  doubt 
as  that  exists  the  accused  is  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  it. 
In  case  93,  the  same  judge  began  by  reeling  off  the  same  definition Q 
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almost  verbatim,  with  a1  ittle  exterrporizing  as  he  yyncluded: 
If  that  was  so,  no  criminal  charge  would  ever  be  proved 
and  God  help  us  all  then.  Some  doubting  Thomases  will 
doubt  everything  even  the  evidence  of  their  owl  eyes.  You 
cannot  indulge  in  that.  Doubt  must  be  based  on  substance 
and  reason  on  the  evidence  before  you. 
The  concept  of  "proof  beyond  reasonable  doubt"  is  thus  redefined  frcm 
the  awesome  heights  of  abstraction  into  pragmatic  minimal  standards 
that  can  be  all  too  readily  attained.  At  the  same  time  the  problem 
of  "unbounded  reality"  is  tackled  by  the  notions  of  admissibility 
and  relevance  . 
Relevance,  with  the  related  concepts  of  "material"  issues  or 
"the  facts  of  the  case"  sets  limits  on  what  may  be  introduced  as 
evidence  or  indeed  on  what  may  be  taken  into  account  as  evidence  : 
Your  experience  of  him  is  limited  to  what  you  heard  in 
that  box 
... 
Try  the  case  according  to  the  evidence. 
(Case  93) 
It  is  also  interlinked  with  the  accusatorial  style  of  a  trial:  indeed 
in  general  terns  it  is  this  that  gives  it  its  substance:  ultimately 
what  is  relevant  is  the  facts  of  the  accusation. 
ui  sets  the  general  boundaries  of  relevance  in  his  charge. 
This  point  is  also  implied  in  Archbold's  dictat  (reserved  only  for 
defence  counsel)  that  : 
the  defence  should  exercise  a  proper  discretion  not  to 
prolong  the  case  unnecessarily.  It  is  no  part  of  his 
duty  to  embark  on  length,  cross-examination  on  matters 
which  are  not  really  in  issue.  (1976  :  s.  525) 2ý 
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And  it  is  the  judge's  duty  to  stop  such  irrelevant  evidence.  So 
in  case  29,  the  boys  accused  of  suspicious  activities  around  cars  'ý.  ýý 
claimed  they  were  in  fact  being  arrested  for  nothing  in  order  to 
be  questioned  about  a  stolen  television  set  .  aý  ;  -ý:  v  "ý.  -ý  c 
Magistrate  :  I'  m  sorry  -  I'm  not  prepared  to  listen 
to  information  about  a  television. 
Accused  :  But  he  said  he  didn't  ask  us  about  a  TV 
set  and  he  did 
. 
Magistrate  :  It's  irrelevant  to  the  charge. 
Infornmtion  relevant  to  the  incident  but  irrelevant  to  the  prose- 
cution's  framing  of  the  charge  is  thus  edited  out.  More  generally, 
how  the  concept  of  relevance  transcends  the  problems  of  truth  may 
be  best  illustrated  by  this  example: 
Witness  :  The  truth  is,  going  back  -  you  want  the 
truth,  you'll  get  the  truth 
... 
Assessor  :  (interrupting)  Just  a  minute. 
Magistrate  :  We're  only  concerned  with  what  happened  on 
this  occasion.  (Case  97) 
The  concept  of  relevance,  thus  allows  artificial  boundaries  to  be 
drawn  around  unbounded  reality,  and  'the  whole  truth'  to  be  replaced 
by  'the  facts  of  the  case  .' 
Indeed  it  is  not  just  the  concept  of  relevancy  that  does  this; 
it  is  also  the  basic  form  by  which  proof  is  accomplished-  by  adversary 
advocacy. 
The  form  of  proof 
Adversay  advocacy  helps  solve  the  philosophical  problem  of 
reproducing  reality  quite  sin  1y  by  not  even  attempting  it.  Instead 2La 
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the  search  for  truth  is  replaced  by  a  contest  between  caricatures. 
Advocacy  is  not  by  definition  about  'truth  or  reality'  or  a  quest 
for  them,  but  about  arguing  a  case.  The  concept  of  a  case  is  such 
a  fundamental  part  of  Western  legal  thought  that  we  may  take  it  for 
granted,  but  it  is  a  method  of  proof  with  a  history  of 
only  two  or  three  centuries,  and  one  which  provides  a 
neat  example  of  the  abstraction  which  theorists  of  law 
under  capitalism,  like  Pashukanis,  see  as  an  essential 
element  of  the  legal  form.  (1978)  Just  as  the  concept  of 
the  legal  subject  abstracts  him  from  his  real  social  being, 
so  the  case  abstracts  from  the  complexity  of  experience, 
and  in  doing  so  it  helps  solve  both  the 
practical  and  the  ideological  problems  of  proof. 
An  incident  and  a  case  made  out  about  the  incident  are  not  the 
same  thing.  Conceptions  of  reality  are  multifaceted  and  unbounded; 
cases  are  'the  facts'  as  abstracted  from  this  broad  anDrphous  raw 
material.  The  good  advocate  grasps  at  ccnplex  confused  reality  and 
constructs  a  simple  clearcut  account  of  it.  A  case  is  thus  very  much 
an  edited  version.  But  it  is  not  just  edited  into  a  minimal  account 
-a  microcosm  of  the  incident  -  it  is  an  account  edited  with  vested 
interests  in  mind.  Hence  the  lawyer's  approach: 
that,  so  far  as  possible,  only  that  should  be  revealed 
which  supports  his  case.  (Napley  1975  :  29) 
Far  from  being  'the  truth,  the  whole  truth  and  nothing  but  the  truth' 
a  case  is  a  biased  construct,  manipulating  and  editing  the  raw 
material  of  the  witnesses'  perceptions  of  an  incident  into  not 
so  much  an  exhaustively  accurate  mtr>>oý-,  t'% 
ý.  ý  '.  3,  ("  , 
0,  ILY,  Lý, 2ý 
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In  relation  to  an  incident,  then,  a  case  is  partial  in  both  senses  - 
partisan  and  incorrplete.  The  good  advocate  is  not  concerned  with 
reproducing  incidents  but  producing  cases,  not  with  truth  but 
with  persuasion. 
Lord  Denning  makes  this  quite  clear: 
the  duty  of  counsel  to  his  client  in  a  civil  case  -  or 
in  defending  an  accused  person  -  is  to  make  every  honest 
endeavour  to  succeed.  He  must  not,  of  course,  knowingly 
mislead  the  court,  either  Qn  the  facts  or  on  the  law, 
but  short  of  that,  he  may  put  such  matters  in  evidence  or 
omit  such  others  as  in  his  discretion  he  thinks  will  be 
most  to  the  advantage  of  his  client.  So  also,  when  it 
comes  to  his  speech,  he  must  put  every  fair  arge  r  nt  which 
appears  to  him  to  help  his  client  towards  winning  the  case. 
The  reason  is  because  he  is  not  the  judge  of  the  credibility 
of  the  witnesses  or  of  the  validity  of  the  arguments.  He  is 
only  the  advocate  employed  by  the  client  to  speak  for  him, 
and  present  his  case,  and  he  must  do  it  to  the  best  of  his 
ability,  without  making  himself  the  judge  of  its  correctness, 
but  only  of  its  honesty.  Cicero  makes  the  observation  that 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  judge  to  pursue  the  truth,  but  it  is 
permitted  to  an  advocate  to  urge  what  has  only  the  semblance 
of  it.  (Tombling  v  Universal  Bulb  Co.  Ltd.  1951) 
The  Bar  is  an  apprentice-based  craft,  and  the 
5"  jrS  "vva￿tiýcdýM 
lectures  and  manuals  on  the  art  of  advocacy  illustrate  the  same 
role.  Sir  William  Boulton's  'Conduct  and  Etiquette  of  the  Bar' 
indeed  quotes  Denning'  s  view,  above,  to  summarize  the  advocate's 
role  (1975  :  69).  Sir  Malcolm  Hilbery's  'Duty  and  Art  of 2s 
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Advocacy'  takes  pride  in  the  transformation  advocacy  can  bring 
to  what  witnesses  have  to  say-. 
His  may  be  bad  material,  his  opponent's  good.  One 
side  is  wrong  and  each  side  has  its  counsel.  But 
even  bad  material  treated  by  a  good  craftsman 
will  take  form  and  with  that  may  even  be  made 
attractive.  (Hilbery  1975  :  29) 
Lord  Cross  observes  proudly  to  the  Holdsworth  Club: 
I  have  seldom  felt  more  pleased  with  myself  than 
when  I  persuaded  three  out  of  five  law  lords  to 
come  to  a  conclusion  I  was  convinced  was  wrong. 
(1973  :3) 
Coddington.  in  'Advice  on  advocacy  in  the  lower  courts'  takes  the 
same  line,  somewhat  less  pithily: 
One  must  never  tell  a  lie  oneself.  One  must  never 
tell  the  witness  to  lie.  One  must  never  put  forward 
a  defence  which  one  has  been  told  by  one's  witness 
is  not  true.  One  must  never  express  one's  personal 
opinion  of  the  truth  and  justice  of  one's  case  or  of 
the  reliability  of  a  witness,  becfluse  one  speaks  as 
an  advocate  not  as  a  private  person.  But  on  the  other 
hand,  one  is  entitled  to  accept  what  one  does  not 
personally  believe,  if  a  witness  has  said  it  on  his 
own  account.  One  is  entitled  to  argue  that  the  court 
should  accept  this,  that  or  the  other  evidence,  whether 
one  does  so  or  not  in  one's  own  heart.  (1954  :2) 
And  like  all  good  writers  of  manuals  on  advocacy  he  cites  an 
apocryphal  case  -  the  case  of  the  trilby  hat  -  to  show  what 
he  means q,  c\ 
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There  is  an  old  Northern  Circuit  story  that  a  woman  was 
found  strangled  on  Ilkley  Moor,  and  beside  her  body  was  a 
trilby  hat  which  a  witness  recognised  as  that  of  the  accused 
though  it  had  no  special  marks  of  identification.  Defence 
counsel  cross-examined:  'Is  not  this  a  perfectly  ordinary 
type  of  hat?  Are  there  not  thousands  of  others  like  it?  Is 
it  not  an  ordinary  size?  Would  it  not  fit  thousands  of 
heads?  '  To  all  these  the  witness  had  to  answer  'Yes.  '  At 
the  conclusion  of  th.  t.  prosecution  Counsel  submitted  to  the 
judge  that  there  was  not  sufficient  identification  for  the  case 
to  go  to  the  jury.  The  judge  agreed  and  told  the  jury  to 
acquit.  The  prisoner  was  discharged,  and  as  he  was  leaving 
the  dock  he  turned  to  the  judge  and  said  'And  now  pray  Lord, 
may  I'  av  my  '  at?  '  C  lv  k.  --  'Zý) 
The  Bar's  fondness  for  supporting  descriptions  of  advocacy  with 
apocryphal  stories  is  itself  a  nice  demonstration  of  the  advocate's 
concern  with  a  good  story  rather  than  an  accurate  one,  while  the 
habit  of  using  such  apocryphal  stories  in  lectures  and  handbooks  on 
advocacy,  even  if  primarily  to  keep  students  awake  with  a  joke, 
nonetheless  suggests  a  latent  socialisation  function  into  manipulation 
and  persuasion  rather  than  '  truth.  ' 
Of  course  there  are  professional  ethics  involved,  for  example, 
not  arguing  for  a  client  one  knows  to  be  guilty,  but  there  are  also 
ways  of  coping  even  with  this  (spelt  out  alongside  the  statement  of 
the  ethic)  namely  by  never  asking  a  client  directly  if  he  is  guilty, 
avoiding  the  ethic  by  making  sure  one  does  not  know,  or  if  the 
client  volunteers  the  information  anyway,  by  refraining  from  arguing 
a  positive  case  for  him  in  court,  while  nonetheless  arguing  against 
the  opposing  case  (Napley:  1975:  43). 'so 
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It  is  worth  noting  in  passing  that  there  are  no  such  rules 
on  arguing  prosecution  cases,  just  one  example  of  the  suspicion 
of  guilt  attached  to  the  accused  by  virtue  of  being  accused.  On 
the  contrary  the  prosecution's  role  is  elevated  in  the  manuals 
(Napley  19  75  :  74  Boulton  19  75  :  74)  to  one  of  public  service  not 
just  in  Scotland  where  he  is  literally  a  civil  servant,  but  in 
England  where  he  ist  barrister  who  may  act  either  for  defence  or 
prosecution.  In  his  defence  role  he  is  a  biased  advocate,  as  a 
prosecutor,  an  impartial  'minister  of  justice.  '  This  role  would 
seem  to  exist  largely  in  ideology.  Archbold,  a  manual  more  concerned 
in  the  main  with  procedural  rules  than  broad  rhetoric  notes  this 
prescription  but  on  the  same  page  lists  legal  rules  which  suggest 
the  expectation  of  rather  a  different  role.  For  example,  it  is 
noted  that  the  prosecutor  has  a  duty  to  give  to  the  defence  the 
names  of  witnesses  whom  he  does  not  intend  to  call  but  who  do  have 
material  evidence  to  offer.  (1979:  S.  433)  The  word  'material'  is 
the  key.  It  indicates  that  the  prosecutor  is  assumed  to  present  a 
case  selected  for  conviction  rather  than  one  that  sets  out  all  of 
even  that  he  sees  as  the  material  facts.  Again,  the  prescription 
for  how  and  to  what  end  examination-in  -chief  should  be  conducted  - 
to  adduce  relevant  and  athisstble  evidence  to  support  the  contention 
of  the  party  who  calls  the  witness'-  makes  no  exception  for  the 
prosecuting  coup,,;  -, 
1  (19  TI:  S.  512) 
At  the  level  of  practice  there  is  no  doubt  that  prosecutors  do 
act  out  the  normal  advocate's  role  of  arguing  a  one-sided  case  :  the 
exariples  throughout  this  book  are  readily  supported  officially  by \  "3  l`ýý 
the  Fisher  RF-port  on  the  Confait  case,  in  which  three 
youths  -  two  of  whom  '  .!  ere  mentally  subnormal  -  were 
convicted  of  murder  on  the  basis  of  impossible  confessions 
mpmssibie,  because  it  was  subsequently  proved  that 
Confait  could  not  possibly  have  died  as  late  as  the 
confessions  alleged.  But  ambiguities  over  the  time  of 
death  were  k  by  the  police  and  prosecution  in 
constructing  and  presenting  their  case.  Fisher  notes 
of'the  prosecutor's  courtroom  examination  of  a  pathologist 
on  the  crucial  issue  of  the  time  of  death- "Y2 
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It  might  well  be  that,  if  Dr.  C.  had  been  given  sight  of  the 
other  evidence  and  asked  to  reconsider  his  evidence  in  the 
light  of  it,  and  had  been  asked  the  relevant  questions  in 
a  neutral  way  instead  of  being  asked  to  suggest  ways  in 
, Ahich  the  period  for  the  time  of  death  could  be  extended  after 
midnight,  the  course  of  the  trial  would  have  been  different 
and  an  acquittal  might  have  resulted.  (1977:  223) 
Or  again  : 
... 
far  from  trying  to  make  the  time  of  death  more  precise, 
those  concerned  with  the  investigation  and  prosecution  ... 
made  every  effort  to  keep  it  as  vague  as  possible.  The 
reason  for  this  was  that  they  were  concerned  to  establish 
a  case  which  rested  wholly  or  mainly  on  confession  which 
could  not  be  entirely  true  unless  the  time  of  death  was 
outside  the  brackets  given  by  (the  experts).  (1977:  20) 
Indeed  a  closer  look  at  the  legal  sources  suggests  it  would  be  very 
hard  to  find  a  legal  prescription  for  the  prosecutor  to  behave  as  a 
'minister  of  justice.  '  The  Puddick  case  from  which  the  phrase  is 
quoted  and  the  Banks  case  which  cited  it  as  law,  were  cases  of 
rape  and  unlawful  carnal  knowledge.  The  prescription  made  in  Puddick 
was  very  much  in  relation  to  the  specific  difficulties  of  knowing 
what  happened  in  sexual  cases,  and  explicitly  related  to  them,  not 
to  the  role  of  the  prosecutor  in  general: 
Counsel  for  the  prosecution  in  such  cases  are  to  regard 
thanselves  as  ministers  of  justice,  and  not  to  struggle 
for  a  conviction  ... 
(1865:  499 
What  is  more,  the  Banks  c,  V  uA  which  tried  to  establish  this  as  law 
even  in  a  sexual  case,  was  dismissed  (1916). ýý 
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Nonetheless  the  notion  of  the  prosecutor  as  a  'minister  of 
justice'  not  only  functions  at  the  ideological  level  both  in  the 
rhetoric  of  the  Bar  as  to  their  role,  and  in  general  to  support 
the  view  of  a  system  of  justice  bending  over  backwards  to  ensure 
the  innocent  are  not  convicted,  but  is  also  an  idea  that  is  put  to 
good  practical  use  by  prosecutors  in  court  to  support  the  credibility 
of  their  cases  as  opposed  to  the  biased  nature  of  the  defence's  : 
Prosecutor:  Wadies  and  gentlemen,  my  function  is  to  elicit 
as  much  evidence  as  possible  to  put  before  you. 
My  friend's  is  to  defend  his  client's  best' 
interests.  I  act  in  the  public  interest.  (Case  103) 
The  emphasis  in  advocacy  on  both  sides  on  persuasion  rather  than 
'  facts'  is  reflected  in  and  promoted  by  the  structure  of  the  profession, 
with  its  separation  of  solicitors  and  barristers  -a  separation 
which  incidentally  is  emphasised  in  the  pages  and  pages  of  Boulton's 
tsQr  'Conduct  and  Etiquette  at  the  Bar'  (1975)  devoted  to  the  rules  of  bar  r 
-solicitor  relations,  right  down  to  the  undesirability  of  a  barrister 
being  an  honorary  member  of  a  local  law  society,  or  of  purchasing 
tickets  for  a  local  law  society  dinner,  (though  there  would  be  "  no 
objection  to  accepting  gratuitous  invitations.  )  The  roles  of  the  two 
should  be  quite  distinct.  The  barrister  is  not  allowed  to  interview 
witnesses.  His  task  is  to  take  as  given  the  facts  assembled  by  the 
solicitor  and  to  argue  from  them  not  about  them  :  Boulton  o,  Sse-s 
It  is  essential  that  he  should  be  able  to  rely  on  the 
responsibility  of  a  solicitor  as  to  the  state  of  the  facts 
put  before  him  (1975:  8) 
Hilbery  notes  that  'a  Barrister  is  required  by  his  professional  code ý4 
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to  make  use  of  the  material  which  is  contained  in  his  instruction, 
and  nothing  else'  (1975:  11)  and  he  has  an  extreme  story  to 
demonstrate  this  with  Mr.  Justice  Swift,  in  his  days  as  a  counsel 
recognising  an  opposing  witness  in  a  case  of  fraud  as  an  ex- 
solicitor  once  convicted  of  forgery  and  enbezzlement,  but  concluding 
'Well,  I  cannot  make  use  of  it.  It  seems  a  pity.  ' 
This  separation  of  processing  from  presentation  encourages  a 
narrow  persuasive  role  with  Iý  skill  in  the  use  of  words  and 
manipulation  of  witnesses  rather  than  in  any  concept  of  search  for 
'what  really  happened.  '  It  also  means  the  barrister  has  no  direct 
experience  of  the  negotiation  that  may  have  lain  behind  the  'facts' 
as  he  has  them,  the  questioning  behind  statements  for  example.  He 
may  therefore  argue  for  'the  facts  of  the  case,  '  without  any  subjec- 
tive  knowledge  of  how  they  have  been  processed,  and  avoid  the  ethical 
limitations  on  wilfully  misleading  the  court.  Working  from  a  prepared 
case,  with  its  ambiguities  and  ifs  and  buts  filtered  out,  he  may  also 
argue  the  more  convincingly.  The  public  presentation  of  evidence  may 
thus  carry  an  aura  of  subjective  conviction  that  is  not  just  produced 
by  the  art  of  the  advocate  but  by  the  structure  of  the  profession. 
The  conceptual  distinction  in  advocacy  between  incident  and  case  is 
hardened  in  the  practical  separation  of  its  private  preparation  by 
one  professional  and  its  public  presentation  by  another. 
A  further  feature  of  the  form  of  presenting  proof  is  that  it  is 
interrogatory.  Evidence  is  not  presented  directly  by  witnesses,  but 
indirectly  in  response  to  questions  by  counsel.  The  rules  prohibit 
leading  questions  but  the  very  framing  of  a  question,  whether  leading 
or  not,  and  the  context  in  which  it  occurs,  set  parameters  on  what  can 
be  an  acceptable  anspr.  The  witness  is  a  respondent,  'he  is  there  to lS 
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answer  questions,  that  is  all"  (Cockburn  1952  10)  and  the  person 
Nkho  asks  the  questions  is  structurally  very  much  in  a  position  of 
control  (Atkinson  and  Drew  1979)  and  quick  to  interrupt  witnesses 
or  warn  them  to  confine  thmselves  to  the  essential  facts  they  are 
being  asked  about,  or  indeed  merely  to  answer  yes  or  no  : 
Prosecutor  (to  victim):  Did  you  know  him  (the  defendant) 
previously? 
Witness:  Yes  we  had  a  scuffle  the  night  before. 
Prosecutor  (sharply):  Mr.  Sweeney,  the  question  was  very 
simple,  Please  answer  yes  or  no.  Don't 
volunteer  anything.  Understand?  (Case  98) 
The  questions  'should  be  clear  and  unambiguous  and  as  short  as  possible, 
each  raising  a  single  point"  (Walker  &  Walker,  1964:  360)  so  particu- 
larising  and  abstracting  the  facts  relevant  for  the  case  from  the 
multiple  possible  facts  of  the  incident.  This  style  of  presentation 
helps  construct  an  idea  of  clearcut  proof,  by  filtering  and  con- 
trolling  the  information  witnesses  make  available  to  the  court,  and 
so  transforming  what  could  emerge  as  an  ambiguous  welter  of  vying 
and  uncertain  perceptions  into  'the  facts  of  the  case  .' 
Interrogation  means  not  just  filtering  potential  information 
but  imposing  order  and  meaning  upon  it  by  the  sequence  and  context 
of  questions  asked  -  whatever  meaning  it  may  have  had  to  the  witness, 
control  by  questioning  can  impose  the  meaning  of  the  questioner.  The 
case  thus  takes  on  its  own  logic  within  the  framework  of  the  'facts 
of  the  case,  '  and  any  other  issues  mentioned,  hinted  at  or  unknown, 
lose  any  relevancy  to  the  meaning  of  the  case  that  they  may  have  had 
to  the  meaning  of  the  incident.  What  is  more  the  order  and  logic  of 
a  controlled  case  is  much  more  visible  than  that  in  the  welter  of ýýo 
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social  reality,  and  therefore,  arguably  the  more  persuasive  in 
carrying  its  evidence  along.  Questions  can  be  both  selected 
and  ordered  to  lead,  as  it  were  inexorably,  to  a  given  conclu- 
sion,  to  proof. 
Hence  the  style  of  asking  a  series  of  questions  to  which 
the  individual  answers  must  be  'yes,  '  then  sunning  them  up  into 
the  logical  total  to  which  they  add  up  -  logical  viewed  in  the 
abstract,  but  with  an  implication  which  would  not  of  itself  either 
reflect  the  incident,  or  be  accepted  as  accurate  in  toto  by  the 
witness.  This  occurs  not  just  in  apocryphal  tales  of  trilby  hats 
but  routinely  in  court: 
Prosecutor: 
Accused: 
Prosecutor: 
Accused: 
Prosecutor: 
Accused: 
Prosecutor  : 
Accused  : 
Prosecutor  : 
Accused  : 
Prosecutor  : 
Weren't  you  making  as  much  noise  as  the  others?  ' 
No  I  was  trying  to  quieten  them  down. 
'You  were  saying  'Ssh'  in  a  whisper?  " 
No  I  was  saying  'be  quiet  or  you'll  get  into 
trouble.  ' 
And  they  were  making  a  lot  of  noise. 
Yes. 
So  you  had  to  raise  your  voice  so  they'd  hear  you. 
Well  maybe  a  wee  bit. 
So  you  were  shouting  and  bawling. 
No. 
fou  just  said  you  were!  (Case  19) 
The  right  of  the  advocate  not  just  to  question  but  to  sun  up  -a  right 
denied  to  the  witnesses  themselves  -  allows  still  further  editing, 
abstraction  and  imputation  of  meaning  to  be  imposed  on  what  witnesses 
say. 
Interrogatory  adversary  advocacy  has  another  function.  It  not ýý 
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only  organises  proof;  it  also  helps  legitimise  the  outcome.  Doing 
the  best  one  can  with  a  client's  case  means  taking  it  to  extremes, 
one  side  taking  the  grey  area,  of  "reality"  and  turning  than  into 
it  black,  the  other  turning  them  to  "white.  "  This  is  why  cross- 
examination  is  often  no  more  than  bringing  ambiguity  back  into  an 
extreme  case.  Being  an  artifice,,  adversary  advocacy  makes  for 
thoroughly  artificial  ways  of  discrediting  people.  A  witness's 
credibility  is  attacked  by  bringing  into  cross-examination  what  he 
would  have  liked  to  say  in  examination,  given  a  chance  to  do  so: 
Prosecutor:  You  didn't  tell  my  friend  (the  defence  agent)  that. 
Defendant  :  He  di  dn'  t  ask  me. 
Prosecutor:  You're  on  trial  -  did  you  not  think  it  was  up  to 
you  to  say  that. 
Defendant:  I've  been  told  not  to  say  other  things.  If  he 
he  asked  me  I'  d  have  said  it.  (Case  103) 
Indeed  for  a  witness  to  suggest  there  is  corrmon  ground,  some  truth 
in  the  adversary's  version,  rather  than  grossly  distinct  black  and 
white  cases,  is  also  to  invite  imputations  on  his  credibility  : 
Prosecutor:  (to  defendant)  So  only  those  bits  of  evidence  that 
go  against  you  aren't  true?  (Case  26) 
But  more  generally  the  presentation  of  cases  as  mutually  exclusive 
extremes  provides  a  potent  legitimation  for  whichever  version  is 
accepted  -  the  whiteness  of  one  extreme  is  all  the  rrpn:  readily 
displayed  by  the  blackness  of  the  other.  Wiping  out  the  grey  area 
means  very  often  that  to  believe  one  case  is  necessarily  not  to  believe 
the  other. 
The  method  of  proof  by  advocacy  thus  focuses  on  the  case  not 
the  incident,  on  manipulation,  persuasion  and  caricature,  not  "truth" 
and  so  sweeps  the  problems  attendant  on  reproching  'what  happened' ,  I'S 
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neatly  under  the  carpet.  Both  in  its  concepts  and  its  form  the 
legal  system  copes  with  the  problear,  of  proof  and  truth  by 
redefining  them.  And  the  problem  of  how  the  judges  of  the  facts 
can  so  readily  find  themselves  convinced  beyond  reasonable  doubt 
that  a  case  is  proved,  is  explained,  in  part,  by  the  legal  meaning 
attached  to  their  task  and  the  method  by  which  they  are  presented 
with  the  information  on  which  they  must  decide. 
But  the  question  of  conviction  is  not  just  how  juries  or 
magistrates  are  convinced;  it  is  also  how  they  are  convinced  of  guilt, 
particularly  since  the  rules  of  evidence,  the  concept  of  admissibility  o  'ý 
the  legal  structure  in  general  are  so  routinely  presented  as  biased 
in  favour  of  the  accused.  It  is  one  thing  to  say  the  concept  of 
the  case  obviates  the  philosophical  problem  of  proof  and  truth;  it 
is  another  to  show  how  the  prosecutor  manages  to  construct  a  case 
in  the  face  of  all  sorts  of  general  I  which  set  limits  on  the 
methods  by  which  evidence  against  the  accused  can  be  acquired  and 
indeed  exclude  all  kinds  of  information  unfavourable  to  him.  In 
assembling  and  presenting  a  case  for  conv',  cr_ion  the  police  and 
prosecutor  must  abide  by  the  demands  of  legality  :  how  then  is  it  that 
in  the  face  of  such  obstacles,  the  prosecution  case  normally  succeeds? 
That  is  the  question  addressed  in  the  next  f;  v  p-  chapters. I 
CHAPTER  2 
1.  Analysed  in  succeeding  chapters. `ýý 
Ol  ß,  3:  Police  Pavers  and  the  Production  of  Evidence 
Incrimination  is  the  first  step  in  the  process  of  conviction. 
Essentially  it  is  a  question  of  gathering  and  presenting 
information  that  pins  enough  evidence  on  an  individual  to  charge 
him  with  an  offence.  One  major  complaint  by  police  and  prosecu- 
tion  -  voiced  for  example  by  Sir  David  McNee,  the  Metropolitan 
Police  ConiTlissioner  and  Sir  Thom  s  Hetherington,  Director  of 
Public  Prosecution,  in  their  evidence  to  the  Royal  Commission 
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on  Criminal  Procedure  -  is  that  legal  procedures  surrounding 
arrest,  search  and  interrogation  of  a  suspect  limit  their  ability 
to  conduct  satisfactory  criminal  investigations  and  acquire 
incriminating  information.  Certainly  a  glance  at  the  broad 
principles  governing  the  areas  of  investigation  would  confirm 
the  problerrs  involved. 
For  example,  how  are  the  police  supposed  to  acquire  evid- 
ence  against  someone  by  questioning  him?  They  can,  according 
to  the  Judges'  Rules  (-t 
c>  N.  %  eo.  ýz  \\k.  %>  ask  questions 
of  anyone,  suspected  or  not,  but  what  they  cannot  do  is  force 
him  to  stay  and  answer  them  since  (according  to  the  judgement 
in  Christie  v  Leachinsky  1947)  they  cannot  detain 
anyone  against  his  will  without  charging  him  or  telling  him  of 
the  specific  offence  involved.  But  since  they  cannot  charge 
someone  till  they  have  reasonable  evidence  against  him  they  are 
back  to  square  one.  What  is  nnre,  once  they  do  charge  someone, 
they  may  not  then  question  him  anyway  (back  to  the  Judge's 
Rules)  while  as  soon  as  they  have  reasonable  grounds  to  suspect 
him  they  should  inform  him  of  his  right  not  to  answer  questions 
by  cautioning  him: 
You  are  not  obliged  to  say  anything  unless  you Cý,  ý 
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wish  to  do  so  but  what  you  say  may  be  put  into 
writing  and  given  in  evidence.  (ýkc), 
Aq_  p  ýý.,  \R64ý 
In  principle  then  the  police  must  have  evidence  against 
someone  before  detaining  him,  not  detain  him  in  order  to  obtain 
evidence  against  him  -  exactly  the  principle  one  might  expect 
to  be  enunciated  in  an  ideology  of  legality  which  seeks  to 
safeguard  the  citizen  from  the  state  by  prohibiting  arbitrary 
arrest.  At  the  level  of  abstract  principle  due  process  and 
crime  control  seem  well  and  truly  at  odds.  And  the  question 
facing  us  is  how  do  the  police,  in  the  face  of  legal  definitiors 
of  due  process,  acquire  the  requisite  information  for  incrim- 
inating  suspects  and  setting  the  whole  process  in  motion?  The 
first  step  is  to  tease  out  a  little  more  precisely  what  both 
crime  and  law  mean  in  practice. 
First,  crime:  how  difficult  the  incrimination  process  is 
depends  on  the  kind  of  offence  involved.  In  what  the  police  see 
as  "real  police  work"  (Cain  1971  :  88)  incrimination  may  well  be 
problematic.  Für  this  is  the  stuff  detective  fiction  is  made 
of,  where  only  the  offence  Dames  to  light  and  both  offender  and 
evidence  for  incrimination  have  to  be  established  by  investigation. 
But  this  is  not  the  kind  of  offence  that  dominates  the  work  of 
either  the  police  or  the  courts.  Petty  offences,  particularly 
of  fences  against  public  order,  are  much  mre  typical  and  these 
are  of  quite  a  different  nature.  They  are  largely  a  matter  of 
police-citizen  encounter  with  the  police  defining  marginal 
behaviour,  as  subject  to  arrest  or  not, 
with  the  policeman  and  the  culprit  on  the  spot,  with  no 
investigation  involved  and  the  process  of  incrimination  simply 
begun  and  ended  with  the  charge.  In  short  for  the  vast  majority Li 
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of  cases  that  are  processed  by  the  police  and  the  courts, 
incrimination,  and  the  constraints  of  law  on  incrimination  are 
simply  not  a  problem.  To  that  extent  the  police  view  must  be 
put  in  perspective. 
Of  course  the  police  demand  for  rrnre  powers  is  less  con- 
cerned  with  such  petty  offenders  than  with  the  "hardened 
criminals"  who  escape  conviction  by  slipping  through  the  net 
of  procedures  that  are  "excessively  solicitous  towards 
accused  persons" 
2  The  irony  is  that  the 
people  mst  likely  to  be  caught  by  wider  police  powers  are  the 
petty  offenders  who  as  it  were,  know  not  that  they  do 
. 
Success- 
ful  professional  criminals  are,  as  Mack  (1976)  notes  and 
McIntosh  demonstrates  historically  (1971)  successful 
professional  criminals  exactly  because  they  can  find  their 
way  round  and  adapt  their  methods  to  new  procedure.  To  expect 
too  much  of  a  change  in  the  rules  is  sociologically  naive: 
too  neat  a  cause-effect,  mechanical  model  imposed  on  the 
negotiable  and  dynamic  relationship  between  law  and  crime. 
One  consequence  of  the  preoccupation  in  the  police  debate 
with"hardened  criminals  "and  "real  crime"  is  that  lawyers  have 
paid  little  attention  to  how  the  law  affects  minor  offences, 
the  vast  majority  though  they  are.  Sociologists  have  studied 
the  petty  offences,  indeed  concentrated  on  them,  but  not  in 
relation  to  the  law.  Their  interest  has  been  in  the  very 
marginality  of  the  behaviour  and  thus  with  a  different  question: 
how  and  why  the  police  come  to  define  specific  incidents  and 
people  as  criminal.  Hence  the  emphasis  on  the  act  of  arrest,  e.  g. 
on  interaction  between  police  and  black  youths  with  the  consequent 
arrest  related  to  the  policeman's  perception  of  the  youth's (lk-  "'s 
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behaviour  as  lacking  in  sufficient  defer 
-ente 
(Sykes  and  Clark 
1975);  on  the  selection  for  arrest  via  e.  g.  police  stereotyping 
of  blacks,  or  lower  class  people,  or  nods  and  rockers,  or 
bohemians  as  likely  law  breakers,  trouble  makers,  drug  takers 
(Skolnick:  1966;  Young:  1971;  Cohen:  1971);  or  on  rrotivations 
behind  the  policeman  decision  -  personal  ambitions,  bureaucratic 
demands,  the  influence  of  family  or  colleagues  (Cain  1973)-  to 
explain  why  the  police  make  such  arrests. 
By  concentrating  on  both  the  topic  of  these  rrnre  marginal 
of  fences  and  the  question  of  how  police  def  init  ions  are  made 
sociologists  have  quite  logically  been  drawn  into  the  operation 
of  all  sorts  of  non-legal  influences  on  the  police  decision  and 
away  frail  the  influence  of  the  law  itself 
. 
But  the  very  fact 
that  legal  procedure  was  not  a  factor  they  found  confronting 
them  much  in  their  studies  of  routine  police  work  is  itself  a 
matter  worthy  of  some  scrutiny.  One  simple  but  significant  point 
implied  by  Maureen  Cain  on  why  there  are  so  many  marginal 
arrests  is  that  they  are  easy.  What  also  requires  investigation 
is  why  they  are  easy  not  just  to  carry  out  but  to  sustain  in  law. (4- 
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processing  marginal  of  fences 
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The  rhetoric  of  legality  prohibits  arbitrary  arrest,  and  in 
accord  with  this  any  arrest  is  accountable.  But  of  course  it  is 
accountable  only  if  it  is  challenged,  and,  as  Renton  and  Brown 
point  out  in  discussing  arrest  without  warrant,  'it  is  not  often 
challenged'  (1972:  28).  Given  the  methods  available  for  challenging 
an  arrest.,  this  is  hardly  surprising.  The  opportunities  are 
limited:  one  may  challenge  the  arrest  in  the  course  of  a  trial, 
one  may  take  out  a  civil  action  or  one  may  lodge  a  complaint 
against  the  police  under  the  1964  Police  Act.  But  most  cases 
do  not  come  to  trial  since  most  defendants  plead  guilty  (whether 
they  believe  themselves  guilty  or  not) 
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and  the  legitimacy  or 
otherwise  of  the  arrest  is  therefore  never  challenged.  Even  where 
a  case  does  come  to  trial,  for  a  petty  offence  of  this  sort  it 
would  be  likely  to  be  before  a  magistrates'  court  and  since  in 
England  at  least 
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rrnst  defendants  there  are  unrepresented  (only  19%  are 
represented  throughout  according  to  Bottor4&  McClean  1976  :  137)  and  unversed 
in  law,  there  would  be  little  chance  of  a  challenge  being  made..  What  is 
more,  even  defendornts  who  are  represented  may  find  their  lawyer 
advising  against  questioning  police  conduct  since  it  might  turn 
the  judge  against  him  (Baldwin  &  McConville  1977.  )6  A  civil 
suit  is  costly  and  legal  aid  is  limited,  and  complaints  against 
the  police  are  rarely  effective.  Box  and  Russell  show  that 
only  18  were  found  -  by  the  police  -  to  be  substantiated 
(1975).  The  i  robability  of  successfully  challenging  an  arrest, 
particularly  for  a  trivial  offence,  provides  one  immediate  reason 
for  the  ease  of  marginal  arrests. 
If  challenged,  however,  an  arrest  is  accountable 
on  two  aspects  :  first,  on  whether  there  is 6 
enough  evidence  to  charge  the  suspect  under  a  specific  law  with 
specific  offence,  since  an  arrest  must  be  accompanied  by  a 
charge,  (Chalmers  v.  H.  M.  Adv.  1954),  and  second  on  whether  it 
is  necessary  to  arrest,  ir\  ; c%%Q-  im  in  custody  after  the 
charge  rather  than  releasing  him  on  bail  until  he  comes  to  court. 
The  legality  of  custody  is  defined  in  terns  of  reasonableness 
or  the  interests  of  justice,  (Renton  &  Brown  1972:  30),  neither  of 
which  sets  the  parameters  very  clearly,  allowing  wide  scope  for 
ktie 
subjective  discretion.  Indeed,  Lcorrrnmýon  law  merely  offers  a  post 
hoc  check  on  the  'reasonableness'  of  the  policerr  ri's  belief  that 
arrest  was  justified.  The  law  also  accepts  the  belief  that  people 
ought  to  be  taken  into  custody  if  they  have  a  past  record  (Carlin 
v.  Malloch  1896)  or  are  jobless  or  homeless.  Lord  Deas  in 
Peggie  v.  Clark  made  it  clear  that  the  arrest  of  a  member  of 
'the  criminal  classes'  or  of  someone  with  no  means  of  honest 
livelihood  or  fixed  abode  is  easier  to  justify  than  that  of 
someone  who: 
even  although  expressly  charged  with  a  crime  by 
an  aggrieved  party,  be  a  well-known  householder  - 
a  person  of  respectability  -  what,  in  our 
judicial  practice,  we  call  a  'law-abiding  party'. 
This  statement  by  a  judge  in  1868  remains  the  criterion  today 
(Renton  and  Brown  1972:  2  ).  What  is  more,  the  requirement  in 
Scots,  though  not  in  English  law,  of  a  cash  deposit  for  bail 
rather  than  just  a  promise  that  the  noney  will  be  paid  if  the 
accused  fails  to  turn  up  in  court,  leads  to  the  detention  of  the 
same  type  of  people  -  the  jobless  and  homeless  -  regardless  of 
the  trivial  nature  of  their  offence.  Even  the  Ludlow 
case  ,  which  found  for  the  complainant  in  his  action  against  the (+(-0 
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police  for  abuse  of  their  pavers  of  arrest  and  search  and  is 
full  of  civil  rights  rhetoric,  nonetheless  draws  its  indignation 
from  the  status  of  the  citizen  so  affronted: 
Is  it  easy  to  imagine  a  more  gross  indignity 
offered  to  a  perfectly  innocent  and  respectable 
professional  gentleman?  (1938) 
Note  the  parallels  in  law  with  the  practical  grounds  for 
arrests  used  informally  by  Skolnick's  policemen,  that  the  homeless 
or  jobless  were  most  likely  to  abscond,  with  King's  account  (1971) 
of  police  objections  to  bail  (the  two  most  frequently  mentioned 
were  that  the  accused  had  previous  convictions  or  no  fixed  abode) 
and  with  Cain's  account  of  the  arrest  of  vagrants.  In  two  police 
stations  she  found  that  20%  and  27%  respectively  of  those  arrested 
for  marginal  offences  were  of  no  fixed  abode.  She  links  this  to 
their  vulnerability  as  'a  small  exposed  and  powerless  section  of 
the  population'  who  are  therefore  particularly  at  risk  to  the 
policman's  interests  in  making  arrests,  especially  during  'the 
long  cold  haul  between  supper  break  and  dawn'  (1971:  74,  -6).  But 
it  is  not  just  informal  motivations  and  assessments  that  are 
involved,  subverting  equality  before  the  law.  Given  the  law's 
attitude  to  the  homeless  and  jobless  we  could  not  expect  equality 
anyway.  Pragmatics  and  rationalisations  at  the  informal  level  - 
with  the  consequence,  intended  or  otherwise,  of  class  and  racial 
bias  -  are  also  endorsed  in  formal  law. 
As  for  having  sufficient  evidence  on  a  specific  offence, 
there  is  also  plenty  of  scope  for  legally  circumventing  that 
principle.  The  specific  offence  may  itself  be  rather  unspecific  : 
breach  of  the  peace  (whose  peace?  ),  loitering  with  intent  or 
being  on  premises  for  unlawful  purposes  (how  does  one  determine 4ý 
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purpose  or  intent?  ),  possessing  goods  for  which  one  cannot 
satisfactorily  account  (how  many  people  carry  receipts  and  what 
is  satisfactory?  ),  carrying  implements  that  could  be  used  for 
housebreaking  (where  does  one  draw  the  line?  ),  or  as  weapons. 
Even  an  empty  milk  bottle  has  been  defined  as  a  dangerous  weapon 
(Armstrong  and  Wilson  1973).  If  the  police  operate  at  this  level 
with  wide  discretion  (Bottomley  1973)  it  is  not  just  because 
they  are  formally  allocated  discretion  on  what  constitutes  an 
of  fence  via  vague  substantive  laws  and  wide  procedural  powers. 
So,  in  vague  cases  like  breach  of  the  eace,  the  offence 
exists  because  the  police  say  they  observed  someone  loitering, 
drunk,  'bawling,  shouting,  cursing  and  swearing,  to  quote  the 
daily  menu  for  the  district  courts,  or  more  unusually  but  none- 
theless  an  observed  case,  'jumping  on  and  off  the  pavement  in  a 
disorderly  fashion'  (case  30).  These  offences  may  be,  in 
Maureen  Cain's  term,  marginal.  They  are,  as  described,  amazingly 
trivial.  But  they  are  also  numerically  significant  (76%  of 
the  arrests  Cain  observed  hence  her  interest  in  probing  the 
non-legal  reasons  for  police  making  such  arrests  (1971:  74).  But 
what  is  also  important  is  the  formal  structure  which  makes  such 
arrests,  whatever  their  nt  tivaticn,  legal. 
Likewise,  one  must  refer  to  Imre  than  informal  stereotyping 
to  explain  the  arrest  of  two  young  boys,  (Case  9)  a  'known  thief' 
and  his  companion,  who,  according  to  the  police  evidence,  were 
'touching  car  handles' 
. 
Whatever  the  rrntivatiai  of  the  police,  the L 
ký% 
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legality  of  their  action  is  indisputable  and  the  stereotyping 
rrore  than  informal.  The  General  Powers  Act  1960  lays  down  the 
law  that  known  or  reputed  thieves  in  suspicious  circumstances  are 
subject  to  arrest.  A  known  thief  is  someone  with  a  previous 
conviction  for  dishonesty:  previous  convictions  become  therefore 
not  just  informal  leads  for  narrowing  down  suspects  on  committed. 
crimes  but  legal  grounds  for  arresting  them.  A  reputed  thief  is 
someone  who  keeps  bad  company  and  has  no  known  means  of  honest 
livelihood:  stereotyping  and  assuming  the  worst  are  thus  written 
into  the  law.  Suspicious  circumstances  are  left  to  the  police 
to  define.  Thus  police  evidence  in  this  case  is  expressed  purely 
as  subjective  interpretation: 
they  were  touching  them  as  though  to  open  them 
he  seemed  to  say  to  Craig  to  stand  back 
they  appeared  to  be  watching  and  waiting  (my  emphases) 
Note  that  it  is  not  just  police  practice  but  the  formal  law 
here  which  deviates  from  the  ideals  of  legality,  replacing  arrest 
for  a  specified  offence  with  arrest  on  suspicion  or  for  prevention  ; 
replacing  established  law  with  arbitrary  definitions;  replacing 
the  doctrine  of  trying  each  case  on  its  merits  with  the  relevance 
of  previous  convictions.  Personal  and  bureaucratic  motivations 
can  explain  why  the  police  want  to  make  arrests  ;  the  law  itself 
explains  why  they  may. 
What  is  rrnre,  judicial  sanctions  on  police  arrests  at  this 
level  are  meaningless.  Vague  laws  and  wide  powers  effectively 
sidestep  standards  of  legality  and  proof  by  equating  the  subjective 
police  decision  with  substantive  law  and  requisite  evidence.  The 
police  are  given  the  statutory  powers  to  define  the  limits  of  the 
behaviour  that  constitutes  public  order.  It  is  not  necessary  to C\ 
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prove  any  i  11  e  ýý  `  ý`ý  oak  CL  %-  in  a  breach  of  the 
peace,  that  anyone  was  offended  or  even  affected:  a  breach  has 
occurred 
where  something  is  done  in  breach  of  public  order 
or  decorum  which  might  reasonably  be  expected  to 
lead  to  the  lieges  being  alarmed  or  upset... 
(Raffaeli  v.  Heatly,  1949) 
So  the  refusal  of  members  of  the  public  to  say  they  were  offended 
in  witnessing  the  incident,  a  point  regularly  made  in  police 
reports,  is  rendered  irrelevant,  as  indeed  judges  point  out  to 
juries,  reading  out  the  legal  definitions  and  emphasising: 
Note  that  'might  be' 
. 
There  need  not  be  evidence 
that  anyone  was  actually  upset.  (case.  93) 
Nor  is  there  any  need  to  --ý 
prove  intent  in  cases  like  these,  by,  for  example,  reference  to: 
any  particular  act  or  acts  tending  to  show  the 
purpose  or  intent  ;  he  may  be  convicted  if,  from 
the  circumstances  of  the  case  and  from  his  known 
character,  the  court  is  of  the  opinion  that  he 
was  intending  to  conmit  a  felony. 
(Vagrancy  Act  1824  s.  12) 
No  further  evidence  than  the  policeman's  general  statenent  of 
his  impression  unsubstantiated  even  by  dc  -,  ails  of  how  he  formed 
it  seems  to  be  required.  Hence  Case  29  where  the  accused  were 
convicted  of  attempted  theft  from  cars  : 
Prosecutor:  And  was  anything  missing? 
Policeman:  No.  They  didn't  get  in. 
Prosecutor:  But  you  are  sure  they  were  trying  to 
get  in? 
Policeman  :  The  behaviour  of  the  boys  left  me  in 
no  cbubt  that  they  were  trying  to  enter 
ýý:,  ";  .  ý.,,  ý°l. 90 
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Indeed  statutory  offences  involving  intent  need  not  even  specify 
at  the  accused  was  intending  to  do.  According  to  Philips  v 
Heatl  (1964) 
where  an  accused  person  is  charged  under  an  Act  making 
it  an  offence  to  loiter  with  intent  to,  or  to  be  found 
about  to,  commit  an  arrestable  offence  ...  it  is  sufficient 
to  aver  in  the  complaint  that  he  was  intending  or  about 
to  carmit  "an  arrestable  offence"  and  unnecessary  to  specify 
which  offence  he  is  alleged  to  have  contemplated 
(Renton  and  Brown  1972:  203) 
Indeed  in  some  public  order  offences  there  need  not  even  be  evidence 
that  the  accused  was  doing  or  intending  to  do  anything,  merely  being 
part  of  an  offensive  crowd  is  enough.  Hence  case  30,  where  the 
charge  was  breach  of  the  peace,  involving  "jurrping  on  and  off  a 
pavement  in  a  disorderly  fashion,  "  and  the  accused  was  the  only 
one  of  a  small  group  of  youths  who  pleaded  not  guilty.  His  independent 
defence  was  that  he  was  not  doing  anything,  the  lads  had  called  to 
him  as  he  was  passing  and  he  merely  stopped  to  say  hello,  he  "didn't 
like  to  pass  then  by.  "  The  prosecutor's  cross-examination  was 
directed  not  at  what  he  was  doing  but  that  he  was  there,  something 
he  readily  agreed  to: 
Accused:  I  didn't  run  off  because  I  didn't  expect  to 
be  lifted 
... 
But  the  prosecutor  pressed  the  point: 
Prosecutor:  lie  admits  he  was  there  quarter  of  an  hour 
or  so  (an  exaggeration  of  the  testimony)  . 
It's 
all  relative  of  course  so  he  may  think  he  wasn't 
misbehaving  as  much  as  the  others  but  he  stayed 
with  then.  (my  emphasis) ,ý 
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And  that/  as  it  emerged'was  all  that  was  necessary  in  law: 
Assessor  :  Mr  S.  I  want  to  make  it  clear  that  if  you're 
with  people  who  are  misbehaving  the  law  is 
that  if  you  stay  with  them  you're  involved. 
It  may  be  a  technical  offence  in  this  instance 
but  you've  got  to  keep  away  from  people  like 
this  or  you're  tarred  with  the  same  brush. 
Case  2  demonstrates  the  same  legal  situation: 
Policeman:  I  can't  identify  individuals  except  those 
two  but  they  were  all  part  of  an  aggresive 
group  . 
The  law  in  marginal  offences  leaves  very  little  to  be  proved, 
and  since  the  offence  presupposes  a  specified  offender  '  caught 
redhanded  at  the  s  oene  of  the  crime'  and  eyewitnesses,  there  is 
nothing  left  at  issue  but  the  credibility  of  the  police  versus  the 
accused.  Indeed  given  the  openness  of  the  law  the  police  scarcely 
need  to  lie  about  the  grounds  for  arrest  :  at  least  that  is  the  import 
of  the  prosecutor's  cross-examination  in  case  29.  The  accused 
maintained  that  the  police  had  made  up  the  story  of  touching  car 
handles  in  order  to  take  them  to  the  police  station  to  investigate 
a  case  of  stolen  television  sets.  They  were  'stalling  for  time.  '  The 
prosecutor  indignantly  declared  it  quite  incredible  that  the  police 
would  have  made  up  such  a  story 
because  they  couldn't  get  you  for  anything  else  ... 
They  could  have  charged  you  with  playing  football  in 
the  street  and  they  wouldn't  need  to  have  made  it  up.  (case  29) 
Little  wonder  that  in  court  arrest  beo  ices  synonymous  with 
guilt: 
Poli  cernan  :  (in  the  face  of  denial  by  the  accused)  You  did  or S2 
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you  wouldn't  have  been  apprehended..  - 
Prosecutor:  You  weren't  shouting  and  swearing? 
Accused:  No  sir. 
Prosecutor:  Then  how  do  you  explain  why  you're  here? 
(case  13) 
Policeman:  If  anyone  hadn't  been  aggre  ve  he  wouldn't 
have  been  there.  (case  2) 
In  Scotland  corroboration  is  required  to  meet  the  standards  of  legal 
sufficiency?  but  since  the  police  (as  a  result  of  this  legal  require- 
wnt  rather  than  the  hostility  of  the  natives)  invariably  go  around 
in  pairs,  this  is  rarely  a  problem. 
The  magistrate  who  sums  up: 
I  see  no  reason  to  disbelieve  the  police  (case  8) 
is  not  informally  ignoring  his  right  to  sanction  police  behaviour 
but  recognising  that  there  is  at  law  nothing  to  sanction.  The 
openness  of  the  law  gives  wide  scope  for  legitimate  arrest  and  few 
grounds  for  judicial  control.  What  is  more,  in  the  nature  of  the 
case  there  is  no  such  category  as  a  suspect  and  no  such  process  as 
investigation,  only  the  encounter  between  the  policeman ý'3 
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and  the  accused,  and  since  most  of  the  ideology  of  civil  rights 
focusses  on  the  police  -suspect  relationship  in  the  course  of 
investigation  there  is  little  to  take  issue  with,  or  protection  from, 
there.  It  is  hardly  surprising  then  that  marginal  behaviour 
dominates  police  work  and,  since  less  marginal  cases  requiring 
harder  proof  are  more  likely  to  be  dropped  in  the  early  stages 
(Mack,  1976)  it  is  not  surprising  that  trivial  cases  dominate  the 
courts  even  more.  In  petty  offences  judicial  control  of  the 
police  is  abrogated  by  the  law. 
For  the  minor  offences  which  dominate  the  courts 
incrimination  is  not  a  problem  either  practically  or  legally. 
Indeed  the  three  analytical  stages  of  incrimination,  assembling 
a  case  and  convincing  the  court  collapse  into  one.  The  policeman's 
observations  constitute  the  grounds  for  arrest,  the  substance  of 
the  case  and  the  authoritative  presentation  to  convince  the  'vAQ-cjý  - 
_ýEratý,,  Mere  is  little  at  issue  for  the  court  to  decide  in  its 
role  of  reaching  a  verdict  -  nor  indeed  for  it  to  control  in  its 
role  of  watchdog  on  the  police. 
It  may  not  be  surprising  that  the  tendency  of  sociologists 
to  concentrate  on  this  vague  kind  of  offence  where  police 
discretion  is  so  wide  has  meant  in  turn  so  much  emphasis  on 
the  operation  of  discretion,  rather  than  the  legal  structure  in 
which  it  takes  place.  But  it  is  very  much  a  structurally  provided 
discretion,  a  legal  power,  that  is  involved,  and  it  is  not  the 
only  type  of  offence  that  has  to  be  dealt  with. S4 
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The  opposite  case  is  one  where  everything  is  at  issue.,  the 
classic  detective  story  where  an  offence  is  reported,  the  offender 
has  to  be  traced  from  'clues'  and  evidence  for  a  case  established 
by  search  and  questioning.  It  is  here  that  the  clash  between 
crime  control  and  civil  rights  coms  into  play.  The  job  of 
incrimination  in  'real  crime'  is  much  more  significant,  and  one 
of  the  difficulties  the  police 
is  that  the  law  itself  "gives  virtually  no 
assistance  to  the  police  and  every  assistance  to  a  suspect  wishing 
to  hide  his  guilt.  118 
But  this  is  where  it  becorws  irrportant  to  tease  out  the 
substance  not  just  of  crim  but  of  law.  For  if  we 
examine  the  law  in  greater  detail  we  find  a  spider's  web  of 
distinctions  and  exceptions  which  present  a  quite  different 
picture  of  the  legal  relationship  of  police  and  suspect:  police 
powers  of  a-rrest  and  search  a-re  f  ar  mre  extensive  than  the 
rhetoric  suggests;  detention  for  questioning  can  be  a  legitimate 
activity;  the  right  to  silence  can  be  less  a  right  and  a  hurdle 
to  conviction  than  a  fact  that  facilitates  it. lsý- 
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Arrest 
Arrest,  that  is,  the  detention  of  a  person  against  his  will, 
may  be  legally  carried  out  only  in  relation  to  a  specified 
offence.  Otherwise  attendance  at  the  police  station  is  purely 
voluntary.  This  is  the  spirit  of  the  Judge's  Rules.  Barry  Cox 
points  out  succinctly  the  gap  between  this  ideology  and  practice: 
Detention  for  questioning  is  therefore  in  theory 
impossible;  in  practice  'helping  the  police  with 
their  inquiries'  is  a  daily  event.  (1975:  172) 
How  is  this  possible?  Partly  because  of  the  simple  fact  that  if 
such  arrest  is  impossible  in  theory  it  is  nonetheless  perfectly 
possible  in  law.  Although  they  are  much  referred  to  as  a  symbol 
of  legality,  the  Judge's  Rules  are  not  law,  only  principles  for 
administrative  guidance.  Authoritative  law  on  arrest  is  rather 
different. 
For  example,  the  voluntary  nature  of  helping  the  police  with 
their  inquiries  has  been  interpreted  in  law,  to  say  the  least, 
very  widely.  Consider  the  Scottish  case  of  Swankie  v.  Milne-  in 
1973  which  defines  the  current  situation.  This  was  deemd  not 
only  not  to  be  an  illegal  arrest  but  not  to  be  an  arrest  at  all. 
The  judges  accepted  that  the  police  had  stopped  the  accused  in 
his  car,  taken  his  keys  away,  waited  with  him  and  would  have 
prevented  him  fron  leaving  if  he  had  tried  to.  However,  they 
concluded  that  the  accused  had  remained  voluntarily  and  had  not 
therefore  been  arrested.  What  their  judgement  would  have  been  if 
he  had  tried  to  leave  is  unclear.  But  it  is  also  an 
arrestable  offence  according  to  the  1964  Police  Act  to  obstruct 1 
t 
the  police  in  the  execution  of  their  duty,  and  this  has  been 
interpreted  as 
the  doing  of  any  act  which  makes  it  more  difficult 
for  the  police  to  carry  out  their  duty.  (Rice  v. 
Connolly  1966) 
What  precisely  that  means  remains  an  open  question.  Although 
Lord  Justice  Parker  in  the  same  case  refuted  the  idea  that 
refusing  to  answer  questions,  even  allied  with  a  generally 
obstructive  and  sarcastic  attitude,  was  not  obstructing  a 
policermn  in  his  duty.  Justice  Jams  made  a  point  of  noting  that: 
I  would  not  go  so  far  as  to  say  there  may  not  be 
circunistances  in  which  the  manner  of  a  person  together 
with  his  silence  could  armunt  to  an  obstruction  within 
the  section;  whether  it  does  remains  to  be  decided  in 
any  case  that  happens  hereafter,  not  in  this  case,  in 
which  it  has  not  been  argued.  (Rice  v  Connolly  1966) 
ýlýs> L 
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difficult  to  see  how  someone  can  avoid  being  arrested  if  the 
(..  %  f  W,  Q"  k-- 
police  have  a  mind  to  L  ýn%tv,.  Furthermre,  refusing  to  co-operate 
is  not  af  ar  cry  f  rom  resistance,  which  is 
,  of  course,  an 
arrestable  of  fence.,  nor  is  resistance  far  frc)m  another  of  fence 
, 
assault. 
Indeed,  in  court,  resisting  arrest  tends  to  be  presented  by 
prosecutors  as  indicative  of  guilt  and  therefore  a  justification 
of  the  arrest  on  the  f  irst  charge  anyway.  Only  the  guilty  take 
advantage  of  civil  rights  is  the  line  taken.  On  the  other  hand, 
with  the  nice  skill  lawyers  have  of  always  holding  the  winning 
trick,  failing  to  resist  is  also  suspicious.  Witness  Case  8. 
The  prosecutor  was  suggesting  that  the  accused  must 
have  been  guilty  or  he  would  not  have  allowed  himself  to  have  been 
seized  (uncharged)  by  two  men  (the  police  were  in  plain  clothes) 
without  resisting: 
Prosecutor:  You  didn't  do  anything? 
Accused:  I  couldn't. 
Prosecutor:  You  didn't  say  'What  are  you  doing?  ' 
Accused:  No,  it  was  all  too  quick. 
Prosecutor:  And  no  explanation  was  given  at  all? 
Accused:  No. 
Prosecutor:  When  did  you  gather  they  were  policmen? 
Accused:  I  asked  them  -  they  said  they  were  taking 
me  to  the  st  at  ion. 
Prosecutor:  But  why  assume  they  were  policemen? ý$ 
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There  are  railway  stations. 
In  his  sunTdng  up  the  prosecutor  considered  it  doubly 
suspicious  that  the  accused's  c(mpanion  had  not  fought  off  the 
two  policemen  if  his  friend  was  being  innocently  seized: 
Prosecutor:  According  to  his  story,  his  companion 
made  no  protest  while  the  accused  was 
dragged  out  by  two  unknown  men.  Mis 
is  quite  incredible.  He  is  clearly 
guilty  of  this  charge. 
The  cormanion  in  question  might,  however,  have  been  relieved 
that  he  had  not  intervened  if  he  had  heard  the  accused's  mother's 
account  of  her  night  in  jail  charged  with  6.  reach  of  the  peace 
when  she  went  to  protest,  or  if  he  had  witnessed  Case  13: 
Q- 
Poli(fmn:  One  youth  ran  towards  us  saying  'What 
are  you  taking  him  in  for?  It's  a  fucking 
liberty.  He's  done  fuck  all!  " 
He  was  cautioned  and  charged  with  Breach 
of  the  Peace. 
In  any  case,  the  prosecutor's  argumnt  was  only  about  the 
credibility  of  the  accused  not  the  legality  of  the  arrest.  Indeed, 
in  cases  of  resistance  or  assault.  even  if  the  arrest  was  unfounded 
and  illegal  it  is  still,  in  English  law, 
open  to  the  jury  to  convict  of  conmn  assault 
1,  \6,1ý  -  Vb\  - 
(HalsburY  L  25,.  364) 
and  the  cha-rge  sticks  even  if  the  resister  did  not  know  the  person 
seizing  him  was  a  policeman.  In  short,  the  law  itself  does  not 
encourage  standing  on  one's  right  to  f  reedam  from  arbitrary  arrest. 
Given  this  ,  the  warrant  system  provides  a  potential  method 
for  safe-guaxding  the  citizen  against  arbit=  arrest  since  it L 
cc\ 
19 
involves  a  specific  charge  and  acceptance  by  a  neutral  judge 
that  there  are  grounds  for  suspecting  the  accused.  Of  course,  not 
everyone  demands  to  see  a  warrant  when  he  is  arrested  or  even  knows 
he  may  -  the  lower  his  status,  indeed.,  the  less  likely  he  is  to 
demand  evidence  of  authority.  And  this  fits  with  the  familiar 
theory  that  rights  available  in  law,  be  they  on  civil  liberties 
or  welfare  entitlements,  fail  in  practice  because  citizens  do  not 
take  them  up  . 
The  law  itself  is  thus  exoner.  ated.  But  that  may  be 
a  little  rrdsleading.  Indeed  there  is  some  evidence  that  the  very 
fact  of  rights  being  taken  up  can  itself  beccue  a  reason  for 
removing  them.  The  Thomson  Comraittee,  for  exarrple,  notes  : 
the  police  at  present  are  able  to  carry  out  their 
functions  only  because  sorw  persons  whcm  they  detain 
without  warrant  fail,  through  ignorance,  or  fear  of 
authority,  to  exercise  their  rights  (1975:  11) 
However  they  also  note  that: 
As  people  become  increasingly  aware  of  their  rights  the 
present  tacit  co-operation  which  makes  it  possible  for 
the  police  to  function  may  not  continue,  and  the  police  may 
find  themselves  in  a  position  to  do  what  they  are  specifically 
authorised  to  do  by  law  (1975:  12) 
-  whidi  of  course  is  exactly  what  legality  n-eans!  But  legality  is 
presented  here  less  as  an  ideal  than  a  problem:  the  solution  is  not 
to  support  this  claiming  of  rights  or  take  further  measures  to  ensure 
all  suspects  do  know  their  rights  but  to  remc)ve  the  rights  by 
introdwing  "a  form  of  liadted,  or  teq:  )orary  arrest  )  arrest  on 
suspicion,  "  (1975  :  12)  with  a  different  name  -  detention  -  and 
mre  relaxed  rules.  In  short  they  recamiend  police  powers  be  widened 
so  that  they  do  not  need  a  warrant 
) 
not  only  in  practioe  I 
but  in  law. (o 
In  any  case  police  powers  are  already  wider  than 
the  warrant  system  might  suggest.  In 
R.  v.  Kulynycz,  1971.,  it  was  agreed  that  arresting  without  a  warrant 
while  pretending  to  have  one  was  not  fatal  to  the  case; 
the  Crimi  nal  Law  Act 
, 
1967  allows  a  nen-ber  of  the  public  or  a 
policeman  to  arrest  without  warrant: 
anyone  who  is,  or  whom  he  reasonably  suspects 
to  be  in  the  act  of  committing  an  arrestable 
offence; 
while  a  policeman  may  also  arrest  someone  whom  he  reasonably 
suspects  is  about  to  ccurrnit  an  arrestable  of  fence.  So  in  most 
serious  cases  a  suspect  can  be  arrested  without  warrant.  Specific 
Ikets  often  have  specific  powers  of  arrest  without  warrant  attached, 
e.  g.  in  drug  offences,  inynigrat  ion  offences  and  motoring  offences. 
Under  Scots  law.,  the  police  may  arrest  without  warrant  for  all 
common  law  crinies  (most  crimes  being  ba-sed  on  conmn  law)  and  for 
statutory  of  fences,  categories  which  can  cover  mst  incidents. 
Warrants  of  course  af  fect  not  just  arrest  but  sea-rch.  However, 
searching  a  suspect  for  evidence  without  a  warrant  is  generally 
excused  if  the  police  plead  "urgency,  "  "urgency  being  widely  inter- 
preted  in  f  avou-r  of  the  police"  (Renton  and  Brown,  p.  36;  Bell 
_v.  _ 
Hogg; 
Hav-v. 
- 
H.  M.  Adv).  Indeed  even  the  seizure  without  warrant  of  perfectly 
legitimate  goods  has  been  deerned  acceptable  in  English  law.  In  Chic 
Fashions,  1968,  Lord  Justice  Salmon  pointed  out  that  the  police  had 
reasonable  grounds  to  suspect  that  the  goods  seized  might  be  stolen, 
and  since  in  the  law  of  arrest  "reasonable  grounds  to  susPect" 
legitirrdses  seizure  of  the  person,  he  could  scarcely  hold  that  the 
sam  did  not  apply  to  Mere  PrcPerty: U` 
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If  a  man's  person  is  not  so  sacrosanct  in  the  eyes  of 
(A 
the  la-w,  how  can  the  goods  which  he  is  reasorLbly  suspected 
of  having  stolen  or  received  be  sacrosanct?  Only  if  the 
law  regards  property  as  more  important  than  liberty  and 
I  do  not  accept  that  it  does  so. 
Ibus  did  ccxmn  law  justify  illegally  invading  personal  liberty  to 
recover  property  by  the  principle  that  personal  liberty  is  more 
significant  in  law  than  property.  In  doing  so  of  course  it  set  up 
a  new  precedent  that  reversed  its  own  justification,  making  the 
right  to  recover  possibly  stolen  property  outweigh  the  right  to 
individual  freedom  from  interference  from  the  police. 
In  any  case,  the  control  function  of  the  warrant  seem 
rendered  redundant  by  the  view  expressed  in  the  authoritative  Scots 
manual  on  procedure  that: 
such  petitions,  being  presented  by  responsible 
officials,  are  assumed  to  be  well-founded. 
(Renton  and  Brown,  1972:  28) 
Ihis  is  rather  at  odds  with  Lord  Hewart's  rhetoric  on  the  rule  of 
law  over  officials  too: 
One  of  our  most  priceless  possessions  is  the  liberty 
of  the  subject.  If  once  we  show  any  signs  of  giving 
way  to  the  abominable  doctrine  that  because  things 
are  done  by  officials,  some  immmity  must  be  extended 
r v 
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to  them.,  what  is  to  become  of  our  country? 
(Ludlow  v  Shelton,  1938). 
However,  the  view  thai  officials  can  be  trusted  was  upheld  by 
the  lbornson  CuTmittee  in  the  f  ace  of  requests  for  change  and  it 
was  on  this  basis  that  they  found  it  'satisfactory'  for  judges 
to  I  rubber  stanpl  rather  than  investigate  requests  for  warrants. 
(1975:  20)  Lafave  and  Remington's  American  study  of  the  warrant 
system  (1975)  points  to  informal  judicial  laxness  as  the  source 
of  its  inef  fectiveness,  but  from  these  views  expounded  by  a 
legal  authority  and  a  cop-mttee  set  up  by  the  governwnt  and 
Crown  Of  f  ice  and  chaired  by  a  High  Court  Judge,  it  would  seem  in 
the  Scottish  case  to  be  formally  endorsed  conmn  law  and  policy. 
Detaining  someone  is  not  then  in  general  quite  so  hampered 
by  controls  as  one  might  imagine  from  the  rhetoric.  Nor,  more 
specifically,  is  detention  for  questioning.  In  the  case  of 
R.  v.  Houghton  (1978)  Lord  Justice 
Lawton  said  that 
except  under  the  Prevention  of  Terrorism 
(Terripora.  ry  Powers)  Act,  1976,  the  police  had  no 
power  to  ax-rest  anyone  so  that  they  could  make 
inquiries  about  him. 
Indeed  the  corrbination  of  rules  on  arrest  -  no  arrest  without  a 
charge  -  and  the  rules  on  interrogation  -  no  interrogation  after 
charge,  would  seem  to  render  it  legally  inpossible.  But  there 
are  ways  round  this:  one  is  the  holding  charge.  The  Rules 
prohibiting  interrogation  in  custody  ref  er  only  to  interrogation 
about  the  offence  with  which  the  person  has  already  been  charged. 
There  is  no  rule  against  using  One  charge  to  take  a  person  into 
custody  then  interrogating  him  in  the  isolation  of  the  police 
staticn  on  another  of  fence  - 
Me  holding  charge  thus  allows  a lýý 
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su-,  pect  to  be  questioned  in  private  and  in  custody  until  a 
ff-)nfession  is  elicited.  It  also  opens  the  way  for  search.  Search 
of  soaýeone's  person  or  home  is  not  permissible  in  order  to  find 
evidence  unless  there  are  prior  grounds  for  suspecting  him  of  an 
of  fence.  "An  Englishman's  home  is  his  castle"  is  indeed  an  old 
legal  maxim  expressing  the  prohibition  on  search  without  warrant. 
But  the  holding  charge  obviates  this.  Once  arrested,  the  person, 
and  the  premises  he  is  in,  can  be  legally  searched,  and  if  evidence 
relevant  to  another  charge  is  unearthed,  the  search  is  quite  lawful 
and  the  evidence  adrrdssible. 
In  short,  according  to  case  law  the  police  may  with  inpunity 
moke  an  arbitrary  arrest,  arresting  not  on  a  charge  based  on  sorre 
kind  of  proof  of  specific  inplication  in  a  specific  offence,  but 
arresting  in  order  to  acquire  that  proof  or  find  out  if  there  has 
been  any  activity  that  could  be  defined  as  an  of  fence.  (I  That  could  be 
defined'  is  irrportant.  Pteiýber  we  am  not  always  talking  about 
finding  sacks  marked  'Swag,  '  but,  for  example,  political  posters 
and  pmphlets).  Authoritative  COMM  'law  thus  unceremoniously  turns 
the  basic  principle  governing  arrest  on  its  head. 
Wide  police  discretion  over  petty  offences  thus  takes 
on  further  significance.  Defining  as  arrestable  offences 
b>,  -haviour  as  indeterminate  as  intent 
, 
loitering,  breach  of  the 
I 
peace,  a  lknomn  thief  in  suspicious  circunstances  and  so  on  gives 
the  police  wide  powers  of  legal  detention,  and  these  powers  may 
be  used  to  establish  evidence  for  a  different  suspected  offence, 
which  the  policeman  is  reaIly  interested  in  but  has  no  evidence 
on  which  to  charge  and  therefore  arrest  -  Pemmber  Case  29,, 
the  case  of  the  irrelevant  television  ,9  in  which  accoiýjding  to  the 
evidence  of  the  defendants,  it  was  exactly  this  nutivation  that  prompted I 
GLý 
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the  p-lice  to  invoke  the  C*-,  neral  Powers  Act  to  arrest  them.  They 
tried  to  use  this  point  to  lend  credibility  to  their  story  that 
they  we  re  I  lifted  for  nothing,  that  they  'were  not  touching  cars  I 
but  'playing  football  and  he  cane  up  and  asked  us  about  a  tv  set.  I 
Magistrate:  Look,  this  charge  is  nothing  to  do  with 
a  stolen  television.  You're  doing  your- 
self  no  good  telling  me  you're  involved 
in  another  charge.  Understand? 
But,  of  course,  the  suspicion  of  involvement  with  a  stolen 
television  set  might  have  had  everything  to  do  with  the  use  of 
the  holding  cha-rge  and  be  absolutely  relevant  to  the  defendant's 
alleged  innocence.  The  police  may  indeed  drop  both  the  holding 
charge  and  the  other  case  so  that  the  chance  to  raise  the  matter 
in  court  at  all  is  denied  unless  the  defendant  takes  out  a  suit 
for  wrongful  arrest. 
The  Judges"  Rules  specify  as  an  overriding  principle  and 
fundamental  condition  that  only  voluntary  statements  are  admissible, 
with  a  veto  on  questioning  af  ter  charge  precisely  in  recognition 
of  the  unreliability  of  I  confessions'  in  such  circurmtances.  So 
the  holding  charge  is  quite  contrary  to  the  whole  underlying 
spirit  of  the  Rules.  But  it  is  perfectly  legal.  Renton  and 
Brown  point  out  indeed: 
Me  police  could  presumably  arrest  an  offender  on 
this  charge  and  hold  him  until  they  obtained  a 
warrant  on  the  charge  in  which  they  were  really 
interested.  (1972:  32) 
The  distinction  between  questioning  in  custody  on  the  offence 
charged  and  questioning  in  custody  for  another  offence  was N 
6/ 
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recognised  as  a  problem  in  the  1930s  Judges'  Rules,  but  it  was 
still  left  as  a  loophole  in  the  1964  version.  Not  an  overlooked 
loophole  though,  f  or  case  law  positively  supports  it.  In  R.  v. 
Buchan  (1964)  the  judge  specifically  used  the  loophole 
ý  t,  \Ik  C-A  Ooco',  %  \9A-  C-ý,  P  4  '1  Z- 
in  the  Judges'  Rules  to  justify  I  questioning  onýburglaryLafter 
L- 
arrest  on  a  vague  loitering  charge.  The  case  of  Christip  v. 
Leaqhýnsky  is  of  ten  cited  as  upholding  a  person's  right  to  be 
told  why  he  is  being  arrested.  But  like  many  cases  it  is 
double-edged  since  Lord  Sinmnds  also  declared  that  it  could  not 
be  wrongful  to  arrest  and  detain  a  man  upon  a 
charge,  of  which  he  is  reasonably  suspected, 
with  a  view  to  further  investigation  of  a 
second  charge  upon  which  information  is 
incomplete. 
Indeed  he  went  on  to  assert 
it  is  not  an  essential  condition  of  lawful 
arrest  that  the  constable  should  at  the  time  of 
arrest  fonmlate  any  charge  at  all,  much  less 
the  charge  which  rmy  ultimately  be  found  in  the 
indictmnt. 
Detention  for  questioning  is  thus  legally  endorsed.  Holding 
Charge  practices  do  not  require  abuse  but  siffply  use  of  the  law. 
They  are  not  informal  subversions  of  due  process:  they  are  due 
process  as  def  ined  by  conmn  law  and  statute. 'm 
ý  (0 
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Helping  the  police  with  theirinqtnries 
However,  interrogation  of  suspects,  interrogation  in  custody 
and  without  caution  is  legal  in  much  broader  terms.  The  Judges, 
Rules  refer  to  questioning  in  custody  before  charge: 
When  a  police  officer  is  trying  to  discover 
whether,  or  by  whom,  an  offence  has  been 
comnitted  he  is  entitled  to  question  any  person 
whether  suspected  or  not  from  whom  he  thinks 
that  useful  information  may  be  obtained.  This 
is  so  whether  or  not  the  person  has  been  taken 
into  custody  so  long  as  he  has  not  been  charged 
with  the  offence  or  inforned  that  he  may  be 
prosecuted  for  it.  (Rule  I) 
In  cases  like  Chandler  (197b)  in  England,  Aitken  (1926)  or  Chalmers 
(1954)  in  Scotland,  all  dealing  specifically  with  police  question- 
ý"Ano-(-v'-  r-ý 
ing,  the  judges  explicitly  discuss  theLaccused  who  is  being 
questioned  in  custody  ýO'Qxýý 
ý  cautioned. 
But  if  the  judges  have  required  that  a  person  cannot  be  taken  into 
custody  unless  he  is  cautioned  and  charged  or  told  why.,  (Christie 
v  Leachinsky  1947)  and  insisted  in  Rule  IIIb  of  the  Judges' 
Rules  that  once  charged  a  person  should  normally  no  longer  be  ques- 
tioned,  bow  can  they  also  discuss  in  leading  cases  the  questioning 
of  an  accused  perscn  in  custody? 
The  situation  mf  lected.  in  the  blatant  contradiction  in 
the  Judges'  Rules  has  been  achieved  by  the  gradual  refinements 
and  vacillating  metaphors  of  legal  reasoning  by  which  the  judges 
have  established  a  linbo,  sitting  uneasily  between  the  law  of 
arrest  and  the  law  of  interrogation. 
The  protectim  offered  by  the  principles  of  arrest  and (Zýl 
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interrogation  outlined  above  depends  on  a  two  stage  mcdel  of 
police-citizen  relations.  One  is  either  a  citizen  entitled  to 
his  f  reedom  f  rom  arrest  or  the  accused  who  .  with  a  prima  facie 
case  against  him,  can  be  charged  and  if  necessary  taken  into 
custody.  The  two  stage  model  reflects  a  once  clea-rly  defined 
structural  distinction  whereby  the  magistrates  took  over  after 
arrest  and  any  questioning  was  done  in  court  under  the  super- 
vision  of  the  not  the  people  reporting  or  investigating 
the  offence.  This  gradually  changed  with  the  introduction  in 
the  early  nineteenth  century  of  an  organised.  police  force 
, 
followed 
by  the  development  of  detection,  widening  of  police  powers  and 
changes  in  the  accused's  legal  situation  in  court.  The  gap 
that  has  developed  between  ideology  and  legal  practice  is  thus 
a  reflection  of  a  changing  structure  but  a  lingering  rhetoric. 
Nonetheless  the  two  stages  were  being  strictly  adhered  to  by 
English  judges  at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century,  so  in  Rv 
Gavin  the  judge  stated  categorically 
When  a  person-is  in  custody  the  police  have  no 
right  to  ask  him  questions  ... 
A  prisoner's  mouth 
is  closed  after  he  is  once  given  the  charge  ,  and 
he  ought  not  to  be  asked  anything.  (1885:  15  Cox  CC) 
Note  the  interchangeability  of  the  points  of  'custody'  and 
I  charge  I  with  the  irrplicaticn  that  custody  could  not  take  place 
without  charge. 
But  in  mre  recent  cases  the  judges  have  operated  in  their 
decisions  on  the  legitimacy  of  police  control  with  a  three-stage 
model  of  investigation  which  distinguishes  the  point  of  custody 
from  the  point  of  charge  and  in  which  the  first  category  is 
governed  by  the  law  of  arrest,  the  third  by  the  law  of  interrogation 
i,  'm -19 
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but  the  second  avoids  both.  The  three  stage  mc)del  is  iniplicit 
in  the  English  Judges'  Rules,  rfeLde  particularly  clear  by  the 
addition  in  the  1964  version  of  a  second  caution.  Early  in  the 
inquiry  the  individual  is  classified  as  a  citizen  helping  police 
with  their  inquiries,  next  he  becomes  a  (possibly)  cautioned 
suspect,  and  f  inally  when  there  is  enough  prima  facie  evidence, 
the  cautioned  and  charged  accused.  Both  English  and  Scots  conmn 
law  spell  out  the  same  mc)del.,  exerrplif  ied  in  England  by  Rv 
Osbourne  and  Virtue  (1973).  in  Scotland  by  Bell  (1945) 
Only  at  the  third  stage  does  a  prohibition  on  interrogation 
become  applicable.  The  proud  boast  of  Scots  law  that  the  law 
is  very  jealous  of  the  rights  of  the  charged  prisoner  thus  takes 
on  both  a  significant  and  a  hollow  ring,  (Renton  &  Brown,  1972: 
382,  my  errphasis).  Interrogation  of  the  suspý!  ct  in  custody  has 
been  interpreted  since  the  Ibrahim  case  of  191,  ý  as  undesirable 
but  nonetheless  legal. 
The  net  result  is  that  protection  f  rom  interrogation  is 
available  only  at  a  very  late  stage  in  the  process  -  only  in 
fact  af  ter  enough  evidence  is  available  for  a  charge  -  and  it 
is  procedurally  defined  out  at  the  crucial  early  stages  of 
establishing  incriminating  evidence  for  that  charge.  The  law 
thus 
, 
by  neatly  pigeonholing  points  and  conditions  where  its 
rules  apply,  creates  the  opportunity  for  extensive  legal  police 
interrogation  in  custody. 
Giving  this  position  in  law  the  situational  definition  of 
the  point  at  which  the  individual  or  suspect  becoms  the  accused 
is  vital  for  claiming  rights  or  raising  issws  of  admissibility. 
And  obviously  such  defining  is  a  fluid  and  subjective  process. 
Nevertheless  the  judges,  when  f  aced  with  the  question  of 
narmwina  rk-%m  thp  accused's  rights,  have  managed  to  divide  it C\ 
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into  three  definite  logical  stages.  When  it  CUTP-s  to  defining 
the  point  at  which  those  rights  comee  into  play,  however,  a  new 
mtaphor  for  chaxacterising  social  reality  is  employed.  The 
situation  is  suddenly  revealed  as  not  a  three-stage  structure 
but  af  luid  process.  and  the  crucial  point  is  left  vague  and 
a-In-ost  mystically  elusive: 
Just  when  that  point  of  tim  is  reached  is  in  any 
particular  case  extren-ely  difficult  to  define  - 
or  even  for  an  experienced  police  of  f  icer  to 
realise  its  arrival.  Mere  does  come  a  time, 
however,  when  a  police  of  f  icer  carrying  out  his 
duty  honestly  and  conscientiously,  ought  to  be 
in  a  position  to  appreciate  that  the  man  whom 
he  is  in  the  process  of  questioning  is  under 
serious  consideration  as  the  perpetrator  of  the 
crime.  Once  that  stage  of  suspicion  is  reached, 
the  suspect  is  in  the  position  that  thereafter 
the  only  evidence  admissible  against  him  is  his 
own  voluntary  statuent.  (Chalrrers  v  HMAdv.  195J. 
Me  timing  is  thus  left  for  definition  to  the  police  thenselves, 
the  people  with  the  mc)st  obvious  vested  interest  in  postponing 
the  point  of  inadmissibilitY  as  long  as  possible. 
Indeed  Soots  law  to  some  extent  acknowledges  the  unprotected 
position  of  the  suspect. iII 
--I  c 
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Hence  Lord  Anderson's  view  in  Aitken  that  the  suspect  ought  to  have 
protection  of  some  sort  too: 
Now  it  seems  to  me  that  the  court  ought  to  be 
mc)re  jealous  to  safeguard  the  rights  of  a 
prisoner  in  a  case  where  a  charge  has  not  yet 
been  made,  but  where  the  prisoner  has  merely 
been  detainLd  by  the  police  on  suspicion.  (1926) 
But  the  safeguard  introduced  is  operated  by  two  criteria,  one 
too  broad  and  one,  ironically,  too  narrow  to  provide  a  clear 
statement  of  what  is  legitimate  police  conduct.  The  substantive 
criterion  is  'fairness  to  the  accused',  too  broad  in  substance 
to  specify  any  waning,  and  the  operative  criterion  to  bring 
this  into  play  is  each  case'sbwn  specific  circumstances', 
too  particular  to  allow  generalisation  from  one  case  to 
another.  Together  they  indicate  neatly  how  the  intrinsic 
specificity  of  the  case  law  method  allied  to  the  corrrnc)n  law 
habit  of  declaration  of  broad  principles  rather  than  tight 
rulings,  leads  to  grand  civil  rights  rhetoric  but  plenty  of 
scope  for  discretionary  judicial  practice. 
Linking  the  concept  of  fairness  to  a  specific  case  with 
multiple  circumstances  involved  makes  it  difficult  to  call 
on  any  one  of  these  circumstances  as  a  precedent  establishing 
a  criterion  for  inadmissibility  -  so  despite  the  rhetoric 
expressed  in  this  case  of  the  need  for  safeguards  for  the  suspect, 
it  could  not  be  said  to  establish  them.  As  ]Renton  and  Brown 
coyly  put  it: 
The  fact  that  the  accused  had  been  a  suspect  was, 
however  ,  only  one  circumstance  ammg  a  number 
which  led  his  Lordship  to  reject  the  statement 
made  by  him  to  the  police  (1972:  375). I 
,  --I  \ 
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Me  other  circun-stances  indicate  rather  that  the  idea  applies 
to  unusual  rather  than  average  situations:  the  accused  in  the 
Aitken  case  was  under  seventeen,  sick  and  mntally  subnorml. 
The  implication  is  therefore  that  there  is  nothing  essentially 
unfair  about  interrogation  in  custody  of  a  normal  adult  suspect. 
In  any  case  in  the  Chalmers  case,  1954.,  and  in  Miln  v  Cullen 
1967,  'fairness'.  introduced  to  protect  the  accusedtook  on  a 
new  twist  -  fairness  meant  not  mrely  fairness  to  the  accused 
but  to  the  public  interest  and  to  the  police  in  doing  their 
job.  In  judicial  reasoning  the  words  can  remain  constant  but 
the  meanings  change  -  one  reason  for  the  divergence  between  the 
rhetoric  and  the  reality  of  law. 
In  both  systems,  of  course,  the  suspect  should  be  cautioned, 
warned  of  the  danger  of  incriminating  hin-self,  but  common  law 
qualifies  that  by  accepting  that  failure  to  caution  does  not 
.ý\.,  C,  -6  \N-  ,ý 
necessarily  mc04z  the  evidence  L-,  (Jeffrey  v  Black  1977  ),  while 
in  any  case  the  caution  may  well  be  seen  as  a  miere  formality  in 
a  situation  where  the  police  can  detain  and  question  the  accused 
in  the  privacy  of  the  police  station.  The  suspect  category 
thus  provides  a  neat  linbo  between  the  uncharged  citizen  who  can 
be  questioned  but  not  in  custody  and  the  accused  who  can  be 
taken  into  custody  but  should  not  generally  be  questioned  on  the 
details  of  the  incident. 
If  this  situation  has  been  established  by  the  judges  though, 
it  has  also  been  questioned  by  them.  In  the  significant 
Chalmers  case  -  significant  to  lawyers  because  the  appeal  court 
of  three  judges  not  only  quashed  the  ccnviction  but  deemd.  the 
issues  raised  inportant  enough  to  be  adjourned  for  consideration 
by  the  full  bench  of  eight  -  the  Lord  Justice  General  recognised 'I 
--T-L 
the  divergence  of  this  situation  from  the  rhetoric: 
...  no  person  can  be  lawfully  detained  except 
after  a  charge  has  been  made  against  him,  and  it 
is  f  or  this  reason  that  I  view  with  some 
uneasiness  the  situation  disclosed  in  this  case 
and  illustrated  by  the  recent  cases  of  Rigg  and 
Short,  in  which  a  suspect  is  neither  apprehended 
nor  charged  but  is  simply  'asked'  to  accompany 
two  police  officers  to  a  police  office  to  be 
there  questioned.  (1954  JC) 
But  this  uneasiness  did  not  make  itself  felt  in  a  dictum 
prohibiting  the  practice.  It  would  thus  seem  to  be  more  of 
a  gesture  to  the  rhetoric  which  -  however  strongly  felt  - 
nonetheless  upholds  the  lirybo  of  interrogation  in  custody  - 
an  exarrple  indeed  of  how  judicial  arrbivalence  serves  to  bridge 
or  at  least  blur  the  gap  between  the  rhetoric  and  reality  of 
law.  Later  cases  have  made  this  implicit  acceptance  of 
interrogation  in  custody  quite  explicit.  In  Miln  v  Cullen, 
for  exmple,  Lord  Wheatley  welcomed  the  case  as: 
an  opportunity  for  clearing  up  certain 
misapprehensions  which  may  have  arisen  in  the 
nAnds  of  the  legal  profession,  the  police  and 
the  public 
as  a  result  of  Chalmers.  Questioning  a  suspect  in  custody  was 
legitimate,  indeed,  was  what  the  caution  suggested,  while 
fairness  meant  not  only  fairness  to  the  accused  but  to  the 
Public;  the  courts  should  be  seeking  a  ba-lance,  not 
v-  --- 
hamstringing  the  police  in  their  investigation 
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of  crime  with  a  series  of  academic  vetoes ---)3 
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which  ignore  the  realities  and  practicalities 
of  the  situation  and  discount  completely  the 
public  interest.  (  19  i:  -  -1) 
In  short  it  is  not  just  the  police  who  take  the  law  into 
their  own  hands  in  detaining  people  in  custody  to  "help  with 
their  enquiries".  Nor  indeed  is  it  just  the  police  who  informlly 
point  to  the  practical  needs  of  crimie-  control  to  justify 
ignoring  the  principles  of  legality:  that  same-  justification 
is  writ  large  and  indeed  of  fered  as  guidance  for  the  police, 
in  the  cases,  textbooks  and  government  reports  which  formulate 
the  law  itself.  Police  justifications  may  be  a  distortion  of 
the  spirit  of  legality  but  they  are  an  exact  replica  of  the 
spirit  of  the  law. 'I 
Iý 
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Vol  untary  Statements 
Me  inplication  of  the  three  stage  mc)del  is  that  once  a 
cha.  rge  is  made  questioning  about  the  of  fence  stops.  In  short,, 
the  nineteenth  century  corrinon  law  prohibition  still  holds:  it 
is 
r 
redefined  to  come  into  play  at  a  later  point.  But  the 
CID 
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n--soluteness  of  even  that  prohibition  has  also  been  diluted 
over  time.  In  both  Scots  and  English  law  the  crucial  condition 
for  admitting  evidence  has  becom  not  so  much  when  the  evidence 
was  acquired  but  how  it  was  provided. 
The  absolute  prohibition  on  questioning  in  custody  expressed 
in  late  19th  century  English  cases  like  RV  Gavin  and  Rv  Male 
and  Cooper  put  the  emphasis  very  much  on  the  danger  implicit 
in  the  privacy  of  the  police  station  with  no-one  present  to 
see  how  the  matter  was  conducted.  Ibis  echoes  very  much  the 
fear  on  which  civil  liberties  ideology  was  originally  based, 
-1-ke 
withLýomon  law  growing  up  in  the  wake  of  interrogation  by 
torture  in  the  King'  s  Court  of  Star  Chanber,  and  a  consequent 
errphasis  on  receiving  only  voluntary  statemnts  as  evidence  in 
court.  Prohibiting  questioning  in  custody  at  all,  the  idea 
that  still  coms  through  in  the  broad  principles  governing 
investigation,  was  clearly  one  extreme  means  of  allaying  those 
fears.  Any  statements  made  in  response  to  questioning  in 
custody  were  basically  treated  as  involuntary.  Mis  definition 
of  voluntary  and  involuntary  statewnts  however  did  not  last  long 
and  the  Ibrahim  case  of  1914  dismissed  it  as  not  the  law. 
Whether  a  person  in  custody  was  asked  questions  or  not  was  not 
the  crux  of  the  issue  and  never  had  been.  What  mattered  in  law 
was  simply  wbether  the  answer  was  given  voluntarily, 
in  the  sense  that  it  has  not  been  obtained  f  rom N 
-yý 
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him  by  fear  of  prejudice  or  hope  of  advantage  ... 
The  principle  is  as  old  as  Lord  Hale. 
Ibis  remains  the  law  in  England  today. 
Scotland  stuck  much  longer  to  the  view  that  there  should 
'be  no  questioning  after  the  charge  and  that  anything  said  in 
custody  should  be  treated  with  suspicion  (e.  g.  HMAdv.  v  Rigg  1946) 
but  a  similar  gradual  change  has  occurred  there  too.  In  1938  the 
judges  were  still  declaring: 
It  is  a  statutory  rule,  which  ought  to  be  observed 
in  the  future,  when  a  prisoner  has  been  conynitted 
for  further  inquiry,  that  the  police  ought  not 
to  approach  him  on  any  question  touching  the 
crim  with  which  he  has  been  charged.  (Stark 
&--Srrdt-h___v_HMAdv.  1938). 
"a 
But  by  1966  Lord  Cameron  could  state 
I  know  of  no  authoritative  decision  in  the  law 
of  Sootland  which  lays  down  that  once  a  person 
CA 
has  become'suspect  he  may  not  therefore  be 
rl 
questioned  by  the  police  at  a.  11,  or  that  if  they 
do  question  him  the  answers  which  he  makes  may 
not  be  given  in  evidence.  (Brown  v  HMAdv.  ) 
And  by  1967  Lord  Wheatley  was  expressing  a  view,  which  ironically 
used  the  criteria  introduced  in  the  Aitken  case  to  protect  the 
sus  ct  who  was  not  protected  by  the  three  stage  model,  but  used 
it  to  dilute  the  protection  of  fered  by  the  three  stage  model  to 
the  charged  accused. 
It  is  wrong  to  assume  that  after  a  person  has 
been  cautioned  and  charged  questioning  of  that 
person  is  no  longer  admissible.  Miln  v  Cullen) 'In 
, -ý  ýo 
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Rather  acknissibility  depends  on  the  faii-ness  of  the 
circumstances.  'Ibus  can  precedents  be  &c-ontextualised  and  used 
for  purposes  d3amiViAcally  opposed  to  their  original  intent. 
There  is  therefore  no  longer  a  prohibition  as  such  on 
questioning  after  charge.  Rather  the  voluntari-ness  of  statewnts 
made  by  the  suspect  or  accused  to  the  police,  in  response  to 
questions  or  not,  is  assessed  in  term  of  whether  or  not  they 
were  acquired  by  inducement  or  oppression.  In  these  terms  there 
is  fairly  wide  scope  for  defining  confessions  or  other 
incriminating  statements  by  the  accused  as  voluntary.  So 
adrrdssions  secured  by  bugging  cells,  tapping  phones  at  the 
police  station  (the  judge  pointed  out  that  the  policeman  had 
not  said  he  would  not  listen)  or  by  a  policeman  in  plain  clothes 
posing  as  a  prisoner  have  all  been  admitted  in  England  as  the 
accused's  voluntary  statements,  (Leigh  1975-.  165,157),  while 
what  a  prisoner  was  overheard  saying  to  his  wife  has  been 
allowed  as  evidence  against  him  despite  the  rules  against 
hearsay,  against  a  wife  being  forced  to  testify  against  her 
husband  and  despite  the  rhetoric  against  self-incrimination 
k_04  _ 
(Cross  75).  In  Scotland  intercepted  letters  and  conversations 
in  prison  between  prisoners  and  between  a  man  and  his  visiting 
brother.  bave  all  been  admitted  (Walker  and  Walker  197Jr 
37). 
Indeed  literally  the  reasoning  is  quite  accurate.  The 
infomation  in  question  may  well  have  been  volunteered  by  the 
accused  but  not  with  any  intention  to  volunteer  it  tLcýýeýlLpý- 
By  focussing  on  the  maning  of  the  word  rather  than  setting 
it  in  the  context  of  the  purpose  of  the  rule,  and  by  ignoring 
the  accusedt  subjective  intentions  (despite  all  the  normal IN 
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rhetoric  of  'mns  rea'),  judicial  reasoning  thus  extends  the 
admissibility  of  self  -incrin-dnating  statements  and  the  legitimate 
exercise  of  police  pavers.  Ihis  style  of  reasoning  is  not 
consistent  however.  Acknitting  Statements  acquired  by  inducement 
or  oppression  by  someone  who  is  not  a  policemn  or  other 
of  f  icial  is  justif  ied  precisely  by  putting  the  action  in  the 
context  of  the  purpose  of  previous  precedents:  to  protect  the  citi- 
zen  vis-a-vis  state  power  in  the  form  of  the  police.  . 
Textbook 
statements  of  the  law  in  Scotland  all  qualify  these  situations 
with  the  criteria  of  'fairness  to  the  accused'  but  the  authority 
cited  is  usually  Aitken  and  me  have  already  seen  how  liffdted 
the  precedent  set  there  is  in  its  applicability. 
Me  term  'inducement'and  'oppression'  are  themselves  of 
course  like  'voluntariness'  not  self-evident  but  subject  to  the 
interpretation  of  the  court.  The  law  does  not  take  account  of 
the  more  subtle  aspects  of  the  terms.  Inman  points  out  the 
discrepancy  between  the  subtle  psychological  methods  of 
persuasion  advocated  by  police  manuals,  and  the  more  blatant, 
objective  coercion  prohibited  by  law  (1978).  Even  in  these  terms 
though,  some  of  the  interpretatiom  of  inducement  and  oppression 
may  seem  rather  surprising.  Questioning  the  accused  in  custody 
overnight  for  ten  hours  out  of  seventeen,  the  last  seven 
r  19  72)?  continuously,  is  not  considered  oppressive  (R  v  L)2:  ae 
while  L  Lord  Chief  Justice  stated  in  Rv  Isequilla. 
that: 
such  considerations  as  fatigue,  lack  of  sleep, 
emtional  strain  cannot  be  efficacious  to 
deprive  a  confession  Of  its  quality  of 
voluntariness  (1975) "M 
---?  Z 
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Decisions  on  inducenmt  vary.  SOmtimes  it  is  def  ined  broadly 
to  f  avour  the  accused.  For  exarrple  appeals  have  been  won  because 
of  inducements  as  mild  as  a  policeman  saying  'I  think  it  would 
be  better  if  you  made  a  Statement  telling  m  exactly  what 
happened'  . 
(R  v  Richards  1967)  However  the 
House  of  Lords  (DPP  v  Ping  Lin)  has  now  decided  that  induc.  (-,  mnt 
alone  does  not  constitute  involuntariness  and  therefore  YQ 
automatic  inadnissibility,  that  it  is  a  factual  matter  for  the 
court  to  decide.  Me  argwmnt  is  that  a  confe'ssion  af  ter  induce- 
mnt  may  be  produced  not  because  of  it  but  despite  it. 
One  major  induced  confession  that  is  always  allowed  is 
"-peen's  evidenWI,  where  one  accused  is  induced  to  "confess"  and 
incriminate  another  in  return  for  the  biggest  inducement  of  all, 
his  freedom  despite  his  acknowledged  guilt.  The  law  books  sirrply 
do  not  discuss  Queen's  evidence  in  relation  to  the  issue  of 
inducemnt  and  voluntariness  at  all  but  it  is  not  logically 
distinct  f  ran  it.  An  even  wre  blatent  mission  is  the  f  act 
that  there  is  in  law  a  sentence  discount  for  pleading  guilty. 
What  stronger  inducemnt  to  incriminate  oneself  could  there 
'be?  Rhetoric  and  reality  are  held  together  here  only  by  the 
subcategorisatiom  of  legal  knowledge,  distinguishing  the 
inadrrdssibility  of  evidence  from  the  law  on  sentencing  although 
the  principles  and  effects  are  the  same. 
Where  a  statemnt  is  spontaneous',  that  is,  not  in  reply 
to  a  question,  threat  or  inducerýnt,  it  is  always  declared 
voluntary  and  admissible.  So  for  exanple  anything  said  by 
the  accused  in  reply  to  being  cautioned  is  always  accepted  as 
incriminating  evidence.  It  has  been  so  def  ined  since  Baldry's 
case  in  1852  and  the  logic  is  irrefutable.  After  all  he  has I= 
--Iý 
just  been  infoiTr-r2d  he  need  not  speak  and  warned  of  the 
consequences  of  doing  so.  Of  course  this  is  one  of  those 
occasions  where  literal  and  situational  logic  tend  to  be  at 
odds.  'Ihe  law  on  other  occasions  operates  on  the  comwn 
sense  assumption  that  accusations  den-and  replies, 
10 
and  this 
certainly  seents  to  operate  in  a  good  many  cases,  despite  the 
warning.  It  is  as  though  the  content  of  the  caution  is  ignored 
and  replaced  by  the  normal  cues  and  expectations  of  everyday 
conversation  -  when  somone  addresses  a  statement  to  you  about 
yourself  you  reply,  especially  if  you  are  being  accused  of 
something  discreditable,  especially  if  the  other  person  is 
standing,  waiting  and  holding  a  notebook,  and  especially  if 
that  person  is  someone  in  authority  -  like  a  policeman.  Fisher 
suggests  that  even  the  content  of  the  caution: 
seen-s  to  assume  that  the  person  cautioned  will  speak 
('whatever  you  say')  and  if  the  caution  is  inmdiately 
followed  by  a  question  in  the  fonn  "What  do  you  want 
to  say  to  me?  "  the  iripression  will  be  given  to  some  people 
that  they  axe  expected,  or  even  requested,  to  speak. 
(Fisher  1977:  17) 
Indeed  the  very  concept  in  law  of  I  replies  to  charges'  seems  to 
recognise  the  irrplicit  interrogatory  nature  of  the  charge. 
A  fairly  crude  analysis  of  100  official  police  reports 
%I 
which  record  replies  to  cautions  produces  these  statistics: 
48  people  are  reported  as  actually  remaining  silent  or  saying 
they  had  nothing  to  say, 
k 
.  -Of  the  rest,  23  replies  were  incriminating,  either  directly  - 
'I'm  caught'  -  or  indirectly  by  way  of  justification  -  'I 
was  bloody  angry'  or  the  simple,  hopeful,  but  fatal,  'I'm  sorry'. 
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Nine  were  directly  discrediting  or  hostile  to  the  police  - 'Im 
2 
I  Piss  of  f  you  bastards  I  or  I  Fucking  geýqtapol.  Remarks  like 
these  reflecting  drunkenness,  cultural  hostility  or  just 
plain  anger  at  what  seems  an  unjust  situation  rrdght  make 
situational  sense  outside  the  court  with  the  policemen  indeed 
giving  as  good  as  they  get.  But  read  out  f  rom  the  witness  box 
to  robed  and  wigged  dignatories  in  the  cool  rational  propriety 
L-'V,  z 
of  a  trial  without  the  context  of  what  police  said  or  did  them- 
selves  -  for  this  is  how  they  are  presented  -  they  are  quite 
sirrply  discrediting  evidence. 
It  is  not  just  literal  and  situational  logic  that  are  in 
contradiction  here  though;  accepting  replies  to  charges  as  a 
matter  of  routine  contradicts  other  aspects  of  legal  logic. 
The  fact  that  it  may  be  in  the  interests  of  the  police  to 
report  replies  to  charges  in  an  incriminating  f  orm  does  not 
rule  them  out  ,  although  statements  rnade  by  the  accused  f  avourable 
to  hinBelf  are  not  admissible  on  exactly  these  grounds.  So 
in  cases  of  rioting,  the  prosecution  can  prove  that  the 
accused  had  incited  others  to  riot,  but  the  accused  cannot 
lead  evidence  that  he  advised  people  to  have  nothing  to  do  with 
it.  (Renton  and  Brown  1972:  388).  Replies  are  acknissible  even 
where  still  mre  rules  of  evidence  are  broken,  not  just  the 
rules  of  hearsay  and  self-incrimination  but  also  the  rules  on 
bad  character  ,  that  is,  the  fact  that  the  accused  has  a  record. 
Usually  evidence  cannot  be  introduced  in  court  for  fear  of 
prejudicing  the  defence  case  on  what  is  held  to  be  irrelevant 
matters  but  replies  to  police  charges  are  always  admissible  even 
when  they  contain  exactly  that  kind  of  information  - 
The  classic 
exanple  is  the  reply: 
The  idea  is  ridiculous  -  It  is  the  big  things  I 
go  in  for.  (HMAdv-  v  McFadyen  1926) 
39 Z\ 
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Voluntariness  as  a  criterion  for  accepting  self- 
incrindnating  statements  by  a  person  accused  of  cournitting 
an  of  fence  does  not  therefore  rule  out  quite  as  much  information 
f  rom  the  court  as  one  might  imagine.  Questioning,  inducement., 
threats  and  replies  to  charges  have  all  been  interpreted  or 
admitted  generously  enough  to  allow  wide  scope  for  the  use  of 
self  -incriminating  statements  in  court.  Mere  is  also  a  catch 
22  involved.  Voluntariness  might  be  taken  to  mean  that  one  can 
r-1-1 ,..  oose  not  to  volunteer  informiation;  the  irony  is  that  remaining 
silent  can  be  taken  as  incriminating  evidence  too. 2  -Z_ 
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A 
_right 
to  silence? 
The  idea  of  a  suspect's  right  to  silence  is  one  that  turns 
up  repeatedly  in  discussions  of  criminal  procedure,  particularly 
from  police  and  prosecution.  The  Criminal  Law  Revision  Conmittee 
of  1972  made  a  major  issue  of  it 
,  while  the  1978  Royal  Camission 
has  had  its  share  of  evidence  on  this  them.  Cases  sorretines 
refer  to  the  right  to  silence  too  -  though  they  put  it  in 
inverted  comas  (e.  g.  Chandler  1976),  a  stylistic  reflection 
of  the  view  of  strict  jurists  that  the  idea  of  a  right  to 
silence  is  not  a  legal  concept  but  a  perversion  of  the  legal 
privilege  against  self-incrimination.  The  law  puts  it  in  mre 
negative  temss:  one  is  not  bound  to  incriminate  oneself  ;  there 
is  no  duty  to  answer  police  questions  (  Rice  v  Connolly). 
Popular  rhetoric  -  and  one  might  add  particulaxly  prosecution 
rhetoric  -  thus  turns  a  negative  privilege  into  a  positive 
right.  To  lawyers  the  distinction  is  significant,  with  the 
negative  statewnt  carrying  much  less  protection.  But  whichever 
way  you  look  at  it,  the  principle  Is  contradicted  by  legal 
procedure.  Having  a  right  to  silence  might  suggest  it  cannot 
therefore  be  used  against  you;  having  a  privilege  against 
self  incrimination  might  suggest  that  the  very  act  of  taking 
that  privilege  up  could  not  therefore  be  used  to  incriminate 
you.  Yet  that  is  exactly  what  can  happen  in  law. 
For  a  start  it  depends  on  when  you  choose  to  exercise 
the  right  or  privilege.  If  you  refuse  to  answer  questions 
before  being  cautioned  that  you  need  not,  your  silence  can  be 
taken  in  law  to  mean  guilt.  Lord  DiPlock  in  Hall  v  the  Queen 
(1971)  confronted  this  by  suggesting  that  everyone  had  a 
conm)n  law  right,  even  before  being  cautioned  I 
to  stay  silent  on zs 
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lx:,  ýjng  accused  of  or  qlx:  -ýstioned  about  a  crim  without  the 
conclusion  being  drawn  (with  the  inevitable  qualification  of 
exceptional  circumstances)  that  silence  mans  guilt,,  In  P.  v 
Chandler  (1976  1  WLR)  the  trial  judge  reiterated  this  right 
but  suggested  a  neat  loophole  in  his  sumadng  up  to  the  jury: 
You  must  ask  yourself  whether  he  declined  to 
answer  questions  in  the  knowledge  that  he  was 
exercising  his  commn  law  right  to  remain  silent 
or  whether  he  remairxed  silent  because  he  might 
have  thought  if  he  had  answered  he  would  in  sorne- 
way  have  incrindnated  hinself. 
In  short  it  is  not  a  protective  right  if  you  use  it  to  L 
protect  yourself  and  it  is  certaj-nly  not  a  right  if  you  don't 
know  about  it.  This  is  not  only  a  strange  piece  of  logic  in 
itself  but  contrary  to  the  norml  legal  assumption  that  ignorance 
of  the  law  is  no  excuse.  Knowledge  of  the  law  is  sinply  assumed 
if  you  break  it  but  not  if  you  exercise  your  rights.  7he  case 
went  to  the  Court  of  Rppeal  where  Lord  Justice  Lawton  refuted  the 
logic  but  also  refuted  any  notion  of  a  basic  legal  right  to 
silence.  Lord  Diplock's  notim  that  everyone  had  a  right  to 
remain  silent  without  guilt  being  inferred  was  sinply  'not  in 
accord  with  the  conmnsense  of  ordinary  folk'.  Silence  could 
me  an  guilt: 
The  law  has  long  accepted  that  an  accused  person 
is  not  bound  to  incriminate  hiniself;  but  it  does 
not  follow  that  a  failure  to  answer  an  accusation 
or  question  when  an  answer  could  reasonably  be 
expected  may  not  provide  sorm  evidence  in  support 
of  an  accusation.  Whether  it  does  will  depend 94 
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on  the  circumstances. 
This  rested  on  Rv  Christie  (1914)  which  established  that 
a  person's  reaction  to  an  accusation  against  him  could 
incriminate  him  if 
) 
by  his  conduct  or  demanor,  he  seemd  to 
accept  the  validity  of  the  accusation.  Scots  law  would  seem 
from  Lewis  v  Blair  (1858)  to  have  traditionally  taken  the  sam 
line.  When  one  accused  person  made  a  statement  to  a  policeman 
on  arrest,  and  the  other  stayed  silent,  the  judge  agreed  it 
was  relevant  to  propose  an  inference  of  guilt  from  the  silence. 
These  cases  refer  to  questioning  by  a  policenm,  but  silence 
in  the  face  of  accusations  by  someone  who  is  not  I  in  authority' 
is  taken  even  more  readily  as  indicative  of  guilt.  In  Parkes  v 
the  Queen  (1976) 
. 
it  was  concluded  that  where  a  person  is 
accused  of  sorrething 
it  is  reasonable  to  expect  that  he  or  she  will 
inmediately  deny  it  and  that  the  absence  of  such 
a  denial  is  some  evidence  of  an  admission  on  the 
part  of  the  person  cba-rged  and  of  the  truth  of 
the  charge. 
Me  basis  for  this  is  that  the  parties  concerned  are  'on  even 
term  I.  as  opposed  to  being  an  individual  versus  the  power  of 
the  state  in  the  guise  of  a  policeman  But  v\  6  ý,  e 
C,  5 
police-accused  encounteýrsý  e  accused 
brought  onto  -  even  term  by  having  his  solicitor  present 
Ihis  is  a  nice  example  of  a  pattern  that  occurs 
repeatedly  -  adding  protectim  for  the  accused  with  one  hand 
and  taking  it  away  with  the  other,  the  factor  introduced 
to  try  and  add  to  the  accused's  protection  becoming  the  very 
thing  that  legitindses  reducing  it  - Z'ý 
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How  these  rulings  operate  in  court  can  be  demnstrated 
by  ease  103.  Me  accused  was  found  on  the  same  floor  of  a 
multi-storey  car  park  as  a  car  which  had  been  broken  into  and 
gDods  stolen.  His  car  was  on  the  same  floor.  Some  of  the  stolen 
goods  were  on  the  ground  beside  the  burgled  car  but  others  were 
not  on  him  or  found  in  the  vicinity.  Me  accused  said  another 
car  had  driven  past  him  from  that  f  loor  as  he  was  approaching. 
Nonetheless  he  was  incriminated  by  three  things.  First  because 
be  was  there,  second  because  he  was  looking  at  the  stolen  car 
with  its  boot  open  and  the  remaining  contents  on  the  ground 
beside  it,  third,  and  this  was  what  the  judge  f  ixed  on,  because  when 
the  owners  of  the  burgled  car  arrived  and  asked  what  he  was 
doing  he  walked  away  toward  his  own  car  without  answering. 
He  expla-ined  he  just  wanted  nothing  to  do  with  it.  The 
judge  intervened. 
Judge:  It  might  be  suggested  that  the  obvious 
answer  you'd  nuke  if  you'd  been  doing 
nothing  is  'nothing'.  (And  here  the  well- 
spcken  judge  lapses  into  Glaswegian  dialect) 
fahlm  gaun  fur  ma  caur'.  Was  that  not  to 
invite  suspicion? 
In  cross-examination  the  prosecutor,  again  with  the  active 
involverwnt  of  the  judge 
,  made  a  big  issue  of  this  lack  of 
msponse. 
Prosecutor:  Why  did  you  not  say  -  you  were  the 
only  person-in  the  world  who  knew  -  'a 
minivan  just  went  down  past  me.  Hurry, 
if  we're  quick  we  might  get  him'? , 'ý10(0 
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The  accused  tried  to  explain  that  he  was  anxious  -d)out  being 
blamd  and  did  not  think  so  clearly,  but  the  judge,  who  was 
taking  what  in  effect  was  an.  active  cross-examination  role, 
interrupted. 
Judge:  Look  it's  a  sirrple  question.  Answer  it. 
Accused:  I  didn't  know  that  van  had  done  it.  (A 
point  absolutely  accurate  in  law.  )  It  could 
have  been  done  hours  ago  for  all  I  knew. 
Judge:  (angrily)  Let  me  finish.  Why  did  you 
not  say  ... 
(repeating  the  point) 
The  accused  replied  he  had  not  had  time  to  think  so  clearly. 
7he  prosecutor  took  his  turn: 
Prosecutor:  Com,  come,  come,  what  kind  of  story  is 
this  you're  trying  to  tell  the  ladies  and 
gentlemen.  You're  frightened  of  being 
accused  but  you're  too  soft  you  don't 
blm-k-,  anyone  else,  Mr.  McG.? 
... 
Why  di  d 
you  not  say  instead:  I'Look,  old  chap,  there's 
my  insurance.  There's  my  driving  licence,  I'm 
a  window  cleaner,  look  in  the  boot"  like  you 
did  to  the  police?  "Leave  me  alone.  You'  ve 
caused  enough  trouble.  " 
The  accused  maintained  he  did  not  know  who  the  real  culprit  was,  it 
was  not  his  business  and  in  any  case  he  panicked,  he  was  shocked. 
Me  judge  seized  on  this: 
Judge:  You  see  if  you  got  a  shock  it  rnight  be  suggested 
that  was  all  the  more  reason  f  or  saying  it 
because  you  "hadr,  4e-  time  to  think  aboct  it.  " 
It  would  Just  bubble  out  spontaneously. 
Prosecutor:  But  you  were  content  to  walk  away. V 
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The  accused  was  found  guilty  and  -sentenced  to  nine  months  in 
prison.  The  accused's  silence  in  the  f  ace  of  pre-caution 
questioning  by  the  police  -  and  even  more  readily  by  somone 
else  -  may  be  construed  as  evidence  against  him  -  only  I  in 
certain  circumstances'  but  since  these  circumstances  are  not 
speci  f  ied  in  advance  but  assessed  af  ter  the  event  this  is  not 
a  right  on  which  one  securely  bases  a  case. 
Scmetimes,  the  circumstances  are  specified  to  an  extent 
indeed  where  they  effectively  man  the  accused  has  to  prove 
his  innocence  and  can  be  presu-ned  guilty  if  he  does  not  answer 
police  questions.  In  specified  cases  of  suspected  theft  or 
receiving  where  the  accused  is  found  in  possession  of  recently 
stolen  goods  and  remains  silent  when  accused,  it  is  quite 
legal  for  the  police  to  infer  guilt  from  his  silence  and  charge 
him  and  for  the  judge  to  instruct  the  J.  ury  they  may  infer  this 
too  ( 
, 
Cryans  v  Nixon  1955),  -  But  the  accused  is  not  warned  of 
this.  Indeed  this  is  exactly  how  the  gap  between  rhetoric  and 
actual  procedure  may  itself  f  acilitate  ccnviction  - 
The 
O.  Pneralised  rights  of  justice  -  to  be  proved  guilty,  to  remain 
silent  .  to  see  a  solicitor  -  are  not  just  the  property  of 
philosophers;  they  are  publicly  coined  phrases.  People  may 
even  believe  they  have  these  rights,  to  be  used  with  impunity, 
and  act  upon  them.  So  one  gets  exariples  like  case  91. 
According  to  the  doctrine  of  recent  possessim  (sha-md  by 
England  and  Scotland),  when  someone  is  found  in  possession  of 
stolen  goods  , 
theft  or  receiving  can  be  presumed  without  proof 
of  the  of  fence  being  corrrrdtted  unless  the  accused  positively 
raises  a  reasonable  doubt  against  it,  so  long  as  two  additional 
conditions  are  met.  First  the  goods  must  be  recently  stolen S? 
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and  second  there  must  be  other  incriminating  circumstances. 
In  this  case,  the  driver  of  a  car  stolen  some  weeks  before  in 
another  part  of  the  country  was  stopped  by  the  police,  a  case 
of  recent  possession.  The  prosecutor  produced  as  his  other 
incriminating-circumstances  two  points.  First,  the  accused's 
attitude  on  being  stopped  was  cool  and  collected,  'couldn't 
care  less'  according  to  police  evidence,  whereas  the  innocent 
citizen  would,  he  suggested,  be  indignant.  Second  he  refused 
to  produce  his  logbook  or  answer  questions  and  asked  to  see  a 
solicitor.  The  defence  of  course  refuted  this  interpretation. 
'D-  .. 
rufmaining  silent  was  not  an  incriminating  circumstance  but  a 
constitutional  right.  His  defence  rested  on 
.  ..  a  matter  fundamntal  to  our  law 
...  You  may 
think  when  the  evidence  is  over  so  quickly  it 
is  all  clear.  But  something  central  is  involved  - 
the  right  of  the  individual  to  remain  silent  ... 
I  do  not  suggest  that  a  person  who  stands  on  his 
constitutional  rights  is  necessarily  innocent  but 
I  do  suggest  that  where  a  person  takes  up  his 
constitutional  rights  he  is  not  to  be  criticised 
and  it  is  not  to  be  taken  by  you  as  an  indication 
of  guilt  ... 
'Ihe  defence  counsel  argued  on  the  grounds  of  the  rhetoric  of 
justice  but-  the  prosecutor  won  on  the  grounds  of  the  law.  For 
what  the  rhetoric  overlooks  is  the  statutory  requirements  of 
the  1968  lbeft  Act  that  it  is  up  to  the  accused  found  in  possession 
of  goods  that  have  been  stolen  to  explain  himself  if  he  is  not 
to  be  assumed  guilty.  So  the  prosecutor  could  point  out  'He 
had  every  opportunity  to  clear  the  matter  up  and  he  f  ailed  to 48 
do  so'.  The  judge,  in  his  suming  up,  focussed  on  the  accused's 
reply  that  he  would  not  answer  until  he  had  seen  a  solicitor 
and  asked: 
Is  this  the  rema-rk  of  an  innocent  n-on?  (Case  91) 
Accepting  the  right  against  self-incrimination  offered  in  the 
rhetoric  of  justice  thus  itself  becomes  an  incrirninating 
circumstance  which  allows  for  presunption  of  guilt. 
But  what  about  after  the  caution?  Af  ter  all  it  explicitly 
informs  the  accused  that  he  need  not  answer  charges  or  questions 
and  indeed  warns  that  statemnts  may  be  used  against  him.  It  does 
not,  however.,  wa-m  that  silence  may  also  be  used  in  evidence 
against  him.  Nor  indeed  would  one  expect  it  to  in  the  same 
breath  as  telling  him  he  has  a  right  not  to  answer.  And  a  whole 
line  of  cases  like  Rv  Naylor  in  England,  Robertson  v  Maxwell 
in  Scotland  makes  exactly  this  point: 
We  do  not  think  that  the  words  of  the  caution 
can  be  properly  construed  in  the  sense  that  the 
prisoner  remains  silent  after  being  cautioned 
at  his  peril  and  may  find  his  silence  made  a 
strong  point  against  him  at  his  trial  (R  v  Naylor 
1933). 
Yet  cases  of  this  being  allowed  do  occur,  with  the  narrow 
s*categorisations  of  legal  knowledge  to  legitimise  thEm.  According 
to  Heydon  Is  text  on  evidence  a  judge  may  always  inform  a  jury 
that  silence  even  af  ter  cautim  strengthens  the  prosecution  case, 
though  it  does  not  corroborate  it.  A  judge  may  invite  the  jury 
to  take  into  account  in  the  weight  of  the  evidence  that  by  not 
mentioning  his  story  to  the  police  , 
he  has  deprived  them  of  the 
C  ý-  \/ 
opportunity  of  investigating  it  /  Littleboy  19  34).  Lord  Justice ýC) 
49 
Stevenson,  in  Rv  Ryan  (1966  50  Cr.  App.  Rep.  ),  distinguished 
the  inference  of  guilt  from  allowing  silence  to  affect 
credibility: 
It  is  we  think  clear  ...  that  it  is  wrong  to  say  to 
jury  'because  the  accused  exercised  what  is 
unrlr-%ubtedly  his  right,  the  privilege  of  remaining 
silent,  you  may  draw  an  inference  of  guilt';  it 
is  quite  a  different  matter  to  say,  'this  accused, 
as  he  is  entitled  to  do,  has  not  advanced  at  an 
earlier  stage  the  explanation  that  has  been  offered 
to  you  today;  you,  the  jury,  may  take  that  into 
account  when  you  are  assessing  the  weight  which 
you  think  it  right  to  attach  to  that  explanation.  I 
Mis  distinction  -  and  indeed  that  between  corroboration 
and  adding  weight  -  may  be  philosophically  accurate  but  the 
impact  is  the  same.  Indeed  Lord  Justice  Salmon  in  Rv  Sullivan 
noted: 
The  line  dividing  what  may  be  said  and  what  may 
not  be  said  is  a  very  f  ine  one  and  it  is  perhaps 
doubtful  whether  in  a  case  like  the  present  it 
would  be  even  perceptible  to  the  menbers  of  an 
ordinary  jury.  (1967) 
Indeed  in  the  appeal  on  Chandler  which  began  this  diScUSSiOn, 
Lord  Justice  Lawton's  rebuke  of  the  trial  judge  was  not  so  much 
o,  jQ-  r  the  net  result,  inferring  guilt,  but  the  style  of 
reasoning  used,  to 
short  circuit  the  intellectual  process  which 
had  to  be  followed. 
In  short.,  such  distinctions  superficially  uphold  the  rhetoric 50 
but  boil  down  to  little  more  protecticph  than  taking  two 
logical  steps  instead  of  one.  So.  judge  and  jury  may  infer 
P-nilt  from  the  exercising  of  the  right  to  silence;  the  accused  CD- 
may  incriminate  himself  by  exercising  the  privilege  against 
self-incrimination. 
But  both  statements  and  silence  are  of  course  only 
responses  as  reported  by  the  police.  They  are  unlikely  to  have 
been  witnessed  and  they  may  never  have  happened.  Even  the  f  act 
that  they  are  rarely  challenged  by  the  accused  does  not  mean  they 
actually  happened.  The  defendant  may  not  remerrber  or  may  not  think 
it  worthwhile  contradicting  the  police  -  there  are  after  all  always 
two  police  witnesses  in  Scotland  to  provide  corroboration  and 
in  both  systems  that  authoritative  notebook  -  on  somthing  he 
cannot  prove  or  indeed  which  may  rebound  on  him  if  he  happens  to 
have  a  previous  record. 
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Evidence  of  the  accused's  replies, 
confessions,  silence,  demeanour  therefore  has  to  be  set  in  context: 
neither  the  methods  used  to  produce  statemnts,  nor  indeed  the 
validity  of  police  reports  is  subject  to  any  effective  controls. U- 
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Controls 
There  are  four  potential  checks  in  the  present  legal 
structure,  legal  advice  for  the  suspect,  an  independent 
witness  at  the  police  stat  ion,  govemmental.  directions, 
and  judicial  sanctions.  The  structure,  \  substance  and  practice 
of  the  law  make  thern  all  too  weak. 
There  is  no  systematic  on-the- 
spot  check  in  the  police  station  on  advice  given, 
methods  used,  the  validity  of  statements  read  out  in  court  , 
and  without  that-there  is  no  way  of  enforcing  at  the  time 
the  prohibition  of  bullying,  pressure  or  third 
degree  methods'  to  secure  answers  to  questions. 
It  is  ha-rdly  surprising  then  that  cases  of  'verballing'  arise, 
like  the  infamous  Challenor  case 
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or  that  Cain  should  find 
policemen  saying,  for  example: 
I  must  say  I've  never  told  a  lie  in  court  myself 
but  I  have  often  said  things  that  were  not  quite 
the  truth.  (1971:  91) 
Judges  and  official  camdttees  and  inquiries  have  recognised 
that  police  malpractices  or  errors  my  occur  in  the  privacy 
of  the  police  station.  The  Fisher  Report  recognised  this.  Lord  Devlin 
has  observed: 
statements  have  sometimes  been  put  in  evidence 
which  have  been  said  to  be  the  prisoner's  own 
unaided  work  as  taken  dDwn  by  the  police  officer 
and  with  mbich  the  prisoner  has  recounted  in  the 
stately  language  of  the  police  station  (where, (\  "I 
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for  exanple,  people  never  eat  but  partake  of 
ref  reshnient  and  never  quarrel  but  indulge  in 
altercations)  the  tale  of  his  misdeeds. 
(cA  Z 
Lord  Cooper  showed  the  same  suspicions  in  the  Rigg  case 
(inauspiciously  named,  one  cannot  help  feeling): 
I  am  bound  to  say  that  I  have  viewed  with  growing 
uneasiness  and  distaste  the  frequency  with  which 
in  recent  yea-rs  there  have  been  tendered  in  support 
of  prosecutions  alleged  voluntary  statements 
said  to  have  been  made  to  the  police  by  persons 
charged  then  or  subsequently,  with  grave  crim  ... 
To  w  mind,  it  is  quite  incredible  that  such  a 
e- 
statuent  could  have  been  taken  f  rcm  any  person, 
least  of  all  f  rom  a  person  of  the  age  and  apparent 
experience  and  condition  of  the  accused.,  as  a 
tru  ly  spontaneous  and  voluntary  statement  in 
the  sense  in  which  that  expression  has  been  used 
in  the  *decision  .  or  without  such  interrogation 
as  would  in  conmn  experience  be  indispensable 
to  the  taking  of  such  a  detailed  precognition.  (  Výk-(6) 
It  is  the  sense  of  a  need  for  some  witnessing  of  what  happens 
at  the  police  station  that  has  led  both  the  lbon-son  Comrdttee 
on  Criminal  Procedure  in  Scotland  and  the  Criminal  Law 
Revision  Committee  to  recoýmend  the  use  of  tape-recorders 
(though  not  just  to  protect  the  accused  but  I  also  to  protect 
the  police  agai-nst  unjustified  allegations'  -  Thomson:  38). 
This  is  one  reason  too  v-by  Fisher  has  recomwnded  that  there 
should  be  a  clearer  right  to  a  solicitor  at  the  police  station q4 
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and  a  public  defender  system  to  make  this  a  real  right  for 
everyone,  and  why  'Momson  has  proposed  that  in  the  post-charge 
situation  an  accused  who  wants  to  make  a  voluntary  staterwnt 
should  be  of  fered  an  interview  with  a  solicitor.  The  other 
reason  of  course  is  to  make  legal  advice  obtainable  to  sameone 
at  the  police  station  so  that  he  knows  what  rights  he  has 
anpvay. 
But  for  the  numnt  the  accused  is  alone  with  the  police 
and  the  formal  structure  creates  an  informal  situation  of 
unilateral  power.  The  police  are  in  the  position  to  define 
what  may  be  an  arrbiguous  situation  for  the  accused  with  no 
contradictory  expertise  to  challenge  it.  Arrest,  search, 
f  inger-printing,  questioning,  being  ebarged  are  all  part  of  a 
degradation  ritual  which  constructs  an  atmc)sphere  of  guilt. 
Alone  with  the  police  the  accused  is  exposed  to  only  one 
version  of  how  the  law  defines  his  behaviour  or  alleged 
behaviour.,  how  the  evidence  looks  against  him,  be  he  innocent 
or  guilty,  and  what  his  chances  are  in  court.  Given  their 
own  involvement  interests  and  indeed  beliefs  in  the  case  the 
police  are  likely  to  create,  with  the  best  will  in  the  world, 
a  sense  of  pending  conviction  which  makes  co-operation,  not 
silence.,  the  only  sensible  reaction.  Indeed  American  police 
manuals,  and  English  Police  Review  editorials  (Release  1973:  9) 
provide  lists  of  techniques  designed  to  produce  precisely  this 
effect.  The  first  technique  of  interrogation  listed  in  Inbau 
and  Reid's  manual  is:  'Display  an  Air  of  Confidence  in  the 
Subject's  Guilt.  '  (1977:  IX) 
00 
Lord  Justice  General  Cooper  has  noted 
In  the  eyes  of  every  ordinary  citizen  the  venue C'k 
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(the  police  station)  is  a  sinister  one.  When  he 
stands  alone  in  such  a  place  confronted  by  several 
officers.,  usually  sone  of  high  rank,  the  dice 
are  loaded  against  him 
... 
(Chalmers  195ý 
Yet  though  this  was  the  summing  up  in  a  full  bench  case  with  all 
the  force  of  comon  law,  he  made  no  recomendation  for  some 
check  to  be  introduced,  not  even  the'most  obvious  one  of  having 
a  lawyer  at  hand. 
This  whole  issue  rrdght  seem  a  bit  odd  given  that  the  1887 
Criminal  Procedure  (Scotland)  Act  laid  down  that  prisoners 
should  have  access  to'!  a  law  agent  "  before  and  during  any  police 
examination: 
where  any  person  has  been  arrested  on  any  criminal 
charge  ,  such  person  shall  be  entitled  irrrrediately 
upon  arrest  to  have  information  sent  to  any 
properly  qualified  law  agent  that  his  professional 
assistance  is  required  by  such  person,  and 
informing  him  of  the  place  to  which  such  person 
is  to  be  taken  for  examination;  and  such  law 
agent  shall  be  entitled  to  have  a  private  interview 
with  the  person  accused  before  he  is  exandned  on 
declaration  and  to  be  present  at  such  examination 
... 
(section  17). 
Indeed  it  specified  there  should  be  forty-eight  hours  delay  if 
necessary  to  ensure  the  attendance  of  the  lawyer. 
The  1887  Act  in  short  would  appear  to  establish 
unequivocably  the  accused's  statutory  right  to  a  solicitor  on 
arrest  and  during  questioning.  But  the  judges  have  interpreted 
it  differently.  The  abstract  right  has  been  qualif  ied  and  the (ý  ýo 
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mchanics  for  putting  it  into  operation  have  quite  deliberately 
not  been  introduced. 
z 
ý'-The 
judges  have  qualified  the  statutory  right 
by  refining  the  definition  of  the  poInt  at  which  it  comes  into 
play.  The  statute  said  'on  a-rrest'  but  the  three  stage  model 
of  investigation  blurs  this.  Being  charged  and  being  taken  i  iito 
custody  were  in  1887  the  sam--  thing:  -  now  there  is  the  liabo 
of  the  L  suspect  Che-  accused's  right  to  access  to 
a  solicitor  is  only  when  he  is  charged.  This  reasoning  thus 
legitimises  not  only  questioning  in  custody  but  questioning 
without  access  to  or  the  presence  of  a  solicitor.  This  was 
clearly  established  by  1926  when  it  was  noted  in  the  Aitken 
case  as  one  of  the  disadvantages  of  the  susPect  vis-a-vis  the 
charged  prisoner. 
3  . ýt  4y  S 
What  is  more  the  have  failed  to  control  violations. 
In  Cheyne  v  McGregor  (1941)  the  Lord  Justice  Clerk 
decided  that,  although  it  was  "altogether  wrong"  according 
to  statute  to  refuse  private  consultation  with  a  solicitor 
and  that  such  consultation  was; 
a  very  important  and  valuable  right  -I 
should  not  object  to  it  being  described 
as  a  constitutional  right, 
I 
hw  was  nonetheless: '1 
not  prepared  to  assent  to  the  view  that  in  every 
case  where  a  mistake  is  made,  and  the 
accused  person  is  wrongly  refused  an 
interview,  the  effect  of  that  must 
be  to  bring  the  whole  proceedings  both 
at  that  time  and  forever  to  an  end. 
Violating  the  "constitutional  right"  nedd  not  therefore 
be  sanctioned. 
In  England  the  Judges'  Rules 
demmstrate  the  knack  of  reiterating  the 
rhetoric  but  qualifying  it  in  a  way  that  can  negate  it: 
every  person  at  any  stage  of  an  investigation 
should  be  able  to  commmicate  privately  with  a 
solicitor,  provided  that  in  such  a  case  no 
unreasonable  delay  or  hindrance  is  caused  to  the 
process  of  investigation  or  the  administration  of 
justice  by  his  doing  so.  (principle  (c)  my  enphasis) 
Ibis  is  exactly  the  opposite  of  the  provision  of  the.  1887  Act 
whereby  a  delay  in  proceedings,  f  ar  from  constituting  reasons 
for  not  calling  a  solicitor,  was  seen  as  a  necessary  masure 
to  be  instituted  in  order  to  ensure  one  was  present.  The 
police  themselves  decide  whether  'unreasonable  delay  or 
hindrance'  will  be  caused  -  that  is  to  say,  those  who  are 
supposed  to  be  checked  by  the  presence  of  a  solicitor  decide 
whether  a  solicitor  should  be  present,  an  odd  state  of  affairs 
to  say  the  least.  There  is  one  check  on  them  of  course,  the Ck  1ý 
view  of  the  High  Court  judges  should  the  case  be  appealed. 
But  they  have  elected  to  sit  on  the  fence  on  this  issue.  Me 
Court  of  Appeal  has  said  it  is  'unsatisfactory'  to  interpret 
,  delay  or  hindrance'  as  maning  sinply  that  the  accused  might 
not  confess  with  a  solicitor  there.,  but  with  the  nice  skill 
high  Court  judges  have  of  both  having  their  cake  and  eating  it 
) 
they  also  refused  to  prohibit  this  or  treat  it  as  grounds  for 
appeal,  since  it  was  a  matter  for  the  discretion  of  the  trial 
judge  (R  v  Lemsatef  19  7'6. 
Duty  solicitor  schems  in  Scotland  and  parts  of  England 
have  to  be  set  in  this  context.  Studies'4-  have  indicated  that 
the  value  of  such  schemes  can  be  more  symbolic  than  real, 
given  not  only  police  failure  to  encourage  prisoners  to  contact 
solicitors,  but  also  the  reluctance  of  solicitors  themselves 
to  provide  a  24  hour  service.  Generally  they  nuet  prisoners 
for  the  f  irst  time  just  before  their  first  court  appearance. 
But  however  the  practices  of  police  and  solicitors  might  be 
'reformed'  the  legal  context  would  still  inpose  a  ba-rrier.  So 
far  as  interrogation  before  charge  is  concerned  there  is  no  ýAQck,  <- 
right  to  a  solicitor  at  all. 
Nor  is  that  a  situation  which  has 
I  as  it  were  I  crept  in 
inadvertently  or  been  overlooked  by  officialdam.  Rather 
proposals  to  reform  it  have  been  rejected  outright  by  Lord 
Widgery  in  England: 
Any  rule  requiring  the  Presence  of  the  suspect's 
lawyer  during  interrogation  is  quite  unacceptable. 
(Zander  1972) 
and  by  the  rMomson  Committee  in  Scotland: 
1ý  "  -, 
'We  recomend  that  a  solicitor  should  not  be C\C\ 
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permitted  to  intervene  in  police  investigations 
before  charge.  The  purpose  of  the  interrogation 
is  to  obtain  from  the  suspect  such  information 
as  he  may  possess  regarding  the  offence,  and 
this  purpose  might  be  defeated  by  the  participation 
of  his  solicitor  (1975:  34) 
-a  statenvent.  that  echoes  the  more  direct  objection  by  the  police 
who  do  not  want  a  solicitor  at  the  police  station  because  he 
would  tell  the  accused  to  exercise  his  right  to  silence. 
Judicial  'cla-rification'  of  the  statutory  right  to  a 
solicitor  thus  denies  it  at  the  time  it  is  most  needed  and  defines 
its  value  as  a  check  on  the  interrogation  of  a  suspect  out  of 
existence. 
As  to  the  mchanics  of  operating  such  right  to  a  solicitor 
as  there  is,  the  police  are  under  no  obligation,  contrary  to  the 
American  ruling  in  Miranda  to  tell  the  accused  of  his  rights. 
There  is  a  contradiction  in  the  1887  Act  to  which  the  Scottish 
textbook,  Renton  and  Brown,  draws  attention,  -It 
imposes  no  duty  upon  anyone  to  inform  the 
accused  of  his  right  to  sunmn  professional 
assistance  but  this  should  always  be  done.  (1972:  ý,  '-) 
It  is  not  really  a  contradiction  of  course,  merely  an  omission 
to  specify  the  mechanics  to  bring  the  right  into  operation  -  an 
orrassion  which  itself  contributes  to  the  gap  between  rhetoric 
and  reality  by  offering  syrfbolic  rights  but  no  instrmental 
access  to  them,  just  as  the  Factory  Acts  did  (Carson  1977). 
However  it  is  an  Omission  which  case  law  could  readily  have 
tackled.  But  the  judges  have  taken  the  opposite  line.  They  have 
used  the  lack  of  specified  enforcement  mechanism  in  the  Xct  to ý00 
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legitimise  the  police  failure  to  infom  the  accused  of  any 
right  to  see  a  solicitor. 
They  do  this  by  focussing  on  the  word  'entitled'  in  the 
statutes  and  interpreting  this  as  maning  entitled  if  he  asks 
for  a  solicitor,  not  entitled  to  be  told  he  may.  He  is  not,  in 
short,  entitled  to  be  told  what  he  is  entitled  to.  Again)  by 
decontextualising  the  word  from  the  apparent  intention  of  the 
Act,  the  intention  is  nullified  by  judicial  reasoning. 
Parliament  is  overruled  by  the  judges,  and  the  statute  beccxws 
a  source  for  the  general  principles  that  constitute  the 
rhetoric  of  justice,  while  the  interpretation  of  case  law 
becoms  the  very  different  legal  reality. 
How  this  operates  in  court  may  be  demonstrated 
t  1ý 
observation,  Me  defence  counsel  was  arguing 
that  the  accused  had  a  right  to  a  solicitor  at  the  police 
station.  The  judge  ruled  that  he  was  wrong  -a  suspect's 
right  to  be  allowed  to  consult  a  solicitor  did  not  of  course 
man  that  the  policennn  was  under  any  obligation  to  tell  the 
defendant  of  this:  'allowed  mans  what  it  says.  The  young 
barrister  incidentally  tried  to  get  over  this  by  telling  the 
jury  in  his  suming  up  that  his  argurneent,  was  not  just  concocted 
by  himself,  someone  wbo  might  be  thought  to  be  wet  behind  the 
ears  but  was  the  view  expressed  by  somone  who  was  definitely 
not  wet  behind  the  ea-rs  , 
Sir  Henry  Fisher,  in  his  of  f  icial 
report.  However,  the  judge  dismissed  this.  The  view  he  said 
was  not  a  statement  of  current  law  but  a  reccxmi--ndation  as  to 
what  it  should  be,  and  he  added  of  no  authority'  anyway,  being 
merely  the  opinion  of  an  ex-high  court  judge!  More  iq)ortant 
than  judicial  snideness  however  is  the  demmstration  here  of 
how  structural  contradictions  influence  the  process  and  outcome 59 
of  cases.  The  confidence  of  both  counsel  and  judge  that  their 
interpretations  were  each  correct  though  apparently  Contradictory 
is  once  again  understandable  if  set  in  the  context  of  the  legal 
structure.  Me  counsel's  argument  is  based  on  statute  and 
rhetoric,  the  judge's  on  the  very  different  legal  reality 
of  case  law.  One  cannot  help  but  conclude  from  such  examples 
of  judicial  interpretation  of  statutes  that  the  ideology  of  the 
separation  of  powers  leaving  the  judges  free  to  protect  the 
citizen  from  the  governmnt  can  be  rendered  sorwwhat  ironical 
by  what  the  judges  do 
- 
Indeed  this  point  is  supported  fuxther  still.  The  Home-  Of  f  ice 
has  issued  a  circular  (31  May  1966)  instructing  that  attention 
should  be  drawn  to  a  notice  at  the  police  station  displaying 
the  accused's  rights.  But  the  sanction,  as  we  have  seen,  lies 
with  the  judges,  and  the  judges  have  ruled  that  failure  to  do 
this  'is  not  necessarily  fatal  to  the  case'. 
Finally  there  are  ways  in  which  a  person  who  does  wish  to 
see  a  solicitor  may  be  discouraged  from  -  or  punished  for  -  doing 
so.  The  f  irst  is  based  on  observation  in  court  xýhich  suggests 
that  asking  for  a  solicitor  may  be  treated  as  incriminating 
evidence.  In  case  91,  as  already  demonstrated,  the  accused's  response.. 
refusing  W  produce  a  log  book  or  answer  questions  and  requesting 
to  see  a  solicitor  was  comnented  on  by  the  judge  to  the  jury: 
Is  this  the  remark  of  an  innocent  man 
The  second  is  rrore  clearly  a  product  of  the  legal  structure 
as  opposed  to  the  interpretation  of  law  by  a  lower  court  judge. 
It  is  financial.  The  Duty  Solicitor  SCheM  has  been  the  norm 
in  Scotland  for  s  ome  tim  but  it  is  not  general  in  England.  Of 
course  there  is  legal  aid  but  Sir  Henry  Fisher  notes  lirrdtations \  0ý2- 
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on  the  funding  of  legal  a-dvic-'  at  1-116  police  station 
TTI) 
Qhe  iffplication  that  the  accused  would  have  to  pay  legal 
costs  himself  if  the  police  drop  the  charge,  and  that  the 
police  are  more  likely  to  drop  the  charge  if  a  solicitor  is 
present  -a  vicious  circle  with  the  accused  losing  out  either 
in  freedom  or  finance. 
Me  law  thus  explicitly  prohibits  at  soun-  stages,  implicitly 
denies  or  discourages  at  others,  access  to  a  solicitor. 
Zander  (1972)  has  shown  that  74%  of  a  san-ple 
who  asked  to  see  a  solicitor  at  the  police  station  were  refused, 
while  Baldwin  and  McConville  found  that  70%  of  defendants  did 
not  ask  to  see  a  solicitor  while  being  interrogated  and  of 
those  who  did  6  out  of  7  were  told  they  were  not  allowed  to 
(1977:  105).  Given  the  legal  context  this  is  hardly  surprising. 
Enforcement  is  thus  lef  t  to  the  post  hoc  decisions'of  the 
courts.  And  so  for  that  matter  are  the  rules  to  be  enforced. 
Certainly  there  is  a  code  of  government  directions  for  police 
conduct  with  suspects,  the  Judges'  Rules,  drawn  up  by  High  Court 
Judges  and  issued  by  the  Home  Office  to  the  police.  Meir  inpact 
may  'be  suggested  by  Sir  Henry  Fisher's  finding  in  his  inquiry  into 
the  Confait  Case  that  sow  policemn  did  not  know,  understand  or  at 
any  rate  obey  the  rules.  He  therefore  recormiends  better  publicity. 
What  is  mom-  inportant  however  is  that  whether  they  are  known 
or  not,  abided  by  or  broken,  there  is  no  machinery  to  enforce \0  "1 
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them,.,  not  even  the  judicial  sanction  of  exclusion  of  evidence 
in  court  -  inadmissibility. 
Inadmissibility  is  the  major  weapon  available  to  the 
court  to  control  police  practices.  'Ihe  Judges'  Rules  are  the 
most  explicit  statemnt  of  controls  on  police  practices.  But 
the  rules  and  the  machinery  for  punishment  do  not  cohere. 
Breach  of  the  Judges'  Rules  does  not  automatically  lead  to 
inadmissibility.  Indeed  according  to  Rv  Prager  (1972)  it  is 
not  even  clear  that  a  judge  is  allowed,  at  his  discretion,  to 
exclude  informatim  that  has  been  obtainedby  mthods  that 
breach  the  rules  unless  it  is  also  proved  to  have  been 
involuntarily  given. 
There  is  a  sinple  enough  reason  for  this.  The  Judges'  Rules 
are  not  law,  just  administrative  directions,  and  not  enforceable 
in  court.  As  Lord  Devlin  puts  it: 
It  must  never  be  forgotten  that  the  Judges' 
Rules  were  made  for  the  guidance  of  the  police 
and  not  for  the  circumscription  of  the  judicial 
power.  (19N'&,  C,:  31) 
Indeed  it  has  been  held  in  the  Prager  case  that  a  voluntary 
confession  made  in  breach  of  the  Rules  could  not  be  made 
inadmissible  exactly  because  that  'would  exalt  the  Judges' 
Rules  into  rules  of  law'.  So  while  the  Judges'  Rules  am 
often  referred  to  in  court,  while  they  are  judge-made  and  in 
part  based  on  cam-on  law,  and  while  they  may  give  rise  to 
questions  of  inadmissibility,  they  are  of  themselves  rules 
without  teeth. 
The  underlying  cause  of  this  situation  interestingly 
enough  is  the  demeratic  ideology  of  the  bepa-ration  of  powers, ý0  kA, 
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whereby  judges  shall  not  be  the  lackeys  of  the  government  ,  in 
order  to  prevent  political  manipulation  and  protect  the  civil 
liberties  of  the  citizen  against  the  state  -  interestingly, 
because  it  is  precisely  protection  of  civil  liberties  that  the 
Judges  I  Rules  might  claim  to  be  providing.  So  a  state  structure 
geared  to  the  dominant  ideology  of  democratic  rights  prevents 
specific  rulings  to  preserve  those  demeratic  rights  from 
being  enforced.  The  structure  behind  democratic  ideology  thus 
ironically  legitimises  the  failure  to  enforce  it. 
We  must  therefore  look  to  judicial  sanctions  in  the  courts 
for  control  on  the  collection  and  presentation  of  evidence. 
Judicial  sanctions  rest  on  the  notion  of  inadmissibility,  on  the 
judge's  right  to  exclude  evidence  cbtained  by  illegal  me-ans. 
Police  conduct  in  collecting  evidence  is  controlled  by  the  possi- 
bility  of  losing  their  case  if  their  conduct  does  not  meet  legal 
standards.  This  means  of  control  severely  limits  its  value  as  a 
control. 
First  it  can  by  its  nature  af  fect  only  those  cases  actually 
brought  to  trial  (or  indeed  to  appeal)  and  of  course  the  vast 
majority  of  defendants  plead  guilty,  partly  because  of  what  happens 
in  their  encounter  with  the  police,  while  the  structural  barriers 
to  appeals  are  such  that  few  are  allaved.  As  a  cc)ntrol  over  routine 
police  behaviour  in  all  cases,  whether  they  actually  end  up  being 
brought  to  trial  or  not,  this  method  is  really  a  non-starter. 
mre,  it  depends  on  a  case  being  made  out  by  the 
defendant  on  the  methods  used,  and  there  we  are  back  to  square  one: 
no  witnesses  at  the  poliCe  station,  the  pmblems  of  proof  and \oc 
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credibility,  a  trial  in  itself  involved  in  raising  the  issue  for 
control.  Indeed  when  such  questions  arise  in  trial  by  jury,  the 
jin-y  is  sent  away  and  "a  trial  within  a  trial"  is  held  to  decide 
how  to  continue.  The  police  are  therefore  controlled  only  by  the 
defendant  successfully  making  a  case  against  them  in  the  course  of 
his  own  trial. 
Second,  since  inadmissibility  involves  a  post-hoc  decision, 
the  rules  themselves  are  never  clear  until  they  are  tested  in  the 
courts  after  the  event.  Indeed  it  was  the  police  themselves,  after 
tvo  contradictory  decisions  by  judges  on  the  legitimacy  of  their 
conduct,  who  asked  for  the  first  Judges'  Rules  in  1912.  Since  the 
Rules  are  still  subject  to  coamn  law  decisions  however,  the  situation 
has  altered  little  in  practice.  If  rules  that  lack  enforcownt  make 
feeble  controls,  rules  that  are  not  known  till  after  they  have  been 
broken  are  feebler  still. 
Third,  inadmissibility  is  not  an  absolute  control.  Even  where 
the  conduct  of  the  police  is  declared  illegitimate  by  the  judges,  the 
evidence  acquired  by  that  conduct  is  not  necessarily  excluded,  and 
the  case  can  still  be  won  by  the  prosecution  regardless.  There  is 
no  equivalent  in  Scots  or  English  law  of  the  Amrican  doctrine  that 
the  fruit  of  the  forbidden  tree  is  itself  forbidden  -  inadmissible  - 
(Mapp  v.  Ohio,  . 
. 
\ct6.  %)  Scots  law  on  exclusion  of  evidence  is 
sometimes  described  as  clearer  and  fairer  to  the  accused,  much  more 
geared  to  disciplining  the  police  via  the  power  of  exclusion  than 
English  law.  Heydon  suggests  this  (1975:  23D)  citing  Lord  Justice 
General  Cooper's  exclusion  of  unwarranted  search  evidence  in  lawrie  v. 
Muir  in  support.  But  the  sam  judge  regularly  acknitted  illegally \  (:  )  ýo 
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obtained  evidence,  for  exanple,  because  it  was  taken  "in  good 
faith"  (Fairley  v.  Fishmongers  of  London,  1951) 
)  although  he 
had  ruled  out  good  faith  as  a  good  reason  just  the  year  before. 
Indeed  Lord  Justice  General  Cooper  has  made  it  clear  that  the 
evidence  he  declared  inadmissible  in  Lawrie  v.  Muir  was  defined 
as  such  mainly  because  it  was  not  the  police  who  obtained  it: 
It  is  especially  to  be  noted  that  the  two  inspectors  who 
in  this  instance  exceeded  their  authority  were  not  police 
officers  enjoying  a  large  residuum  of  common  law 
discretionaEy  pSývers  , 
but  the  employees  of  a  limited 
company  acting  in  association  with  the  Milk  Marketing 
Board,  whose  only  powers  are  derived  from  contracts 
between  the  Board  and  certain  rrdlk  producers  and 
distributors,  of  whom  the  appellant  is  not  one.  'Mough 
the  matter  is  narrow,  1  am  inclined  to  rega-rd  this  last 
point  as  sufficient  to  tilt  the  balance  against  the 
prosecution.  (1950,  my  emphasis) 
This  is  hardly  a  raising  of  the  standards  of  civil  rights  against 
E01i  illegal  po  lee  activity.  However,  the  image  of  Scots  law  as  fair 
and  operating  tight  controls  on  the  police,  may  be  understandable 
if  it  is  corypared  with  the  extmnes  in  English  law.  In  Kuruma,  a 
1955  case  of  illegally  obtained  evidence  (the  evidence  itself  being 
rather  dubious  anyway),  English  judges  went  so  far  as  to  justify  their 
decision  by  citing  a  judicial  opinion  of  1861  that  effectively 
declared  anything  goes: 
It  matters  not  how  you  get  it;  if  you  steal  it  even 
it  would  be  admissible. 
Ducking  the  inadmissibility  issue  nieans  that  even  the  principle  of 
post-hoc  control  of  police  behaviour  via  the  courts,  power  to  exclude 
evidence  is  avoided. 
Fourth,  as  this  chapter  and  indeed  this  whole  study  demonstrates, 
the  line  drawn  between  the  admissible  and  the  inadmissible  by  the 
judges  in  exercising  control  over  the  police  has  been  far  fran  rigid. \0"-l 
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But  in  drawing  that  line  they  are  not  just  exercising  control  in  a 
specific  case  they  are  also  making  the  rules  for  the  future.  The 
judges  have  not  chosen  to  use  their  powers  to  exclude  evidence  to 
offer  clearcut  protection  of  the  accused's  alleged  rights.  Rather, 
with  every  questionable  practice  that  is  admitted  and  so  legitimised, 
case  law  has  whittled  these  'rights'  away. CHAPTER  3 
1.  The  Times,  15th  June  1978;  the  Guardian.,  8th  January  1979. 
2.  The  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions:.  Guardian,  8th  January 
1979. 
3.  This  and  the  following  section  are  based  on  and  developed 
from  a  previous  article,  McBaxnet  1978  (a) 
4.  See.,  for  example,  S.  Dell  1971  ;  Baldwin  and  McConville  1977. 
5.  In  Scotland  there  is  a  duty  solicitor  scheme  which  was 
extended  for  the  first  time  to  the  district  courts,  (the  nea-rest 
equivalent  in  what  is  rather  a  different  court  structure-)  in  1.975. 
6.  See  chapter  4. 
7.  See  chapter  2  and  chapter  6  for  further  details  on  corroboration. 
8.  Sir  David  McNee,  Metropolitan  Police  Comnissioner,  'The  Tims, 
15th  June  1978. 
See  chapter  2. 
10.  See  this  chapter,  on  "The  Right  to  Silence?  " 
11.  A  randan  seirple  f  rom  a  Glasgow  court's  f  iles. 
12.  Baldwin  and  McConville  1977;  and  see  chaT)ter  4. 
13.  See  Cox  1975. 
14.  For  example,  Mungham.  and  Thcrnas  1976. 
15.  In  England.  Full  details  are  being  written  up  by  the  author 
in  a  separate  study  on  The  Jury. 
16.  See  chapter  8  for  a  discussion  of  the  implications  of  the 
post-hoc  nature  of  case  law. ý  ocý 
CRAPIER  4  Pleading  Guilty 
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Given  the  extent  of  legal  police  powers  to  acquire  and 
construct  incriminating  evidence  and  the  broad  scope  for 
adrrdtting  it  as  evidence  in  court  . 
it  may  be  hardly  surprising 
that  nust  defendants  never  force  the  prosecutor  to  prove  his  case 
at  a  trial  but  incriminate  then-selves  in  the  mst  direct  way  by 
pleading  guilty.  Saryple,  studies  show  that  767o  to  937o  of  defendants 
in  magistrates'  courts  and  57%  to  75%  in  higher  courts  plead 
guilty.  (Dell  1971;  2ander  1969;  Bottars  and  McClean  1976; 
Baldwin  and  McConville  1977).  'Ihis  prcportion  includes  not  only 
those  who  see  therrrelves  as  factually  guilty,  or  factually  innocent 
but  technically  guilty,  (both  of  whom  according  to  the  rhetoric 
still  have  a  right  to  force  the  prosecution  to  prove  guilt)  but 
those  who  see  themselves  as  cornpletely  innocent.  Me  encounter  with 
the  police,  be  it  the  definitional  encounter  in  petty  offences 
Pgainst  public  order,  or  the  mre  omplicated  process  of  arrest,  t::  ) 
interrogation  or  search  in  I  real  crime,  '  is  the  essence  of  crindnal 
justice  for  most  of  the  people  who  turn  up  for  their  ritual  plea  and 
sentence  in  court.  Indeed  the  very  nature  of  mc)st  murtroom 
appearances  as  routine,  boring,  ritual,  unprcblematic  processing, 
as  described  by  Carlen  or  Bottom  and  McClean  niakes  particular  sense 
in  the  context  of  what  has  gcne  before  -  the  matter  is  already 
effectively  decided.  Baldwin  and  McComrille's  recognition  that 
the  lack  of  safeguards  f  or  the  accused  in  custody  can  lead  to  forced 
-  or  fabricated  -  statements  and  a  plea  of  guilty  touches  just  the 
lip  of  the  ioeberg.  The  whole  gamut  of  pretrial  procedures ýýo 
contributes  to  the  sane  sense  of  the  defence  case  as  a  lost  cause 
long  before  the  trial,  either  by  the  defendant  hirrself  or  by 
defence  counsel, 
!  )ý 
and  the  defendant  ends  up  pleading  guilty. 
Most  studies  of  the  guilty  plea  have  focussed  not  so  much 
on  the  legal  context  surrounding  either  the  preliminam--- 
I 
ýo  the 
plea  or  the  plea  itself  but  on  the  interactional,  informal  and 
bureaucratic  aspects  of  plea  bargaining  (Newman  1966;  BluTherg  1967; 
S 
'MI* 
kolnick  1967;  Baldwin  and  McConville  1977).  Alliances,  (often 
frowned  on  as  unholy)  and  negotiations  between  prosecutor  and  defence 
counsel  or  indeed  between  counsel  and  judge  axi--  focussed  on  as  the 
mcechanism;  the  bureaucratic  need  for  a  speedy  and  efficient 
throughput  of  cases  is  focussed  on  iýthe  motivation.  Bottons-,  and 
McClean  conclude  f  rom  their  observations  that  court  workloads  am 
such  that: 
the  smooth  administration  of  justice  essentially 
depends  on  the  co-operation  of  the  mass  of 
defendants  (1976  :  6) 
-  the  co-operation  of  pleading  guilty.  So  ve  are  presented  with  a 
picture  where  the  legal  system  is  geared  to  notions  like  right  to 
a  fair  trial,  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  prosecutor,  no-one  is 
bound  to  incriminate  himself  -  but  in  the  course  of  doing  their 
icb  the  administrators  of  justice  undermine  this  system  for  the  sake 
of  efficiency  and  the  net  result  is  all  sorts  of  pressures  to  plead 
guilty.  Mere  are  two  dangers  in  this  "law  in  action"  perspective. 
Pirst,  approaching  the  guilty  plea  via  administrative  pressures 
paints  too  neutral  a  picture  of  the  criminal  pmoess  -  bureaucracy M 
is  a  neutral  word:  what  it  is  for  is  important.  Second  it 
overplays  non-legal  motivations  at  the  expense  of  the  part  played 
11 
bv  the  legal  svstem  itself 
c  \:  QcL¼ 
(O 
'Ihe  errphasis  on  adrrdnistrative  needs  -  epitomised  in  BottomZ 
I 
!& 
McClean's  'liberal  bureaucrat'  -  presents  a  picture  of  neutral 
officials  whose  sole  aim  is  efficiency  and  for  whom  conviction  is 
rrerely  a  by-product.  Ibis  is  not  necessarily  the  case.  It  would 
after  all  be  even  speedier  at  the  legislative  level  to  decriminalise 
general  categories  of  behaviour,  especially  given  the  triviality  of 
n-ost  cases  that  ccme  before  the  oc)urts,  and  the  magistrates,  courts 
in  particular,  or  at  the  adrdnistrative  level,  to  drop  specific 
cases.  This  is  within  the  discretion  of  police  and  prosecution  and 
indeed  it  is  defined  in  the  Scots  manual  as  the  duty  of  the  procurator 
fiscal  to,  among  other  things,  decide: 
wbether  the  act  or  orrdssion  charged  is  of  suf  f  icient 
irrportance 
and 
whether  there  is  sufficient  evidence  in  support  of 
these  facts  to  justify  the  institution  of  criminal 
proceedings.  (Renton  and  Brown  1972  :  19) 
Of  course  cases  are  dropped  %bere  there  is  not  enough  legal  proof  for 
prosecution.  Indeed  Mack  points  out  that  bigtini, 
-  criminals  know 
exactly  how  to  manage  the  system  in  order  to  ensure  there  will  not 
be  enough  proof  (1976).  But  where  there  is  some  hope  that  the 
accused  will  plead  guilty,  the  case  will  not  necessarily  be  dropped, 
even  where  it  is  known  that  it  could  not  stand  up  in  court.  7hus 
polioe  ccnplaj-nt  files  ocme  back  from  the  procurator  fiscal  with \  \-Z- 
notes  in  the  margin  like  this: 
If  not  guilty,  desert,  can't  identify. 
Me  accused  not  guilty  and  the  case,  after  four  adjournn-k--nts 
L 
was  dropped.  Other  cases  work  out  differently.  In  a  case  annotf--te& 
thus: 
If  not  guilty,  reconsider,  doubt  if  it  can  be  proved 
the  accused,  who  had  been  stopped  while  taking  copper  piping  worth 
a  pound  from  a  lorry  to  a  broker,  and  accused  of  stealing  it,  plea6Q-16 
guilty  and  was  duly  sentenced.  Prosecutions  thus  continue  even 
when  the  prosecutor  knows  from  the  evidence  that  the  accused  is 
either  in  real  or  in  legal  tems  not  guilty.  He  does  not  neces- 
sarily  drop  cases  for  which  he  could  not  neet  the  burden  of  proof 
in  court;  he  sinply  hopes  he  will  not  have  to. 
These  were  only  two  cases  out  of  100  randcm]-y  selected  police 
conplaint  files.  But  Baldwin  and  McConville  would  seem  to  offer 
supporting  evidence  for  prosecution  cases  that  could  not  in  fact 
be  proved  succeeding  because  of  a  guilty  plea.  Independent  assessors 
concluded  that  acquittal  would  have  been  possible  or  likely  in 
21%  of  the  121  cases  in  their  sanple  because  the  prosecution  evidence 
was  weak  (1977  :  74).  But  although  many  of  these  defendants  claime-d. 
innocence  on  interview,  all  of  them  had  pleaded  guilty  and  the 
prosecutor  never  had  to  prove  his  case.  The  rhetoric  of  the  burden 
of  proof  therefore  did  nothing  to  protect  them. 
What  these  exarrples  suggest  is  that  ad-ninistrative  pressures 
for  speed  and  efficiency  should  not  be  taken  as  sorm  neutral 
influence  with  the  incidental  product  of  a  high  conviction  rate 
without  a  lot  more  research  into  the  rwtivations  behind  dropping  or ýý  "2 
pursuing  cases.  It  is  not  without  significance  that  Bottoms  and 
McClean  cite  and  syrrpathise  with  the  adrrdnistrative  prcblen-s  and 
mtivations  of  their  'liberal  bureaucrats'  without  any  empirical 
scrutiny  at  all  to  check  out  either  their  prcblen-s  or  their 
mc)tivation.  Me  image  of  the  overworked  court  has  becom  a 
cliche'  that  can  be  referred  to  without  further  analysis.  But  are 
the  courts  overworked?  What  level  of  work  constitutes  overwork? 
On  routine  visits  to  the  courts  one  can  certainly  cuwe  across 
afternoon  sessions  that  begin  at  2  p.  m.  and  finish  at  twelve 
minutes  past.  In  any  case  Laurence  Friedmann's  historical  study 
demmstrates  that  Alamena  County  Courts  in  the  late  nineteenth 
century.,  -  not  crowded  urban  courts  still  operated  routinely 
by  plea  bargaining  (1978).  'Ihe  four  adjournrrents  noted  in  the  case 
CUj above  where  the  prosecution  could  not  be  sure  of  conviction  suggest 
that  some  lengths  wre  gone  to  to  strengthen  the  case  before  giving 
it  up  -  in  short,  that  efficiency  was  defined  not  so  much  in  term 
of  securing  a  speedy  throughput  of  cases  as  in  tenm  of  securing 
convictions.  Administrative  mtivation  may  be  less  value-free  than 
is  normally  suggested. 
More  inportant,  the  emphasis  on  bureaucratic  and  other  non-legal 
influenoes  distracts  from  the  role  of  the  legal  system  itself  in 
pressurising  people  to  plead  guilty.  For  if  all  sorts  of  interests 
which  may  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  law  per  se  provide  the  motives 
for  plea-bargaining  it  is  the  legal  system  itself  which  provides  the 
opportunity. 
aA  Q  a, 
Discussicns  of  plea-bargaining  in  England  have  drmvn  attention 
to  the  differenoes  in  English  and  American  prosecution  structures, ýý  Lý 
and  concluded  that  the  general  structure  of  prosecution  in  England 
does  not  create  so  much  of  an  opportunity  for  putting  pressures 
on  the  defendant  to  plead  guilty.  Nar  is  it  seen  to  be  a  practice 
with  official  endorserwnt.  Rather  it  is,  as  Carlen  puts  it, 
some-thing  to  be  hidden  from  the  magistrate,  'a  betrayal  of  the 
professional  construction  of  justice.  '  (1975  :  35).  But  one 
cannot  conclude  from  the  differences  betveen  American  and  English 
legal  structures,  and  the  covert  nature  of  plea-bargaining  in 
England,  that  it  is  not  structura-Ily  or  authoritatively  promoted. 
Philip  Momas  (1978)  makes  the  point  that  although  overt  judicial 
plea-bargaining  is  frowned  on  in  case  law,  structural  factors 
allowing  covert  judicial  plea-bargaining  are  established  by  it  - 
an  exarrple  of  how  case  lmv  can  both  uphold  and  deny  the  rhetoric 
of  justice.  Cases  allow  counsel  to  give  his  client  "advice  in 
strong  terms"  as  to  his  plea  (R  v  Turner  1970  and 
allows  counsel  and  judge  to  meet  privately  and  discuss  the  case 
and  potential  sentence  (R  v  Turner;  R_v_Cain  1976).  What  is 
not  allowed  is  the  barrister  actually  telling  the  defendant  that  the 
advice  he  is  giving  emanates  from  discussion  with  the  judge. 
Widgery  put  it  in  a  nutshell: 
One  of  the  advantages  that  flowed  from  the  close 
relationship  between  judge  and  barrister  was  that  the 
barrister  in  that  situation  could  go  to  the  judge  and 
ask  him  for  guidance.  If  the  judge  felt  disposed  to 
Lord 
give  it  to  him,  counsel  would  then  have  a  reliable  idea 
of  what  sort  of  sentence  his  client  f  aced,  and  could 
ark-ise  him  properly.  But  the  whole  point  would  be destroyed  if  he  disclosed  what  the  judge  had  told  him. 
Me  confidentiality  in  their  relationship  would  be 
broken.  (R  v  Peace  1975) 
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We  are  back  to  one-step  linkages  being  disapproved  while  two-step 
linkages  to  the  same  end  a-re  deewd  quite  legitimate. 
In  Scotland  "plea-adjustme-nt"  is  not  only  facilitated  by  the 
structure  of  prosecution  but  is  officially  encouraged.  The  cha-rge, 
the  allocation  of  a  case  to  solen-n  or  sunrm-ry  jurisdiction  (with 
higher  or  lower  maxim=  sentences),  and  the  acceptance  of  the  plea 
are  left,  with  the  occasional  statutory  exception,  to  the  prosecutor's 
discre_,  tion,  and  can  be  changed  without  explanation.  There  are  clear 
parallels  with  Skolnick's  study  of  the  public  prosecutor's  role  in 
Awrica  (1967)  which  he  suggests  creates  the  opportunity  for 
bargaining.  It  is  also  officially  endorsed,  for  exanple,  by  the 
Thornson  Conrdttee: 
There  is  no  statutory  authority  for  plea  adjustmnt  but 
it  is  accepted  as  proper  practice  for  either  the  accused's 
legal  adviser  or  the  prosecutor  to  approach  the  other  and 
negotiate  the  acoeptance  of  a  partial  plea.  Nomally  such 
an  approadi  corres  f  rom  the  defence  but  it  is  perfectly 
prcper  for  the  prosecutor  to  intimate  to  the  defenoe  that 
he  would  be  willing  to  accept  a  plea  of  guilty  to  less 
than  the  full  extent  of  any  particular  cha-rge  (1975  :  97). 
The  only  criticism  by  the  Ccvrdttee  was  that  it  was  wasteful  for 
plea-bargaining  to  occur  at  the  last  minute  after  the  case  had  been 
prepared  and  witnesses  called,  so  it  was  proposed  that: 
While  the  practice  of  plea  adjustment  should  continue, \(  ýp 
it  should  wherever  possible  be  effected  well  befoit- 
the  trial  (1975  :  97) 
and  that  procedures  should  be  used  or  adapted  f  or  this  purpose. 
The  period  of  tirm  between  the  charge  and  the  plea  diet  should 
be  extended  frcm  six  to  twenty  days  (too  bad  for  those  in  custody 
untried)  to  'facilitate  early  plea  adjustment  in  solerm  proceedings,  I 
and  there  should  be  a  preliminary  meeting  between  the  two  sides, 
at  whidi: 
We  recormiend  that  there  should  be  informl  discussion 
between  prosecution  and  defence 
...  on,  for  exanple, 
the  following  subjects  ...  plea  adjustmnt 
(1975  :  116  -  nly  emphasis). 
In  short,  f  ar  f  rom  being  some  under-  the-  carpet  subversion  of  of  f  icial 
policy,  plea-bargaining  in  Scotland  has  been  recognised,  endorsed 
and  promoted  by  a(\  -  c)ý  ý  c-,,  (xk  'Ccý-,  4,  kvkk  Ift-Qe  . 
But  the  legal  system  in  both  England  and  Scotland  also 
pressurises  defendants  into  pleading  guilty,  vibether  they  consider 
themselves  guilty  or  not,  in  more  specific  ways.  There  is  for 
exanple  a  discount  in  sentence  for  pleading  guilty  -a  clear  and 
explicit  exanple  of  how  legal  rules  emsculate  legal  rhetoric.  It 
may  be  a  'golden  thread'  of  justice  that  the  defendant  has  the 
right  to  make  the  prosecution  prove  his  guilt,  but  should  he 
exercise  that  right  and  be  found  guilty  he  will  be  given  a  heavier 
sentence.  Not  that  the  law  phrases  it  like  this',  rather  it  is  put 
in  term  of  a  mitigated  sentence  for  showing  repentance  by  pleading 
guilty.  But  the  effect  is  the  sarne  and  this  justification  only 
demnstrates  the  reasming  by  which  the  gap  between  ibetoric  and  law ý  k"I 
is  maintained.  We  have  already  seen  that  although  self  -incriminating 
staterrents  made  to  the  police  are  inadmissible  if  they  are  obtained 
by  fear  or  induoement,  sentencing  policy  is  based  precisely  on 
inducerrent  for  the  most  self-incriminating  statement  of  all  -a 
guilty  plea.  There  are  other  inducements  too.  In  Scotland  there  is 
a  special  form  to  apply  for  an  'accelerated  diet,  '  in  other  words, 
quick  disposal,  if  you  plead  guilty,  an  attractive  proposition, 
t 
especially  for  the  defendant  in  custody  losing  wages  and  perhaps 
his  jcb,  and  especially  if  he  thinks  he  might  as  well  plead  guilty 
since  as  scme  of  the  defendants  interviewed  put  it: 
You  don't  have  a  chance  anyway. 
People  like  us  can't  go  against  the  polioe. 
A  copper's  word  would  go  against  you  if  he  cmv-  and 
lifted  a  bloke  off  the  street. 
I  was  surprised  to  hear  them  actually  lie  in  the  court 
but  they  can  say  anything  and  get  away  with  it. 
People  like  us  don'  t  have  rights. 
For  the  defendant  with  previous  convictions  there  are  paxticular 
pressures  to  plead  guilty,  particularly  in  England.  Baldwin  and 
McConville  discuss  the  situation  of  the  defendant  with  a  record  who 
wishes  to  defend  hin-E;  elf  by  saying  that  the  police  stateme-nts  are 
sinply  not  true.  'Ihey  suggest  that  the  tendency  of  defence  counsel 
to  advise  a  guilty  plea  instead  is  not  soundly  based  in  lav,  cite 
and__Whittle 
the  appropriate  sentence  cannot  be  increased  by  an 
attack  that  may  be  made  on  the  credibility  of  any 
witness 
(kq6-)ý ý  v7-ý, 
ý  (i 
and  suggest  that  the  counsel's  advice  runs  against  this: 
Ibis  however,  is  not  a  view  apparently  shared  by 
scrrk--  barristers  (1977  :  47) 
But  the  barrister's  advice  is  not  entirely  misplaced. 
not  be  legal  for  attacks  on  the  credibility  of  prosecution 
It  may 
witnesses  to  affect  the  sentence,  but  it  is  perfectly  legal  for 
it  to  affect  the  evidence  that  can  be  introduced  against  the 
accused  and  so  affect  the  verdict,.  Me  barrister  quoted  as  n-ds- 
stating  the  law  is  absolutely  right  when  he  says: 
All  this  mud  that  you  want  to  sling  at  the  prosecution 
and  the  police,  it's  all  going  to  come-,  back  on  you. 
According  to  the  1898  Criminal  Evidence  Act  -  s.  1  (f)  (ii)  - 
whenever  a  defence  case  involves  inputations  against  the  character 
of  a  prosecution  witness,  the  accused's  bad  character  can  be  put 
before  the  court  too.  This  has  been  interpreted  in  English  law 
(  though  not  in  Sootland)as  involving  any  suggestion  by  the 
accused  that  prosecution  witnesses  are  lying.  If  he  does  this  the 
prosecutor  can  bring  in  as  evidence  the  f  act  that  the  accused  has 
previous  convictions,  af  actor  which  the  jury  is  not  normally 
allowed  to  hear  on  the  grounds  that  they  might  be  tenpted  to  convict 
on  issues  that  have  no  bearing  on  the  case  in  question.  Having 
cormdtted  a  crime  before  is  no  evidenoe  that  he  owmitted  this  one. 
But  that  rule  goes  by  the  board  if  the  accused  challenges  the  police 
or  other  prosecution  witnesses.  7here  is  some  discretion  for  the 
court  to  decide  where  the  line  is  to  be  drawn,  and  there  is  soffe 
indication  of  a  matter  of  degree  involved  in  exactly  what  mmunts 
to  a  challenge  on  character.  So: ff\ 
V-vk 
It 
. 
was  one  thing  forLappellant  to  deny  that  he  had  made 
the  ccnfession:  but  it  was  another  thing  to  say  the 
whole  thing  was  an  elaborate  and  deliberate  concoction 
on  the  part  of  the  inspector.  (R  v  Jones  1923). 
However,  even  if  the  accused  does  not  n-oke  such  a  challenge  on 
his  own  initiative  it  may  be  made  for  him  and  still  count  against 
him.  In  R.  v-ýa%Awer  it  was  deemed  quite  legitimate  for  the  defendant 
to  be  cross-examined  on  his  previous  record  after  his  denial  of 
police  statements  was  interpreted  for  him  by  the  judge  into  an 
attack  on  police  character: 
Judge:  It  follows 
-from 
that,  does  it  not,  that 
the  whole  of  the  evidence  of  these  two  officers 
where  they  say  you  adffdtted  the  offence,  is  made 
up? 
Defendant:  Yes  (19-)  -)) 
Prosecution  counsel  for  their  part  have  techniques  for  inducing  the 
defendant  himself  to  transform  his  own  -%nv%cc-  6ous  words  into  a 
fom  that  will  count  legally  as  an  attack  on  character: 
Prosecutor:  And  you  say  this  before  us  is  not  the  proceeds 
of  shoplifting? 
Defendant:  No,  not  that  stuff,  no. 
Prosecutor:  And  the  police  have  invented  this  case  against 
you,  it  must  follow,  nistn't  it? 
Defendant:  Well,  I  suppose  so. 
Prosecutor:  Well  it's  the  only  thing  possible  isn't  it? 
Defendant:  Yes 
Prosecutor:  You  think  they  created  this  whole  case  against  you? 
Defendant:  I  an  not  calling  them  liars  but  that's  what 
happened.  (7ý  enphasis) ý-ýo 
Prosecutor:  It's  not  good  enough  to  say  you  are  not  calling 
them  liars,  because  that  is  the  only  possibility 
if  you  a-re  telling  the  truth. 
Defendant:  Yes.  5 
Ihis  rri--thod  of  introducing  damaging  evidence  against  the  defendant  is 
all  too  easy.  It  is  after  all  in  the  nature  of  the  adversary  system 
that  the  two  sides  offer  conf  licting  versions  of  what  occurred,  each 
inplying  the  other  wrong:  the  scene  is  already  set  for  negotiating  an 
inplicit  into  an  explicit  (and  sanctioned)  accusation. 
In  any  case  the  court's  discretion  to  decide  where  the  line  is 
to  be  drawn  has  had  clear  qualifications  imposed  by  the  House  of 
Lords.  In  Selvey  v.  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  they  agreed  that 
the  court  might  have  some  discretion  to  stop  the  pmsecutor  cross- 
examining  the  accused  about  his  previous  convictions,  but  they 
refused  to  agree  that  the  discretion  should  be  exercised  in  f  a,.,,  ()ur 
of  the  accused,  even  if  it  did  put  the  accused  in  the  double  bind 
0ý  being  unable  to  develop  a  quite  legitimate  defence  without 
giving  the  prosecutor  a  free  hand  to  introduce  unf  avourable 
character  evidence  against  him  (1970), 
It  may  now  be  clear  why  Baldwin  and  McConville  found  "those 
with  prior  criminal  records  were  singled  out  as  being  vulnerable 
in  these  circumstances"  to  counsel's  advice  to  plead  guilty.  In 
the  current  state  of  English  lm,  counsel's  advice  to  the  defendant 
with  a  record  to  plead  guilty  rather  than  attack  police  I'verbals" 
for  fear  of  mud  slung  at  the  police  rebounding  on  him  and  a  higher 
sentence  resulting,  is  not  so  much  rrdsleading  the  defendant  as 
surrming  up  for  him  only  too  accurately  his  legal  position.  Attacking 
police  evidence  leaves  him  wide  open  to  having  his  previous  con\,  ictions ý'L  \ 
made  known  in  court  and  reducing  his  chances  of  a  successful 
defence;  pleading  not  guilty  and  failing  me-ans  a  heavier 
sentence. 
Once  a  guilty  plea  is  made  the  defendant  tends  to  be  stuck 
with  it,  since  there  are  also  structural  ohstaA; 
kTo-altering 
a  preliminary  guilty  plea  to  not  guilty  which  do  not  exist  in  the 
reverse  situation.  'The  Cmvn  is  master  of  the  instance'  as 
Thomson  puts  it,  so  the  prosecutor  can  accept  the  change  to  a 
guilty  plea  any  time  he  chooses  without  explanation.  But  in  the 
High  Court  and  summary  courts  a  change  of  plea  to  not  guilty  is 
only  al  lowed  at  the  discretion  of  the  court  if  an  adequate  case 
is  made  out  by  the  accused: 
it  being  necessary  for  him  to  satisfy  the  court  that 
his  plea  was  tendered  under  substantial  error  or 
misconception  or  in  circumstances  which  tended  to 
II1  -11- 
prejudice  his  case.  (Renton  and  Brown  95) 
In  jury  cases  in  the  shlerif  f  court  there  is  no  statutory  provision 
for  withdrawing  a  guilty  plea  at  all:  it  is  legally  impossible  to 
change  one's  plea  to  not  guilty.  The  lbomson  CaTyrdttee  recomended 
that  this  should  be  made  possible  but  only  at  the  discretion  of  the 
court  )  not  as  of  Tight. 
Nor  is  there  any  attempt  by  the  court,  once  a  guilty  plea  is 
made,  to  check  whether  it  is  appropriate.  It  is  simply  accepted  in 
court  without  exandnation  of  the  circumstances  or  intent,  though 
both  may  affect  the  legal  applicability  of  the  charge,  and  the 
validity  of  the  prosecution  case.  A  not  guilty  plea  stands  to  be 
disproved;  a  guilty  plea  does  not. \1  -7- 
p 
In  all  these  ways  then  the  pressures  to  plead  guilty  lie  not 
just  in  negotiations,  infomal  liaisons  and  bureaucratic  interests, 
but  also  in  the  legal  system  itself.  Criminal  justice  in  principle 
places  the  onus  of  proof  on  the  prosecution  and  provides  the 
accused  with  the  right  to  a  trial  and  a  presumption  of  innocence. 
But  it  operates  in  practice  on  the  assu-nption  that  for  the  vast 
mjority  these  rights  must  be  merely  empty  rhetoric.  As  one 
prosecutor  put  it  when  asked  about  expanding  legal  aid: 
Good  heavens  we  couldn't  do  that.  'Mey'd  all  want 
trials  then. 
The  procedural  devices  built  into  the  legal  system  ensure  that  the 
vast  majority  do  not. CHAPTER  4 
1.  Chapters  4  and  5  draw  on  and  develop  a  section  of  "Pretrial 
Procedures  and  the  Construction  of  Conviction"  (McBa-rnet  1976). 
2.  Baldwin  and  McConville  1977. 
3.  As  in  for  examnle,  chapter  3,  p.  9k 
4.  In  Scots  law  a  distinction  is  drawn  between  a  necessaxy  attack 
on  character  (Renton  and  Brown  1972:  365), 
5.  This  example  demonstrating  a  point  of  English  law,  is  taken 
from  observations  in  English  courts,  in  the  course  of  a  separate 
study  of  the  jury  system. CHAPTER  5  Strong  and  Weak  Cases:  The  Trial  in  Context 
The  trial  is  the  focal  point  of  the  ideology  of  democratic 
justice.  Though  the  trial  per  se  is  older  than  democracy  it 
assumed  a  fom  with  the  en-kergence,  of  the  demeratic  state  which 
expressed  a  historically  specific  ideology  of  justice.  Its 
emphasis  on  proof  by  a  reasoned  case  reflected  the  victory  of 
eighteenth  century  "rationality"  over  the  superstition  of  trial 
by  ordeal.  Established  rules  of  evidence  and  procedure  date 
largely  f  rom  the  san-e  period  expressing  the  end  of  arbitrariness 
and  the  establishment  of  the  rule  of  lmv.  The  banner  of  Magna 
Carta  and  trial  by  jury  was  raised  by  Coke  in  the  battle  against 
10 --solute  monarchy  under  the  guise  of  resurrected  tradition  but  also  C" 
expressing  the  modern  ideology  of  control  by  "the  people,  "  as 
indeed  did  the  demand  that  the  trial  must  be  public.  The  doublesided 
idea  that  the  accused  is  presumed  innocent  till  proved  guilty  and  that 
the  burden  of  proof  lies  with  the  prosecutor  indicated  a  new 
ideological  relationship  between  the  citizen  and  the  state:  the 
citizen's  liberty  would  be  the  norm  and  any  interference  or  punishment 
by  the  state  a  matter  for  clear  and  public  justification.  This  last 
doublesided  idea  is  indeed  depicted  as  the  lynchpin  of  the  ideology 
of  justice. 
Every  law  student  must  know  the  quotation  frcm  Woolmington  v. 
D.  P.  P.  on  the  burden  of  proof: 
Throughout  the  web  of  the  English  Criminal  Law  one  golden 
thread  is  always  to  be  seen,  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
prosecution  to  prove  the  prisoner's  guilt  ... 
"  (193ý 
Lord  Devlin  makes  an  inpassioned  plea  for  the  right  to  silence  as 
I. 
a  consequence  of  the  doctrine  of  the  burden  of  Proof: \? 
- 
I  hope  that  the  day  will  never  come  when  that  right  is 
denied  to  any  Englishmn.  It  is  not  a  refuge  of  techni- 
cality;  the  law  on  this  matter  reflects  the  natural 
thought  of  England.  So  great  is  our  horror  at  the  idea 
that  a  man  may  be  questioned,  forced  to  speak  and 
perhaps  condemn  himself  out  of  his  own  mouth  that  we  af  ford 
to  everyone  suspected  or  accused  of  a  crime,  at  every  stage, 
and  to  the  very  end,  the  right  to  say:  "Ask  me  no  questions, 
shall  answer  none.  Prove  your  case,  (R  v.  Ad'ams  19-51  Heýdon  1M:  bl) 
Scots  law  puts  it  more  prosaically  but  just  as  strongly: 
It  is  a  sacred  and  inviolable  right  that  no  man  is  bound 
to  incriminate  hirrself  (Livingstone  v.  Murrýqys  1830) 
The  trial  is  the  focal  point  of  justice  in  another  sense.  It 
is  the  only  part  of  the  legal  process  which  is  open  to  the  public 
and  the  press.  This  not  only  carries  the  potential  for  more  control 
over  what  takes  place,  than  for  example,  the  secrecy  of  the  police 
station;  it  also  invests  the  trial  with  a  particular  ideological 
significance.  It  is  the  showcase  of  justice,  the  only  place  where 
a  sample,  whether  representative  or  not,  of  the  legal  process  is 
put  on  display.  The  High  Court  trial  is  also  a  showcase  for  the 
demc)cratic  state,  for  this  is  one  point  where  the  doctrine  of  the 
separation  of  powers  is  put  on  display  and  the  executive  in  the  shape 
of  the  polioe,  must  hand  over  control  to  ýthe  neutral  and  independent 
judge.  It  is,  in  addition,  the  only  stage  at  which  an  elite  of  the 
state  is  put  on  public  view  -  not  the  amateur  magistrates  of  the 
owrrdttal  proceedings,  the  petty  executives  Of  the  police  or  the  court 
bureaucracy  but  the  robed,  wigged,  aloof  dignatories:  of  the  judiciary. 
If  the  ideology  of  justice  is  to  have  any  credibility  -  and  EP  7homrSu..  % ý16 
suggests  an  ideology  cannot  survive  unless  it  is  also  seen  to  be 
effective  (197,  ý  it  is  at  this  stage  that  one  would  expect 
it  to  be  visibly  in  operation.  7he  legal  adage  might  aptly  be 
reversed:  what  is  seen  to  be  done  must  pass  as  justice;  the  state's 
public  practice  must  fit  plausibly  with  its  ideology.  So,  if  it 
is  a  crucial  demand  of  the  ideology  of  justice  that  the  prosecutor 
bears  the  burden  of  proof  beyond  reasonable  doubt,  one  might  well 
expect  that  he  will  indeed  have  to  demonstrate  this  ideology  in 
practice,  before  he  can  win  his  case.  And  in  most  cases 
I 
he  must. 
In  that  sense  justice  may  well  be  seen  to  be  done. 
What  is  seen,  however,  is  but  the  proverbial  tip  of  the  iceberg. 
The  trial  is  not  an  isolated  event;  it  is  part  of  a  long  process 
which  takes  place  out  of  the  public  eye.  Chapter  four  has  shown  how 
pressures  which  the  public  do  not  see  mean  that  the  vast  majority  of 
accused  people  do  not  make  the  prosecution  prove  guilt  but  incriminate 
themselves  with  a  guilty  plea.  The  trial  is  not  just  part  of  a  larger 
process  though;  it  is  also  the  product  of  that  process.  What  is  seen 
in  court  is  moulded  by  all  sorts  of  unseen  factors  and  what  is  not  put 
on  public  display  is  exactly  how  the  public  version  has  been  shaped, 
tailored,  and  distorted  behind  the  scenes.  If  judge,  jury,  press 
or  public  leave  the  court  satisfied  that  the  prosecutor  has  fulfilled 
his  duty  by  making  his  case,  that  his  case  was  clearly  the  stmnger 
and  that  they  have  seen  the  ideology  of  justice  in  operation,  they  may 
be  absolutely  right  -  in  the  light  of  what  they  have  observed  and  heard. 
What  they  have  not  seen  and  heard  however  rnight  rnake  them  think  again. \11 
It  has  been  argued  that  pre-trial  filtering  of  cases  is 
exactly  why  prosecutors  tend  to  win  in  court,  since  the  filtering 
is  essentially  a  filtering  out  of  weak  prosecution  cases  leaving 
only  the  strong  cases  where  the  accused  is  almost  incontrovertibly 
guilty  to  com  to  court  at  all.  .L 
Sir  Robert  Mark's 
o,  ý\o'  I .  0--  less  in  explanation  of  why  prosecutors  win  than  in  mral 
indignation  that  they  should  somtimes  lose: 
The  procedural  safeguards  for  the  suspect  or  accused 
in  our  system  of  criminal  justice  are  such  that 
conrdttal  for  trial',  involving  the  participation  of 
lawyers  and  bench.,  is  itself  an  indication  of  strong 
probability  of  guilt-  (Alderson  1973:  16) 
But  pre-trial  procedures  are  not  just  about  safeguards  for  the 
accused;  they  a-re  also  about  conferring  powers  and  inposing 
limitations  on  how  each  side  can  set  about  preparing  its  case  for kqs 
trial.  Procedures  do  not  then  just  filter  out  weak  cases  and 
filter  in  strong  cases;  they  play  a  part  in  determining  exactly 
how  strong  or  weak  a  case  can  be. 
They  do  so  both  at  the  general  level  of  the  relationship  of 
prosecution  and  defence  in  an  adversarial  and  accusatorial  system, 
and  at  the  specific  level  of  the  powers  and  limitations  awarded 
each  side  by  particular  rulings  of  legal  procedure.  And  they  do 
so  in  a  way  which  mokes  it  likely  that  the  prosecution  case  that 
comes  to  trial  will  be  stronger  than  the  accused's.  The  defence 
is  placed  at  a  disadvantage  in  three  broad  ways:  in  knowing  the 
issues  of  the  case,  in  access  to  evidence  for  his  case,  and  in  the 
ability  to  ensure  witnesses  are  available  to  state  his  case.,  both 
in  the  sense  of  getting  them  along  to  state  their  evidence  in 
the 
court  at  all  and  in  having  the  right  to  use/controls  of  contenpt 
of  court,  prevarication  or  perjury  to  mke  sure  they  do. 
Knowing  the  issues 
In  a  sense  the  accused  really  need  not  know  much  of  the  case 
against  him  at  all.  Since  the  onus  of  proof  is  on  the  prosecution 
the  defence  need  not  present  a  case  at  all,  but  sirrply  pick  holes 
in  the  prosecution  case  to  raise  a  reasonable  doubt  in  the  minds 
of  those  judging  him  or  indeed  say  nothing  at  all.  It  may  even  be 
(Alecided  after  the  prosecutor  has  put  his  case  that  there  is  'no 
case  to  answer,  . 
But  if  the  prosecutor  does  assenble  a  legally 
sufficient  and  logically  plausible  case  -  and  he  is  unlikely  to 
take  it  as  far  as  trial  if  it  does  not  appear  to  rreet  minimal 
standards  -  the  accused  really  has  to  present  a  positive  alternative 
if  he  is  to  enter  the  battle  for  credibility  at  all.  Given  this ý  10\ 
task,  the  defence  is  ironically  enough  in  a  vAeaker  position  than 
the  prosecution  in  building  up  a  case  exactly  because  he  is 
responding  to  a  charge  not  instigating  it.  The  framework  of 
relevant  issues  (in  both  conmn-sense  and  legal  term)  is  set  up 
by  the  charge  and  the  defence  has  to  be  constructed  within  this 
frarrework.  Historically  this  fact  was  actually  used  to  channel 
out  possible  defences: 
An  ingenious  prosecutor  could  render  any  defence 
inadn-dss  Ible  by  explicitly  contradicting  it  in  the 
indictmnt.  (Gordon  1968:  1-1ý  ) 
This  particular  technique  is  no  longer  possible,  since  the 
introduction  of  the  shortened  charge  in  1887  but  the  Crown's 
prerogative  in  creating  a  framework  of  relevance  for  information 
remains. 
Given  the  accused's  position  as  respondent,  it  is  obviously 
essential  that  he  should  know  exactly  what  the  charge  against  him 
is,  and  this  is  a  procedural  requirement  in  line  with  the  doctrine 
of  'no  surprise'  : 
It  is  improper  for  the  counsel  for  the  prosecution  to 
attenpt  to  take  the  defence  by  surprise  (Arguile  196  :  149) 
Of  course  that  does  not  man  much  if  the  accused  does  not 
understand  the  charge  and,  having  received  evidence  that 
the  esoteric  language  of  the  charge  may  mystify  rather  than 
inform  the  accused,  that  indeed  people  were  pleading  guilty 
without  knowing  what  they  were  accused  of  (p.  84),  the  Manson 
CamAttee  recommended  that  the  form  of  the  charge  should  be  simplified. 
This  seems  a  step  toward  the  practical  realisation  of  the 
accused's  right  in  the  rhetoric  of  justice  to  know  what  he  stands 
accused  of.  But  there  am  lin-dts  to  its  value.  Ibr  exanple 
the  Scottish  procurator  fiscal  also  has  a  procedural  Ix)wer  to ý 
alter  the  charge  before  the  trial,  while  in  England  the  masons 
given  for  arrest  need  not  be  'the  charge  which  may  ultkately  be 
found  in  the  indictment'  (Christie  v  leachinsky).  So  it  is  that 
defendants  conplain  that  they  are  charged  with  one  offence  at  the 
police  station,  come  prepared  to  dispute  that,  only  to  find  the 
charge  has  changed  form: 
Ibis  is  ridiculous.  We  want  to  complain  about  this. 
We  were  charged  with  resisting  arrest  thcn  when  we  get 
to  the  court  it's  breach  of  the  peace'  (case  17) 
The  problem  was  acknovledged  but  sustained  by  the  Thon-r-ion  Coinnittee: 
An  arrestee  must  be  told  why  he  is  arrested.  As 
however  it  is  the  procurator  fiscal  who  prepares  the 
indictment  or  complaint  which  contains  the  charge 
against  the  accused  in  court,  it  follows  that  the 
charge  made  by  the  police  may  be  different  from 
the  charge  eventually  libelled  against  the  accused 
in  court  ... 
We  do  not  see  how  this  could  be 
changed.  (1975:  24) 
Nor  dc)es  the  doctrine  of  'no  surprise'  stretch  to  the  accused 
being  informed  of  the  case  against  him,  though  this  can  significantly 
affect  his  ability  to  prepare  a  case  in  response. 
In  England  there  are,  for  indictments  at  least,  conndttal 
proceeding,,  ý;  where  the  basis  of  the  prosecution's  case  is  publicly 
stated.  Ibis  is  designed  not  only  to  inform  the  accused  of  the 
case  against  him  but  for  the  bureaucratic  purpose  of  deciding 
whether  the  case  is  strong  enough  to  spend  tine  and  money  taking 
it  to  trial,  but  it  does  also  have  the  effect  of  putting  the  'no 
surprise'  doctrine  into  practice  for  the  accused  to  some  extent.  The 
effect  is  limited  since  the  prosecutor  has  no  dutý  to 
Zall 
all  the 
witnesses  he  intends  to  use  at  the  trial 
(R.  v  Epping  and  Harlow),  and  the  defendant  can  be  n-fused  copies  of' ý3\ 
additional  evidence  for  the  prosecution  raised  after  ccemittal 
proceedings.  In  Scotland,  however,  there  is  no  public  rehearsal  of 
the  prosecution  case  at  all  since  the  decision  to  prosecute  is  a 
matter  for  the  private  discretion  of  the  prosecutor  himself. 
The  Thomsson  Committee  did  recanmnd  a  revival  of  the  old 
judicial  examination  between  charge  and  trial  but  that  would  not 
bq-td-let  the  accused  know  thecaseagainst  him.  Indeed  it  would 
be  for  exactly  the  opposite  purpose.  It  would  not  be  the  prosecutor 
but  the  accused  who  would  have  to  present  his  version  of  an 
incident  to  the  court  and  the  purpose  would  be  to  put  the  I  no 
surprise'  doctrine  into  practice  for  the  prosecutor's  advantage 
only,  and  explicitly  take  advantage  of  'surprise'  so  far  as 
the  accused  was  concerned  by  forcing  him  to  put  his  version  on 
record  before  knowing  the  details  of  the  case  against  him: 
In  our  opinion  the  best  opportunity  of  obtaining  the 
truth  f  rom  the  accused  is  inn-ediately  af  ter  he  has 
been  charged  when  he  does  not  know  the  evidence 
against  him.  (lbomon  1975:  188) 
Mis  would  prevent  him  f  rom  producing  alibis  later  or  being: 
in  a  position  to  adjust  his  own  evidence  to  met 
the  case  against  him.  (rlbomon  1975:  188) 
<--  What  is  not  even  considered  is  that  the  prosecution  might  also 
have  a  case  that  can  be  I  adjusted'  to  meet  the  recorded  version 
of  the  accused,  recorded  before  he  knows  the  context  in  which 
his  own  words  can  be  used  to  incriminate  him  (for  context  does 
affect  waning),  and  recorded  so  that  he  cannot  deviate  from 
them  later  when  he  does  know  the  context  without  losing  credib- 
ility  anyway.  This  of  course  is  the  precise  purpose  of  the  proposal \3  -z- 
and  it  is  only  the  defendant,  not  the  prosecutor,  Who  is  so  constrained. 
. Ac:  so  often  in  the  7homon  Report  the  problem  of  ascertaining 
truth  is  defined  purely  in  tern-s  of  the  possibility  of  the  accused 
'fabricating'  a  case,  not  in  terms  of  both  cases  being  part  of 
an  artificial  reconstruction  process  susceptible  to  ladjustmnt, 
and  distortion  after  the  event. 
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But  for  the  momnt  there  are  ýno  courtroom  rehearsals  of  either 
case.  The  procedure  is  simply  that  the  prosecutor  gives  the  accused  a 
list  of  his  witnesses  and  vice  versa.  (Even  this  is  compulsory 
only  in  jury  trials.,  not  in  the  sunrfury  cases  which  constitute 
the  vast  majority  of  proceedings.  )  Only  the  nan-es  of  the  witnesses 
are  provided,  not  the  statewnts  the  prosecutor  has  put  together  from 
his  witnesses.  lbough  each  side  can  interview  the  other  pa-fty  Is 
witnesses  it  does  not  follow  that  this  will  reveal  the  points  that 
the  adversary  is  using  to  build  up  his  jigsmv  of  a  case.  A  witness 
for  one  side  will  not  necessarily  be  freely  co-operative  with  the 
other,  so  that  the  questioner  only  gets  answers  to  the  questions 
asked  and  without  knowing  the  crux  of  the  other's  case  he  may  not 
ask  the  right  questions.  Even  the  interpretation  of  the  answers 
given  may  vary  so  that  the  f  ina-1  gloss  on  the  statement  for  the 
Crown  and  the  defence  may  be  quite  different.  A  defence  lawyer 
is  not  entitled  to  see  any  statement  attributed  to  the  aýccused 
even  though  it  may  be  read  out  in  court  as  evidence  against  his 
client  ,  and  may  be  dannging  to  his  case.  In  the  first  requiremnt 
for  collecting  evidence  -  knowing  the  relevant  issues  of  the  case  - 
the  prosecutor  has  the  double  advantage  of  not  only  defining \Yý 
the  issues 
. 
but  of  being  under  no  duty  to  disclose  them  till  the 
trial. 
Collecting  evidence 
In  the  actual  collection  of  evidence  the  advantage  also  lies 
with  the  Crown:  the  prosecutor  is  more  likely  to  con-e  across  a 
breadth  of  potential  evidence  because  of  his  superior  facilities. 
Almost  all  prosecutions  in  Britain  a-re  presented  by  the  state, 
not  by  an  individual.  This  is  even  mre  clear-cut  in  Scotland  than 
in  England,  where  the  police,  even  if  only  in  legal  fiction, 
prosecute  as  private  citizens.  Under  Scots  Law.,  the  police  do  not 
conduct  their  own  prosecutions  but  hand  their  cases  over  to 
procurators  fiscal,  legally  trained  and  experienced  civil  servants 
under  the  aegis  of  the  Lord  Advocate.  Prosecution  is  thus  conducted 
by  a  professional  public  prosecutor  who  works  full-tim  in  court, 
for  whcm  the  establishment  of  a  case  in  law  and  fact  is  a  matter 
of  routine,  to  whom  the  judges  and  clerks  a-re  colleagues,  whose 
evidence  is  collected  by  a  team  of  professional  detectives,  the 
police.  Me  facilities  for  constructing  the  prosecutim  case  are  a 
publicly  funded  part  of  the  legal  structure,  but  defence  is  left 
to  the  private  citizen  and  private  enterprise. 
This  produces  inequality  between  one  accused  and  another 
according  to  class,  since  the  accused  has  to  buy  the  case  he  can 
afford.  IA--gal  advice.,  representaticn.  in  court,  the  search  for 
witnesses,  the  taking  of  statements,  all  have  a  price  attached. 
It  is  market  forces,  teqpered  at  the  margins  by  legal  aid,  that 
Count  in  the  preparation  of  a  defence  case,  not  the  merits  of  the 
situation.  But  even  with  the  best  of  lawyers  and  unlimited  funds 
the  accused  could  not  stand  in  the  same  position  as  the  Lrown. 
Defence  agents  do  not  have  forensic  laboratories  and  team  O.  f experts  at  their  disposal,  or  the  legal  po-vers  of  scai,  ch  and 
detention  available  to  the  Police.  At  best,  placing  the  onus  of 
proof  on  the  Crown  is  not  so  much  an  advantage  to  the  accused  as 
a  coq-x--nsation  for  the  unequal  start  in  producing  cases.  Mere 
could  be  no  pretence  that  accused  and  Crown  start  off  on  an  equal 
footing  unless  a  public  system  of  defence  was  set  up  in  parallel 
to  the  public  system  Of  prosecution. 
There  is  therefore  an  expectation  grounded  on  notions  of 
fairness  that  any  information  discovered  that  is  favourable  to 
the  accused  should  be  provided  to  the  defence.  Lawyers  feel  this 
sirrply  does  not  happen: 
Me  police  don'  t  help.  7hey  give  you  a  list  of 
witnesses  but  of  course  you  don't  know  What  the 
witnesses  said  to  them.  Uhey  select  and  omit  to 
tell  you  bits  that  might  help  your  case. 
Ihis  is  partly  an  informal  process  of  normal  selective 
perception.  People  see  what  they  are  looking  for  and  policemen 
wbo  have  taken  a  case  as  far  as  charge  a-re,  as  one  policeman  put  it, 
'all  out  for  conviction.  '  They  are  looking  for  incriminating 
evidence  and  they  do  not  necessarily  know  uhat  the  defence  case 
is.  If  the  prosecution  only  turns  up  black  points,  not  grey  or 
white  ones,  it  is  only  what  you  would  expect  as  the  informl 
product  of  a  formal  system  of  adversary  investigation.  Indeed  this 
has  been  recognised  by  Scottish  judges: 
Me  people  who  take  precognitions  are  searching  for 
evidence  in  order  to  prove  a  crime,  and  what  they  take 
down  or  afterwards  remember  of  what  has  been  said  to  them 
is  apt  to  be  coloured  by  their  desire  to  make  out  a  good 
case.  (Cook  v  McNeill  1906) 
This  tendency  might  be  enhanced  by  the  fact  that  it  is  the  policemn 
on  the  case  who  normally  take  statements  from  witnesses  in  sumar-y  cases, \' 
and  occasionally  (though  the  job  is  then  officially  the 
fiscal's)  in  jury  cases.  The  Thorrson  reT  port  recognised  the  problem 
involved,  but  also  recognised  that  tim  and  staff  did  not  allow 
the  fiscals  to  do  all  this  work  theaselves  and  that,  if 
it  is  found  necessary  for  the  police  to  continue  to  assist 
with  this  work,  it  is  preferable  that  an  officer  familiar 
with  the  case  should  precognosce  the  witness.  (p.  110) 
Given  that.  it  would  seem  sensible  to  allow  the  accused  access  to 
the  infonmtion  culled  by  the  prosecution  in  order  to  assess  its 
value  for  himself.  But  this  does  not  happen.  When  it  was  proposed 
to  the  Thorrson  Corrinittee  that  witnesses'  statemnts  should  be 
exchanged  -  not  .  as  it  happened,  to  help  the  accused  know  the  case 
and  spot  useful  infomaticn,  but  to  save  the  tirre  of  witnesses, 
especially  the  police,  and  facilitate  pleas  of  guilty,  -  this  was 
rejected  on  the  grounds  that  confidentiality  would  be  breached  and 
people  would  be  less  willing  to  help  the  police  (1975:  91),  while  ký 
the  present  situation  is  explained  in  Renton  and  Brown,  the  official 
manual  of  Scots  criminal  lawyers,  in  the  sam  vein: 
Confidentiality  of  Crown  precognitions  is,  in  general, 
necessaxy  for  the  prosecution  of  crim  . 
(1972:  54) 
Me  effect  on  defences  against  that  prosecution  is  not  considered. 
Even  the  passing  on  of  information  by  the  prosecution  is  not 
a  right,  and  the  exchange  of  names  stretches  only  to  those  selected 
as  witnesses,  not  the  whole  pool  of  people  interviewed  as  potential 
witnesses  whose  contribution  was  discarded  as  not  helpful  to  the 
prosecuticn.  In  England  the  nams  of  all  witnesses  interviewed  by 
the  prosecution,  not  just  those  selected  as  supporting  the 
prosecution  case,  should  in  law  (according  to  the  1967  Crýinal 
Cý'%r 
Justice  Act  L  be  passed  17n,  Pgant  vD ý  -ý  ýo 
need  not  in  law  be  passed  on  (Bryant  v  Dixon)  and,  according  to 
the  Fisher  Report  on  the  Confait  case,  as  a  matter  of  informal 
policy,  they  are  only  provided  if  the  defence  ask  for  them  (1977: 
239).  Hence  Fisher  reconynends  that  disclosure  should  be  made 
whether  or  not  it  is  asked  for,  and,  to  introduce  a  little  more 
control,  that  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  should  play  a  more 
boe'ý  IACXVQ' 
active  role.  The  defence  /11  a  right  to  see  the  names  of  the  witnesses 
on  the  indictment  -  but  not  to  be  provided  with  addresseS  by  which  to 
contact  them  (R.  v.  Gprb-ý  MLI) 
The  Fisher  Report  also  provides  a  striking  -  and  official  - 
example  of  just  how  much  filtering  of  informaticn  goes  on  in  the 
collection  of  police  evidence,  and  its  effects.  One  of  the  crucial 
factors  in  the  ability  of  the  prosecution  to  produce  a  stmng 
case  out  of  thoroughly  dubious  information  in  the  Confait  case 
was  the  role  of  the  police  in  investigating  and  reporting  the  matter. 
Far  from  seeking  out  information  for  both  sides  as  the  law  assumes 
them  to  do,  the  police  agreed  that  after  confessions  were  obtained 
from  the  three  boys: 
enquiries  continued  only  to  strengthen  the  evidence 
against  them  (Fisher  1977:  203) 
Ibis  was  despite  the  fact  that  there  were  very  definite  doubts 
about  the  truth  of  the  confessions,  brought  up  at  the  inquiry,  but 
simply  not  pursued  by  the  police: 
(a)  the  lack  of  supporting  evidence; 
(b)  the  low  intelligence  of  at  least  two  of  the  boys; 
(c)  the  fact  that  to  their  knowledge  them  were  others 
(Goode  being  the  principal  one)  who  mLght  have  had  a 
motive  to  kill  Confait  and  who  had  no  alibi  for  the 
relevant  time; 
(d)  the  apparent  discrepancy  between  the  estimates  of  time 
of  death  and  the  sequence  of  events  described  in  the ý  Yl 
boys'  statemnts; 
(e)  the  bizaxre  nature  of  the  events  described  by  the 
boys;  and 
(f)  the  questions  which  the  statemnts  might  have  been. 
expected  to  provoke  -  how  could  the  boys  have  got  in 
and  out,  and  done  what  they  described  doing,  undetected? 
How  did  they  know  which  was  Confait  Is  room?  Why  should 
they  go  to  a  lighted  room  to  steal?  How  could  they 
have  killed  Conf  ait  without  disturbing  the  room?  How 
did  they  find  the  flex  and  why  did  they  put  it  back 
in  the  drawer  where  according  to  Goode  it  was  normlly 
kept?  What  happened  to  the  handbag? 
(Fisher  1977:  203) 
Statements  taken  from  witnesses  by  the  police  were  given  to 
the  defence,  but  they  were  edited  versions  only.  Two  sets  of 
statements  were  taken:  the  first  were  full  accounts,  including 
information  favourable  to  the  defence 
, 
the  second  were  short 
versions  presenting  only  pro-prosecution  infonnation.  Only  the 
latter  were  given  to  the  defence.  The  police  were  thus  able  to  comply 
with  policy  by  providing  witnesses'  statements  and  at  the  same 
time  protect  their  own  distorted  case  by  making  sure  they  excluded 
information  that  might  point  to  the  innocence  of  the  accused.  (p.  230) 
What  is  more  . 
the  written  police  report  to  the  Director  for 
Public  Prosecutions  presented  a  much  harder  case  against  the  three 
youths  than  all  the  information  available  could  suggest.  This 
was  done  by  adding  into  the  official  statements  points  helpful  to 
the  prosecuticn  case  which  were  not  menticned  in  the  record  of 
interrogation,  by  misrepresenting  the  evidence  on  when  the  murdered 
man  had  last  been  seen  and  by  omitting  points  helpful  to  the  defence 
cziir+i  nc  thp-  in-rm-babilitieS  in  the  confessions  and  the  fact  that  there \  -ýs 
had  been  another  suspect  (pp.  210-212). 
The  crucial  issue  in  the  case  was  timing:  the  boy 
who  I  confessed  to  the.  mrder  had  an  incontrovertible. 
alibi  for  what  emrged  on  apPea-1  as  the  actual-  tim  of  death.  But 
in  the  police  report  tinAng  was  fudged.  Indeed  Fisher  concludes 
that  'far  from  trying  to  make  the  time  of  death  mre  precise, 
those  concerned  with  the  investigation  and  prosecution  ...  made 
every  effort  to  keep  it  as  vague  as  possible.  There  was  sinply 
no  reference  to  the  boys'  movemnts,  the  disagreements  between  the 
experts  on  tim  of  death  or  the  discrepancy,  'plain  as  a  pikestaff  I 
(p.  23)  between  the  confessions  and  the  experts'  estimates.  What 
is  more  , 
the  time  of  death  recorded  on  the  crime  report  was  uyster- 
iously  altered  from  'between  7  p.  m.  -  11  p.  m.  I  to  17  p.  m.  -  1.30  a.  m.  I, 
with  1.30  a.  m.  written  over  the  original  tim  (p.  196),  so  obviating 
any  problems  with  an  alibi  which  extended  only  to  11.30.  The  case 
was  thus  strengthened  as  it  was  processed  by  transforrdng  or 
ondtting  evidence  that  might  raise  reasonable  doubts. 
The  Conf  ait  case  demonstrates  very  clearly  how  airbiguous 
information  can  be  filtered  into  an  unarrbiguous  case,  and  how  points 
that  raise  doubts 
, 
helpful  to  the  accused  but  available  only  to 
the  police,  may  never  com  to  light.  It  a1so  demonstrates  exactly 
V%-O 
why  Rýoyal-  CXxmissions  should  not  assum  only  -  defence  cases  are 
susceptible  to  'fabricatim'  and  'adjustmnt'. 
In  two  special  cases,  the  prosecutor  has  access  to  in  ormation 
that  the  defence  has  not,  simply  by  virtue  of  representing  and 
using  the  power  of  the  state.  One  is  access  to  police  records  and  so 
I 
to  infonnation  on  any  previous  convictions  the  accused  or  other  witnesses 
'L 
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may  have.  The  second  is  access  To  uouunluini:  uy ýYý 
7he  police  have  powers  of  search  and  remval  available  which  the 
defence  has  not.  If  the  accuseA  requireg  documents  for  his  case,  kD--p 
(L  "-  0? 
L  account  books  in  a  case  of  embezzlerrent,  either  frcrn  a 
third  party  or  from  the  prosecutor,  he  cannot  corrpel  the  possessor 
to  hand  them  over  but  must  take  out  a  civil  case  of  diligence, 
with  all  the  expense  that  entails,  to  appeal  for  the  right  to 
see  and  'use  them.  Though  Renton  and  Brown  (1972  :  80)  say  'such 
applications  have  been  repeatedly  granted'  they  are  fax  from  being 
cut  and  dried.  In  Hassom  v.  HMAdv  (1971) 
)  Lord  Carwron 
rejected  the  taken  for  granted  view  that  a  statement  f  rom  the 
defence  lawyer  to  say  the  documents  were  required  for  the  case 
would  be  sufficient  grounds  for  granting  the  application.  Rather 
some  indication  of  their  role  in  the  proposed  defence  was  required. 
Documenta-ry  evidence  thus  becoms  available  only  at  the  expense 
of  disclosing  the  defence  case. \«-O 
So  the  cbetrine  of  I  no  surprise'  seem  to  work  mie  for  the 
prosecution  than  for  the  defence.  Nowhere  is  this  mre  obvious 
than  in  the  procedures  regarding  special  defences.  These  axe 
alibi,  self-defence,  insanity,  incrinAnation  of  a  specified  other 
Person  ,  and,  oddly,  I  that  the  accused  was  asleep  at  the  tim  when 
he  conynitted  the  crime  charged'  . 
In  these  instances  prior  notice 
must  be  given  to  the  prosecutor  at  C,  >-%t%N%kw6A  -.  If  notice  is 
given  later  he  is  entitled  to  an  adjournment  for  further  investigation 
into  the  claimed  defence.  In  short  the  Crown,  s  positive  case 
renr,  dns  something  to  speculate  upon  from  the  bare  list  of  witnesses. 
But  when  the  defence  of  fers  a  positive  case  the  prosecutor  is 
not  left  to  put  two  and  two  together  from  interviews  with  defence 
witnesses  . 
but  is  provided  with  a  right  to  prior  notice  about  the 
case  he  will  have  to  comter.  Informtion  on  both  sides  of  the 
dispute  is  mc)re  readily  available  to  the  Crown. 
Power  over  witnesses 
Informtion  a-lone.,  hcwever,  is  not  enough.  Evidence  mst  be 
presented  at  the  trial  orally,  on  oath  or  af  firmation  by  first-hand 
witnesses,  so  that  part  of  the  preparation  of  a  ease  is  inevitably 
the  task  of  f  inding  people  who  are  coq3e-tent  and  willing  to  put 
the  relevant  information  to  the  court.  When  it  coms  to  procedural 
powers  over  witnesses  the  sam  inbalance  is  revealed. 
The  prosecutor's  role  as  agent  of  the  state  provides  both  the 
aura  and  the  sanctions  of  official  authority.  Potential  witnesses 
for  the  prosecution  are  approached  either  by  a  uniformed  Policealan, 
or  by  an  equally  official  warrant  of  citation  from  the  court. 
Potential  witnesses  for  the  defence  aixe,  approached  by  the  accused 
himself,  his  solicitor  or  by  the  solicitor's  assistants.  The 
latter  are  often  ex-policemen  as  it  happens  but  lack  the  authority  -7 1(4ý 
Of  unifolins  just  as  the  accused  and  the  solicitor  lack  the  ecinpulsion 
of  officialdom.  Being  a  witness  is  an  (-,  xl)crience  but  it  is  no  fi-m. 
As  one  woman  put  it: 
I  was  terrified  up  there.  My  legs  were  quaking. 
Time  at  work  is  lost  and  expenses  are  meagre.  One  sheriff  informed 
the  jury  they  should  collect  the  expenses  they  were  allowed  "within 
the  wholly  inadequate  limits"  (case  93).  Unless  the  witness 
had  some-  positive  urge  to  contribute  there  is  no  obvious  rationality 
in  volunteering  for  the  job,  and  there  can  be  major  disincentives. 
In  case  93  a  young  man  was  accused  of  brandishing  a  sword.  It  was 
an  ornamental  brass  Indian  sword  and  his  story  was  that  he  was  on 
his  way  to  sell  it  to  a  friend.  The  friend  was  not  there  as  a 
witness,  something  the  prosecutor  made  good  use  of: 
Prosecutor:  Why  is  he  not  here? 
Accused:  He  was  scared. 
Prosecutor:  You  mean  you  said  "Tell  thern  I  was  going  to 
sell  it  to  you,  "  and  he  was  scared? 
Accused:  No  sir. 
Prosecutor:  Why  was  he  scared  then? 
Accused:  He  was  seared  cos  he  was  gonnae  buy  a  sword. 
Prosecutor:  But  you  can  buy  thern  in  shops,  it  was  just  for 
hanging  on  the  wall,  why  was  he  scared? 
7he  irony  here  of  course  was  that  the  reason  he  might  be  afraid 
was  self-evident  in  the  accused's  plight. 
Not  that  volunteering  may  be  in  issue.  Once  on  the  witness 
list  a  witness  can  be  forced  to  attend  and  indeed  punished  in  a 
variety  of  ways  if  he  does  not.  Thus  in  case  96  where  one  of  the 
victirm  in  a  pub  brawl  was  called  to  give  evidence  and  found  to 
have  gone  off  for  lunch  without  asking  permission,  the  judge  prepared 
for  his  return  by  saying  to  the  prosecutor: 
We  must  decide  what  we  Ire  going  to  do.  Whether  you  want 
to  charge  him  with  subverting  the  course  of  justice  by 
not  appearing  or  whether  I  charge  him  with  contenpt  of 
court. When  the  errant  did  return  and  came  in  to  court  to,  as  he  thought 
, 
give  evidence,  he  found  himself  seized  by  two  policemen,  led  to 
the  dock 
,  sentenced  to  imprisormient  for  contempt  of  court  and  led 
off  in  handcuffs,  stunned  and  protesting,  to  the  cells.  In  fact 
he  was  released  later  that  afternoon  but  the  whole  display  demon- 
strated  very  clearly  the  powers  of  the  court  over  witnesses. 
Before  forcing  a  witness  to  attend  and  give  evidence,  however, 
one  would  want  to  know  what  he  is  going  to  say,  and  that  is  the 
purpose  of  the  pretrial  interview  or  'precognition'.  Calling  him 
to  court  without  interviewing  him  first  would  be  to  risk  him  actually 
giving  evidence  against  rather  than  for  your  own  side.  But  in  Scotland 
this  is  exactly  the  dilenym  the  defence  -  and  only  the  defence  - 
faces.  If  a  potential  witness  for  the  crown  refuses  to  attend  for 
precognitim  or  to  give  informatim  'within  his  knowledge'  he  is 
liable  to  a  t25  f  ine  or  up  to  20  days  in  prison  in  accord  with  the 
Sumaxy  Jurisdiction  (Scotland)  Act  1954  s.  33(4).  No  such  sanctions 
axe  available  to  the  accused.  He  can  cite  an  unwilling  witness  to 
attend  court  but  cannot  corrpel  that  he  be  interviewed  beforehand, 
as  the  prosecution  can.  To  cite  him  on  force  of  law  as  a  witness 
would  therefore  be  to  do  so  blindly  and  take  the  risk  of  adverse 
nd  that  the 
evidence.  Me  Thorrson  Conmittee  recorrm 
defence  be  given  the  right  to  seek  a  warrant  to  cite  a  witness  for 
precognition  (1975:  91).  Tbr  the  momnt,  the  infoiml  adv3.  ntages 
of  state  authority  behind  the  prosecution  are  bolstered  by  the  one- 
sided  nature  of  formal  sanctions  - 
Particular  situations  can  make  things  even  wre  difficult. 
Fbr  exanple,  the  accused's  position  regarding  witnesses  MaY  be 
complicated  further  by  the  procedures  of  group  trials.  7be I  ký-  ") 
rnagistrates  I  courts  in  particular  a-re  dominated  by  offences 
against  public  order,  like  breach  of  the  peace.  Of  fences  like 
these  often  involve  severa-I  individuals  who  I  formed  a  noisy  crowd 
outside  a  public  house  I  or  are  charged  with  brawling  with  each 
other,  and  they  are  tried  together.  Normally  the  only  witnesses 
are  the  police  and  the  group  of  ar-cused  people.  In  this  situation 
the  accused  who  disputes  that  he  was  part  of  the  crowd,  or  that 
he  was  contributing  to  the  noise,  or  says  he  was  trying  to  stop 
the  brmvl  has  no  witnesses  other  than  his  co-accused  to  rely  on 
CA 
for  a  case.  But  law  states  that  an  accused  cannot  call  Lco- 
accused  to  give  evidence  even  with  his  consent,  and  he  cannot 
nonmlly  cross-examine  him  when  he  is  giving  evidence  for  his  own 
case.  The  Thomson  Report  recomends  that  one  defendant  should  be 
allowed  to  call  another  as  a  witness  so  long  as  the  latter  agrees. 
But  there  are  further  obstacles  too. 
To  give  this  evidence  the  co-accused  would  have  to  give  up 
his  own  right  to  silence  and  incrindnate  himself  by  admitting  to 
being  part  of  the  crowd  or  brawl,  while  it  would  alSO  lay  him  open 
to  questions  on  previous  conviction  and  the  like  from  which  a 
defendant  is  nornully  protected.  In  a  separate  trial  he  could 
give  evidence  as  a  witness  and  it  would  not  count  against  him  in 
his  own  trial 
, 
but  in  the  group  tria-l  situation  this  is  irrpossible. 
To  be  a  witness  is  to  be  a  witness  for  all  aspects  of  the  trial, 
even  if  it  mans  being  a  witness  against  oneself. 
Yet  the  accused  has  no  right  to  denmd  a  separate  trial.  That 
is  a  matter  for  the  court  to  decide  and  the  request  for  a  separate 
trial  in  order  to  call  a  co-accused  as  a  witness  is  not  considered 
a  sufficient  reason  in  law.  (Cpxrwll  v.  McFadyen  &  MacNiven  ý2-S) A  44 
Me  Sam  can  happen  in  more  serious  cases.  Where  for  exanVle 
two  people  are  charged  with  robbery  and  assault  and  one  did  not 
coamit  the  assault  . 
he  may  only  be  able  to  prove  his  case  if  his 
co-accused  is  prepared  to  incriminate  hin-self.  Mis  is  exaetly 
why  separate  trials  a-re  frowned  on  of  course.  Each  guilty  accused 
could  get  off  the  hook  by  one  taking  the  sole  blaw  at  the  other's 
trial  in  the  knowledge  that  it  could  not  be  referred  to  at  his  own. 
This  would  clearly  present  problem  for  the  prosecution,  but  not 
to  allow  it  offers  equally  difficult  prcblen-s  for  the  accused. 
Of  course  the  co-accused  is  from  another  perspective  the 
accoaplice  and  avai-lable  to  turn  Queen's  evidence  for  the  prose- 
cution  against  the  other  defendant.  Where  each  side  is  vying  to 
secure  the  co-accused  as  a  witness  the  prosecution  is  in  a  much 
stronger  position.  lbr  defendant  1  to  take  the  witness  box  in 
favour  of  defendant  2  can  be  to  lay  hirrself  open  to  a  verdict  of 
guilty;  to  take  the  witness  box  for  the  prosecution  can  be  to  buy 
himself  imamity  from  trial,  since  the  prosecutor  has  the  power  to 
trade  security  for  evidence.  This  buys  him  immunity  even  from  legal 
action  by  the  prosecuted  accouplice.  When  Mr.  Turner  after  being 
sentenced  to  seven  years  for  robbery  in  March  1978  brought  a  private 
prosecution  for  the  same  crime  against  the  fellow-rcbber  who  turned 
Queen  Is  evidence  against  him,  the  case  was  rejected  by  the 
Queen's  Bench  as  "vexatious  and  an  abuse  of  the  process  of  the  court" 
7here  was  no  doubt  about  the  existence  or  the  unfettered  nature 
of  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecution's  powers.  And  of  course,  His 
Lordship  also  had  to  take  into  account  the  effect  on  future 
criminal  inquiries  and  prosecutions.  (Turner  v.  D.  P.  P.  ) 
To  secure  his  co-accused's  testimony  the  defence  can  thus  of  fer  only 
punishment,  but  the  prosecution  can  offer  rewards  - 
Tn  ql  I  thp-qe  Ways  the  accused  is  faced  with  problerrs  in  gettinp )  w,  ý, 
witnesses  to  support  his  case.  Yet  failure  to  call  Witilesses 
is  samething  that  can  legally  be  held  against  him  in  court,  so 
that  he  f  inds  himself  -  a-S  so  often  in  law  -  in  a  procedural 
double  bind  -  prevented  f  rem  getting  witnesses  there,  yet  held 
responsible  for  that  appearance  and  soap-tinjes  for  their  absence. 
It  is  a  situation  which  Prosecuting  lawyers  are  happy  to 
capitalise  on.  NurThers  of  witnesses  beconxe-  a  factor  in  credibility: 
Prosecutor:  So  Mr.  A.  is  lying? 
Ac,  cij-,  ed:  Yes 
Prosecutor:  So  Mrs.  A.  is  lying? 
Accuspd:  Yes 
Prosecutor:  So  your  euployer  is  lyine. 
Accused:  Yes,  sir. 
Proseci  i  tor:  So  everyone's  lying  but  you?  (case  12) 
In  the  elemnts  required  for  assenbling  a  case,  knowing  the 
issues,  access  to  evidence,  and  availability  of  witnesses,  the 
prosecution  has  the  advantage.  Information  games  in  court  and 
informticn  selection  by  judges,  should  be  set  in  the  context  of 
pre-tria-I  procedures  which  operate  as  filters  on  the  knowledge 
available  at  the  trial. 
There  are  indeed  procedures  to  ensure  that  the  filtered 
versions  of  reality  -  and  only  those  -  are  the  ones  that  appear  in 
court.  Cases  thus  appear  exaggeratedly  strong  or  weak  in  court 
-An exactly  because  all  the  Pre-trial  negotiation  Of  evidence  and  the 
pre-trial  failures  to  gain  access  to  information  or  secure  the 
co-operation  of  potential  witnesses  goes  unrecorded.  All  sorts  of 
procedures  encourage  the  public  hearing  to  expose  only  the  end 
products  of  the  pre-trial  process,  for  example  the  policy  of 
accepting  without  enquiry  minutes  of  admission,  that  is,  the 
accepted  facts  as  negotiated  by  the  defence  and  prosecution  before 
the  trial.  The  ways  in  which  agreemnt  is  reached  are  not  the 
business  of  the  court  and  the  points  are  sinply  presented  as 
undisputed.  If  tapes  of  pre-trial  events  are  introduced  they  will 
be  discussed  before  the  trial.  and  only  any  disputed  sections 
actually  brought  in  as  evidence  for  the  judge  or  jury  to  decide  on. 
The  Thomson  Conynittee  recorm-tended  that  such  filters  and  negotiations 
be  encouraged  by  increasing  the  time  lapse  between  indictment  and 
first  court  appearance  f  rom  si-x  to  twenty  days  and  persuading 
solicitors  to 
use  the  procedure  mre  extensively.  We  therefore 
reconyriend  that  the  initiative  for  reaching  agreement 
on  these  matters  should  lie  with  the  Crown.  (1975:  1,93) 
We  n-dght  note  from  this  that  routines  for  clarifying  issues, 
for  all  their  infornul  appearances,  are  grounded  in  forml  POIicY 
and  procedure. 
More  generally,  the  procedures  for  collecting  witnesses' 
evidence  enhances  the  channelling  out  of  contradictory  information. 
Witnesses  are  interviewed  before  a  trial  and  the  aforewntioned 
'Pmcognitions  I  taken.  These  are  not  statements  by  witnesses 
but  the  interviewer's  edited  version  of  what  was  said,  neither  signed 
nor  usually  seen  by  the  witness,  hirrself.  7hougil  the  value  of  the information  will  depend  on  the  witness  saying  what  the  counsel 
selects  as  relevant  not  just  privately,  but  in  court.,  and  though 
mch  is  made  of  the  rhetoric  that  the  witness  is  not  bound  by  his 
precognition,  that  indeed  he  has  a  right  to  have  it  destroyed  before 
be  gives  evidence  at  trial  (Renton  and  Brown  1972:  398),  there  are 
actually  ways  of  encouraging  him  to  present  the  information  wanted 
and  only  that.  rMis  is  partly  achieved  in  court  by  techniques  of 
examination  and  cross-examination.,  but  there  are  also  procedural 
facilities  to  help  witnesses  reproduce  the  prepared  pretrial  o-wýoýAs  . 
'Ibis  is  particularly  obvious  with  police  witnesses  I 
notebooks.  Policerren  are  permitted  to  "refresh  their  memories" 
by  reading  f  rom  a  notebook  in  the  witness  box  so  long  as  the  notes 
were  1  Icon  terrporaneous"  with  the  event.  Like  all  legal  criteria  it 
is  a  fairly  elastic  tem  of  course.  'It  has  cow  to  man  not  "at 
the  same  time"  as  the  Oxford  Dictionaxy  would  have  it,  but  "at  the 
first  available  opportunity"  (  R.  v.  Sirrmnds  1967)- 
, and  that  has  been  interpreted  as  loosely  as  two  weeks  later.  (R.  v. 
Laiýton  1876)  The  justification  of  course  is  the  police 
witness's  profession.  The  police  deal  with  so  many  cases  and  the 
delay  in  court  proceedings  may  mean  months  of  other  cases  before  the 
one  in  question  comes  to  court  . 
What  is  perhaps  less  obvious  is  that  in 
English  lxN  other  witnesses  may  refresh  their  memries  too,  though 
here  a  nice  distinction  is  drawn  between  the  public  and  the  private 
faces  of  the  judicial  process.  According  to  Archbold's  manual  on 
PIX)cedures:  in  English  law,  a  witness  may  only  refresh  his  neml'y  frM 
a  document  in  the  witness  box,  if  special  requirements  are  satisfied 
(1979  :  S13)  However,  there  is  no  prohibition  On  V-%irvý  doing  exactly 
the  same  before  he  goes  into  court  with  no  questions  asked.  It  is 
even  acceptable  for  him  to  read  a  statement  written  for  him  by  scmeone 
else  so  long  as  he  had  also  read  it  at  a  tim  when  the  f  acts  were I  (-ký 
clear  in  his  memory.  A  Home  Office  circular  (82/1969  a)  directs 
that: 
notwithstanding  that  criminal  proceedings  may  be  pending 
or  contenplated,  the  Chief  Officer  of  police  should 
normlly  provide  a  person,  on  request,  with  a  copy  of 
his  statement. 
In  R.  v.  Richardson  (1970.  it  was  noted  that  this  directive 
had  been  approved  by  Lord  Parker  and  the  Justices  of  the  Queen's  Bench 
Division,  "the  repositories  of  the  Common  LaV'  and  endorsed  an 
extension  of  the  practice  -  of  the  prosecutor  providing  these  not  "on 
request"  but  on  his  own  initiative.  Witnesses  for  the  defence  a-re 
also  allowed  copies  of  statements.  The  chief  justification  is  that 
otherwise  the  testimny  of  the  witness  becoms  a  test  of  mmory 
rather  than  truthfulness,  but  it  also  neans  -  indeed  the  more  so 
if  the  memory  is  so  feeble  -  that  it  is  the  filtered  version  of  what 
the  witness  had  to  say  at  the  time  edited  for  a  particular  black  or 
white  case  that  is  being  rehea-rsed  before  entering  the  witness  box. 
This  might  be  seen  as  somewhat  defeating  the  public  presentation  of  a 
witness's  testimny  on  oath  as  only  what  he  directly  experienced. 
addition  there  are  procedural  powers  that  can  be  brought  to  bear  if 
witnesses  dD  not  reproduce  pre-trial  accounts  . 
In  English  law,  when 
a  witness  fails  to  provide  the  requisite  evidence  for  the  party  who 
called  him,  the  procedures  that  follow  depend  on  whether  he  is  classified 
as  an  unfavourable  witness,  as  it  were  accidentally  failing  to  be 
helpful,  or  wilfully  hostile.  In  general  .a  party  may  not  cross- 
examine  or  discredit  his  own  witness,  so  that  if  an  unfavourable 
Witness  fails  to  reproduce  the  facts  he  stated  before  the  trial  there  is 
nothing  to  be  done.  If  the  judge  classifies  the  witness  as  hostile, 
however,  he  can  be  cross-examined  and  mre  witnesses  can  be  produced ((Lýý 
to  prove  that  he  has  made  previous  statements  inconsistent  with  what 
he  is  saying  in  court.  Indeed  the  judge  can  be  shcwn  the  written 
record  of  his  previous  statement  in  order  to  have  him  classified 
as  a.  hostile  witness.  (Cross  1974:  222) 
In  Scotland  there  is  no  such  concept  as  a  hostile  witness  but 
there  is  a  right  to  refer  back  to  previous  statements  where  a 
W\'  . 
".  0- 
witness  does  not  reproduce  the  account  I  counsel  wants.  It  is, 
however,  a  one-sided  right  ava-ilable  only  to  the  prosecution, 
because  of  a  distinction  drawn  between  the  records  of  defence 
lawyers  and  prosecutors  -  precognitions  -  and  the  records  of  the  police. 
Precognitims  were  not  originally  excluded  from  the  1852  Act 
which  allowed  reference  to  previous  inconsistent  statements. 
(rc'!  ýO- 
Indeed  in  McNeilie  v  HMAdv  L  it  was  noted  that: 
The  statute  is  extremely  generous  in  its  term  and  I 
do  not  think  that  any  exception  has  ever  been  suggested 
except  the  case  of  precogniticn. 
In  Scotland  precognitions  are  excepted  on  the  grounds  that,  first, 
confidentiality  is  required  for  successful  prosecution,  and  second, 
they  are  edited  versions  of  interviews: 
filtered  through  the  udnd  of  another  whose  job  it  is 
to  put  what  he  thinks  the  witness  mans  into  a 
form  suitable  for  use  in  judicial  proceedings  Ibis 
process  tends  to  colour  the  result.  (Kerr  v  HMAdv 
It  might  well  be  thought,  especially  after  noting  police  activity 
in  the  Conf  ait  case,  that  similar  argumnts  could  be  applied  to 
police  staterrents  but  they  are  not.  So,  although  a  witness  cannot 
be  attacked  in  court  for  failure  to  fit  with  the  precognitiOn C1 
k'ý-b 
taken  by  the  prosecutor)  his  credibility  can  be  put  in  doubt  and 
the  pre-trial  version  brought  in  as  infornRtion  for  the  court  by 
putting  his  police  statemnt  to  him  in  examination 
., 
as  in  this  case 
where  informaticn  was  drawn  out  of  very  unco-Operative  witnesses 
after  a  gang  f  ight: 
Pp:  )secutor:  Do  you  know  McNIs  sister? 
Witness:  Yes. 
Prosecutor:  Did  you  see  her  there? 
Witness:  Never  noticed  her. 
I Prosecutor:  You  rea-lise  you're  on  oath? 
Witness:  Yes. 
Prosecutor:  And  you're  on  the  crown  list  of  witnesses? 
Witness:  Yes. 
Prosecutor:  But  you  saw  nothing  at  all? 
Witness:  I  never  seen  them. 
Prosecutor:  Have  you  ever  said  anything  different? 
Witness:  No. 
Prosecutor:  I  suggest  you  have.  I  suggest  you  told  the 
police  that  you  saw  these  three  accused  and  the  girl  corrdng 
a,  long  just  at  that  point. 
or  with  another  witness: 
Witness:  I  didn't  see  anyone  else. 
Prosecutor:  Did  you  give  a  statement  to  the  police? 
Witness:  Yes. 
Prosecutor:  Did  you  give  a  description  of  someone? 
Witness:  I  just  saw  somebody  in  a  denim  jacket. 
Prosecutor:  So  you  did  see  him? 
Witness:  I  only  saw  arms  in  a  denim  jacket 
Prosecutor:  And  you  saw  that  piece  of  wood? 
Witness:  It  could've  been. 
Prosecutor:  Were  you  able  to  tell  the  police  what  happened? 
Witness:  No. 
Prosecutor:  Sure? 
Witness:  Think  so,  sir. 
Prosecutor:  Did  the  police  take  a  note  of  what  you  said? 
Witness:  Yes. 
Prosecutor:  But  You  didn't  say  anything. Ný  -L 
Witness:  All  I  saw  was  sowthing  coming  down  on  his  head 
and  he  fell  back  into  the  shop. 
Prosecutor-  r1hen  why  didn't  you  say  so? 
(case  98) 
In  another  case  where  a  victim  of  assault  failed  first  to 
identify  the  knife  then  to  give  clear  evidence  on  what  had  been 
said  during  the  attack  , 
both  prosecutor  and  judge  mode  it  clear 
they  had  ways  and  means  of  eliciting  the  information  required: 
Prosecutor:  Did  he  say  anything.? 
Witness:  He  n-dght  have.  I  couldn't  make  it  out  exactly. 
Prosecutor:  Have  you  always  said  that? 
Witness:  Yes. 
Prosecutor:  What  did  you  say  to  the  police? 
Witness:  Oh  aye.,  he  said  he  was  going  to  get  me  or  something. 
Prosecutor:  Was  it  not  more  specific?  IIm  going  to  be 
talking  to  the  policeman  you  spoke  to  that  night  you  know, 
so  let  us  be  clear  on  what  you  axe  telling  the  court. 
Judge:  Now,  Mr.  S. 
,  you  have  at  the  moment  made  two  contra- 
dictory  statemnts.  (reading)  "I  couldn't  make  it  out" 
and  "he  was  going  to  get  m  or  something".  If  I  think  You 
are  prevaricating  -  do  you  know  what  prevaricating  mans? 
Witness:  It  mans,  eh.,  saying  sorwthing  ... 
Judge  (interrupting):  It  mans  avoiding  a  question.  Now 
if  I  get  the  irrpression.  you  are  prevaricating  then,  believe 
me)  I  have  powers  to  use.  If  you  are  going  to  answer, 
answer  truthfully. 
The  prosecutor  resumes  with  the  now  IzLrgely  intimidated  witness: 
Prosermtor:  Did  you  tell  the  policermn  you  were  not  100% 
sure  or  did  you  give  him  two  clear  sentences? \s-J 
Witness:  (pause)  Yes.  He  said  he  had  a  knife  for  mL-.  He 
said  held  use  it  througýi  ny  heart.  (case  92) 
The  right  to  prove  previous  inconsistent  statemnts  by 
reference  to  police  statemnts  -  and  to 
sanction  deviations  -  thus  provides  a  valuable  mans  of  ensuring 
that  the  case  prepared  before  the  trial  is  the  one  produced  in  court. 
But  since  the  defence  by  definition  has  no  police  statemnts  but 
only  precognitions  to  work  from,  it  is  available  only  to  the 
prosecution. 
The  Thomson  Corrudttee 
.  while  declining  to  make  precognitions 
a  legitimate  subject  for  examination,  nonetheless  took  note  of  the 
,  strong  feeling'  that: 
so  many  witnesses  who  have  given  precognitions  which 
incrindnate  an  accused  depart  from  their  precognitions 
at  the  trial  that  something  has  to  be  done  to  overcomee 
the  problem.  (1975:  166) 
They  remm-ended  three  changes.  First,  prosecutors  should  be 
allowed  to  recall  witnesses  after  all  the  evidence  is  led  to  prove 
that  Statements  made  to  the  police  contradict  testimny  brought 
out  by  the  defence  even  if  this  removes  f  rorn  the  accused  his  traditional 
righttothe  lastwordin  the  trial.  Second,  intunewith  English  law,  wit- 
nesses  'should  be  allowed  to'  sbe  their  -precognitions  before  the  trial  to 
shaxpen  their  mmories,  even  though  these  are  not  their  own  state- 
ments  but  the  edited  version  prepared  by  prosecutor,  defence 
or  police.  Third)  they  suggest  sharpening  up  procedure  by  not  only 
allowing  examination  related  to  precognitions  on  oath,  but  attaching 
criminal  sanctions  to  any  departure  from  the  pretrial  statewnt, 
to  the  tune  of  up  to  two  years  imprisonment,  af  ine  or  both.  Ibis 
sanction  would  be  available  only  to  the  C-ccxvn.  The  problem  is 
defined  as  one  'where  the  Ccown  case  failsl(p.  168)  and  to  stretch  it ý  S-ý 
to  the  defence  too  would  be  to  make  it  'UnnecessarilY  wide  in  its 
application'  . 
This  is  based  on  the  dubieus  assurrption  that: 
alnust  all  Crown  witnesses  who  have  incriminated  an 
accused  in  a  sworn  statemnt,  before  a  sheriff  (and  it 
will  be  on  this  incrirdnatory  evidence  or  at  least 
partly  on  the  basis  of  this  incriminatory  evidence 
that  the  Crown  will  have  launched  its  prosecution) 
will  have  told  the  truth  in  the  statenient.  (P.  169) 
So  one  more  one-sided  power  for  the  Crown  is  proposed  despite  the 
ndnority  view  on  the  ConwrLttee  that: 
It  seems  wrong  that  a  witness  ...  should  be  liable  to 
punishment  for  =king  a  mteria-I  change  from  an  X-  --  - 
earlier  sworn  statement  if  that  change  helps  the 
defence,  but  not  if  it  helps  the  prosecution.  (p.  171) 
The  recorm-undation  is 
, 
in  fact,  only  a  strengthening  of  a  sanction 
already  in  existence  -  conteirpt  of  court  by  prevarication  which  is 
liable  to  p-unishmnt  by  a  E25  fine  or  20  days  in  prison  but  can  be 
'purged'  by  giving  the  evidence  required. 
In  short,  in  all  three  elen-ents  involved  in  ass  ing  a  case  - 
knowledge  of  the  issues,  access 
witnesses  -  the  defence  is  at  a 
trying  to  construct  a  strong  Pa 
criumphantly  pointed  out  that 
too  obvious  explanation  for  the 
to  information  and  power  over 
disadvantage  \-  the'-prose--cution  in 
V-, 
3itive  case.  So  when  it  is 
there  is  an  all 
statistical  success  of  prosecution 
cases  at  trial,  notably  that  the  pre-trial  filters  operate  such 
that  only  indisputably  strong  Crown  cases  cow  to  trial  at  all,  it 
should  be  borne  in  mind  that  strong  and  weak  cases  do  not  rrdraculouslY appear  after  an  incident  ready  fomed  like  tablets  of  stone  on 
Mount  Sinai.  They  are  the  product  of  a  process  of  construction 
in  which  both  the  technical  skills  of  lawyers  and  the  structural 
opportunities  and  limitations  offered  by  the  legal  system  play 
their  part  in  shaping  what  facts  get  into  the  courts  and  just  how 
strong  or  weak  a  case  can  be 
_INDEPENDENT 
of  the  incident  in  question. 
Exardning  the  niceties  of  legal  procedure  suggests  that  the 
strength  of  the  prosecution  case  at  the  trial  is  a  product  of  just 
such  influences.  Adversary  investigation  filters  out  mbiguities 
and  leaves  only  black  and  white  cases  -  the  caricature  versions  of 
reality  offered  by  prosecution  and  defence;  courtroom  powers  and 
sanctions  help  prevent  any  deviation  rom  either  of  these  filtered 
versions,  but  especialiyLthe  Crown  case;  and  the  unequal 
powers  available  to  the  adversaxies  before  the  trial  help  ensure 
that  the  nrosecution  case  is  the  stronger. 
These  filters  however  are  not  observable  by  the  judge  or  jury, 
press  or  public  watching  justice  being  done.  They  sinply  see  the 
prosecutor  successfully  executing  the  burden  of  proving  guilt.  How 
that  has  been  organised,  out  of  the  public  eye,  is  of  necessity 
Imknown.  So  it  is  that  the  intermeshing  of  public  and  private  sectors 
in  the  legal  pmcess  allows  the  trial-  imultaneously  two 
functions:  the  ideological  function  of  displaying  the  rhetoric  of 
justice  in  action  by  being  tipped  visibly  in  favour  of  due  process  and 
the  accused,  and  the  pragmatic  function  of  crime  Covtty,  '\  by  being 
tipped 
_invisibly 
but  decisively  in  favour  of  conviction.  The  role  of 
the  trial  can  only  be  understood  by  being  set  in  the  context  of  the 
legal  process  as  a  whole. CIIAPTER  5 
1.  In  som,  cases  the  burden  is  shifted  by  statute  or  presumption. 
See  chapter  6. 
2.  Discussed  in  chapter  6. I  S-  -,  ý 
CHAPTER  6  Standing  Trial:  Prosecutor's  Duties,  Defendant's  Ri 
-ts? 
The  rhetoric  of  justice  is  expressed  not  just  in  the  general 
e 
cliches  surrounding  the  trial  but  in  the  sPecific  roles  of  pmsecutor 
and  defendant  that  follow  from  them.  Whatever  the  situation  may  be 
behind  the  scenes,  once  in  court  the  prosecutor  seens  to  be  given  all 
the  duties  and  the  defendant  all  the  privileges.  The  rbetoric  poses 
the  trial  essentially  as  a  test  for  the  Prosecutor.  The  accused 
need  do  nothing  -  it  is  up  to  the  prosecutor  to  prove  guilt  or  fail. 
The  "test"  involves  five  basic  tasks  for  the  prosecutor  in  proving 
guilt,  with  attendant  rigbts  for  the  defendant.  First,  the 
prosecutor,  not  the  accused,  must  make  the  case;  the  accused  can 
make  a  case  or  sin-ply  remain  silent  and  the  prosecutor  may  not 
prove  a  point  by  suggesting  that  silence  means  guilt.  Second,  the 
prosecutor  nnist  prove  his  case  without  using  useful  but 
inadmissible  evidence,  not,  for  example,  introducing  any  reference to  the  defendant's  previous  convictions  al-thouol  the  defendant 
can  always  att  a  prosecution  witness  on  this  basis.  'Mird, 
the  prosecutor  nm-ist  prove  guilt,  which  ncludes  intent.  Fourth, 
he  must  reach  a  ndnimum  standa  rd  of  what  legally  constitutes 
sufficient  evidence  for  a  conviction,  and  the  accused  may 
always  close  the  case  by  submitting  he  has  not  done  so.  Fifth, 
he  must  pass  the  crucial  subjective  test  of  convincing  the 
jury  beyond  reasonable  dDubt  that  his  evidence  is  true.  But 
the  powe+d  privileges  of  the  trial  have  proved  as  open  as 
previous  stages  of  the  crirrdnal  process  to  qualification  by 
case  lmv  and  statute,  and  these  tasks  are  not  always  quite  so 
demanding  -  nor  the  related  defendant's  privileges  quite  so 
secure  -  as  a  general  suma-ry  suggests.  There  a-re  ifs  and  buts 
attached  to  evexy  one. 
The  burden  of  proof  and  the  right  to  silence 
The  Prirrdnal-  Law  'Revision  CaM-Iittee  Is  proposal  to  revoke  the 
defendant's  right  to  remain  silent  in  court  or  at  least  to  make 
it  subject  to  adverse  conment  (the  Monson  Report  reconrended  the 
saw)  sparked  off  a  heated  debate,  stimulated  PmPhlets  of  protest 
and  was  seen  as  one  of  the  crucial  reasons  for  (xýD(Ay,  ý&A'W"-\ 
(  (-, 
,x  ý--  e-C),  (",  I-ý-, 
V,,  Nk  'pt  -11) 
ýQLýý 
\\LýI-kC-y\  to  reform  criminal-  procedure.  Yet  it  is  hard  to  f  ind 
the  grounds  for  either  side  -  c>f  the  debate  since  in  large  measure 
the  situation  proposed  by  the  CAomnittee  already  exists  in  law. 
The  crucial  proposal  in  the  Conudttee's  Report  and  indeed  in 
the  evidence  of  Sir  David  McNee,  the  Metropolitan  Police 
COMissioner,  to  the  Royal  Caýission  on  Criminal  Procedure  in 
1979,  is  this:  if  the  dl'-fendant  chooses  not  to  enter  the  witness \  ý-6\ 
box  to  present  his  om  version  of  events  and  to  have  it  tested 
by  cross-examination,  then  the  jury  should  be  able  to  draw 
advc-rse  inplications  frcm  this:  they  should,  in  short,  be  able 
to  infer  that  silence  rne-ans  guilt.  'Ihe  idea  that  the  current 
situation  differs  frcm  this  is  based  on  the  fact  that  the 
C-t  k  "I  VNCý\ 
1898rvidence  Act  expressly  prohibited  the  prosecutor  from 
emrenting  on  the  accused's  silence.  The  report  in  the 
"Guardian"  of  Sir  David's  evidence  puts  it  like  this: 
'Neither  prosecuting  counsel  nor  the  judge  is  entitled 
to  draw  any  inference  from  the  choice  of  a  defendant 
not  to  give  evidence  .  'Judges  and  prosecution 
should  be  able  to  con-ment  on  the  defendant's  silence. 
1 
(17  January  1979) 
This  is  however,  a  somewhat  misleading  account,  since  it  confuses 
ccumnt  with  inference.,  and  conf  lates  the  rigbts  of  judge,  jury 
and  prosecutor. 
r1he  current  situation  is  that  the  prosecutor  should  not 
cmmnt  at  all  in  his  ýkvc,  \  sVe[ý,  on  the  defendant's  failure  to  give 
evidence  :  neither  to  cIrwN  attention  to  it,  nor  to  suggest  any 
irrPlications  from  it.  He  may  of  ec)urse  make  great  Play,  as 
6xcL?  te-,  r-  Gkrxk,  &ow1  of  the  accused's  alleged  silence  on  being 
j 
ai'msted,  or  indeed  on  his  alleged  pretrial  statements.  Silenc)e 
in  court  samewhat  loses  its  va-lue  if  words  can  be  put  in  the  silent 
mDuth  via  "ve:  rbals"  reprrted  from  the  pretrial  stage-  Indeed  the 
IhOmon  Com-aittee  sav  the  issue  of  the  right  to  silence  in  court 
as  a  red  herring  exactly  because  of  the  acknissibility  of  pretrial 
stateffents.  Instead  of: )(00 
forcing  the  accused  into  the  witness  box  at  his  trial 
when  he  has  heaxd  the  evidence  for  the  Prosecution  and 
is  in  a  position  to  adjust  his  own  evidenoe  to  meet 
the  case  against  him 
...  the  best  opportunity  of 
cbtaining  the  truth  from  an  accused  is  imudiately 
a-f  ter  he  has  been  charged  when  he  dOes  not  know  the 
evidenoe  against  him.  (1975:  188) 
IL- 
Me  assumed  dishonesty  of  the  accused  expressed  here  ja-rs  a 
little  with  the  presu-nption  of  innocence,  while  the  recamie-n- 
dation  as  a  whole  violates  "the  sacred  and  inviolable" 
protection  from  self-incrimination,  and  the  prosecutor's  duty  to 
bear  the  burden  of  proof  beyond  reasonable  doubt. 
The  right  to  silence  in  court  should  indeed  be  set  not  just 
in  the  context  of  pretrial  silence  or  statements  but  in  the  wntext 
of  the  trial  in  general.  'Ihe  defendant  may  have  a  right  to  mmain 
ý  roi3  "kKk  eQQ  %^  114 
silent,  to  ý-  no  but  force  the  prosecution  to  prove  the 
case  against  him.  But  consider  the  natuce  of  a  trial,  with  the  full 
prosecution  case  stated  f  irst  rather  than  each  issue  being  debated 
in  full  all  the  way  through;  the  nature  of  a  case,  with  infolmtion 
selected  and  distorted  to  fit  into  a  version  Of  realitY  f  avourable 
to  one  side  only;  the  nature  of  the  prosecution  case,  setting  the 
ag,  p-nda  for  the  issues  of  the  case  according  to  the  information 
available  and  wmnable;  the  nature  of  cross-examinaticn,  too  j%  bitty 
tID  indicate  the  defence  version,  indeed  designed  not  to  give  WNaY 
the  defence  version  while  the  prosecutor  is  still  presenting  his, 
and  Often,  with  so  little  pretrial  knowledge  of  all  the  existing 
evidence,  a  shot  i-n  the  dark  rather  than  a  knowledgeable  prepared ý  (O\ 
attack.  Consicl--r  these  things  and  it  is  only  too  clea-r  that 
if  the  prosecution  case  goes  smoothly  there  can  be  no  reason 
not  to  accept  it  unless  it  is  answered.  Sorrietirres  this  is 
not  left  irrplicit  but  made  only  too  clear  in  the  closing  conTwnts 
of  judges.  When  a  prosecutor  eXpressed  anxiety,  in  coming  to 
the  end  of  his  side  of  the  case,  that  his  last  witness  had  not 
yet  turned  up,  the  sherif  f-  sitting  without  a  jury  -  announoed 
nonchalantly: 
I  wouldn't  worry.  You've  plenty  of  evidence  for 
the  first  charge  and  the  second  is  imaterial  in 
corrparison.  (case  96) 
Or  again,  when  a  prosecutor  prcposed  calling  a  witness  to  clarify 
a  point  at  the  end  of  his  evidence  and  before  the  defence  case,  the 
sheriff  responded: 
'Well  can  we  have  him  for  that  only  because  I  Im 
satisfied  otherwise. 
Me  defence  counsel  protested: 
Your  honour! 
And  the  sheriff  only  then  qualified  his  acceptance  of  the  prosecution 
case: 
Subject  to  any  evidence  led  by  the  defence.  (case  95) 
Indeed  the  defendant's  right  not  to  prove  his  innooenoe  but 
to  let  the  prosecutor  prove  his  guilt,  should  be  set  in  the  context 
of  the  criminal  process  not  just,  as  we  have  seen  in  chapter  5,  in 
te'T%  of  how  that  process  affects  the  reality  of  the  burden  Of 
Proof,  but  of  how  it  affects  the  reality  of  the  PresumPtion  Of 
innooence.  Crimina.  1  procedure  includes  a  filter  between  the ý  G-2- 
police  and  the  (x)urt  for  the  specific  purpose  of  establishing 
that  there  is  a  prima  facie  case  bdor;  ýprcsecutions  0,  Y-e_ 
brougbt  to  trial.  The  procurator  fiscal  1s  discretion  to 
drcp  or  pursue  police  cases  fulfils  this  function  in  Scotland, 
the  magistrates'  decision  in  coarnittal  proceedings  does  the 
sam  in  indicUwnts  in  England.  The  filter  is  not  so 
efficient  in  practice  that  only  watertight  cases  come  to  trial-, 
while  "watertight  cases"  as  we  have  seen  are  themselves  only 
an  axtificial  construction.  Indeed  Baldwin  and  McConville  found 
that  mc)st  defendants  were  ccranitted  for  trial  without  the 
prosecution  case  being  scrutinised  either  by  the  defence  (they 
were  given  the  prosecution  papers  only  on  the  day  of  coarrdttal) 
or  indeed  by  the  magistrates,  who  did  not  look  at  the  evidence. 
(1979:  25  )  But  the  presupposition  that  there  is  an 
established  case  for  conviction  is  thus  built  into  the 
3 
assuTtions  of  the  court  before  any  evidence  is  heard.  - 
e 
If  then  the  accused  enters  the  cc)urt  on  a  rhetorical  PresumPtion  01 
innooence  but  a  real  presumption  of  guilt,  it  is  hardlY  surprising. 
Uie  displaoement  is  not  just  the  product  Of  ccimmon  sense 
assimptions  that  where  there  is  smoke  there  is  fire,  the  work 
routines  of  the  court  officials  (Carlen)  or  the  symbolic  position 
Of  the  accused  in  the  dock  (Hetzler  and  Kanter).  After  all  there 
is  SOMething  a  little  tautological  in  that.  Being  in  the  dock ý  ko"3 
does  not  intrinsically  man  guilt.  Rather  it  nj,  -,  qns  that  to  the 
,  a,  server  because  it  has  becom  associated  with  conviction,  but  "i 
presunably  moving  the  defendant  to  a  table  or  a  pulpit  would 
soon  come  to  have  the  sanie-  connotation.  It  is  the  status  of  being 
a  defendant  rather  than  his  location  that  inplies  guilt.  Routine 
rc-) 
expectations  and  syn-bolisrns  inay  play  their  part  in  placing  the 
presumption  of  innocence  with  a  presumption  of  guilt,  but  it  is 
also  built  into  a  system  of  pre-tria-I  pix)cedu-res  which  irrplies 
that  the  innocent  (and  the  guilty  who  cannot  be  proved  guilty) 
are  exempted  fran  the  process  of  public  proof.  In  short.  )the 
very  fact  that  a  case  has  com  to  trial  at  all  rreamin  law  that 
the  prcsecution  case  is  recognised  as  having  som  convincing  if 
preliminaxy  proof  of  the  defendant's  guilt. 
More  specifically,  prohibiting  the  prosecutor  from  caTmnting 
on  the  accused's  silence  in  court,  does  not  man  the  judge  or  C 
jury  may  not  infer  guilt  frcm  it,  or  take  account  of  it  in 
weighing  up  the  case  for  conviction.  As  a  Scottish  case  puts  it: 
--.  the  silent  defendant  does  take  a  risk  and  if  he 
fails  to  d)allenge  evidence  given  by  witnesses  for  the 
Crown  by  cross-exarrdnation  or,  in  addition,  by  leading 
substantive  evidence  in  support  of  his  challenge,  he 
cannot  corrplain  if  the  court  not  wrely  accept  that 
unchallenged  evidence  but  also,  in  the  light  Of  all  the 
circumstances,  draw  from  it  the  n-ost  unfavourable  and 
adverse  inference  to  the  defence  that  it  is  capable  of 
supporting.  QIcIlhwTy  v  Herron  1972) 
Indeed  the  prohibitions  placed  on  the  prosecutor  from  cmTenting on  the  accused's  silence  are  not  repeated  for  the  judge.  Uhether 
or  not  the  1898  Act  was  intended  to  prohibit  Coarrunt  frcrn  aný,  one 
in  court  On  the  accused's  silenc(ý.  only  the  prosecutor  was 
ý_  ýJicitly  prohibited  frCm  doing  so  and  English  case  law  the 
following  year  fastened  on  this  literal  interpretation  to 
establish  that  the  judge  is  quite  entitled  to  drmv  the  jury's 
attention  to  the  accused's  silence  in  COUrt,  -  indeed  from  his 
position  of  neutrality  and  authority  he  may  arguably  do  so  with 
greater  inpact  that  the  prosecutor  could.  Mis  was  defined  as  part 
of  his  role  in  conmnting  on  the  evidence  and  on  how  the  case  has 
been  conducted  (R.  v  ]Rhodes  1899),,  and  Precisely  how  he  CoaTwnted 
was  left  to  the  judge's  own  discretion,  normally,  as  Heydon  puts  it 
"in  robust  term.  "  (1975  :  153).  In  Scotland  in  1966  it  was  noted 
that  judges  should  not  put  "undue  enphasis"  on  the  accused's  silence 
(ýCott)  and  in  England  in  1950,  it  was  suggested  that  judges  ought 
to  be  careful,  (Waugh  v  R.  1950)  although  errphasis  was  laid 
on  the  specific  "state  of  the  evidence"  in  that  particular  case,  where 
the  prosecution  had  an  extremely  weak  case  (the  police  had  actually 
dropped  it  because  there  was  so  little  evidence  and  it  only  wnt  to 
court  at  all  on  the  direction  of  the  coroner.  )  In  such  circumstances 
it  was  considered  a  bit  excessive  for  the  judge  to  coment  on  the 
ace'used's  silence  nine  times  in  the  course  of  the  summing  uP 
'Ahen  it  was  f  ar  frcgn  clear  that  the  prosecution  had  really  made  out 
a  case  agains  th  im  anyway. 
WO  V-ý 
Where  the  prosecution  case  seems  strong,  ý,  the  judge's  right 
tO  cOnmnt  may  even  becaw,  in  the  Court  of  Appeal's  words  in  1973, (paralleled  in  Scotland  in  1974 
'ý 
a  duty: 
In  the  judg  ment  of  this  court,  if  the  trial  judge 
had  not  comunted  in  strong  ternis  on  the  appeltant  ts 
absence  f  rcm  the  witness  box,  he  would  have  been 
failing  in  his  duty.. 
..  where  an  accused  person  elects 
not  to  give  evidence,  in  rrost  cases  but  not  all,  the 
judge  should  explain  to  the  jury  what  the  consequences 
of  his  absence  from  the  witness  box  a-re  ... 
(4.  y 
The  judge's  duty  to  cormr--nt  does  not  mean  he  may  him,  -elf  explicitly 
infer  guilt  frcm  the  accused's  silence,  nor  direct  the  jury  to  do 
so, 
S 
but  he  is  quite  entitled  to  tell  the  jury  that  any  innocent 
explanations  from  the  defence  lawyer  would  have  oome  better  from 
6 
the  accused,  who  would  have  been  liable  to  cross-exarrdnation, 
or  remind  them  that  they  are  there  to  represent  the  common  sense 
of  ordinary  people  and  instruct  them  to  follow  that  conmn  sense 
in  drmving  what  inplications  they  consider  fit  from  the  accused's 
silence.  He  may  indeed  suggest  what  questicru  their  oorrmn  sense 
might  dictate  to  them.  Me  jury  is  thus  directed  it  may  if  COMM 
sense  so  dictates,  infer  reasons  for  silence  that  suggest  guilt  4'ý'J4- 
there  may  be  many  others  'Ihe  lav  does  specify  that  there 
should  be  "no  apparent  reason  for  silence  other  than  inabilitY  to 
answer  truthfully  the  case  mde"  (Heydon  1975:  156)  but  there  maY 
be  many  unknown  factors  quite  consistent  with  innooenoe-  involved. 
The  jury  is  not  warned  about  inferring  too  much. 
Indeed  it  is  interesting  that  the  jury  is  sPec-i-ficallý-' 
directed  to  follow  11conmn  sense"  rather  than  legal  rules.  Rather 
than  directing  jurors  to  ask  why  the  defendant  has  remained  silent, ý  Wo 
the  judge  could  just  as  readily'have  a  duty  to  tell  them  they 
need  not  and  May  not  ask  such  questions:  silence  is  a  right 
and  as  such  can  be  exercised  without  explanation,  the  jury 
must  be  persuaded  by  the  prose  cut  case  not  the  defendant's 
silence.  It  is  often  elaimed  that  there  would  be  no  point  in 
directing  the  jury  like  this  because  they  would  operate  on  their 
carmn  sense  anyway.  This  not  only  assuTes  a  rather  one-sided 
view  of  11conmn  sense,  "  but  overlooks  the  possibility  that  jurors 
operate  not  as  ordinaxy  mrrbers  of  the  public  moved  by  corrm.  n 
-7 
sense  but  as  legal  actors  deciding  accoiding  to  legal  rules  - 
legal  rules  which  in  this  case  they  a-re  being  told  to  ignore. 
w  Jurors  in  short  do  not  fnformu\\-.,,  break  the  rules  by  jumpiiig 
to  "caTmon  sense"  conclusions  from  the  defendant's  silence:  they 
are  explicitly  directed  by  the  judge  to  operate  in  direct 
contradiction  to  the  legal  rhetoric  of  the  right  of  silence. 
-The 
judgýLlmust 
choose  his  words  carefully,  He  mst  not  suggest,  even  'by  a  slip 
of  the  tongue"  (R  v  Sparrow)  that  the  accused  must  speak  if  the 
defence  is  to  succeed.  Even  this  however  does  not  apply  to 
everyone.  Statutes  and  case  lmv  have  created  offences  and  legal 
doctrines  which  undemdne  not  only  the  right  of  silence  but  the 
it 
Presuription  of  the  defendant's  innocýence  and  the  placing  of  the burden  of  proof  on  the  prosecution.  Indeed,  Ashworth 
argues  that  so  many  qualifications  have  been  imposed 
on  the  WoDlminqton  principle  -  and  he  cites  in  particular 
the  1952  Magistrates'  Courts  Act  and  the  case  of  ýdwards 
(1975)  which  effectively  extended  its  provisions  to  the 
Crown  Courts  -  that: 
the  golden  thread  has  become  tarnished. 
English  law  now  so  frequently  imposes  upon  the 
defendant  the  burden  of  proving  a  particular 
defence  that  it  cannot  be  asserted  with  confidence 
whether  the  hallowed  presumption  of  innocence  or 
the  disowned  presumption  of  guilt  is  the  dominant 
principle  -  which  iy,  ý,  reality  is  the  rule  and  which 
the  exception.  (  1978:  385) 
One  waj  in  which  this  done  is  via  the  notion  of  legal  I 
presumptions.  "Innocent  till  proved  guilty"  may  be  the  only 
presumption  that  has  reached  the  rhetoric  and  become  one  of 
the  common  catch-phrases  anout  justice,  buý  it  is  not  the 
only  presumption  in  law.  There  are  all  sorts  of ý  (C:  s 
practical  items  like  how  long  it  takes  fr(:  rn  conoeption  to  birth 
which  can  sinply  be  presumed  rather  than  proved.  7a  convenient 
timesaving  device.  But  the  convenience  has  also  stretdied  in 
saTe  circumstances  beyond  saving  time  about  proving  practical 
item  of  that  sort  into  something  of  a  rather  different  order, 
not  just  making  it  easier  to  prove  guilt  but  eliminating  the 
need  for  proof  altogether. 
So  according  to  the  1968  Theft  Act  if  somone  is  caught 
caxrying  tools  that  could  be  used  for  a  burglaxy  -  and  that  of 
course  raises  questions  of  definition  -  it  is  not,  as  we  have  seen, 
11 
to  the  police  to  prove  that  he  did  -use  the  tools  for  a  burglary 
or  that  he  intended  to  do  so,  as  the  rhetoric  of  the  burden  of 
proof  on  the  prosecution  might  suggest.  Rather  it  is  up  to  the 
arrestee  to  explain  himself  if  he  is  not  to  be  automatically 
presuned  gui  lty.  Likewise  according  the  the  "doctrine  of  reoent 
possession"  if  the  accused  is  found  with  stolen  goods  not  long 
after  they  were  stolen  and  in  incriminating  cireumtanoes,  he  is 
assumed  to  be  guilty  of  thef  t  or  receiving  unless  he  can  raise 
doubts  to  the  contrary. 
A  perfectly  logical  reason  is  of  fered  f  or  this  departure  f  rm 
tbd'golden  thread'  of  the  law.  Presurrptions  allow  the  law  to  do 
the  impossible: 
one  of  their  princiPal  uses  being  to  establish  f  acts 
which,  by  their  nature,  a-re  incapable  of  proof  by 
direct  evidence.  (Walker  and  Walker  19715:  50) 
And  so  useful  are  they  indeed  that,  according  to  Walker  and  Walker's 
text  en  evidence  in  Scotland: I  (o  1ý 
the  presumption  of  innocence,  for  exanple,  which 
is  a  presunptio  juris,  is  displaced  in  the  courts, 
as  a  matter  of  everyday  oceurrence  --ýi) 
qbe  result  is  that  the  accused  is  faced  with  proving  his 
innocence  and  indeed  with  trying  to  prove  lack  of  guilty 
intention,  an  extremely  difficult  thing  to  do.  Indeed  the  law 
of  evidence  reeognises  it  as  such  and  generally  operates  ba  the 
I 
rule  that  no  one  shouId  be  required  to  prove  something  was  not 
the  case;  rather  the  burden  of  proof  should  f  all  on  the  person  wbo 
says  it  was.  This  has  been  described  in  English  law  as 
an  ancient  rule  founded  on  considerations  of  good 
sense  and  it  should  not  be  departed  frcrn  without 
strong  reasons  (JoseRh  Constantine  Steamship  Line  Ltd  v 
Irrperial  Smlting  Corporation  Ltd'  %c4;  --) 
The  sarw  line  is  taken  in  Scotland  in  discussing  the  rules 
of  evidence 
'of  which  one  of  the  most  fundamental  and  raost 
rational  is  serrper  praesumitur  pro  negante. 
(Lennie  v  H.  M.  Adv.  1946) 
This  is  the  justification  for  the  prosecutor  not  being  required 
tO  Prove  for  example  that  a  poacher  is  operating  without  a  licence; 
rather  the  ace-used  must  prove  he  has  one.  'Ihe  reason  is  that 
othemise  the  result  would  be  "many  offenders  escaping  conviction.  " 
v  Turner  1816)  But  the  sarm  reasoning  does  not  seem 
tO  aPply  in  leaving  the  acOused  in  scme  eircurrstanoes  at  least  not 
MlY  to  have  to  demnstrate  his  innocence  but  to  have  to  do  so  by 
Pmving  a  negative. \  -ý  C) 
So  far  as  the  right  of  silence  is  concerned,  the  accused 
in  these  situations  has  no  such  privilege,  since  he  must  of  fer 
an  explanation  of  what  he  was  doing  with  the  tools,  or  how  he 
cxn--  by  the  stolen  goods  -  or  be  convicted.  So  Lord  Devlin 
could  poin  t  out  that  in  cases  of  recent  possession: 
the  f  act  that  an  accused  is  found  in  Possession 
of  property  recently  stolen  does  not  of  itself  prove 
that  he  knew  of  the  stealing.  Nevertheless  it  is  not 
open  to  the  accused  at  the  end  of  the  prosecution's 
case  to  submLt  that  he  has  no  case  to  answer;  he  must 
offer  some  explanation  to  account  for  his  possession 
(Hill  v  Baxter  1958) 
Likewise  in  a  Scottish  case  of  a  fraud  where  the  accused  claimed 
an  inheritance  on  the  grounds  that  he  had  been  narried  to  the 
deceased  lady  had  witnesses  of  a  sort  to  support  but  did  not 
give  evidence  hin-self 
, 
the  Lord  Justice  Clerk  could  sum  up  to 
the  jury  in  no  uncertain  telnrý: 
'Ihe  one  man  who  might  have  told  us  his  storY  is  trLIe  is 
sitting  there.  He  has  preferred  the  security  of  the 
dock  to  the  insecurity  of  the  witness  box  .... 
Now, 
them  are  certain  cases  in  which  the  proved  facts  may 
raise  a  piýesumption  of  guilt,  and  in  which,  in  the  absenoe 
of  some  explanation  by  the  person  accused  -  where  the 
person  accused  is  the  only  one  person  wbo  can  know  the 
real  truth  -a  jury  may  be  entitled  to  draw  an  inferenoe 
of  guilt-,  and  I  direct  You  in  law  that  this  is  one  of  them..  - 
L 
there  is  evidence  pointing  to  it  being  a  dishonest  and  a \1\ 
fraudulent  claim  and  there  is  no  evid--noe-  pointing  to  it 
being  an  honest  and  genuine  claim  ...  I  direct  you  that 
there  is  arrple  evidence  in  this  case,  if  you  accept  it, 
to  justify  you  in  finding  a  verdict  of  guilty  (H.  M.  Adv. 
Hardy  1938) 
The  defendant's  silence  in  court  thus  becomes  a  significant  factor 
in  proving  hi-m  guilty. 
The  right  of,  silence  then,  although  it  is  a  phrase  that  has 
been  given  much  mileage  in  debates  about  civil  rights  is  in  fact 
something  of  a  misnomer.  It  iTdght  be  mre  accurate  to  describe 
it  as  the  recognition  that  without  torture  no  one  can  now  be 
forced  to  speak  in  court.  To  suggest  that  it  is  currently  a 
privilege  which  the  defendant  can  legitimately  exercise  without 
fear  of  adverse  consequences  is  quite  misleading.  Certainly  he 
may  remain  silent  in  or  out  of  court,  but  in  oontradiction  to  the 
rhetoric  of  the  presumption  of  innocence  and  the  burden  of  proof, 
guilt  may  be  presumed  in  same  cases,  inferred  in  others,  if  he 
dc)es:  the  defendant's  silence  in  court  as  readily  as  out  of  it  is 
less  a  privilege  and  an  obstacle  to  proving  guilt  than  a  fact 
which  may  help  convict  him. 
The  defendant's  character 
One  of  the  categories  of  inadmissible  evidence  nx)st  clearly 
presented  as  one-sided,  as  a  problem  for  the  prosecutor,  privilege 
for  the  accused,  is  the  rule  governing  information  on  ,  character.  " Th 
Discrediting  the  testi  mony  of  any  opposing  witn(--,.  -  ,s  pl  ays 
an  inportant  part  'in  the  advocate's  role  of  persuading  judge  or 
jury  to  believe  his  case  rather  than  his  opponent's.  Discrediting 
the  character  of  an  opposing  witness  is  a  useful  way  of  doing 
this,  *lost  decisively  of  all,  by  showing  he  has  a  criminal 
record.  For  the  prosecutor  there  is  an  obstacle:  he  may  not 
bring  out  as  evidence  any  Previous  record  the  acciised  may  have. 
the  defence  on  the  other  hand  it  is  always  possible  to  attack  the 
diaracter  of  a  prosecution  witness  or  indeed  cross-examine  him  on 
his  criminal  record  -  for  Prosecution  witnesses  may  have  "bad 
For 
characters"  too,  a  point  "common  sense"  proposals  to  bring  in  all 
relevant  inf  omation  often  overlooks.  Yet  it  would  be  n-dsleading  to 
sun  up  the  situation  too  readily  as  one  of  privileges  for  the 
accused,  prcblem  for  the  prosecution.  It  can  equally  operate  in 
One  prcblem  f  or  the  defence  is  sirrply  unequal  access  to 
information.  Only  the  prosecutor  has  official  access  to  polioe 
records.  To  describe  the  defence  position  as  a  privilege  is  to 
ignore  the  fact  that  he  can  be  in  a  catch  22  situation  with  the 
right  to  take  the  initiative  on  information  he  is  not  allowed  to 
have.  In  English  law  where  a  prosecution  witness  is  known  to  have 
, 
Previous  convictions  or  a  'bad  character,  "  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
Prosecutor  to  let  the  defence  know  this;  he  can  then  bring  this 
infomation  out  in  court  and  let  the  jury  use  it  in  assessing  the 
credibility  of  the  prosecution  witness.  However  the  prosecutor  is 
'Mider  no  duty  to  actually  check  out  the  character  of  his  witnesses 
V  Collister  and  Warhurs  I  while,  if  the  prosecutor  does  not  pass 
On  the  relevant  information,  he  is  not  necessarilv.  sanctioned  and  a 
vk')  ý 
MrIviction  may  well  be  sustained  on  appea-I  - 
(R  v  Matthewt)  r1be \11ý 
prosecution  is  therefore  very  much  in  control  of  the  infoimation 
gam  on  the  character  of  witnesses.  7hat  may  even  include  the 
character  of  the  defendant.  In  English  law  the  Prosecutor  has 
a  duty  to  supply  the  defence  with  details  of  the  defendant's 
record,  but  not  in  Scotland.  In  the  Context  of  this  infomation 
control,  exercising  the  defence  privilege  of  attacking  bad 
character  can  backfire.  The  defence  solicitor  may  attack  a  Crown 
witness  in  the  belief  that  his  client  has  a  clean  record,  only  to 
U  '"  U'L-k- 
find  that  the  accused  had  been  hiding  his  past,  ýthe  prosecution 
bring3  in  his  previous  record  as  evidence  -.  for  the  sake  of 
underrrdning  one  aspect  of  the  prosecution  case  the  defence  agent 
has  jeopardised  the  accused  through  revealing  him  as  a  legally 
discredited  character. 
If  the  defence  position  oin  character  involves  mre  problerrs 
than  the  rhetoric  might  suggest,  the  prosecutors  can  often  involve 
less.  'Ihe  prosecutor  can  always  bring  in  discrediting  information 
about  the  defendant's  past  in  retaliation  should  the  defence  attack 
a  prosecution  witness's  character  or  lead  evidence  to  suggest  his 
own  respectability.  We  have  already  seen  in 
just  how  broadly  "attacking  the  character  of  a  prosecution 
witness"  has  been  defined  in  England,  if  not  in  Scotland,  and  how 
easy  it  is  as  a  result  for  the  retaliation  rule  to  com  into  play. 
Even  explaining  away  fingerprints  in  a  prosecut'on  witness's  room 
by  saying  he  had  had  a  honusexual  relationship  with  him,  has  been 
interpreted  as  an  attack  by  tlne  defendant  on  that  witness's 
character  (R-  There  is  an  equally  broad 
ctlinition  of  "  leading  evidence  of  his  own  good  character.  "  In  R 
COuhM'q  (192  the  defence  was  deemed  to  have  led \1 
evidence  on  the  defendant's  good  character  by  (ý-stablishing  that 
he  was  married,  had  a  family,  and  was  in  regular  emploýTrr--nt  .  1he 
Crirrdnal  Lav  Revision  Comittee  suggest  just  as  wide  a  definition 
in  the  exarrples  they  give  f  rcrn  past  cases: 
r)- 
"ie  of  two  mn  charged  with  conspiracy  to  rob  (both 
had  long  crin-dnal  records)  went  into  the  witness  box 
vkaring  a  dark  suit  and  looking  as  if  he  were  a 
respectable  businessman.  When  asked  by  his  counsel  when 
and  where  he  met  his  co-accused,  he  said:  "About 
eighteen  months  ago  at  my  golf  club.  I  was  looking  f  or 
a  gam.  The  secretaxy  introduced  us.  "  In  another  case 
the  defence  continued  to  introduce  evidence  suggesting 
that  the  accused,  who  lived  on  crirrk-,,  was  negotiating 
for  the  purchase  of  a  substantial  property.  (1977-  :  par.  135) 
This  provides  sonie,  interesting  ta,  -: 
Otss  i  into  the  assumptions  and 
ý  ýo,  ý,,  ý  of  the  Criminal  Law  Revision  Conudttee:  rrdddle  class 
lifestyle  and  criniinal  behaviour  are  apparently  assumed  to  be 
inconpatible  -  though  studies  of  white  collar  crim  might  well 
suggest  the  opposite  -  and  crime  is  sonlething  expected  only  of  the 
lower  class.  However  it  a1so  suggests  that  the  accused  may  not 
I  t- 
even  dress  in  his  Sunday  best  withoutl,,  being  taken  as  a  sanctionable 
tactic  allowing  the  prosecutor  to  introduc)e  supposedly  prohibited 
infomation  of  his  past  record.  Indeed  cases,  not  just  these  CCUTWnts 
011  cases,  support  this.  In  Rv  Hamilton  the  accused 
charged  with  indecent  assault,  was  required  to  remve  a  regimntal 
blazer,  in  case  it  was  considered  evidence  of  good  Character.  Since 
researCh  has  shown  that  not  dressing  up  f  or  court  can  lead  to  the 
i1rPlication  being  drawn  that  he  is  not  respectable  or  indeed  not , -i,  uýdng  respect  for  the  court,  ,:  )Al  with  adverse  consequences  for  him 
too) 
q 
the  accused  may  be  caught,  as  so  often,  in  a  double  Bind. 
There  are  also  inckkr,  ý,  c_ýc  ways  in  which  'nf0matiOn  about  the 
accused  can  be  irrplied  in  court  as  the  result  of  prior  procedural 
rules.  Whether  the  accused  is  on  bail  or  in  custody  gives  a  clue. 
It  cbes  not  take  a  juror  of  kAr,  genius  to  work  out  that  the 
accused  who  is  brought  into  court  by  two  unifoiTrx--d  n-k-,  n  with  H.  M.  P. 
on  their  epaulettes  might  have  come  straight  from  Her  Majesty's 
Prison,  and  has  therefore  been  adjudged  for  sow  reason  different 
from  his  co-accused  transporting  himself  unacompanied.  Studies 
\ 
have  also  shown  that  defendants  who  have  been  on  bail  stand  a 
better  chance  of  acquittal  than  those  who  have  not,  perhaps 
because  they  have  less  opportunity  to  cow  smartly  turned  out 
for  the  occasion,  perhaps  bec-ause  of  the  just  being  in 
cus  tody.  A  person  can  be  refused  bail  for  several 
reasons;  one  inportant  factor  that  will  weigh  against  any  request 
forbail  is  that  he  has  previous  convictions.  A  known  crirrdnal 
has  no  right  to  bail.  Previous  conviction  can  thus  operate  at  the 
pm-trial  level  to  feed  adverse  information  about  the  accused  into  -0-z 
More  generally,  controls  are  weak.  Even  where  the 
accused's  mcord  has  been  illegitimately  brought  out  in  court, 
aPpeals  have  been  turned  down  if  it  is  deem-d  to  have  had  no 
Prejudicial  effect  (Mclean  v  Skinner  1907);  it  is  not  a  rigidly 
exclusive  rule.  It  is  explicitly  overruled  too  in  specific  types 
Of  offence,  notably  sex  offences,  where  ,  similar  acts"  or  the 
sirrdla.  rity  of  style  or  behaviour  in  previous  cases  for  which  the 
accused  has  been  convicted,  can  be  used  as  evidence  that  he  is  the 
culPrit  this  tirw  too.  There  am  obvious  dangers  here  of  a  vicious 4 
Lk.  ý 
ý  ",  ")  (49 
circle  of  being  convicted,  being  prin-n-  suspect  next  time, 
rec,  onvicted,  even  mre  of  a  prijrk-,  suspect  next  tim  and  so  on. 
ibere  are  also  dangers  of  deliberate  to  Pass  the 
blam  onto  that  prim  suspect,  while  it  is  a  PrOcedure  quite 
contrary  to  the  idea  that  each  cýase  should  stand  on  its  own  rrerits. 
, LZ. 
According  the  Prevention  of  Crim--s  Act  1871,  section  19,  previous 
c,  onvictlons  may  also  be  called  upon  to  prove  intent  (Watson  v  IMA 
on 
09  ý3hile  som  lmvs  actually  require  that  the 
accused's  previous  record  be  made  known  to  the  judge  and  jury; 
indeed  the  charge  constituted  by  suspicious  behaviour  on  the 
part  of  su-neone  with  a  previous  convicticn.  Case  9,  for  example, 
arose  out  of  the  police  observing  a  "known  thief"  and  his 
conpanion  "taking  a  special  interest  in  cars,  "  and  contrary  to 
the  nonml  expectations  that  previous  convictions  are  not  n-entioned 
in  oc)urt  and  the  judge  or  jury  certainly  does  not  know  of  them,  it 
began  with  the  stipen&-ry  magistrate  addressing  one  of  two  cc)- 
accused: 
You  Ire  the  known  thief.  Do  you  understand  that  procedure? 
Your  finger  prints  have  been  taken,  mtched  with  those 
taken  from  you  at  borstal  and  you  have  two  previous 
convictions.  Therefore  you  are  a  known  thief  . 
In  all  these  ways  then  the  accused's  record  is  less  of  a  privilege 
for  the  accused  and  less  of  a  problem  for  the  prosecutor  than  a 
general  statemnt  of  their  positions  rnight  suggest- 
Provin  g  pi  It 
.  ng  guilt,  the  fourth 
The  prosecutor's  third  task  involves  prov, 
and  fifth  tasks  proving  guilt,  wit  errphas's  on  each  word  in  turn 
h  the Vlý 
b,  ecause  each  involves  problenr--,  of  definition.  In  the  realm  of 
legal  and  indeed  moral  ideas  guilt  involves  not  just  objective 
but  subjective  criteria:  it  means  proving  that  the  accused  not 
only  did  sorm-  specified  deed,  but  that  he  intended  to  do  it. 
Intent  or  fnens  rea  is  an  inWrtant  part  of  the  ideology  of 
criminality  as  the  ultiniate  illstific-atiOn  of  punishrrent:  it  ties 
in  with  the  democratic  notion  of  the  rule  of  law.  Me  conmn  1mv 
maxim  is  Actus  non  f  acit  reum  nisi  uxens  sit  rea,  :  the  deed  does  not 
make  a  man  guilty  unless  his  mind  be  guilty.  It  is  described  in 
Archbold  as: 
of  fundamental  irrportance  in  upholding  the  rule  of  law.  To 
make  a  man  liable  to  irrprisopjwnt  for  an  offence  which  he 
does  not  know  that  he  is  comitting  and  is  unable  to 
prevent  is  repugnant  to  the  ordinary  man's  conception  of 
justice  and  brings  the  law  into  conterrpt. 
(II'll 
sJ438  a) 
Mens  rea  features  as  a  central  diapter  in  books  on  criminal  lmv, 
especially  "the  general  part"  on  the  theories  behind  it.  Yet  it 
receives  remaxkably  little  attention  in  the  books  on  evidence,  an 
indication  that  the  ideology  of  crindnal  law  and  the  pragmatics  of 
criminal  procedure  do  not  always  go  hand  in  hand.  Mere  is  little 
On  the  topic  in  the  books  on  evidence  because  there  is  effective1v 
nothing  to  say.  The  existential  Prcblems  of  proving  intent  that 
pose  such  fascinating  problens  for  theorists  of  crim  and  crirdnal 
1,  %v  are  frequently  sidestepped  and  the  conoept  of  mens  rea  effectivel\, 
rendered  redundant  by  routinely  collapsing  intent  anci  wnav-i(-)uL 
tOgether: \IS  - 
(,  Ný 
...  corrupt  and  evil  intent  (n-x--ns  rea),  is  a 
necessary  elea-kent  in  crimes  ---  It  is  inferred, 
however,  from  proof  of  the  crime  itself,  and 
does  not  need  to  be  separately  established. 
(Walker  &  Walker  1-975  :  25) 
What  is  more  the  concept  does  not  apply  in  many  offences  at  all. 
For  some-  it  is  ruled  out  by  the  doctrine  of  strict  liability.  In 
others,  as  we  have  seen  in  chapter  3,  effect,  indeed  pot  mtial 
effect,  rather  than  intent  is  all  that  need  be  suggested,  while 
evidence  of  intent,  f  rcm  the  cases  observed  seem  to  boil  down  to 
the  polLman  Is  inpression.  In  English  law,  the  declaration  in 
R.  v.  Tolson  (1889)  that  the  defendoott:  L  prove  facts  from  which 
the  jury  might  reasonably  infer  that  she  had  reasonable  grounds 
for  believing  her  action  legitimate,  becane  the  basis,  according 
to  Archbold  (1979)  for  a  particular  concept  of  proof  of  intent. 
Mens  rea  came  to  mean 
the  absence  of  an  honest  and  reasonable  belief 
in  the  existence  of  circumstances  which  if  true,  would 
make  the  act  or  omission  for  which  the  accused  is 
indicted  innocent  (Archbold  1979  s.  14  :  38(9)  ) 
The  errphasis  on  "absence"  effectively  switched  the  burden  to  the 
aCCUsed  to  prove  such  honest  belief  was  present  (a  relocation  of 
the  burden  of  proof  which  lasted  till  the  Woolmington  decision  Of 
1935);  the  eaphasis  on  "reasonable"  switched  the  subject  Of  Proof 
fltm  what  the  accused  actually  thought  at  the  time  to  the  more 
Objective  standard  of  what  a  reasonable  man  in  the  same  circumstances 
mIght  have  thought,  a  total  undemining  of  the  notion  of  intent. \11ý 
The  cbjective  standard  was  at  that  time  the  only  sensible 
one  anyway  since  defendants  could  not  give  evidence  themselves 
of  their  subjective  state  of  mind  or  for  that  matter  anything 
else,  until  1898.  The  Criminal  Evidence  Act  of  that  yea-r  changed 
that  situation  but  the  objective  interpretation  of  rrýens  rea 
lingered  on,  and  only  recently  has  there  been  a  small  move  tavards 
a  more  subjective  approach,  that  is,  to  advising  acquittal  if  the 
jury  accepts  that  the  defendant  honestly  believed  what  he  was  doing 
was  right,  Abether  there  were  reasonable  grounds  for  his  belief  or 
the  linking  of  intent  with  the  idea  of 
known  law  is  ruled  out  by  the  f  act  that  citizens  are  presumed  to 
know  the  Im  anyway  whether  they  actually  do  or  not  -  ignorance  of 
the  law  is  no  defence  against  intent  even  for  a  foreigner  -  and 
indeed  they  are  presumed  to  know  they  are  committing  a  particular 
tyw  of  offence  whether  they  actually  do  or  not.  It  is,  for  example, 
no  defence  for  a  person  accused  of  assaulting  a  police  officer  in 
the  execution  of  his  duty  that  he  did  not  Imow  he  was  a  police 
officer  (unidentified  and  in  plain  clothes)  executing  his  duty ý90 
(Archbold  1979  :  1439d).  Even  shooting  X  accidentally  While 
aiming  at  Y  is  not  deerred  accidental  but  intentional  via  the 
doctrine  of  "transferred  malice.,, 
Proving  guilt  involves  both  objective  and  subjective  a-spects 
too.  7he  law  distinguishes  between  credibility  of  evidence,  the 
jury's  subjective  decision,  and  sufficiency  of  evidence  whereby 
the  judge  f  irst  decides  whether  the  evidence,  rega-rdless  of  how 
ciie-dible  it  is,  wets  rrdnimum  objective  legal  standards.  'Ihe 
defence  indeed  has  a  right  to  challenge  the  prosecution  case  ý- 
failing  to  meet  the  objective  standards  of  legal  sufficiency,  and 
subn-dt  that  there  is  no  case  to  answer. 
To  do  so,  however,  can  be  a  dangerous  strategy.  If  successful 
it  ends  the  case.  But  if  it  is  unsuccessful  it  means  that  the 
defence  case  begins  with  an  explicit  -  if  legally  limited  - 
statewnt  from  the  judge  that  he  has  decided  after  hearing  the 
prosecution  case  that  there  is  evidence  for  the  jury  to  consider 
(]ý  v  Falconer-Atlee  197  4  ),  in  short  that  the  prosecution  has 
established  a  prima  f  acie  case.  The  jury  is  therefore  given  an 
explicit  favourable  conclusion  to  the  prosecution  case  and  an 
unfavourable  cue  for  its  reception  of  defence  evidence. 
That  is  in  England.  In  Scotland  the  consequences  are  more 
direct  and  irmie-diate.  if  the  cla-im  of  no  case  to  answer  is 
UnsUcoessful  the  next  step  is  a  verdict  of  guilt  With  no  opportunity 
to  lead  evidence  for  the  defence  at  all,  since  the  accused  can  only 
choose  one  strategy  or  the  other,  claim  no  case  to  answer  or  clail 
the  right  to  of  fer  a  positive  case  in  response,  but  not  both.  To 
trY  One  is  therefore  to  forfeit  the  other,  a  situation  described  to ýXý 
the  lburson  Counittee  (who  prcpose  refoliTdng  it)  as: 
a  cruel  dilenna  and  an  invidious  and  unfair 
position  in  which  to  place  the  defence. 
(7horrson  1975  :  183). 
The  ef  fect  of  this  is  de  M-nstrated  by  case  91 
,  vLere  a  man 
. 2-'Ar, 
was  stopped  driving  a  car  stolen  three  weeks  previously  and  K 
charged  with  theft  or  receiving.  At  the  end  of  the  prosecution 
case  the  defence  counsel  declared  to  the  judge  that  he  did  not 
propose  to  lead  evidence.  As  an  observer  at  that  tine  unread  in 
procedural  law,  I  took  this  to  mean  that  the  defence  counsel  was 
afraid  to  put  the  accused  in  the  witness  box  for  fear  of  what  he 
rTdght  say  to  incriminate  himself  -  and  that  may  also  have  been 
the  case.  But  set  now  in  the  context  of  legal  rules  it  is  clear 
from  what  followed  that  the  defence  counsel,  whether  he  wanted  to 
put  his  client  in  the  witness  box  or  not-.,  was  caught  in  just  this 
dilemma 
. 
for  in  the  absence  of  the  jury  he  went  on  to  subrrdt  that 
there  was  insufficient  evidence  and  no  case  to  answer.  His  point 
was  that  in  order  to  make  his  case,  the  prosecutor  had  to  prove 
incriminating  circumstances  to  suggest  that  the  accused  knew  was 
guilty,  and  that  this  had  not  been  done.  But  the  judge  decided 
that  there  was  a  case  to  be  put  to  the  jury,  and  there  followed  a 
verdict  of  guilty. 
This  case  demonstrates  three  dangers  for  the  defenoe  in  subn-dt- 
ting  there  is  no  case  to  answer.  First  in  presenting  his  subrrdssiOn 
tO  the  judge  he  has  to  disclose  the  criticisms  of  the  prosecution 
case  that  he  will  be  mok-ing. 
The  prosecutor  thus 
gOes  into  -ýto  the  jury  forearwd  and  the  defence  counsel  -Qr  -N \  SI-L 
effectively  loses  the  advantage  of  having  the  last  word.  Second, 
he  loses  the  possibility  of  producing  evidence  for  the  accused. 
qbird,  the  discussion  takes  place  in  the  absence  of  the  jury  and 
the  reasons  for  there  being  no  defence  evidence  -  and  indeed  for 
the  accused  hiniself  not  speaking  -  are  not  given  to  the  jury. 
They  are  therefore  left  to  assume  it  to  be  a  matter  of  choice  and 
an  indication  of  guilt  rather  than  a  constraint  inposed  by  legal 
rules.  The  defendant  thus  has  a  right  to  challenge  rather  than 
dispute  the  prosecutor's  case  but  as  is  so  often  the  case  with 
the  rights  of  the  accused,  it  is  a  right  with  drastic  penalties 
attached. 
Mere  are  no  stat'i  stim  on  how  often  a  subrrdssion  of  no  case 
to  answer  succeeds  but  it  would  be  surprising  if  it  happened  very 
often  for  the  sinple  reason  that  the  minimum  legal  demands  inposed 
by  the  concept  of  sufficiency  are.,  as  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  2, 
often  rather  lower  than  one  adght  expect.  r1he  amunt  of  evidence 
required  for  conviction  in  England  has  never  been  very  demanding. 
Indeed,  Langbein  argues  that  it  was  precisely  because  the  standard 
Of  Proof  was  so  low  in  England  that  for  most  of  its  history  it  has 
not  involved  torture.  The  high  demands  of  the  European  jurisdictions 
on  what  constituted  enough  evidence  to  prove  a  case,  led  them  to 
acquire  it  by  torture;  England  did  not  need  to.  (1977  :  77)  There 
was  and  still  is  no  need  for  corroboration  in  the  majority  of  cases. 
A- 
-5  Langbein  puts  it: 
To  this  day  an  English  jury  can  convict  a  defendant 
on  less  evidence  than  was  required  as  a  mere 
precon&t,  g)A  for  interrogation  under  torture  On  the \S113 
continent  (1977  :  78) 
One  witness  has  always  cOnstituted  sufficient  evidence  in 
cumn  law  for  a  conviction  and  that  remains  true  if  the  witness 
is  an  accxxVIiee  and  indeed  even  if  he  has  the  verY  strong 
incentive  of  being  offered  a  pardon  on  condition  that  the  defendant 
is  convicted. 
"  ?) 
Juries  should  normally  be  warned  about  the 
reliability  of  acconplice  evidence,  though  even  that  is  not  done 
in  joint  trials,  (Renton  and  Brown  197gt  :  380)  and  joint  trials 
axe  nomal  where  cc-accused  are  involved  -  indeed  the  rules  am 
such  that  it  is  extremely  unusual  for  a  defendant  to  be  tried 
'NJ+  r,  I[),  -  b  ý'  'r  Q  r-  Ir- 
alone,  even  if  he  requestSit,  witness  is  not  really  necessary 
in  England  for  legal  sufficiency  :  an  uncorroborated  alleged 
confession  will  do.  Me  effects  of  this  axe  graphically  illustrated 
by  the  Confait  case  in  which  a  finding  of  guilt  was  based  on  the 
uncomborated.  alleged  confession  of  a  mentally  retarded  teenager 
interviewed  without  a  solicitor  or  his  parents  -a  confession 
which  was  later  proved  inpossible,  but  only  after  he  and  his  two 
co-accused  had  spent  two  years  in  institutions. 
In  all  cases  in  Scotland  and  in  sorre  in  England  there  is  an 
cbjective  critexi.  ý,,  r,  of  sufficiency:  corroboration.  Scotland  is 
often  described  as  having  a  tougher  standard  of  proof  because  of 
its  insistence  on  corrcboration,  but  of  course  it  also  has  the 
corollary  of  a  third  verdict 
"  not  proven,  wbich  somwhat  undennines 
this.  Rather  than  upholding  its  tough  rules  by  finding  anyone 
whose  guilt  is  not  proved  according  to  their  denmds  not  guilty, 
Scots  law  effectively  proclajjm  that  he  would  have  been  found 
guiltY  if  only  it  was  not  for  those  stringent  rules:  he  is  not vlý 
"not  guiltY;  the  case  is  simply  "not  Proven.  "  In  anY  case  the 
rules  are  not  quite  so  stringent  as  they  n-Light  seem.  In  both 
countries  the  meaning  of  corroboration  has  been  watered  down 
over  the  years.  Me  rule  according  to  Renton  and  Brown,  s 
manual"does  not  require  every  circurrstance  to  be  proved  by  two 
witnesses.  "  Indeed  such  is  the  erosion  that  has  occurred  that 
this  manual,  listing  the  "facts"  which  do  not  require  corro- 
boration,  can  state:  "it  may  be  that  the  only  fact  of  which 
we  can  say  that  it  rmist  always  be  corroborated  is  the  identity 
of  the  accused.  "  (1972  :  390-1)  (IM5,,  it  may  be  said,  involves 
pointing  him  out  in  the  dock,  not  the  most  difficult  identification 
procedure,  and  where  this  does  fail  the  evidence  of  two  polLerren 
that  the  defendant  was  identified  earlier,  so  long  as  the  witness 
accepts  that  he  did  identify  him  to  the  police,  will  do.  ) 
Corrcboration  once  want  two  independent  witnesses;  now  it  simply 
requires  two  circumstances.  'Ihis  is  so  even  where  the  evidence  is 
wholly  circumstancial,  so  long  as  there  are  two  circunstances. 
Cormborating  evidenoe  need  not  point  unequivocally  to  guilt,  and 
where  there  are  similar  offences  charged,  a  single  witness  for 
each  can  be  taken  as  corroboration  . 
Indeed  despite  the  accused's 
right  against  self-inerirrdnation  he  can  Provide  the  prosecutor's 
necessary  corroboration.  Fingerprint  evidence  can  provide  its  own 
corroboration  by  simply  getting  two  witnesses  to  identify  the 
Presence  of  the  print!  (Hain  vH-M-  _Adv. 
1934) 
Indeed  even  the  strong  corrcboration  of  two  witnesses  inde- 
Pendently  giving  independent  supportive  testimony  in  the  witness 
box,  or  the  weaker  notion  of  this  sijrply  adding  to  credibility, may  need  closer  scrutiny.  Police  witnesses,  for  exmlple,  are 
allowed  to  collaborate  on  the  evidence  they  give,  and  decide 
together  on  what  is  to  go  into  their  notebooks.  This  is  not 
just  a  devious  practice  an-Ong  the  police  but  in  England  at 
least  a  legal  right.  7he  English  Manual  for  criminal  procedure 
notes: 
Nothing  could  be  more  natural  or  proper  Ahen  two 
persons  have  been  present  at  an  interview  with  a 
third  person  that  they  should  afterwards  make  sure 
that  they  have  a  correct  version  of  what  was  said. 
v  Bass  1ýý3ý 
. 
Indeed  they  are  quite  entitled  to  use  the  sarre  notebook  in  the 
4  ýý  -1  1 
witness  box.  (R  v  Adarns1957;  Archbold:,  51t#)  In  addition,  any  K 
witness  may  "refresh  his  memry"  from  a  dc)current  before  giving 
evidence  even  if  it  was  written  by  someone  else,  for  exarrple, 
from  a  statement  written  by  the  police,  so  long  as  he  had  already 
rL  read  it  at  the  time.  (It 
was  roted  in  a  1976  case  04o  ey  v 
114111, 
UR  "le 
) 
Archbold  ý-  255)  that  it  was  desirable  that  the 
defendant  should  be  informed  of  this,  a  marked  watering  dovxi  of 
the  previous  situation  which  took  for  granted  that  it  was 
Obviously  essential"  this  should  happen.  )  If  the  testimny  of 
two  police  witnesses  or  Police  and  other  prosecution  witnesses  is 
corroboratory  then  one  should  hardly  be  surprised.  The  idea  of 
comboration  may  suggest  a  more  den=ding  criterion  of 
sufficiency  of  proof  than  procedural  practice  actually  involves. 
Indeed  sufficiency  is  a  shifting  standard  for  ultimately  it 
Sems  to  boil  down  to  the  best  evidence  available  - 
Reading  the \o 
qualifications  one  almost  comes  away  with  the  irrpression  that 
the  rules  stand  only  for  cases  that  can  stand  them  -  where 
they  cannot  be  met,  they  are  modified.  Heajýsay  is  inactnissible, 
unless  the  direct  witness  has  inconveniently  died;  then  it 
b)ecoms  adffdssible.  Corrcboration  is  essential  unless  the  crin-e 
is  one  where  only  perpetrator  and  victim  are  Present;  then  it  is 
weakened  to  allow  similar  fact  And  so  on. 
More  generally  and  indeed  mote  indirectly,  the  very  existence  of  two 
hurdles  of  proof,  legal  sufficiency  and  the  subjective  conviction 
of  the  jury,  on  the  f  ace  of  it  a  double  protection  for  the  accused, 
can  ironically  help  ease  the  prosecutor's  task  of  convincing  the 
court  of  guilt.  Mis  is  because  of  the  nature  of  the  first  hurdle 
and  the  processes  relating  it  to  the  second.  Me  legal  standards 
of  the  first  hurdle  are  not  greatly  demanding  as  we  have  seen. 
Hawever,  it  is  the  judge  Is  duty  to  decide  that  they  have  been  net 
b,  ý,  b 
and  to  hand  the  case  to  the  jury  L  if  he  considers  this  done. 
This  is  often  made  explicit.  Indeed  in  cases  where  alternative 
charges  have  been  made,  in  which  for  example  the  ultimate  charge 
will  be  either  theft  or  receiving  depending  on  the  sufficiency 
of  the  evidence  stated  in  court,  the  judge  should  pass  the  case  to 
the  jury  with  an  explicit  statement  that  there  is  in  lmv  sufficient 
evidence  for  a  charge  of  theft  or  insufficient  evidence  for  a 
chajýge  of  theft  but  sufficient  for  a  charge  of  receiving.  Likewise 
where  there  is  more  than  one  charge,  the  jury  may  be  directed  that 
theY  can  ignore  one,  since  there  is  insufficient  evidence,  but  go 
On  with  the  other: 
I  have  decided  for  technical  reasons  there  is (I 
\11 
I  insufficient  evidence  for  charge  two,  so  you  are  (,  r, 
asked  to  consider  char  ge  one.  (case  91) 
I 
(Notýthe  throwaway  phrase  "for  technical  reasons"  and  the  Potential 
irfplication  of  "real"  guilt,  technical  acquittal-.  )  Ihis  mans 
that  the  jury  is  presented  with  the  case,  buttressed  by  the  aiTbiguous 
and  caTplex  notion  that  there  is  sufficient  evidence  to  con\-i  ct. 
7hey  need  never  of  course  be  told  there  is  sufficient  evidena-  to 
acquit  since  the  rhetoric  of  the  presumption  of  innocence  and 
burden  of  proof  me-ans  only  the  prosecutor's  case  has  to  be  put  to 
the  test.  Likewise,  in  Scotland  in  particular  where  a  majority 
verdict  is  acceptable  f  rcrn  the  beginning,  the  judge  in  sum-ning  up 
will  tell  the  jury  what  size  of  majority  is  necessary  to  convict 
though  again  ,  since  the  presumption  of  innocence  is  taken  for 
granted  in  the  rhetoric.,  there  need  be  no  explicit  reference  to 
i 
acquittal. 
In  sum,  these  four  prosecution  tasks  -  carrying  the  burden  of 
proof,  mking  a  case  without  infringing  the  privileges  of  the 
accused,  proving  intent  and  meting  the  standards  Of  legal 
sufficiency  -  and  the  attendant  rights  for  the  accused  -  an  silence, 
character,  claindng  no  case  to  answer  -  are  all  hedged  by  qualifi- 
cations  -which  can  modify  and  even  totally  erade  them.  The  idea 
that  the  trial  poses  prcblen-s  for  the  prosecution  and  privileges 
for  the  accused  can  all  too  readi  ly  be  reversed. 
The  fifth  task  for  the  prosecutor  is  to  convince  the  jury, 
thOugh  even  that  subjective  decision  is,  as  we  have  seen  in  chapter 
ýý 
,  hedged  by  external  legal  provisos,  and  the  jury  is  wil-warned 
that  not  all  its  doubts  may  be  reasonable.  That  said,  however,  the ýv 
fact  remains  that  it  is  the  jury  who  decide.  'Ihe  rules  of 
evjdenceý  case  law.,  the  str,  ý&-u-v- 
I 
Of  advOcacy  and  the  Profession 
all  give  way  to  the  ordinary  man  in  the  street.  It  is  not  the 
convolutionsof  legal  reasoning  that  deci-de  the  verdict  but 
"coamn  sense":  the  jurY  retires  to  its  own  room,  to  secmey, 
with  no  legal  professional  to  direct  it,  no  criticism  allowed 
of  its  decision  and  no  need  to  account  to  the  legal  e>q)erts  on 
hcyw  it  was  reached.  In  the  end  it  is  not  state  ýofficials  who 
decide  but  twelve  or  f  if  teen  ordinary  people. 
Yet  that  is  only  the  image:  observing  the  jury  from  the  inside 
, 
cbserving  how  it  actually  operates  -  or  is  operated-  raises  serious 
doubts  about  its  aceuracy.  This  is  dealt  with  at  length  in  a 
1.!; 
separate  study,  but  suffice  to  say  here  that  once  in  the  jury 
box,  the  jury  is  no  longer  twelve  or  fifteen  ordinary  people  but 
a  group  self-  consciously  playing  the  legal  role  of  jurors,  and  a 
group  whose  "ccmion  sense"  has  already  been  moulded  into  a  sense 
of  legal  propriety.  What  is  more  the  jury  can  only  decide  cc  the 
basis  of  the  information  it  is  presented  with.  And  this  is  why  it 
is  too  simple  to  separate  off  the  jury's  decision  from  the  rules  of 
evidence,  case  l2w,  advocacy,  the  role  of  the  judge:  these  are 
exactly  what  limit  and  shape  its  verdict.  Indeed  this  is  why  the 
trial  and  the  verdict  cannot  be  separated  from  pre-tria-1  pmcesses. 
What  decision  can  reasonably  be  reached  by  -the  judge  or  jury  or  the 
P"blic  audience  depends  on  the  infolination  provided  for  them  in  court, 
Okll- 
and;  as  we  have  seen,  has  been  structured,  shaped  and  filtered  befom 
t1le  Public  stage  is  ever  reached.  But  to  understand  the  role  of 
trial  by  jury  in  the  legal  system  we  have  to  set  it  not  just  in  the \  ZC\ 
context  of  the  processing  of  the  jury,  the  Pl'ows-sing  of  evidence, 
the  convolutions  of  legal  re,  "IsOning;  we  must  also  set  it  in  the 
context  of  the  legal  structure.  Trial  by  jury  may  be  one  of  the 
cornerstones  of  the  ideology  of  justice  but  it  is  a  rare  event 
in  crindnal  justice.  So  is  the  participaticn  of  the  judiciary. 
So  is  the  provision  of  legal  representation  for  the  defence. 
Bottoms  and  McClean  found  997o  of  defendants  in  Crown  Courts  ývere 
professionally  represented,  937o  on  legal  aid  (ý976  :  142).  But 
the  Coom  Courts,  where  the  ideology  of  justice  is  displayed  in 
the  fom  of  judge,  jury  and  barrister  for  the  defence  deals  with 
I(, 
only  91  of  the  business  of  the  courts-,  99%  ý  caý,,  2&  are  dealt 
with  in  the  lower  courts  by  sunynary  justice  and  that  is  a  diffenýnt 
brand  of  justice  altogether. \`ý  c) 
CfIAPTER  6 
1.  Whether  this  is  an  entirely  accurate  version  of  the  Commissioner's 
evidence  is  less  significant  than  the  fact  that  this  was  the  ideology 
made  available  to  the  public. 
2.  Indeed  the  CcxTmittee  recon-viended  a  marked  extension  of  this. 
If  the  judge  or  jury  should  have  doubts  about  Crown  evidence,  the 
accused's  silence  should  effectively  be  use(i  wine  thern  out. 
(Thorason  1975  :  190). 
3.  Raranber  Sir  Robert  Mark's  camient  chapter  5,  p.  N  2.1 
4.  Knowles  v.  HM  Advocate  unreported 
5.  R.  v.  Gilbert  1977 
6.  Maitland  v.  Glasgow  Corporation  1947 
7.  Discussed  in  detail  in  separate  study  of  The  Jury  (McBarnet). 
8.  Chapter  3 
9.  Frazier  1979 
10 
-  For  example:  Davies  1971 
11.  See  Hepworth  and  Turner  1979 
12.  Though  "neutral  acts'  require  proof  of  mens  rea. 
13.  In  Scotland  two  co-accarplices  -wwill-  (3(-). 
14.  See  chapter  5 
15.  On  the  jury  (McBarnet) 
16.  It  would  have  been  interesting  to  note  not  just  the  percentage 
of  cases  dealt  with  without  a  jury,  but  the  percentage  of  trials. 
This  information  is  not,  however,  available  in  the  Criminal  Statistics 
or  f  ran  the  Home  Office. V\\ 
CHAPTER  7  Two  tiers  of  justice 
I 
The  lower  courts  are  where  most  of  the  ývork  of  the 
criminal  law  is  done  -  they  are  also  where  the  characteristics 
of  legality  and  justice  are  least  in  evidence. 
To  enter  the  lower  courts  is  to  be  taken  aback  by  the 
casualness  and  rapidity  of  the  proceedings.  The  mental  image 
of  law  carried  into  the  courts  is  shattered  by  observation. 
The  solermity,  the  skills  of  advocacy,  the  objections,  the 
slow,  careful  precision  of  evidence,  the  adversarial  joust, 
none  of  these  taken-f  or-granted  legal  imges  are  in  evidence. 
It  seems  to  be  another  world  f  rorn  the  legal  system  we  have 
learned  about  in  books  and  film  and  television.  The 
statistics  tell  the  sane  story.  Credibility  in  the  ideology 
that  the  scales  of  justice  are  tipped  to  acquitting  ten  guilty 
mn  rather  than  convicting  one  innocent  man,  is  stretched  to 
breaking  point  by  the  work  of  the  lower  courts.  According 
to  1972  statistics  the  conviction  rate  in  Scottish  summ-rY 
courts  is  9S%,  in  English  magistrates  courts  A  5%  for 
non-indictable  offences  and  ctýjjfor  indictable  crimes.  The 
cw-bination  of  pleas  and  verdicts  of  guilt  brought  the  tota-I 
of  convictions  in  the  Sheffield  nogistrates'  courts  BOttOns 
and  McClean  studied  to  98.5/o'  (1976  :  106) 
Magistrates"  courts  have,  perhaps  because  of  the  blatancY 
InA 
of  this  contradictioný  been  the  courts  that  have  mst  attracted 
the  scrutiny  of  sociology  and  social  policy-  Dell  has  shown 
that  defendarts  remain  "silent  in  court"  through  fear  or  ignorance 
(1971)  Hetzler  and  Kanter  have  shown  how  the  defendant ý  clý- 
stands  in  court  at  a  situational  disadvantage  because  of  the 
symbolic  layout  of  bencb  and  dock  (1974).  In  particular)  Carlen  (19A.  ) 
has  demonstrated  how  the  processing  of  defendants  is  achieved 
situationally,  how  the  court  team  -  magistrates,  clerk  of 
court,  police,  solicitors)  probation  officers  -  manages  to  obviate 
due  process,  suppress  challenges,  make  the  defendant  ý'duTyqy'by 
K 
niling  him,  whenever  he  speaks,  out  of  tinie)out  of  place,  out 
of  order,  even  out  of  mind.  All  of  these  studies  focus  on  the 
situation  of  participants,  the  use  and  avoidance  of  the  rules. 
This  study  fullysupports  Caxlen's  description  of  the  operation  of 
sumaxy  justice  but  it  changes  the  focus  of  analysis  in  three  ways. 
First  it  changes  the  stress  f  rom  use  of  rules  to  the  rules 
used,  to  the  rules  of  procedure  which  actually  def  ine  wbat  is  out 
of  tim,  place  or  order,  and  to  ironies  not  accoWlished  by  the 
magistrate  in  situ  but  inherent  in  the  structure  of  magistrates' 
justice.  If  the  defendant,  nornally  unrepresented,  is  the  only 
one  wbo  does  not  know  the  rules,  as  every  study  of  courts 
demonstrates,  the  cause  must  be  traced  beyond  his  ignorance,  or 
the  court  team's  games,  to  the  paradox  of  a  legal  structure  vhich 
requires  knowledge  of  procedural  propriety  in  making  a  case,  and 
a  legal  policy  which  denies  access  to  it. 
Second,  that  paradox  itself  requires  explanation  too.  A 
little  delving  into  the  historkcal  developrrient  of  magistrates' 
justice  shows  only  too  clearly  that  the  high  conviction  rate  in 
the  face  of  all  the  safeguards  for  the  defendant  offered  by 
legality  is  no  mere  situational  acconplishment.  of  the  magistrates' 
cOurt.  Nor  indeed,  is  it  accomplished  by  the  High  Court  judges 
through  the  subtle  qua-lificationsy  the  ifs  and  buts  Of  case  Imv, 
Maintaining  the  genera-I  rule  but ý  Cý  11 
qualifying  it  for  each  particular  case.  It  is  the  product 
of  the  heavy  hand  of  legislation  siTrPly  wiping  out  the 
rules  as  neither  necessary  nor  relevant  for  the  lower  court 
at  all. 
100% 
'k  Is  \,  -.  I  I 
the  particular  situational  problem  f  aced  by  magistrates  in 
presenting  their  work  ideologically  as  justice.  The  higher 
courts  are  helped  by  rigid  rules  of  ceremony'  and  'traditional 
ceremonial  costumes'.  Magistrates  have  to  'produce  a 
disciplined  display  of  justice  I  despite  the  lack  of  so-lamity 
and  ceremony,  lack  of  solicitors  ,  and  petty  and  marginal 
of  fences  that  characterise  the  lower  courts  (1975:  38).  This 
f4l ,  bapter  suggests  that  the  lower  courts  in  fact  have  no 
significant  ideological  function,  that  the  factomCarlen  points 
to  as  situational  problem  for  the  production  of  n-agistrates' 
justice,  are  the  very  factors  which,  by  ideological  sleight  of 
hand,  screen  it  f  rom  scrutiny,  and  indeed  which  acckiMlish  the 
ultimate  irony  of  protecting  the  ideology  of  justice  wbile 
simultaneously  denying  it. 
Self-Defence 
One  of  the  crucial  disadvantages  pinpointed  by  all  the  studies 
Of  the  accused  in  the  lower  courts  is  the  f  act  that  he  is  normally 
unrepresented.  In  Scotland  there  is  now  a  duty  solicitor  scherre 
at  all  levels, 
3 
but  duty  stretches  only  to  thDse  in  custody  and 
stops  at  the  point  of  plea  -  legal  advice  is  available  of  right 
0111Y  to  answer  a  charge  not  -to  contest  it  . 
In  England  the 
d'-fendant  only  exceptionally  has  a  lawyer:  Bottom  and  McClean's 0ý 
compared  997b  in  the  higher  courts.  The  reason  for  this  is 
sbTple  enough:  legal  aid.  2though  virtually  a  right  in  the 
higher  courts,  is  not  available  in  any  but  exceptional  cases  in  the 
lower  courts.  Nor  do  the  reCooffaendat  ions  of  the  Royal  C(Mission  on 
Legal  Services  augur  well  for  any  significant  change. 
4 
(1979:  158). 
The  Widgery  Conudttee  on  legal  aid  denied  that  a  professional  1,  'myur  was 
normally  necessa-ry  in  the  lamer  courts,  irrpl.  ving  that  points  of  law, 
tracing  and  interviewing  witnesses  or  engaging  in  expert 
cross  examination  were  not  normally  involved.  Yet  the 
smie  report  insisted  that  a  professional 
-lawyer  was 
necessary  for  the  higher  courts: 
A  layman,  however  canpetent,  can  ra-rely  be  relied 
on  to  possess  the  skill  and  knowledge  necessary 
to  put  forward  the  defence  effectively  tried  on 
. 
indictment  without  the  guidance  of  a  lawyer 
. 
(1966  79,  my  italics). 
Were  the  structure  and  rules  of  procedure  essentially  different 
this  distinction  rrdght  be  valid;  differences  there  are,  as  we 
shall  see,  but  not  in  the  proof  of  a  case.  The  trial,  and 
*%,,  b 
with  it  the  method  of  proofj  the  criteria  of  proof:, 
remin  exactly  the  saw  There  is  the  same 
adversarial  structure.,  the  same  structure  of  proof  by  examin- 
ation,  cross-examination)  the  same  requirement  of  direct 
I 
LA 
witnesses  to  provide  that  proof  , 
the  same  rules  of  evidence) 
and  the 
requirement  that  the  procýdures  be  rigidly  oLered  to  - 
These  are  not  laymen's  courts  but  highly  legalised  proceedings. The  bench  may  be  composed  of  laY  magistrates  of  course, 
though  there  is  an  increasing  number  of  stipendiary  magistrates 
in  England,  and  in  Scotland  lay  magistrates  operate  only  on  the 
fringes  of  criminal  justice.  But  lay  magistrates  have  clerks 
in  England,  assessors  in  Scotland  to  keep  the  proceedings 
legally  in  check  (both,  according  to  Ca-rlen's  study,  and  this 
one  keen  to  stress  legal  technicalities  exactly  because  that 
is  their  only  justification  for  being  there),  while  even  the  lay 
magistrates  are  therfrelves  repeat  players  with  knowledge  -  or 
belief  in  their  own  knowledge  -  of  the  law.  The  prosecutor 
is  always  a  professional  lawyer  in  Scotland,  While  in  England 
more  and  more  police  forces  have  prosecuting  solicitors' 
departments  to  do  the  job  professionally;  and  at  worst  the 
prosecution  will  be  conducted  by  a  policermn,  a  repeat  player 
and  a  legal  professional.  All  of  this  is  at  the  state's 
expense  of  course,  which  makes  Widgery  Is  conclusion  on  the 
provision  of  professional  representation  f  or  the  defence  that 
there  is  a  limit  both  to  the  nurrber  of  practitioners 
who  can  provide  legal  assistance  and  to  the  funds 
that  the  state  can  reasonably  be  expected  to  Make 
available  (1966:  14) 
appear  something  of  a  one  sided  view.  The  provision  of  a 
Prosecution  is  taken  for  grantedý  the  provision  of  a 
defence  is  not  - 
Yet  the  trial  remains  adversarial,  and  the  legi- 
timation  of  the  adversary  structure  is  exactlY  that  it 
M-ist  be  conducted  by  adversaries.  To  declare 
a  prof  essional  defence  unnecessary  in  this  context  is  to 
put  the  accused  into  the  ring  as  an  amateur  f  lYvveight 
Etga:  Lnst  pro  essionals  or  heavyweights  or  both. ýý  (0 
The  plight  of  the  unrepresented  defendant  in  the 
magistrates  I  courts  has  often  been  put  davn  to  his  lower  class 
background,  and  consequent  lack  of  speec  skills)  articulat(?  -bv-,,  ') 
understanding.  But,  as  Sociologists  of  education  and  speech 
have  demonstrated,,  there  is  little  essentially  inarticulate  about 
kwer  class  speech,  and  these  sarre  defendants  recounting  the 
saw  event  of  a  Friday  night  in  the  pub  as  a  story  not  as  a  case 
might  do  so  with  great  aplonb.  Nor  is  it  necessarily  fear  (Dell 
1971  )  that  prevents  them  getting  their  story  across. 
51 
Certainly  surveys  have  noted  that  riore  than  half  of 
die-fendants  found  the  experience  an  ordeal  but  that  does  not 
necessarily  silence  them.  Fear  might  explain  why  so  many  people  plead 
CkeC-4,:,  b 
guilty:  but  all  o.  f  those  who  not  guilty  in  this  study 
wre  prepared  to  tell  their  story  to  the  magistrate.  Me 
pmblem  was  in  fact  that  they  were  too  prepared  to  do  so  to 
be  ridndful  of  courtroom  procedures  - 
Carlen  describes  how  any 
challenges  by  the  defendant  to  the  actual  administration  and 
legitimacy  of  the  law  result  in  them  being  portrayed  as  "out 
of  place,  out  ot  time,  out  of  vy%ljnd  or  out  of  order.  "  (1975: i 
ýýj 
M).  But  the  rules  of  tirre-,  place  and  order  are  invoked 
much  more  routinely  than  this:  they  are  not  just  emergency 
wasures;  but  the  very  things  which  make  a  trial  a  trial, 
and  the  result  is  that  the  defendant  is  not  only  prevented 
from  challenging  the  law  but  is  routinely  prevented  frcin 
participating  in  the  trial. 
The  trial  is  organised  into  a  quite  definite  order  of 
events  and  at  each  sta3e  different  rules  pertain: 
the  defendant  makes  his  plea 
(2)  the  prosecutor  calls  his  witnesses  -  usually  policemn  - 
and  examines  them  5 
the  defendant  can  crossexamine  each  witness,  ime-diately 
af  ter  the  prosecution  has  exan-dned  him  -  at  this  stage 
the  rule  is  that  he  can  only  ask  questions  of  the  witnesses 
not  rmke  statements  on  his  own  behalf  ') 
(4)  the  defendant  can,  but  only  at  this  point  and  only  if  he 
mves  from  the  dock  to  the  witness  box  make  a  stateiTunt  -) 
(5)  he  is  crossexamined  in  turn  -) 
(6)  if  he  has  any  witnesses  he  can  examine  them  (again  ask 
questions  only)  to  elicit  support  for  his  story  -) 
(7)  they  a-re  crossexamined  by  the  prosecutor 
eadi  party  may  sum  up. 
The  defendant's  first  admissible  opportunity  to  make  a 
statement  is  at  stage  4.  But  repeatedly  he  takes  up  the  f  irst 
invitation  to  speakvat  stage  :ý  to  deliver  a  statemnt  to  the 
magistrate,  only  to  be  rebuffed  on  procedural  grounds.  He  is 
likewise  interrupted  or  silenced  with  each  witness  until  when ýCý  -ý 
it  cows  to  his  turn  to  enter  the  witness  box  (and  often 
he  starts  his  statement  again  in  the  dock  only  to  be  rebuffed 
or  mved),  he  often  rejects  the  chance  or  is  quite  taken 
aback  to  have  a  say.  When  he  does  speak  he  may  well  find 
his  story  interrupted  and  what  seem  to  be  crucial  points 
excluded  by  the  rules  of  evidence. 
Magistrate:  How  do  you  know  what  they  (the  police) 
said  to  Pauline  (co-accused)? 
Accused:  She  told  us 
Magistrate:  That's  hearsay 
Accused:  Sir  IId  left  before  closing  time-  to  go 
to  another  pub. 
Magistrate:  That's  an  alibi  defence.  You  didn't 
intimate  that.  t,  In  his  suraning  up  later 
he  declared  it  inadmissible  because  no 
warning  bad  been  given)  (C 
In  Case  27  the  accused's  defence  depended  on  his  having 
good  reason  to  use  a  police  phone: 
Magistrate:  Would  you  like  to  ask  the  officer  any 
questions  Mr.  MCC 
Accused:  Do  you  know  why  I  was  on  the  phone? 
Prosecutor:  He  can't  answer  that. 
The  unrepresented  accused  i-s  not  only  denied  access  to 
knowledge  of  procedures  but  to  the  opportunity  of  being 
questioned.  It  may  be  easy  to  tell  a  long  story  in 
relaxed  surroundings  where  the  odd  mission,  carelessness ýCA  CN 
or  exaggeration  in  detail  is  irrelevant,  but  where  all  these 
things  are  likely  to  be  picked  up  by  an  opponent,  wi  thout  an 
opportunity  to  redress  them,  it  is  easier  to  sustain  a  long 
detailed  account  via  questions  and  answers,  as  indeed  is 
Sormtimes  made  explicit  in  court.  In  Case  25  the  Prosecution 
witness  was  telling  a  long  confused  tale.  The  rregistrate 
intervened  to  invoke  the  prosecutor  into  a  more  active  role: 
Magistrate:  Do  you  think  you  could  question  him 
and  get  it  a  bit  nore  clearly? 
Defendants  have  the  sam  problem.  But  with  no  lawyer  repre- 
senting  them,  there  is  no-one  for  the  magistrate  to  call  on 
to  get  the  defence  case  clear.  What  is  mre  a  lawyer  with  an 
eye  to  legal  relevance  will  ask  questions  that  make  the  account 
into  a  case,  son-ething  a  layman  might  sinply  lack  the  knowledge 
to  achieve. 
Indeed  a  case  is  not  made  sinply  by  presenting  an  account 
of  one's  own  version  of  events.  Proof  in  the  adversary  trial  is 
achieved  not  just  by  building  up  the  strong  points  in  one's  own 
case  but  by  pointing  out  the  weak  points  in  one's  OpPonent's- 
Proof  has  to  be  built  up  by  countering  the  persuasive  points 
in  the  opposing  case  or  by  destroying  them,  and  givea  the  nature 
of  the  evidence  in  minor  of  fences,  it  is  very  often  a 
necessity  for  the  defendant  not-b  simply  remain  silent  or  present 
an  account  that  does  not  challenge  police  evidenoe,  but  to 
actively  rai-se  reasonable  doubts  in  the  prosecution  case  - 
IMMber  the  magistrate's  conclusiOn 
I  see  no  reason  to  disbelieve  the  police  (Case 
One  way  to  raise  such  doubts  is  by  cross  exandnation  - 
Yet  the ý-Oo 
Widgery  Report  sees  professional  cross-exami.  nation  as 
rarely  needed  in  summary  cases.  (1966  :  47)  This 
ignores  the  f  act  that  in  a  good  many  cases  this  only  denies 
professional  cross-examination  of  the  prosecution  case  since 
the  prosecution  will  have  a  professional  advocate  to  subject 
the  defendant  to  professional  cross-examination.  Perhaps 
the  implication  is  that  the  police  do  not  need  to  be  cross- 
examined  because  their  version  is  correct.  In  any  case  that 
is  the  net  result.  Yet  Cross-examination  is  one  of  the 
essential  weapons  of  the  adversarial  trial.  With  no  cross- 
exarrdnation  there  is  in  a  sense  no  trial  and  with  no  profes- 
sional  lawyer  there  tends  to  be  no  ercss-examination,  as 
observation  in  court  demonstrates. 
In  order  to  be  allowed  to  cross-examine  his  opponent 
just  as  in  presenting  his  own  story,  the  defendant  must  do  so 
according  to  the  rules  and  at  the  right  stage  of  the  procedum. 
But  he  is  not  necessarily  told  the  prooedum  or  the  varying 
rules  at  each  stage  .  and  indeed  he  my  not  understand  the 
distinctions  in  the  rules  between  questions  and  statements,  or  be  too 
intent  on  getti-ng  his  story  across  to  the  magistrate  at  the 
first  opportunity  to  abide  by  the  formal  rules  of  the  court  - 
His  confusion  of  stages  3  and  4  of  the  trial's  procedure 
not  only  tends  to  foil  his  attempt  to  present  his  case,  it 
also  foils  the  possibility  of  cross  --exami  n  at  ion  taking  plaoe 
at  all,  so  that  the  prosecution  goes  unchallenged.  Take  Case 
for  exaMle,  where  four  young  men  and  one  elderly  m  an  of  no 
fixed  abode  were  charged  with  Breach  of  the  Peace.  Only  two 
Wre  individually  identified  bLrt  they  were  all  collectivelY qo\ 
identified  as  part  of  an  aggres5ive  crowd  - 
Magistrate:  Would  you  like  to  ask  any  questions? 
Accused  1(the  elderly  man) 
All  I  said  was  '%ýbat's  happening?  " 
Magistrate  to  Policeman: 
Are  you  in  any  doubt  that  this  man  was 
committing  the  of  fence? 
Policeman:  No. 
Accused  1:  1  never  opened  ny  muth  except  to  ask 
what  was  happening. 
Magistrate:  You  can't  deliver  a  peroration  at  this 
point.  Have  you  (moving  on  to  Accused  2)  any  questions? 
Accused  1  is  left  still  on  his  feet  looking  baffled.  Accused  2 
shakes  his  head  and  the  magistrate  mves  on  to  Accused  3. 
Accused  3:  What  time  was  this  ? 
Policeman:  10.15 
Accused  3:  Sir,  IId  left  before  closing  time  to  go  to 
another  pub. 
Magistrate:  Ihat's  an  alibi  defence.  You  didn't  intimate 
that.  Stay  on  your  feet.  Don,  t  talk  (to 
Accused  1  who  was  asking  Accused  2  something  in 
an  agitated  manner) 
Accused  2:  (one  of  the  two  identified) 
Sir,  I  had  a  beard  that  night  - 
Magistrate:  Ask  him,  don't  tell 
Ace-used  1,  having  had  his  response  to  the  P01i0e  stOry 
ruled  out  at  the  point  of  cross-examination  with  the  first 
witness  did  not  w.  ait  so  long  with  -the  seoond  one,  but  si'TPIY- *ýL  C)  ý- 
inte-n,  cned  to  say  that  what  was  being  said  was  not  true.  1hat 
attempt  was  ruled  out  too: 
Magistrate:  I  wish  you  wouldn't  interrupt.  It's  bad 
manners. 
Accused  1:  But  I  wasn't  with  them,  I'm  a  stranger. 
7hey  1  11  tell  you  if  you  ask  them. 
(ibis  procedural  heresy  was  of  course  ignored) 
Case  21  involved  an  Italian  who  could  not  speak  English 
and  therefore  had  an  interpreter.  When  it  C,  -m  to  stage  3 
the  assessor  to  the  magistrate  invited  the  accused  to  ask 
questions: 
I 
L-U--) I-sessor:  You'll  realise  it's  difficult,  but  ask 
questions  to  the  interpreter. 
Accused:  No 
.I 
don  It  want  to  waste  the  court's 
tim  with  language  problems. 
Magistrate  and  assessor  both  leapt  in  at  this  undermining 
of  courtroom  rhetoric: 
Magistrate:  Ch  we  have  all  the  time  in  the  world 
Assessor:  'Ihe  court  Is  tim  is  not  wasted. 
But  the  accused's  'question'  was  a  staterrent;  he  sirrply 
stated  what  was  incorrect  in  his  view  about  the  testimny.  So 
it  did  not  count;  it  did  not  have  to  be  answered  since  it  was 
not  a  question  and  since  it  was  too  early  for  a  statermnt,  1 
lost  him  his  turn.  The  magistrate,  having  gone  overboard  to 
invite  him  to  speak,  now  sinply  stopped  him:  "fou'  11  get 
Your  chance  later" 
Case  35  involved  two  teenage  girls  on  a  breach  of  the  peace 
charge: , 20,  ) 
Magistrate:  At  this  time  YOU  may  ask  the  Officer 
questions  from  the  evidence  he's  gimen. 
Have  you  any  questions? 
Accused:  We  were  just  standing  talking. 
Magistrate:  (To  policeman)  She  says  they  were  just 
standing  talking.  Is  this  so? 
Policeman:  No. 
Magistrate:  lb  at  Is  the  answe  r  to  your  ques  ti  on.  You 
my  not  like  it  but  that's  it.  Move  on 
to  the  next  question. 
Accused:  Mere's  nothing  else. 
Case  30  was  the  "jurrping  on  and  of  f  the  paverrent  in  a 
disorderly  mannev,  case.  The  accused's  "cross  examination" 
consisted  of  no  mre  than  a  series  of  staten-ents  of  denial 
that  he  was  part  of  the  disorderly  group,  and  the  magistrate 
ultimately  interrupted: 
Magistrate:  Are  you  satisfied,  constable,  that  the  boy 
was  in  the  original  groijP? 
Policeman:  Yes. 
Magistrate:  Right.  Any  other  questions? 
Case  2  was  about  the  theft  of  lead  and  involved  "verbals" 
which  the  accused  denied: 
Policeman:  He  said  "I  took  the  chance  because  the 
sheriff  oDws  to  the  house  tomrraw  and  I 
need  the  money.  " 
Accused:  I  said  I  got  it  from  the  coup  Lrubbish  tipý 
I  didn't  show  him  a  sheriff's  letter 
Magistrate:  Well  he  says  he  saw  a  letter  that  YOu 
produced.  Next  question. Case  29: 
"I  iz),  A 
Accused:  We  were  playing  football  and  he  came 
up  and  asked  our  name  and  about  a  TV.  " 
Assessor  to  policeman: 
Did  you  say  this? 
Poli  ceman:  No 
Magistrate:  There's  your  answer.  Any  other  questions? 
Case  5: 
Magistrate:  Any  questions? 
Accused:  I  was  only  violent  because  I  was  being 
punched. 
Magistrate:  Was  he  being  assaulted? 
Policeman:  No.  We  put  him  on  the  floor  when  he 
entered  to  await  assistance. 
Magistrate:  That's  your  answer.  Any  more  questions? 
Case  25: 
Accused  to  magistrate: 
Well  all  I  can  say  is 
Magistrate:  It's  him  you  ask  the  questions 
Accused:  No  questions  then. 
And  so  on.  7here  are  dozens  of  examples  from  the  data  - 
these  are  not  peculiar  cases  but*typical  of  the  lower  courts, 
as  indeed  the  Lord  Chancellor's  office  recognises  in  a  series 
of  lectures  to  magistrates; 
cross-examination  and  re-examination  axe  difficult 
matters  for  unrepresented  parties,  and  the  help  of  the 
court  is  often  necessary,  just  as  it  is  necessary  in  most 
cases  for  the  court  to  conduct  the  examination-in-chief.  (1953:  38) 
Several  points  are  to  be  drawn  from  such  exmmles.  First, 
they  demonstrate  how  the  accused's  ignorance  of  the 
procedures,  inability  to  handle  them,  or  indeed  unmind- 
fulness  of  them  in  his  indignation  or  nervousness,  leads  to ioc 
the  magistrate  simply  silencing  him.  It  is  partly  Procedural 
nicety  and  grammatical  pedantry  that  defines  this  as  out  of 
court  because  making  a  statenxent  rather  than  asking  a 
question  is  not  cross-exandnation.  It  is  also  a  matter  of 
substance.  For,  and  this  is  the  second  point,  approaching  an 
opposition  witness  with  a  direct  denial  and  a  clear  staterae-nt 
of  one's  own  case  is  not  cross-examination  in  that  it  does  not 
adiieve  the  jcb  cross  examination  is  fashioned  for  in  the 
adversarial  trial.  It  does  not  search  out  (or  create  the 
inpression  of)  weakness  in  the  opponent's  evidence,  or  undermine 
the  credibility  of  the  witness.  On  the  contraxy  it  underlines 
the  opposing  case  by  giving  the  witness  an  easy  opportunity  to 
sinply  dea  the  defence.  Professional  cross-examination 
proceeds  by  quite  different  means,  by  indirect  approaches,  by 
a  series  of  questions  on  apparently  peripheral  matters,  with  a 
crucial  issue  casually  dropped  in  en  route,  by  a  series  of 
questions  leading  the  witness  to  an  accusation  which  the  witness 
cannot  logically  deny  without  discrediting  his  previous  answers  . 
The  wthods  reconnended  by  manuals  on  advocacy  and  used  routinely 
by  lawyers  in  court,  are  indirect  and  subtle.  They  may  contradict 
the  methods  used  in  non-legal  situations  to  establish  truth  but 
they  are  the  stuf  f  of  cross-examination. 
im -1  0ý0 
The  unrepresented  accused  then  all  tA30  often  does  not 
cross--examine;  neither  -  and  this  is  the  third  point  -  does 
the  mgistrate.  An  Ret  in  1903  for  helping  "poor  prisoners" 
to  be  legally  represented,  offered  help  only  in  exceptional 
circumtances  on  the  grounds  that 
where  a  prisoner  was  not  defended  by  counsel  his 
interests  were  safe  in  the  hands  of  the  presiding  judge. 
(Widgery  1966  :  2) 
And  the  lectures  f  rom  the  Lord  Ch  an  ce  Ilor's  0ffi  ce  al  re  ady 
referred  to  remind  the  magistrate  he  may  well  need  to  help. 
If  the  defence  when  told  he  may  cross-examine  begins  to 
make  a  statermnt  and  persists  in  doing  so  when  told  he 
must  ask  questions,  the  court  will  usually  be  able  to  turn 
his  stateme-nts  into  questions  on  his  behalf 
... 
(1953  :  38) 
But  as  these  exanples  frcm  court  observation  show.,  putting  cross- 
exanunation  in  the  hands  of  the  magistrate  does  not  resolve  the 
problem.  This  is  not  just  because  of  the  team  gaws  played  out 
in  murt,  nor  indeed  because  of  the  personal  characteristics, 
the  impatience,  hostility,  sarcasm  of  the  magistrate,  though 
they  undoubtedly  play  a  part,  but  precisely  because  the 
magistrate;  cannot  cross-examne  for  the  the  accused  by  turning 
his  statements  into  questions.  For  a  start  it  is  too  late:  once  the 
statement  is  put  the  suiprise  is  lost.  What  is  more  once  the 
translated  direct  question  is  put 
it  creates  an  impasse,  a  categorical  denial,  with  nothing  to 
Pursue  further.  A  carpetent  professicna-I  advocate  would 
never  take  this  route.  For  the  magistrate  to  do  so  does  not 
therefore  help  the  unrepresented  accused  conduct  his  cross- 
exaudnation  as  a  professional  Might,  it  sirrply  ensures  that 
s  amteur  cross-exami  nation  both  terndnates  and  f  ails  - 
The , -? 
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magistrate's  "help"  is  therefore  no*  substitute  for  defence 
advocacy.  Nor  could  it  be:  that  is  not  his  role. 
The  magistrate  can,  as  all  judges  can,  ask  questions,  but  his  role 
remains  that  of  independent  judge,  he  has  no  involvera-ent  in  the 
prepaxation  of  cases  and  he  rray  not  take  sides.  And  of  course  he 
does  not  know  the  defendant's  version  beforehand,  so  the  questions 
he  asks  are  necessarily  Coloured  by  the  only  version  he  has  heard, 
the  prosecution'  s.  With  the  best  will  in  the  world  he  is  not  in 
the  structural  position  to  do  the  job  of  defence  advocate. 
Neither,  for  that  matter,  is  the  defendant.  Indeed  the 
unrepresented  defendant  is  truly  in  a  dileram.  Without  exercising 
the  skills  of  the  advocate  or  knowledge  of  the  law  he  cannot  par- 
ticipate  in  his  trial,  and  there  is  no  defence,  but  if  he  does 
demnstrate  such  skills  he  is  caught  in  the  double  bind  that  he  is 
not  supposed  to.  Inplicit  in  the  notion  of  professional  expertise 
is  an  unspoken  closed  shop  which  fosters  the  idea  that  only 
professionals  can  or  !  nýy  do  the  jcb.  Ibis  indeed  is  an  expectation 
pramted  not  only  by  experience  of  scores  of  baf  fled  defendants  but 
by  authoritative  sources,  like  the  matter  of  fact  observation  in  the 
Chancellors's  lectures  for  magistrates,  that: 
Cross-examination  and  re-exarrdnation  are  dif  f  icult 
matters  for  unrepresented  parties  ... 
(1953:  38) 
The  result  is  that  the  accused  who  does  cross-examine  rather  than 
make  statewnts  invites  interruption  and  criticism,  even  though  he 
is  Often  pursuing  only,  if  perhaps  a  little  wre  atlitatedlYi  the 
same  lines  that  the  professional  would.  In  Case  6  the  accused  is 
invited  to  cross-examine  for  the  second  time  with  the  quip: 
I 7 
We  don  It  want  a  breach  of  the  peace  here. 
When  one  of  the  accused  in  Case  1  caught  out  the  police 
witness  on  a  detail  of  location,  exactly  the  kind  of 
detail  advocates  rub  their  hands  over,  he  was  interrupted 
by  the  magistrate  (who  after  all  had  to  decide  his  fate)  with 
the  corrinent: 
I  wish  you  wouldn't  be  so  aggresrve  -  you're 
slightly  offensive. 
The  same  man  had  been  cross-exarrdning  police  witnesses  as  to 
identity  with  the  trurrp  ca-rd  up  his  sleeve  that  he  had  a  beard 
then  and  none  now  yet  this  was  not  being  noted  wben  he  was 
identified.  Having  tried  to  cross-examine  the  preceding  two 
witnesses  on  this  scmewhat  convolutedly  but  with  enough  grasp 
of  the  advocate's  style  to  keep  surprise  on  his  side.,  he  began 
on  the  third  only  to  be  beaten  to  it  by  a  direct  question  f  rom 
the  magistrate: 
How  was  he  facially?  Did  he  have  a  beard? 
It  is  not  at  all  unusual  for  prosecutors  to  conclude  cross- 
examination  of  the  accused  with  the  suggestion  that  he  is  -telling 
a  pack  of  lies.  "  The  same  attack  by  an  accused  on  the  police  is 
seen  as  insolent: 
Accused  to  police:  I  think  you're  a  liar. 
Assessor:  Mat's  enough!  (Case  29) 
ý  I,  - I 
CC\ 
ý-2  Accertaining  and  trying  to  catch  opponents  out  on  details  of 
tim  and  place  of  ten  take  up  a  good  deal  of  court  time  in 
represented  cases  but  the  Unrepresented  accused  may  not  play 
the  same  game  - 
In  Case  9,  one  of  the  defendants  tried  to 
establish  that  the  police  could  not,  from  their  vantage  point, 
have  seen  them  "touching,:  cars"  even  if  they  were.  qhe  prose- 
cutor  in  cross-examining  him,  reproved  him: 
Prosecutor:  SO  the  story  of  touching  cars  is  all  lies 
Defendant:  Aye,  that's  all  lies.  I  never  touched  it. 
Prosecutor:  Why  did  you  not  ask  the  police  that  Nýhen 
they  were  here  instead  of  about  walls  and 
curves  in  roads? 
The  magistrate  had  his  say  too: 
Magistrate:  You're  still  a  cockey  young  whippersnapper. 
When's  your  bubble  going  to  be  burst? 
You're  a  very  oonfident  self  -opinionated 
young  man. 
Dell  may  point  to  nerves  as  a  problem  for  defendants  but  it 
would  appear  f  rcm  such  corments  that  conf  idence  f  ares  them 
little  better.  Defendants  may  not  play  the  role  of  the  oonfident 
punch-pulling  advocate  because  it  clashes  not  only  with  the 
incorrpetence  and  deference  routinely  demanded  of  the  lower 
class  people  who  dcminate  the  courts,  but  because  it  clashes 
with  the  role  expected  of  the  defendant.  The  defendant  may 
be  diffident,  nervous,  excited,  contrite;  he  may  not  be 
confident,  aggresssive,  COOL  calculating,  tricky  -  unless  of 
coume  he  is  that  rarety,  an  unrepresented  middle  class 
defendant  in  the  lower  courts.  The  inherent  characteristics 
Of  the  conpetent  defendant  and  the  caq)etent  advocate  make  i 
way  with  playing  both  roles  at 
StrUcturally  difficult  to  get  a , --L  ý 
Defendants  occasionally  succeed  in  Cross-examination, 
managing  to  suggest  an  alternative  case  without  stepping  over 
the  threshold  of  the  professional  closed  shop,  succeed  at  least 
in  the  sense  of  winning  judicial  tolerance,  if  not  of  winning 
the  case  .  -\,  s  ý,  e\  cc  k-sc-  -1  \.  ?, 
tix  - 
k\Ak, 
ý  c-st  -ended 
as  not  proven  on  a 
technical  lack  in  the  prosecution  case,  not  on  the  strength  of 
the  defence.,  Oc  was  not  only  marked  by  exchange 
of  srrdles  throughout  between  magistrate,  assessor  and  prosecutor Il  ýý 
but  by  emments  amng  the  court  team  at  the  end  on  how  I,  h, 
_  (k-,  fcn- 
dant  had  dDne,  which  rather  suggested  this  was  a  Phencrwnon 
that  was  neither  expected  not  typical. 
It  is  a  normal  technique  of  advocates  to  CrCSS- 
exalune  on  matters  which  appear  to  be  peripheral  as  a  way  of 
catching  the  witness  on  a  crucial  matter  unawares,  or  indeed 
to  make  something  significant  of  a  matter  whidi  may  not  seem 
so  to  the  witness.  Either  way  the  crucial  elerwnts  are  surprise  ay,  ý 
a  continuity  of  f  low  in  the  questioning,  and  a  judge  would  be 
unlikely  to  intervene.  Unrepresented  defendants  are  not  so 
readily  accorded  this  privilege: 
Magistrate:  'What's  that  got  to  do  with  it? 
Next  question.  (Case  1) 
Repetittoopear  repetition,  or  persistence  with  a  particular 
line,  nonnal.  enough  advocacy  styles  invite  terrrdnation: 
Assessor:  I  think  you  I  ve  covered  that.  I  think 
we  I  ve  got  the  picture.  (Case  21) 
-  though  the  assessor,  having  stopped  this  defendant  then  went  on 
to  ask  questicns  on  a  new  line  only  to  tell  the  defendant  when 
he  interrupted: 
A,  Ssessor:  you  sit  down  -  You've  had  your  turn  to 
cross-exarrdne.  This  is  the  court's  turn  . 
Or  the  defendant's  cross-examination  may  be  ended  by  a  sirrple 
"Anything  else?  "  -  sirrple,  but  from  the  powerful  court  figure,  be 
it  brusque,  bored  or  kindly,  undeniably  final.  Magistrates 
exercise  much  more  control  over  defendants  representing  themselves 
than  over  lawyers.  Not  only  is  there  no  professional  etiquette  tO 
get  in  the  way  but  there  is  njC)re  of  an  inmediate  power 
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relationship  between  the  defendant  and  the  magistrate  v;  ho 
holds  the  key  to  his  f  ate  than  between  magistrate  or  indeed 
judge  and  lmvyer. 
It  is  not  therefore  just  as  simple  as  lawyers 
things  that  laymen  cannot.  Even  among  defendants  conpetent  /in  the  art  of  self  defence/ 
/it  is  harder  for  the  unrepresented  defendant  to  get  away  with 
the  same  methods  as  a  lawyer.  Indeed  to  be  tOO  au  fait  with 
law,  procedure  and  advocacy  can  mean  inviting  not  just  ridicule 
or  interruption  but  suspicion: 
Assessor:  Your  vOcabul-axY's  very  expressive,  isn  It 
it?  You  know  all  about  the  powers.  (Case 
29)  (General  Powers  Act). 
Or: 
Magistrate:  It  seems  strange  a  young  girl  like  you 
shoul  d  know  all  this  j  argon  if  you  I  ve 
not  been  in  trouble  before.  (case  29). 
The  inplication  was  made  explicit  when  assessor,  magistrate  and 
prosecutor  chatted  together  after  the  case: 
Prosecutor:  'IheytxL-  been  at  it  so  often  they  know  the 
score. 
The  accused  is  thus  put  in  an  absurd  double  bind  -  darmed  if 
he  is  knowledgeable  in  the  rules  ,  conpetent  in  advocacy,  damned 
if  he  is  not. 
This  analysis  has  exarrdned  the  situation  of  the  unrepresented 
defendant  in  court  ,  as  others  have,  and  it  has  set  it  in  the 
fairly  obvious  context  of  a  structural  Paradox-  The  trial  is 
Predicated  upon  professional  knowledgeý  expertise  and  adversarial 
advocacy., 
- 
but  legal  policy  denies  access  to  professional  representa- 
L-". 
U1011.  Indeed  even  status  differentials  in  the  lower  courts  can  be explained  in  part  by  legal  policy.  Not  only  are  the 
occasional  middle 
. 
class  defendants  wre  likely  to  be 
articulate  and  conpetent,  more  li-kely  than  'their  working 
Cla.  -,  s  counterparts,  to  be  e  cted.  and  allowed  by  cour-t 
personnel  to  be  articulate  and  cOnpetent,  and  more  likely 
to  be  able  to  afford  a  lawyer  themselves,  but  they  are  also 
wre  likely,  if  they  cannot.  to  be  awarded  legal  aid.  Me 
f 
Widgery  Committee  noted  that  assessrwnt  of  the  need  for  a 
lawyer  should  take  account  of  variations  in  the  consequences 
acoording  to  the  social  status  of  the  person  involved: 
the  seriousness  of  the  consequences  likely  to  result 
frcrn  loss  of  enployment  will  also  dif  fer  widely  in 
dif  ferent  circumstances.  A  young  labou-rer  who  loses  his 
job  in  conditions  of  full  employment  will  obviously  not 
suf  fer  to  anything  like  the  same  extent  as  a  middle 
aged  black-coated  worker  who  in  the  loss  of  his  job,  sacri- 
fices  cqreer  prospects  ,  pension  rights  and  may  have  the 
greatest  dif  ficulty  in  f  inding  other  conparable  enploymnt. 
(1966  :  46) 
7hus  speaks  the  middle-aged  black-coated  judge.  Likewise  though 
the  jeopardy  of  mere  stigma  resulting  frcm  a  case  is  not  of 
itself  enough  to  allow  legal  aid,  it  can  be  taken  into  account 
vhere  it  is,  say,  "a  respectable  housewife  charged  with  shopliftiW' 
(nV  enphasi!  ýý 
One  policy  irrplication  of  analysis  at  this  level  rrdght  seem 
denies  the  defendant,  and  clear  enough:  if  legal  poliCY  -- 
PaLrticula.  rly  the  working  class  defendant,  a  lavyer  on  the  mis- 
taken  assumption  he  does  mt  need  one  and  if  errpirical  evidenoe "I  (  (4 
shows  be  is  at  a  disadvantage  without  one,  then  perhaps 
legal  Policy  sbould.  remve  the  disadvantage  by  pmviding 
a  lawyer.  Leaving  aside  the  financial  consideration 
whidi  undoubtedly  activated  the  Widgery  Corr]Mittee  to  minimise 
legal  aid  in  the  lower  courts  --ý, 
CtZiýz 
this  seem  sinple,  but  the 
sirrplicity  is  in  the  analysis.  The  lack  of  a  lwvyer  for  the 
lower  court  defendant  cannot  be  analysed  siriply  as  causing  his 
probleas  nor  indeed  as  causeciv  by  a  paradox  of  policy  and 
structure.  That  paradox  is  itself  a.  synptcm  of  a  deeper 
structural  and  ideological  distinction  between  highOr  and 
lower  court  justice,  vihich 
inplies  that  even  with  a  lawyer  the  defendant  in  the  lower 
murt  would  have  the  odds  weighted  against  him.  To  raise 
questions  about  the  need  for  lawyers  or  the  quality  of  their 
service  before  magistrates  is  to  confuse  the  social  roles  of 
higher  and  lower  courts  - 
Me  lower  courts  are  not  there  to 
stage  grand  ideological  scenarios  of  proof  by  adversarial 
advocacy;  they  a-re  sirrply  in  the  business  of  sumary  justioee  . Summary  Courts  and  Me  Ideology  of  Justice 
Till  the  narre  was  changed  in  1952  the  magistrates,  courts 
were  called  courts  of  sum-ký  jurisdict  iOn,  as  in  Scotland  they, 
(and  the  1;,  heriff  Courts  operating  without  a  juxy)  still  are.  What 
they  offer  is  sumary  justice.  Suramry  justice  is  diaracterised 
precisely  by  its  lack  of  many  of  the  attributes  of  the  ideology  of 
legality,  and  a  fair  trial.  'Me.  Oxford  Dictionary  defines 
SuTynary  law  as  "proceedings  in  a  court  of  lwN  carried  out 
rapidly  by  the  omission  of  certain  formalities  required  by  the 
conmn  law.  "  Me  lack  of  representation  is  but  one  of  many 
omissions.  The  judicial  definition  in  Scots  lav  is  a  procedure: 
"without  iriluciae  and  without  indictment  and  further  without 
any  notice  to  the  party  of  the  nams  of  the  witnesses  that 
are  to  be  called  against  him  and  without  the  accused  being 
represented  by  legal  adviser  unless  he  chooses  to  provide 
himself  with  c)v)p-.  "  (LaTTb  V.  'Ihreshie  1892) 
7he  judge  irdght  have  added,  without  a  record  of  the  proceedings 
and  of  course  without  a  jury.  Summary  justice  is  thus  character- 
ised  legally  not  by  Positive  attributes  but  by  negative  ones:  it 
t.  \  &,  -n  ýý, 
negates  Lthe  procedures  held  to  be  necessary  in  the  ideology  of  due 
Process. 
Controls  are  not  very  nuch  in  evidence  either.  Indeed  till 
1953  the  accused  could  not  even  appeal  against  a  magistrate's 
(I'cision.  Now  he  can  appeal  against  sentenoe  and  have  the  case 
IýIheard  at  the  Crown  Court,  so  long  as  he  does  so  within  twenty-one 111  (  ýo 
clays,  and  with  the  proviso  that  the  sentence  may  be  increased  if 
be  does  appealy  scmething  that  is  not  possible  for  appeals  fi-cn 
higher  courts  . 
He  can  also  appeal  against  conviction  on  a  point 
of  law,  though  the  meethod  by  which  this  is  done  in  the  Imer 
courts,  "by  case  stated',  is  scme-what  illogical  as  a  nxethod  of 
control.  Appeal  against  a  magistrate  is  made  by  that  magis- 
trate  stat  ing  the  f  acts  of  the  case  to  a  higher  court.  There 
are  no  official  records  agains-t  which  to  check  the  magistrate's 
version.  Nor  does  the  defendant  have  an  opportunity  to  give 
his  own  version  of  what  occurred  to  cause  him  grievance.  Thus 
in  contradiction  to  the  rest  of  the  criminal  justice  system, 
the  cemplaint  is  stated  not  by  the  complainant  or  independently 
by  both  complainant  and  defendant 
, 
but  only  by  the  person  being 
complained  against.  Since  all  adversary  legal  procedure  is 
geared  to  the  idea  that  there  are  two  contradictory  versions  of 
the  f  acts  in  any  dispute  this  is  a  tota-I  violation  of  its  own 
assunptions.  In  law  it  is  not  stated  like  this  of  course. 
The  appeal  is  presented  as  an  appeal  against  the  prosecutor: 
he  is  the  "respondent",  and  the  magistrate  is  merely  the 
independent  judge.  But  it  is  of  course  the  magisjýratýeýLs 
decision  that  is  in  question,  and  control  would  seem  to  be  Put 
in  the  hands  of  those  Whm  it  is  supposed  to  control.  Not 
surprisingly  only  0.3%  Of  surmoxy  defendants  on  indictments, 
0.4%  on  non-indictable  offences,  appeal  against  conviction.  ýand 
Only  a  quarter  of  those  succeed. 
In  all  sorts  of  ways  the  fonmlity  of  the  higher  court  is 
I-  ,  -1 
abandoned.  The  indictments  by  which  prosecutions  are  launched "? 
-  ý  -1 
in  the  superior  courts  require  ab.  s()Iute  precision  -  evcn 
the  size  of  the  paper  and  margins  were  specified  in  the  1918 
rules,  but  the  "information"  which  initiates  the  lower  court 
prosecution  has  no  set  form,  it  need  not  even  be  written,  though 
it  usually  is,  and  not  all  the  elerwnts  of  the  offence  need  to 
be  stated.  Nor  can  any  objection  be  raised  to  an  "infoimation" 
on  the  grounds  of  defect  of  substance  or  fom  or  because  the 
evidence  given  at  the  trial  varies  f  rom-  it  (Arguile:  1969:  55). 
Hence  the  administration  of  the  lower  courts  is  of  ten  presented 
as  less  fonnal  and  legalistic  than  that  of  the  higher  courts. 
But  the  "informality"  would  seem  to  be  rather  one-sided:  the 
defendant's  role  as  this  chapter  has  already  shown,  is  still 
governed  by  forml  prcx-ýedures,  but  the  defendant's  rights  are 
, greatly  reduced. 
If  the  lower  courts  seem  to  present  a  different  world  from 
the  image  we  carry  in  our  heads  of  the  higher  courts  then,  it  is 
hardly  surprising;  in  law  that  is  exactly  what  they  are.  The 
law  has  created  two  tiers  of  justice,  one  which  is  geared  in 
its  ideology  and  generality  at  least  to  the  structures  of 
legality,  and  one  which,  quite  simply  and  explicitly  is  not. 
State  struggles  and  the  two  tiers  of  just  ic 
The  positive  characteristics  of  summary  justice  are  not  legal 
So  Wch  as  economic  and  bureaucratic:  sunrurY  justice  is  last, 
easy  and  cheap.  The  Scots  Manual,  Renton  and  Brown  notes  "the 
faCility  and  rapidity  of  summary  process"  (1972:  184)  while  a 
'' 
handbook  for  English  law  students  observes  that , "Z 
ýý 
sunTriary  of  fences,  being  both  more  nunx-,  rou.  s  and  less 
serious  than  indictable  offences,  a-re  tried  by  a 
siffVler  and  cheaper  method.  (Price  1979:  74). 
But  the  appropriateness  of  simpler  cheaper  procedure  for 
minor  of  fences  has  not  always  been  quite  so  taken  for  granted. 
In  the  early  days  of  the  liberal  democratic  state  after  the  1688 
Revolution  the  judiciary  viewed  with  considerable  suspicion  the 
operation  of  sunTnary  justice,  and  convictions  by  JPs  were 
constantly  quashed  throughout  the  18th  century. 
1 
The  grounds 
were  often  technical,  an  inaccuracy  in  the  form  of  the 
"infonmtion"  (the  JPs  acting  in  the  absence  of  an  organised 
police  force,  on  the  word  of  anonymous  informers).  Eighteenth 
century  justice  was  thus  not  only  ma-rked.  by  mierciful  pardons,  as 
Hay  has  demonstrated  (1975),  nor  indeed  by  technical  acquittals 
by  jurors 
,  which  have  been  put  down  to  the  severity  of  the 
penalties,  but  by  technical  acquittals  by  the  judiciary  of  the 
higher  mirts.  The  reasoning  displays  not  so  much  a  fetish  for 
technicality: 
mere  f  orm  or  f  ormality  is  not  required  in  these  nor  any 
other  summary  proceedings  (R.  v.  Chandler  1700)  - 
but  as  a  deliberate  POliCY  Of  strict  control  over  the  smmary 
courts: 
a  tight  hand  ought  to  be  holden  over  these  summarY 
convictions.  (R.  V.  Corden  1769) 
This  may  have  been  because  the  theories  f  rom  wbich  democratic 
ideOlOgY  emerged  were  still  recent  enough  for  that  ideology  to 
be  believed  in  and  fervently  upheld.  The  seventeenth  century '7-  k 
ca-,  ron  lawyers  had,  in  their  challenge  to  the  monarchy,  traced 
the  pedigree  of  conmn  law  justice  to  no  less  than  the  Magna 
Carta  and  the  famous  dictum  of  chapter  29  that 
No  f  ree  man  shall  be  taken  and  imprisoned  or 
disseised  of  any  f  ree  tenernent  or  of  his  liberties 
or  f  ree  customs  Or  outlawed  or  exiled,  or  in  any  other 
way  destroyed,  nor  will  we  go  upon  nor  send  upon  him, 
except  by  the  lawful  judgement  of  his  peers  or  by  the 
law  of  the  land.  T 
SI  kich  rhetoric  certainly  jarred  with  the  trial  by  "a  single  jus- 
tice  of  the  peace  in  a  private  chamber  upon  the  testimony  of 
one  witness"  that  sumnary  justice  offered: 
Everybody  knows,  that  this  being  a  penal  law  ought  by 
equity  and  reason  to  be  construed  according  to  the  letter 
of  it  and  no  further;  and  that  this  Act  is  penal  is  most 
plain,  ...  and  what  is  highly  so,  the  def  endant  is  put  to 
a  sunnary  trial  different  from  Magna  Carta,  for  it  is  a 
fundamental  privilege  of  Englishmen  to  be  tried  by  jury, 
which  privilege  has  been  secured  to  us  by  our  ancestors 
(R.  v.  Whistler  169ý 
But  sLumary  jurisdiction  was  an  af  f  ront  to  the  c,  (rmn  law 
judges  not  just  because  it  violated  the  concept  of  justice  cele- 
brated  in  Magna  Carta  but  by  the  fact  that  it  was  not  a  ccrmx)n 
law  creation  but  was  statutory  - 
It  had  historically  been  intro- 
duced  by  the  monarch,  used  oppressively  by  Henry  II  in  particular,  and 
thus,  in  a  state  now  geared  to  keeping  the  Mona-rchy  in  its  Place) 
must  have  had  unfortunate  connotations  . 
But  it  was  not  done 
awaY  urith.  On  the  contraxy  there  were  new  interests  involved. 
Thlý  new  state  was  based  on  an  idea  of  divided  sovereignty.  The -Z-7 
separation  of  poweis,  but  what  that  meant  remained  to  be 
(Jeterridned  and  there  was  still  a  battle  to  be  fought  out  on 
the  division  of  spoils. 
acquittals  on  appeal  f  rom 
In  the  judiciaryis  technical 
Suarary  courts  we  may  be  witnessing  a  battle  over  the 
ITeaning  of  the  separation  of  pcAver's,  with  the  judges 
claiming,  on  the  basis  of  pre-parliamentary  authority  (hence 
the  rhetoric  of  Magna  Carta),  exclusive  rights  over  the  operation 
of  justice.  Sumaxy  jurisdiction  as  a  statutory  creation 
offended  this  claim  by  being  the  prerogative  of  parliwTx--nt.  7he 
sumary  courts  may  thus  have  beeom  one  of  the  battlegrounds  in 
the  struggle  over  the  form  of  the  mdern  state;  through  such 
ndnutia--  are  the  great  battles  of  history  fought  out. 
If  this  is  correct  ,  and  it  would  require  a  deeper 
historical  study  -than  this  to  find  out,  it  was  a  battle  which 
the  judges  lost.  By  1787  in  the  summary  justice  skirrrdsh  at 
least  they  were  beginning  to  assume  the  role  of  the  interpreters 
of  parlim-ent,  rather  thah  its  challengers  and  watchdogs,  to 
dq-ý  lae  their  role  within  the  CCgrpass  of  parliamentary  authority 
rather  than  as  derived  from  a  different  tradition: 
As  to  the  principle  drawn  from  the  old  cases  that  the 
court  will  be  astute  in  discovering  defects  in  convictions 
before  sirnary  jurisdiction  there  seeM  to  be  no  reason  for 
it.  Whether  it  was  expedient  thatthoSe  jurisdictiord  should 
have  been  erected  was  a  matter  for  the  legislatule;  but  as 
long  as  they  exist  we  ought  to  90  to  a-"  reasonable  lengths 
--M-  1 
- 
Z. LL- 
--?  - 
7-  ý 
to  support  their  deteminatiors 
1787) 
ý 
v.  Thoapson 
In  any  case  by  the  mid  nineteenth  century  in  Nets  "to 
facilitate  the  performance  of  the  duties  of  the  Justices  of 
the  Peace"  Parliament  had  intervened  decisively  by  sinply 
remving  the  means  by  which  convictions  could  be  quashed. 
The  judges  had  always  insisted  as  the  superior  courts  that 
detailed  records  were  kept  by  the  JPs.  The  nure  complete  the 
mc)re  likely  they  were  to  disclose  technical  errors.  Parliarrent 
now  removed  the  need  to  keep  a  note  of  the  evidence  on  which 
the  conviction  was  based 
,  and  so  made  appeal  and  judicial 
control  well  nigh  irrpossible.  This  move  frcm  excessive 
technicality  might  be  seen  as  a  sirrple  -  welcom  - 
A-oumyý\ 
for  corrmon  sense  over  legalism.  But  for  its  full  irnplications 
to  be  understood  it  should  be  set  in  the  context  of  why  the 
judges  quashed  sminary  convictions  on  technical  grounds.  One 
irdght  speculate  from  the  spaxse  evidence  offered  here  that  this 
represented  not  just  mindless  procedural  fetishism  but  a  rreans  of 
'Upholding  justice  based  on  the  ideology  of  the  ancient  rights  of  free  mný 
Technical  acquittals  may  have  defied  mwo4ense  but  they  may 
also  have  been  no  more  than  a  front  for  challenging  not  the 
case  but  the  procedure  per  se  - 
The  irony  is  that  the  front 
itself,  especially  in  the  'conm+ense,  par  excellence  of 
Benthanism  becarre  an  easy  justification  not  for  renuving 
Sumia-Ty  procedure  but  for  remving  the  judges'  control  over  it, 
by  declaring  technicalities  irrelevant. 
The  Justices  of  the  Peace  lost  their  administrative  mle  vith 11-12- 
the  municipal  Corporation  Act  of  1835  but  their  judicial  role  began 
to  expand.  The  1847  Juvenile  Offenders  Act  and  the'ýUrmuryj-uris- 
diction  and  Indictable  Offences  Act  of  1848  allowed  sumary  justims 
to  deal  with  an  increasing  range  of  indictable  offences.  By  the  mid- 
nineteenth  century  more  and  more  offences  were  being  diverted  f  rcm 
ý\o)V'O.  r 
the  t  courts  to  the  surrinary  courts  (a  Process  that  continues  one 
himdred  years  later,  in  for  example,  the  James  Report).  Sunnary 
courts  were  also  well  established  by  the  same  period  as  courts  f  reed 
from  the  due  process  of  the  ccnmn  law.  The  apparent  contradiction 
in  the  Dictionary  quotation  cited  earlier)  "proceedings  in  a  court 
of  law  whidi  omit  fonmlities  required  by  the  cormun  law"  may  now 
be  clearer.  Courts  of  law  can  operate  without  what  is  required  by 
law  precisely  because  the  courts  in  question  are  created  by  one 
strand  of  the  state,  parliament,  and  the  rules  by  another,  common 
law.  The  separation  of  powers  thus  provides  the  structural  background 
for  democratic  ideology  to  operate  despite  its  internal  contradictions. 
The  principles  of  one  strand  have  remained  as  the  dDminant  image  of 
law  and  as  the  rhetoric  of  justice,  but  the  existence  of  the  other 
allows  the  legal  system  to  deal  with  the  vast  majority  of  offenders 
in  a  way  which  flouts  the  principles  of  justice  legally  - 
The  shorteircuiting  of  justice  as  traditionally  defined  required 
not  just  structural  manoeuvring  however,  but  legitimation.  Due 
Pmeess  was  and  is  ruled  out  of  the  lower  courts  as  unnecessarY  on 
tw  grounds:  fimt 
P 
both  the  of  fences  and  the  penalties  am  too 
trivial;  second,  the  issues  and  processes  are  such  that  the  nioeties 
Of  law  and  lawyers  are  irrelevant  - 
The  next  sections  analyse  these 
legitimations  to  demonstrate  their  ideological  nature$  and  their 
icL'Olc)gical  acccrrplishrrents  - "LýI-s 
The  ideOlOgY  of  triviality 
To  read  law  books  for  information  on  the  magis- 
trates'  COurts  is  tO  com  away  with  the  clear  irq)ression 
that  what  goes  on  in  them  is  overwhelmingly  trivial.  7bey 
deal  with  "minor  offences,  "  "everyday  offences,  "  "the  most 
ordinary  cases,  "  "humdrum"  events. 
14 
Legal  academics  even  go 
so  far  -  rare  event  -  as  indulging  in  jocularity.  Co!  j  it  and  Merry  Is 
text  gives  the  Scottish  police  courts,  very  much  the  lowest  tier 
of  justice,  seven  lines,  largely  taken  up  with  the  f  act  that 
they  are  enpcywered, 
inter  alia,  to  irrpose  a  fine  of  50p  for  'allowing 
a  chimney  to  catch  or  be  on  fire  I  or  a  penalty  of 
E2  for  throwing  I  any  snowball,  to  the  danger  or 
annoyance  I  of  any  person.  (1971:  "C 
viality  of  the  work  of  the  This  cluninant  image  of  the  t1ii 
lower  courts  is  shared  by  the  press.  Me  press  benches  in 
magistrates'  courts  are  rarely  occupied.  The  colum  of  offenders 
and  penalties  that  every  local  paper  carries  is  the  result  of  a 
Phone  call  for  results.  The  proceedings  themselves  a-re  of  no 
interest,  except  perhaps  to  provide  this  week's  funny  stories 
for  the  Diary  colum,  institutionalised.  indeed  in  one  Scottish 
10  WlIrt  paper  as  "little  stories  from  the  police  :  stt  wbere  the 
corric  antics  and  Glaswegian  patter  in  the  dock  Of  Big  Bertha  and 
13 Wee  Annie  are  recounted  for  laughs.  And  wby  not?  much  of 
what  happens  in  the  court  is  -  as  Pat  Carlen  demonstrates 
- 
funny  or  pathetic  or  absurd,  and  so  very  trivial,  too 
trivial  to  attract  any  serious  attention  from  the  press. 
Nor  indeed  from  the  public:  so  rare  is  it  for  a  nvnber  of 
the  public  to  attend  surnmary  courts  that  the  public  benches  are 
often  used  as  a  waiting  room  for  the  Morning's  batch  of 
defendants,  frcm  which  they  can  observe  their  predecessors, 
fate  and  shuffle  along  to  each  newly  vacated  space  till  their 
turn  comes  for  the  dock.  To  go  to  these  courts  as  a  rrmTber  of 
the  public  is  to  beccime  an  object  of  curiosity;  to  sit  there 
taking  not  es  is  to  invite  pa-roxysms  of  paranoia.  I  have  been 
asked  by  one  police  of  f  icer  on  duty  if  I  was  "fram  one  of  those 
radical  papers"  by  another  if  I  was  "just  heie  to  practice  your 
shorthand,  dear?  "  I've  been  called  before  the  bench  to  explain 
rnyself,  had  a  policeman  sent  by  the  magistrate  to  ask  me  what 
was  doing  there,  been  advised  not  to  take  notes  by  a  policeman 
on  duty,  told  by  another  that  taking  notes  was  illegal,  and 
instructed  by  yet  another,  not-  to  note  down  an  altercation 
between  an  assessor  (the.  legal  adviser  to  a  Jay  magistrate  in 
Scotland)  and  a  solicitor  -  it  wasn't  "done.  "  The  'pub  ic'  in 
the  lower  court  is  an  unusua-1  phenomenon,  and  the  purveyors 
Of  m3gistrates'  justice  are  scmwhat  sensitive  to  anyone  seeing 
their  Particular  brand  of  justice  being  dc)ne.  More  than  that, 
sOme  were  just  genuinely  concerned  that  I  should  be  wasting  rW time  at  the  lower  courts  when  I  could  be  watching  "juicy 
cases"  and  "real  judges"  eLsewhere.  'Meir  assurnption  was 
that  the  work  of  their  court  was  too  trivial  to  be  of  interest. 
So  the  image  of  triviality  that  pervades  the  lowest  ranks  of 
crirdnal  justice  has  the  consequence  of  ranoving  yet  another 
requisite  of  due  process:  that  the  adn-dnistration  of  justice 
, slmldbe  public.  One  of  the  objections  of  the  eighteenth 
century  judges  to  sumnary  justice  was  that  it  was  ,  in  a  private 
chanber"  behind  closed  doors.  Me  doors  were  opened  in  1848 
but  the  dominant  image  of  triviality  helps  ensure  that  the 
public  benches  remain  errpty.  It  is  not  just  the  offences  that 
are  deerred  trivial  -  drunkenness,  swearing,  petty  theft  (a  report 
by  the  Chief  Constable  for  Glasgow  (197!;  )  noted  that  47,  c  of  all 
thefts  were  of  goods  valued  under  E10)  -  but  the  penalties,  and  the 
triviality  of  the  penalties  may  help  in  Pa-rticular  to  explain 
public  apathy.  Not  only  is  it  dif  f  icult  to  work  up  a  moral  panic 
over  scmeone  I,  junping  on  and  of  f  the  pavement  in  a  disorderly 
manner,  "  taking  lead  worth  20p  from  a  rubbish  tip  or  touching 
cars,  but  the  life  and  death  decision  of  Hay's  eigbteenth 
century  courts  is  rnissing.  The  selacious  fascination  of  whether 
the  scales  would  tip  to  the  gallows  or  rwrcy  can  hardly  be 
matched  by  crimes  whose  maximum  penalties  are  (o  mc)n  in 
Prison  or  af  ine  of  ILI  0  00 
- 
More  specifically,  it  is  the  relative  trivialitY  Of  the e-L  ý-  ýo 
ýenýlties  that  provides  the  crucial  legitimations  in  law  for 
the  lack  of  due  process  in  sumary  justice.  Due  process  of 
law  is  required  in  the  ideology  of  demcratic  justice  before 
a  person's  liberty  may  be  interfered  with.  The  reasoning 
which  legitimises  reducing  due  process  in  the  lowest  courts  is 
based  on  this  premise,  but  with  a  refinelnent.  "Liberty"  ceases 
to  be  an  absolute  and  becorres  subject  to  a  Trie-asu-Ting  rod. 
The  limited  penalties  available  to  magistrates  n-k,  ,  ans  they  can 
interfeile  less  with  one's  liberty  than  the  higher  courts,  so 
defendants  in  these  courts  need  less  due  process.  Me  less 
one's  liberty  is  at  risk  the  less  one  needs  protection.  This  is 
perhaps  nDst  explicitly  statedin  the  criteria  for  warding  legal 
aid.  One  irrportant  condition  is  where  the  defendant  is  "in  real 
jeopardy  of  losing  his  liberty  or  livelihood  or  suffering 
1(,. 
i- 
inprisonment.  11  (Widgery  1966;  Royal  Ccnimission  on  Legal  &ervices  1979:  158) 
More  generally  this  is  in  many  ways  a  strange  argument  . 
'Trivial'  offences  after  all  still  involve  state  intervention  in 
the  citizen's  liberty.  Indeed  if  the  same  due  process  is  not  to 
be  awarded  to  all  defendants,  it  rnight  seem  a  bit  illogical  to 
Rdnirrdse  the  legal  rights  for  those  Who  have  allegedly  infringed 
least  on  law  and  order  and  maximise  them  for  those  who  have 
infringed  most.  Perhaps  it  is  just  that  the  more  unusual  the  crilre 
and  the  larger  the  penalty  the  more  public  interest  is  likelY  to 
be  aroused  and  the  more  justice  will  be  willy-nilly  on  display  - 
7he  More  criTrdnality  in  the  offence,  the  m0re  legalitY  in  the 
!  SLIX,  PMO&edings  might  be  an  odd  equation.  The  mc)re  I)'Will  tij(ý  more 
IPPnli+"  is  in  ideological  ternis,  perfectly  understandable. 
Pubhcilý -Lý  -ý 
is  not  an  issue  that  need  trouble  lower  court  justice 
,  closetted 
from  the  public  eye  by  its  own  triviality 
-  or  rrx)re  accurat(-,  I\-,  by 
its  own  ideology  of  triviality.  Triviality  is  not  just  a  descrip- 
tion  but  an  interpretation,  an  assessment,  and  the  work  of  the 
lower  courts  could  be  viewed  quite  differently. 
'For  a  start,  offences  and  penalties  may  seem  trivial  from  the 
outside  but  f  ar  from  trivial  f  rom  the  perspective  of  the  accused  - 
unless  they  have  become  so  only 
it 
through  the  folk  memory  of  the  lower  class  people  xvho  pass  through 
the  court,  to  whom  police  and  law  have  become  enerrdes  and  prosecution 
for  trivial  offences  a  risk  of  everyday  life.  'Me  James  Report 
rejected  the  perspective  of  the  defendant  as  a  way  of  categorising 
which  offfences  and  penalties  were  serious  and  which  were  not,  on 
OA  S  C'- 
grounds  which  stressed  its  significance  but  ki  ts  bureaucratic 
inconvenience: 
It  Nvould  be  irrpracticable 
...  since  that  ilYportance  va-ries 
according  to  his  character  and  position  in  society  (1975:  20) 
though  the  same  reasoning  is  used  in  the  Widgery  Report  to  do  the 
Opposite,  that  is,  to  use  the  defendant's  perspective,  as  it  varies 
according  to  his  social  status,  to  justify  discriminating  in  favour 
VL 
of  the  middle  class  in  the  award  of  legal  aid.  Thus  the  very  people 
who  are  expected  rightly  or  wrongly  to  be  more  cDq:  )etent  in  handling 
both  authorities  and  formal,  verbal  situations,  are  the  ones  who  are 
also  made  the  exceptions  who  need  additional  professional.  help.  One 
is  teupted  to  conclude  frcm  such  careful  exceptions  that  the  ideolog.  ' 
Of  triviality  may  ultimately  derive  less  from  the  trivialitý'  of  the 
Offences  or  the  penalties  but  from  the  triviality  in  authoritatl%,  e  eý'(-zs 
Of  lkt_pto  rployed, 
_ýle, 
the  lower  class  and  lower  still,  the  une --Z-Lý 
howless,  feeble,  who  provide  the  fodder  for  the  lower  courts  -  an 
iMlication  indeed  which  is  supported  by  the  fact  that  the  only 
tim  the  lower  courts  bemne  news  is  wben,  for  exarrple,  Mark  phillips 
is  charged  with  speeding. 
Nor  is  it  just  a  question  of  perspective  but  a  question  of 
focus,  There  is  an  inherent  pa-radox  in  the  very  idea  of  prose- 
cuting  trivial  offences.  They  are  too  trivial  to  interest  the 
public  but  not  too  trivial  for  the  state  to  prosecute  in  the  narre 
of  the  public;  too  trivial  to  merit  due  process  of  law  but  not  too 
trivial  for  the  intervention  of  the  law. 
C'Ihe 
ideology  of  triviality  focusses  on 
the  offences  and  penalties,  not  on  the  question  of  prosecution 
itself.  It  is  these  trivial  offences  after  all  which,  as  we  have 
seen  in  chapter  3  are  first,  mst  open  to  the  direct  intervention 
of  the  state  in  the  sense  that  the  police  are  the  only  curplainants; 
second,  nust  open  to  the  irrposition  of  a  crimLnal  label  on  "Mirginal't 
behaviour;  and  third  most  open  -  because  their  content  is  so  open  -  to 
post  hoc  law-making.  In  short,  it  is  exactly  in  the  area  of 
rdnor  offences  that  the  operation  of  the  law,  in  teim  of  dermcratic 
justice,  becomes  njost  suspect.  If  the  behaviour  involved  in  the 
Offence  is  not  intrinsically  interesting,  perhaps,  as  the  eighteenth 
wentury  judges  felt,  the  law's  processing  of  that  behaviour  into  an 
Offence  is.  But  contemporaxy  official  discourse  is  n-Dre  concerned 
With  the  quantity  of  crim  than  the  quality  of  justice  and  the  lower 
(Mrts  remain  scn-ething  to  be  laughed  at  or  yawned  over  for  the c4\ 
, -L  lcý 
pettiness  of  their  crimes,  not  watched  with  care  for  the 
marginality  of  their  legality. 
Tegal  Relevance 
The  second  justification  for  reducing  the  strictures  of 
due  process  -a  view  indeed  taken  for  granted  by  socirvl  egal  r 
wr  I  Urs  like  Mungham  &  Momas  (1979)  -  is  that  the  offences 
dealt  with  in  the  lower  courts  do  not  involve  much  law  or  require 
much  legal  expertise  or  advocacy.  They  can  therefore  be  safely 
I  -Jý 
left  to  be  dealt  with  by  laymen  -  by  lay  magistrates  and  by  the 
defendants  therrrelves,  with  lawyers  seen  as  nonnally  unnecessary 
in  the  lower  courts.  According  to  the  Widgery  Report,  legal  aid  is 
rarely  necessa-ry  for  simrm-ry  of  fences  since: 
The  large  majority  of  cases  are  straightforward  and  the 
facts  are  uncomplicated  and  clear-cut  (1-966:  47) 
But  this  view  of  the  lower  court  is  inaccurate  in  two  ways  - 
First  empirical  study,  as  already  demonstrated,  shows  that  the 
lower  courts  are  penneated  by  legalistic  and  professional  conscious- 
ness.  Second,  it  is  logically  confused  -  it  confuses  cause  and 
ef  fect.  The  reasoning  in  the  Widgery  Report  and  Mungham  and  Thon-kis' 
essay  verges  on  tautology.  It  udght  just  as  readily  be  argued 
that  minor  offences  are  characterised  by  sinple  facts  and  straight- 
\CLk'sýy'.  -  %ý 
forward  cases  because  are  so  rarely  involved.  The 
'case'  is  a  construct  from  an  event,  not  a  reproducticn  of  it.  'Me 
construction  of  a  case  as  straightforward  or  as  involving  points 
of  law  is  very  much  the - 
-4 
-Z-3  0 
product  of  the  advocate's  trade.  Case  law,  after  all,  develops 
exactly  because  advocates  Present  cases  which  draw  subtle 
distinctions  and  shades  Of  Meaning,  in  short,  CaTlicate  the 
sirrple,  in  arguing  for  the  treatment  of  the  case  in  hand  as 
different  from  previous  tuves:.  , 
What  is  mre,  case  law  and 
the  developuent  of  complicated  and  difficult  legal  issues  in 
specific  types  of  offence  and  case,  is  predicated  largely  on  the 
right  to  appeal  on  points  of  law,  and  both  the  nature  of  the  appeal 
procedure  in  the  lower  courts  and  the  lack  of  lawyers  to  formulate 
an  appeal  on  a  point  of  law,  mans  that  there  is 
, 
Ittele  opportunity 
to  develop  difficult  and  conplex  case  law  on  minor 
offences.  It  is  not  in  the  nature  of  drunkenness,  breach  of 
the  peace  or  petty  theft  to  be  less  susceptible  than  f  raud, 
burglary  or  murder  to  complex  legal  argument;  it  is  rather  in  the 
nature  of  the  procedure  by  which  they  a-re  tried.  Indeed  the  James 
T)- 
Re-port  mplicitly  recognises  this  when  it  notes  that 
trial  on  indictwnt  takes  longer  than  summary  trial 
even  for  a  case  of  similar  gravity  and  conplexity 
(1975:  13) 
And  of  course  the  eighteenth  century  judges  f  ound  plenty  of  legal 
niceties  in  the  work  of  the  sunTm-ry  courts,  until  they  wre 
explicitly  deprived  of  the  means  to  intervene.  The  ccmwnt  in  the 
lords  debate  on  the  1952  Magistrates'  Act  that  the  high  courts  Were 
not  aware  of  what  went  on  it  the  magistrates'  courts  because. 
in  the  nature  of  things  their  professional  skill  has  led (ýO  ,1 
-L%\ 
them  into  the  higher  reaches  of  the  law  rather  than  the 
more  hundrum  reaches  of  the  magistrates  I  courts  (  V+oAvs,,  cý  \IA5  ?--.  N  !  "-I  -, 
) 
ignores  the  use  that  professional  skill  was  put  to  historically 
and  the  legislative  axe  that  ended  it.  The  "straightforward 
cases"  of  the  lower  courts  are  then-selves  legal  constructions. 
Me  same  is  true  of  the  "sin-ple  facts.  "  The  facts  of  a 
case  -a  case  of  any  sort  -  are  not  all  the  elements  of  the  event  , 
but  the  infomation.  allowed  in  by  the  rules,  presented  by  the 
witnesses,  and  surviving  the  credibility  test  of  cross-examination. 
The  f  acts  of  surmary  cases  my  not  be  sirrple  because  of  the 
nature  of  the  of  fence  but  because  of  the  lack  of  professional 
expertise  in  manipulation  of  the  rules,  persuasive  presentation 
of  one's  own  case  and  destructive  cross-examination  of  the  other 
side's.  It  is  not  that  corrplex  facts  need  lmvyers  but  that 
lavyers  can  make  'f  acts'  corrplex.  That  is  exactly  their  trade. 
Or  the  f  acts  may  be  I  sirrple  I  not  because  of  the  nature  of 
the  behaviour  in  the  of  fence  but  because  of  the  nature  of  the 
definition  of  the  of  fence.  As  diapter  suggested  the  openness 
of  the  legal  definition  of  what  constitutes  an  of  fence,  a  IVO-n 
with  the  fact  that  these  offences  are  normlly  the  result  not  of 
citizens'  reports  but  of  police-accused  encounters,  with  only  the 
acCused's  word  against  the  policeman's  constituting  the  case,  means 
that  it  is  extreiiely  difficult  to  establish  a  defence.  In  short, 
the  facts  a-re  sinple  only  because  they  a-re  legally  so  dif  f  icult 
for  the  defendant  to  contest. IIII  -j  I 
-L  '(-,  2- 
Indeed  it  rrdght  be  suggested  that  the  openness  of  the  laws 
(1,2-f  ining  sunmary  of  fences  argues  not  for  less  legal  expertise 
but  for  more.  If  the  police  can  legally  define  ah-nost  anything 
as  an  offence,  then  the  f  acts  cannot  be  in  dispute  and  the  only 
was  to  establish  a  defence  is  on  a  point  of  law.  Remember  case 
30,  the  "juWing  on  and  of  fa  paverrent  in  a  disorderly  manner" 
case.  One  reaction  to  being  charged  for  that,  even  if  one  was 
doing  it,  nAght  be  total  disbelief  and  a  defence  on  the  basis 
of  it  being  absurd  to  be  taken  to  court  for  such  behaviour  at 
all.  But  that  of  course  is  not  a  legal  defence,  just  a  cut  and 
dried  admission  of  guilt  . 
The  accused  in  this  case,  the  only 
one  of  the  group  charged  who  pleaded  not  guilty  defended 
himelf  by  saying  he  was  not  doing  anything  disorderly,  that 
indeed  he  had  just  crossed  the  road  to  talk  to  the  group  collected 
at  th  e  and  that  he  didn't  run  away  because  he 
"didn't  expect  to  be  lifted.  "  That  was  his  rrdstake.  The 
prosecution  even  noted  in  his  SVQv0-  -v, 
'he  may  think  he  wasn't  misbehaving  as  much  as  the  others 
but  he  stayed  with  them.  " 
I  It 
And  that  was  all  that  was  neoessary  in  law. ?  "I  Is 
There  was  therefore  no  legal  defence  in  denying  his  behaviour 
was  offensive,  not  only  becaiLse  that  was  difficult  to  maintain 
against  two  policemen  but  because  in  law  it  was  irrelevant. 
A  relevant  defence  would  have  to  take  on  the  meaning  of  the 
Imv,  for  example,  contending  that  to  be  "part  of  a  disorderly 
crowd"  requires  not  just  one's  presence  but  active  participation. 
But  that  would  be  a  point  of  law:  it  would  require  a  more 
sophisticated  knowledge  of  law  and  legal  reasoning  than  this 
layman  had,  and  of  course,  as  we've  already  seen,  might 
require  presentation  by  a  lmvyer  to  be  given  a  hearing  at  all. 
Me  irony  is  then  that  because  of  the  openness  of  the  law  on 
minor  of  fences,  kept  open  because  there  is  so  little  case  lav 
to  specify  meaning,  the  best  route  to  a  defence  is  to  challenge 
on  a  point  of  law.  Ibis  of  course  could  establish  that  rrdssing 
case  law,  but  it  can't  be  readily  done  because  no  need  for 
lawyers  is  perceived  and  the  rmans  to  raise  a  point  of  law  are 
denied.  The  image  of  the  lower  courts  as  not  needing  lmvyers, 
which  justifies  not  providing  lwNyers.,  is  itself  a  product  of 
their  absence.  The  defendant  is  thus  caught  up  in  the  vicious 
circle  that  lies  behind  the  image  of  "sirrple  f  acts"  and  "straight- 
forward  cases.  " 
But,  and  this  is  why  situational  analysis  needs  to  be  set  in 
its  deeper  structural  context,  providing  lawyers  would  not  neces- 
SarilY  make  any  difference:  the  ideologies  of  non-law  and 
triviality  pervade  the  origins  and  structure  of  the  lower  courts 
11 
and  so  pervade  the  attitudes  of  those  who  work  in  them.  Rewnber -ZA  4 
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the  police  official  who  helpfully  suggested  I  go  to  the  higher 
wurts  for  "juicy  cases"  and  "real  judges.  "  And  lmvyers  then-,  -- 
selves  often  operate  with  a  different  style  in  the  lower 
courts.  Indeed  they  are  different  1.  %vyers.  The  non-l,  %v 
ideology  has  its  structural  expression  in  the  idea  that  only 
barrister's  can  act  in  the  bigher  courts  but  only  solicitors 
can  usually  be  provided  on  legal  aid  in  the  lower  courts.  rMis 
is  not  to  suggest  insidious  comparisons  between  the  ski  Ils  of 
solicitors  and  barristers,  but  nerely  to  indicate  that  whatever 
the  personal  attitudes  or  caTetence  of  the  solicitors  who  do 
appea-r  in  the  lower  courts  the  standard  of  advocacy  required  is 
pre-set  as  second  class.  Likewise  there  is  a  structural  expectation 
that  lower  courts  do  not  need  cases  that  a-re  well  prepared  or 
indeed  prepaxed  beforehand  at  all  by  either  side.  With  no  conmittal 
proceedings  the  defence  has  no  advance  warning  of  the  prosecution 
case  it  will  have  to  face  anyway,  while  Arguile's  book  on  criminal 
procedure  notes  that  if  a  matter  arises  in  the  defence  evidence 
that  takes  the  prosecution  by  surprise  he  may  call  evidencýe  in 
rebuttal  of  it  afterwards: 
Mis  is  pennitted  because  summary  trials  usually  owe 
very  little  to  advance  preparation  of  the  case,  and 
vvý  the  prosecution  is  therefore  more  likely  to  , 
surprised  by  unexpected  defences  (1969:  164) 1- 
Mis  is  certainly  borne  out  by  observation,  as 
indeed  is  the  idea  that  lawyers  consider  lower. 
court  cases  too.  trivial,  or  too  sinple  to  be  worth  nuch 
bother.  In  case  17  two  brothers  charged  with  breach  of  the 
ýQC4,  Dz) 
peace  while  on  business  in  Scotland  had  not  guilty  and 
come  all  the  way  from  London  to  stand  trial.  They  had  hired 
a  solicitor  and  provided  him  with  the  details  of  their  case. 
He  did  not  turn  up.  The  brothers  were  adamant  they  would  not 
continue  without  a  solicitor,  though  they  earned  thenr-,  elves  a 
few  rude  comments  as  a  result.  A  solicitor  from  the  sam  firm 
who  happened  to  be  in  the  building  agreed  to  step  in,  and 
began  to  find  out  about  the  case  there  in  court,  suppressing  one  of 
his  new  clients  I  indignation  at  these  proceedings  with  the 
reprimand  that  he  should  have  reminded  the  solicitor  of  the 
date  and  venue  of  the  trial: 
I'd  have  thought  someone  who  knows  as  much  about  the 
law  as  you  would  know  that  - 
And  he  added  the  ultimate  put-down  that  in  any  case: 
Breadi  of  the  peace  isn't  a  serious  charge  - 2s(0 
Mere  were  lawyers  who  operated  as  advocates,  Prepared 
efficient  cases,  organised  witnesses.  Tiey  tended  to  be  young, 
one  was  a  wcman,  all  were  patronised  by  the  cOurt  officials 
as  new  to  the  game  and  trying  a  bit  too  hard.  Me  reaction 
of  the  court  suggested  they  were  not  typical.  7bere  was  even 
one  who  launched  into  technicalities  refusing  to  let  his 
client  stand  trial  because  he  had  turned  up  on  the  due  date 
given  him  and  the  court  had  not  tried  him  -  the  c-lerk  had  got 
the  date  wrong  and  made  it  a  SundaY 
ý  (case  18).  He  was,  in  a  tired  tone, 
given  a  new  date:  such  technical  details  are  expressly  ruled 
out  as  unirrportant  in  the  lower  courts.  -ý.,, 
Another,  representing  the  middle  class  owner 
of  a  pub  on  a  strict  liability  licencing  charge,  even  raised 
a  point  of  law,  cited  precedents  and  got  the  court  very 
excited.  This  was  such  an  unusual  occurrence  they  had  to 
adjourn  to  find  the  relevant  books  (Case  14).  There  were 
others  however  who  siffply  lef  t  their  clients  dumbfounded,  like 
the  defendant  in  case  8  "C  b.  and  his  mother.  He  had 
been  so  adamant  he  was  innocent  that  they  had  hired  a  lmvyer  at  their 
own  expense.  And  in  their  view,  'it  was  the  easiest  E  30  1  ever  saw  anyone 
k-C  Co  , rb  ý  %ýý  Am  0  110  1"  % 
**f-k 
earning.  "  There  was  a  witness  for  the  case.  K  had  in  fact 
been  comnitting  the  offence,  and  had  seen  arriving 
r  kq-C'6  Qý 
after  the  event.  He  had  guilty,  but  recognised 
was  not  and  gave  a  statement  to  that  effect  to  the  lawyer. 
k  (,  - 
SUMWning  him  was  left  to  the  defendant's  nDther.  Neither  she 1  3-1 
nor  the  witness  had  a  phone.  She  sent  her  seven  year  old  son 
with  a  note.  The  witness's  father  took  it  at  the  door.  She 
never  knew  if-die  Lreceived  it.  He  certainly  did  not  turn  up.  In 
court,  the  defence  lawyer  merely  noted  "I  had  hoped  to  have  sorm 
supoorting  evidence  but  unfortunately  for  one  reason  or  another  it 
is  not  available.  "  The  magistrate,  not  surprisingly  saw  "no 
reason  why  I  should  doubt  the  evidence  given  by  the  policeman.  "  And 
the  family  even  less  surprisingly  concluded:  "People  like  us  don't 
have  rights.  " 
Camients  on  the  lawyers  in  my  observed  cases  must  necessarily  be 
scant  and  may  be  unrepresentative.  This  was  a  qualitative  study  of 
a  relatively  small  number  of  cases  and  the  number  of  lawyers  was  in 
the  nature  of  things  -  and  particularly  in  the  nature  of  legal  aid  - 
few.  There  are  other  snippets  of  information  that  may  lend  support 
thouIA)  for  exanple,  Daxbyshire's  study  of  justices'  clerks  and  her 
description  of  the  courts  as  dominated  by  a  handful  of  solicitors 
usually  engaged  on  several  cases  at  once,  and  always  holding  things 
up,  or  by  inexperienced  young  barristers  who  "hadn't  a  clue.  "  She 
assessed  the  level  of  advocacy  she  observed  in  action  as  generally 
"mediocre"  and  "appalline'  with  little  legal  argument,  and  with  (to 
her)  obvious  defences  either  not  put  at  all  or  put  as  mitigation 
which  if  accepted  would  amount  to  a  ccrrplete  defence.  (1978:  239) 
There  is  also  the  criticism  of  the  level  of  advocacy  in  the  magistrates' 
courts  nude  to  the  Royal  Cannission  on  Legal  Services  by  the  As!  sociation 
of  Magisterial  Officers.  My  concern  however  is  less  with  assessing 
the  level  of  performance  and  attitude  of  lawyers  1:!  ýýr  se  than  with 
teasing  out  what  that  demonstrates  about  the  professional  lmvyer's 
ideology  of  the  lower  courts.  On  that  score,  the  reply  by  the  Lmv 
Association  is  as  telling  as  the  criticism.  First  the  magisterial 
officers  are  thenrelves  derided  for  both  their  menial  stattis,  and -L'ýs 
their  lack  of  law  since  they 
for  the  most  part  probably  entirely  lack  legal 
qualification  and  were  foiTwrly  called  the  National 
Association  of  Justices'  Clerks'  Assistants. 
'Men  the  offenders  and  offences  and  work  of  the  court  in  general 
is  discussed  as: 
relative  trivia 
and 
the  dross  of  the  criminal  courts 
The  suggestion  by  the  officers  that  such  offenders  and  offences 
need  specialists  to  deal  with  them  is  noted  as  showing 
how  divorced  from  reality  their  cminents  must  be 
and  as 
the  best  indication  of  the  unreliability  of  this 
evidence  and  the  lack  of  thought  which  appears  to 
have  preceded  it 
- 
(The  Times,  23  Aug.  1977) 
What  these  comnents  suggest  is  that  the  profession  too  is  imbued 
with  the  dcn-dnant  images  of  the  lower  courts  as  neither  serious 
enough  nor  legally  relevant  enough  to  need  lawyers.  To  simply 
PrEicribe  lawyers  on  tap  for  the  lower  courts  as  a  solution  to  the 
defendant's  dileama  is  thus  to  ignore  the  much  mc)re  fundamental 
structural  and  ideological  realities  which  lie  behind  the  courtroom 
situation. 
The  Accurplishments 
These  images  of  the  court  are  not  just  ideological  acccuplislynents; 
they  also  accamplish  ideological  functions  themselves.  Carlen  point-s 
to  the  marginality  of  the  offences,  the  lack,  of  ceremony,  lack  of 
lawyers  in  the  lover  courts,  as  a  problem  for  the  magistrate  in 
presenting  the  court's  work  as  justice.  (1975:  38)  But  the  situationki 
problem  is  in  fact  resolved  structurally.  The  very  same  factors  aný 
I., "I  IC\ 
transformed  into  images  of  the  court  as  trivial  and  non-legal: 
and  the  ef  fect  of  those  images  is  that  the  court  never  actually 
has  to  account  for  its  work  anyway.  The  magistrate  may  have  an 
existential  problem  in  portraying  his  work  as  justice  but  he 
rarely  has  a  social  problem.  For  the  magistrates  I  court  is  a 
theatre  without  an  audience. 
Legal  policy  has  established  two  tiers  of  justice.  One, 
the  higher  courts,  is  for  public  consunption,  the  arena  where 
the  ideology  of  justice  is  put  on  display.  The  other,  the  lower 
courts,  deliberately  structured  in  defiance  of  the  ideology  of 
justice,  is  concerned  less  with  subtle  ideological  messages  than 
with  direct  control.  The  latter  is  closetted  from  the  public  eye 
by  the  ideology  of  triviality,  so  the  higher  courts  alone  feed  into 
the  public  image  of  what  the  law  does  and  how  it  operates.  But  the 
higher  cou-r+cz  deal  with  only  IL7o  of  the  cases  that  pass  through  the  (-,  ýo 
courts.  Almost  all  criminal  law  is  acted  out  in  the  lower  courts 
without  traditional  due  process.  But  of  course  what  happens  in  the 
lower  courts  is  not  only  trivial  it  is  not  really  law.  So  the 
position  is  turned  on  its  head.  The  9S76  becoms  the  exception  to 
the  rule  of  "real  laW'  and  the  working  of  the  law  comes  to  be 
typified  not  by  its  routine  nature,  but  by  its  atypical,  indeed 
C  CO'Sy" 
exception'  -11orm. 
Between  them  the  ideologies  of  triviality  and 
legal  irrelevance  accouplish  the  remarkable  feats  of  defining  97'/c- 
Of  court  cases  not  only  as  exceptions  to  the  rule  of  due  process, 
but  also  as  of  no  public  interest  whatsoever.  The  traditional  ideologY 
Of  justice  can  thus  survive  the  contradiction  that  the  suTrnarY  courts 
blatantly  ignore  it  every  day  -  and  that  they  were  set  up  preciselý- 
for  that  purpose. . 
J. 
CHAPTER  7 
1.  In  England  this  refers  to  the  magistrates'  courts.  In  Scotland 
,  non-jury'  trials  and  guilty  pleas  a-re  dealt  with  not  just  by  lay 
magistrates  (indeed  lay  magistrates  operate  only  on  the  fringes  of 
cr=nal  justice)  and  stipendiary  magistrates  Nit  also  by  sheriffs 
sitting  without  a  jury  who  deal  with  half  of  non-indict%nt 
prosecutions.  (Walker  1976 
, 
238).  In  England,  though  not  in 
Scotland,  the  defendant  can  choose  for  a  range  of  offences  whether 
to  be  tried  by  jury  Of  by  magistrates,  though  there  are  systematic  ,, 
pressures  towards  I  qpting'  for  a  guilty  plea.  For  a  start  there  is 
a  much  lower  maximum  penalty,  6  months  imprisoi-mi-ent  of  11.1000  fine 
(raised  f  rom  3  months  and  E500  by  The  Crirrdnal-  Law  Act  1977);  second 
the  defendant  cannot  be  camitted  to  the  Crown  Court  for  sentence. 
These  a-re  described  by  Smith  and  Hogan  as  "bonuses"  though  of 
course  on  could  as  readily  interpret  them  as  JiAucements. 
2.  That  is,  for  law  and  justice.  Dtcy  do  fi',  iJ  other  ideological 
roles,  e.  g.  on  the  virtues  of  employment  and  family  life. 
3.  Extended  to  the  lower  courts  only  in  the  1975  reorganisation, 
or  at  least  renaming,  of  the  district  oourts. 
4.  The  report  retains  descretion  in  the  awar(3-  of  aid  in 
cases  triable  only  by  magistrates,  changing  the  er-mhasis  from  the 
need  to  find  grounds  to  award  it  to  the  need  to  find  grounds  to 
de-ny  it,  but  employing  the  saw  basic  criteria. 
5.  James  Report  1975  Appendix. 
6.  See  chapter  2. 
7.  See  Rouse  Jones  1953:  6. 8.  See  Thomson  1950. 
9.  Arguile  1969;  Lords  Debate  on  the  Magistrates  COLlfts  Hansard 
1952;  Walker  1976. 
10.  The  Weekly  News. 
11.  See  Brogden  1979. 
12.  See  this  chapter, 
13.  Less  so  in  Scotland,  see  note  1. 
14.  See  chapter  3 I 
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cHAPTER  8  Conclusion  and  Implications 
Tjnderstanding  law  enf  orcement:  a  new  perspective 
Ibis  study  set  out  to  analyse  the  role  of  legal  form 
,  powers, 
privileges,  limitations,  rulings  on  the  process  of  cx)nstructing 
wnviction  in  court  -  conviction  in  both  the  subjective  sense  of 
how  a  judge  or  jury  comes  to  be  convinced  beyond  reasonable  doubt 
of  its  verdict,  and  in  the  legal  sense  of  a  finding  of  guilt, 
for  that,  statistically,  is  the  likely  outcome  of  a  foray  into,  the 
criminal  courts.  7he  problem  for  the  sociologist  is  how  that  is 
possible  when  all  the  rhetoric  of  the  democratic  ideology  of 
justice  proclaims  that  in  the  battle  between  the  state  and  the 
accused  the  system  is  heavily  biased  in  favour  of  the  latter.  By 
examining  the  law  not  just  in  term  of  the  general  principles  of 
its  own  ideology,  but  in  tenns  of  the  details  of  its  specific 
structures,  procedures  and  decisons,  this  analysis  has  tried  to  show 
that  the  law  governing  the  production,  preparation  and  presentation 
of  evidence  does  not  live  up  to  its  own  rhetoric. 
'Me  rhetoric  of  justice  requires  incriminating  evidence  as 
the  basis  for  arrest  and  search;  the  law  allows  arrest  and  search 
in  order  to  establish  it.  Justice  requires  that  no  one  need 
incriminate  himself;  the  law  refuses  to  control  the  production  of 
confessions  and  allows  silence  as  a  factor  in  proving  guilt. 
Justice  requires  equality;  the  law  discriminates  against  the  horeless, 
the  jobless,  the  disreputable.  justice  requires  each  case  be 
judged  on  its  own  f  acts;  the  law  makes  previous  convictions  grounds i, 
'I(jr,  2 
for  defining  behaviour  as  an  offence  and  evidence  against  the 
accused.  Justice  places  the  burden  of  proof  on  the  prosecutor; 
the  law  qualifies  the  standard  and  method  of  proof  required  and 
offers  the  prosecutor  opportunities  for  making  a  case  which  the 
accused  is  denied.  Justice  proclaiTyr,  the  right  to  trial  by 
onets  peers;  the  legal  system  ensures  that  91%  of  all  defendants 
plead  guilty,  and  of  the  rest  ýwosv-  are  tried  without  a  jury. 
If  then,  the  process  of  conviction  is  easier  than  the  rhetoric 
of  justice  would  have  us  expect  -  and  easier  still  the  lower  the 
status  of  the  defendant  -  it  is  hardly  surprising.  A  wide  range 
of  prosecution  evidence  can  be  legally  produced  and  presented.  ) 
despite  the  rhetoric  of  a  systern  geared  overwhelmingly  to  safeguards 
for  the  accused 
I 
precisely  because  legal  structure,  legal  procedure, 
I 
legal  rulings,  not  legal  rhetoric  govemthe  legitimate  practice 
of  criminal  justice,  and  there  is  quite  sinply  a  distinct  gap 
N,  Aween  the  substance  and  the  ideology  of  the  lmv. 
This  conclusion  has  two  direct  and  iffwdiate  inplications. 
First  it  places  the  policy  debate  of  the  1976--ý  over  law  and  order 
in  a  new  light.  The  police  demand  for  mre  powers,  for  the  removal 
of  the  hanistrings  of  the  right  to  silence,  the  limitations  on  arrest 
and  search  -  and  indeed  the  civil  liberties  carrp's  agitated  response 
that  the  legal  checks  of  British  justice  must  be  upheld  -  begin  to 
aPPear  rather  odd.  Both  sides  of  the  debate  are  frawd  in  ternE 
Of  the  ideology  of  civil  rights,  not  in  term  of  the  realities  of 
legal  procedure  and  case  law,  which,  as  I  hope  this  analysis  has 
amply  shown,  have  all  too  often  already  given  the  poli  ce  and 
Prosecution  the  very  powers  they  are  demanding.  The  lmv  does  not 
need  reforrn  to  remove  hanF;  trings  on  the  police:  they  exist  largelY. I  (4ý4 
in  the  unrealised  rhetoric. 
Second,  more  theoretically,  this  analysis  has  implications 
I 
for  the  explanation  of  law  enforcement  and  its  Outcorres.  A  whole 
range  Of  excellent  sociological  studies  has  pointed  out 
situational,  infonnal,  non-legal  factors  in  POlicle-citizen  encoun- 
ters  and  courtroom  interaction  to  explain  who  is  arrested  or 
convicted,  and  to  explain  why  the  system  so  often  seems  in 
pLactice  to  be  weighted  against  the  accused.  Their  answer  lies 
essentially  in  the  complex  nature  of  social  interaction  and  moti- 
vation;  in  the  f  act  that  people  do  not  n-ýerely  administer  the  law 
but  act  upon  and  alter  it  as  they  do  so.  'Mis  study  of  fers  a 
supplementaxy  perspective,  making  the  law  rather  than  the  activities 
of  its  administrators  problematic.  The  conclusion  is  quite 
different.  Given  the  fonml  procedures  and  rules  of  the  law  and 
the  structure  of  arrest,  investigation,  plea  and  trial,  one  could 
not  -  even  if  human  beings  acted  entirely  as  legal  automatons  -  expect 
the  outcomes  to  be  other  than  they  are.  If  the  practice  of  criminal 
justice  does  not  live  up  to  its  rhetoric  one  should  not  look  only  to 
the  interactions  and  negotiations  of  those  who  put  the  1mv  into 
practice  but  to  the  law  itself  - 
One  should  not  look  just  to  how 
the  rhetoric  of  justice  is  subverted  intentionally  or  otherwise  by 
POlicemen  bending  the  rules,  by  lawyers  negotiating  adversariness 
Out  of  existence,  by  out-of-touch  judges  or  biased  magistrates:  one 
Must  also  look  at  how  it  is  subverted  in  the  lwN.  Police  and  court 
Officials  need  not  abuse  the  law  to  subvert  the  principles  of  justice; 
they  need  only  use  it.  Deviation  from  the  rhetoric  of  legality  and 
justice  is  institutionalised  in  the  law  itself. 
Corning  back  to  Packer's  two  POlar  tYPes  for  describing  law z4ý,,  - 
enforcement,  due  process  and  crinl-_  control,  effpirical  analysis  of 
the  process  reveals  them  as  af  alse  distinction.  'Me  law  on 
crimnal  procedure  in  its  current  fOTn  does  not  so  much  set  a 
standard  of  legality  from  which  the  Police  deviate  as  Provide  a 
licence  to  ignore  it.  If  we  bring  due  process  down  from  the 
dizzy  heights  of  abstraction  and  subject  it  to  empirical  scrutiny, 
the  conclusion  must  be  that  due  process  is  for  crime  control. 
0 
This  perspective  offers  quite  a  different  ideological  gloss 
on  the  nature  of  criminal  jus-bce  and  a  shift  of  focus  for  its  study. 
Focussing  on  the  subversion  of  justice  by  its  petty  administrators, 
on  the  gap  between  the  law  in  the  books  and  the  law  in  action  in 
I 
effect  whitewashes  the  lmv  itself  and  those  who  make  it.  Front  mn 
like  the  police  become  the  fall  guys  of  the  legal  system  taking  the 
blame  for  any  injustices  in  the  operation  of  the  law,  both  in  theory 
(in  the  assuTption  like  Skolnick's  that  they  break  the  rules)  and 
indeed,  in  the  law.  The  law  holds  the  individual  policeman  person- 
ally  responsible  for  contraventions  of  legality  that  are  successfully 
sued,  while  at  the  same  time  refusing  to  make  clea-r  until  after  the 
event  exactly  what  the  police  are,  supposed  to  do.  It  is  no 
coincidence  that  the  police  themselves  asked  for  the  original 
Judges'  Rules.  Shifting  the  focus  to  the  substance  of  lav  places 
resPonsibility  for  the  operation  of  criminal  justioe  -  and  the  need  for 
the  spotlight  of  study  -  squarely  on  the  judicial  and  political  elites 
who  make  it. 
Tracing  a  gap  between  the  rhetoric  of  justice  and  the  sul)sta"Ce 
and  structure  of  law  is  not  however  just  the  end  of  a  piece  of 
4e  indignant  expose  research  - 
(Taylor  Walton  &  Young  1975:  I-Ot  )  It  OPens 
lip  a  whole  ccrnplex  of  further  issues  - 
If  the  wntra&ctions  between /ý-4  (. 
rhetoric  and  practice  in  law  enforement  cannot  sinvly  be 
O-Z. 
explained  away  as  the  unintended  consequences  of,  rttY  officials, 
then  we  are  faced  with  contradictions  within  the  core  of  the  state 
between  the  ideology  and  substance  of  the  law.  Why  does  such 
institutionalised  deviation  occur?  How  is  the  ideological  gap 
mnaged?  What  implications  does  it  have  for  the  idea  of  the  rule 
of  law?  7hough  these  are  major  issues  which  each  require  a  full- 
scale  study  in  theryselves,  the  sections  that  follow  offer  some 
speculative  beginnings. 
Rhetoric  and  law:  why  the  gap? 
It  is  too  sinple  to  discuss  the  gap  between  the  rhetoric  of 
justice  and  the  substance  of  law  as  unproblernatic,  as  the  inevitable 
and  self-evident  consequence  of  a  class  society  in  which  the  rhetoric 
of  justice  is  necessarily  mere  illusion.  Some  more  sophis  ticated 
analyses  have  been  suggested.  Hall  and  his  colleagues  (1978)  have 
tried  to  of  fer  a  mterialist  explanation  of  a  particular  move  in  the 
1970s  to  a  more  repressive  crime-control.  oriented  use  of  law  and 
steady  erosion  of  civil  liberties  by  relating  it  to  a  crisis  in  the 
hegemony  of  the  bourgeois  state,  and  that  in  turn  to  economic  crisis 
i 
At  another  level  of  contextual  analysis  a  series  of  sociologists, 
including  indeed  Hall  et.  al.,  have  demonstrated  how  a  moral  panic  and 
cmpaign  for  the  repression  of  a  particular  scx-ia-1  p"Oblem  -  mugging, 
football  hooliganism,  drugs,  mods  and  rockers  -  can  lead  to  more 
crinle-control.  oriented  judicial  decisions,  and  so  help  explain  why 
Particular  swings  in  the  orientation  of  law  to  or  away  from  the 
rhetoric  of  justice  take  place.  It  might  also  be  Possible  however 
that  a  tendency  one  way  or  the  other  exists  in  the  law  itself  - 
From 
exmdning  the  legal  structure  it  would  seem  that  there  are  also  forces within  the  lmv  which  might  well  lead  routinely  -  when  there  are  no 
mc)ral  panics  in  either  direction  -  to  a  develOPMent  of  case  I.  -av 
that  f  avours  crime  control  rather  than  due  process. 
Case  law  and  judicial  discretion  could  as  readily  be  used  - 
and  indeed  have  been  -  to  cojNtzNvr%  Police  practices  as  to  condone 
thern.  But  case  law  emanates,  to  state  the  obvious.  from  particular 
trials.  Mere  is  no  public  interest  law  in  Britain,  no  way  in 
wbich  a  point  of  law  can  be  brought  to  court  as  an  abstract  issue 
of  public  concern.  A  point  of  law  can  only  be  clarified  in  the 
context  of  a  dispute  in  a  real  case,  either  directly  at  a  high  Court 
trial  frcm  the  decision  taken  by  the  judge  on  a  dispute  over  a 
point  of  law,  or  indirectly  via  appeal  from  the  trial  court  to  the 
Court  of  Appeal  or  House  of  Lords.  Locating  the  dispute  over  law 
in  the  facts  of  a  concrete  case,  might  well,  despite  the  distinction 
drawn  in  legal  theory  between  issues  of  f  act  and  issues  of  law,  mean 
that  the  facts  of  the  case  af  fect  the  finding  in  1mv  by  providing 
the  context  in  which  the  decision  has  to  be  made.  What  this  whole 
study  has  suggested  is  that  that  context,  if  the  point  of  law  is 
being  raised  in  the  course  of  a  trial,  is  one  in  which  the  accused 
iS  likely  to  look  guilty.  If  it  is  being  raised  on  appeal,  then  he 
will  already  have  been  found  guilty  since)Pnly  defendants  can  appeal, 
and  only  defendants  with  a  grievance,  that  is,  those  who  have  been 
COnvi  Cted 
Cl 
What  is  more  because  retrials  of  fact,  or  the  introduction 
Of  new  evidence  are  rarely  allowed  on  appeal,  that  defendant's  case 
is  Often  of  necessity  based  on  technicality  rather  than  equitY,  On 
the  mans  by  which  the  evidence  was  acquired  rather  than  the  misleading 
'Dr  inaccurate  nature  of  the  evidence  itself  - 
judges  making  Case  law 
on  aPPeal  are  thus  faced  in  effect  with  a  guilty  defendant  tn-ing  to -ý  (-ý￿  3 
argue  his  way  out  of  his  due  deserts  through  legal  technicalities. 
Who  could  blw-ne  them  for  closing  the  escape  route  by  r&wving 
the  technicality,  by  seeing  rights  as  loopholes  that  should  in 
the  name  of  justice  be  removed?  If  these  hypotheses 
are  correct,  one  can  readily  see  why  in  particular  cases 
judges  may  be  likely  to  decide  against  the  accused. 
The  problem  is  that  judges  are  exercising  a  dual  function 
in  readiing  their  decision.  They  rmist  not  just  ensure  that  justice 
is  done  in  the  sense  of  the  accused  getting  his  deserts;  they 
mist  also  ensure  that  the  technical  checks  on  how  criminal  justice 
is  executed  are  upheld.  'Mey  must  not  just  uphold  the  substantive 
-  criminal  law  but  the  procedures  of  legall  But  this  duality  of 
function  sets  up  an  inpossible  contradiction.  The  decision  is  a 
finding  forione  party  or  the  ot  her.  It  has  to  declare  the  methods 
illegitimate,  the  evidence  inadmissible  and  quash  the  defendant' 
kA, 
S  ýk 
conviction,  or  uphold  the  conviction,  V,  ),.  kt  in  dc)ing  so, 
inevitably  legitimise  the  questionable  methods  -  inevitably  because 
of  a  second  duality  in  the  function  of  decisions.  The  judicial  decision 
cbes  not  just  resolve  the  particular  case  but  sets  a  precedent  for 
future  cases.  Provisos  in  civil  rights  introduced  in  the  context 
of  a  particiELar  case  beconie  abstracted  and  available  for  argument 
in  all  cases.  Rejecting  a  technical  defence  may  be  quite  understand- 
Bble  in  the  context  of  the  black,  and  wbite  cases  constructed  through 
advOcacy  and  procedure,  but  with  every  rejection  of  a  lechnical 
dýfellce  case  cornes  an  extension  of  police  and  prosecution  powers. 
Civil  liberties  cease  to  be  legal  rights  and  the  control  of  crime 
is  safeguarded  at  the  expense  of  legality  -3 
In  Short,  f  rcm  the  structure  Of  trial  and  appeal,  and  f  mm  the 6 
17- 
functional 
, 
dualities  in  the  judicial  decisioýýdeeiding 
on  both 
the  ýcase  and  the  law;  upholding  both  substantive  and  Procedural  L 
law  -  one  can  plausibly  hypothesise  a  structural  trend  in  case 
law  towards  crirne  control  and  away  from  due  process. 
system  itself  elp,  explain  why  substantive  lc'ON  might  routinely 
be  upheld  at  the  expense  of  procedural  law  and  the  rights  of  the 
rhetoric  of  justice  gradually  whittled  away. 
Managing  the  ideological  gap 
Me  gap  between  the  rhetoric  of  justice  and  the  substance  and 
structure  of  law  raises  not  only  'why'  quest"L  How  is  it  pos- 
sible  for  the  law  to  deviate  f  ram  the  rhetoric  and  how  does  the 
rhetoric  survive  kdevi  at  ion?  Much  has  been  made  of  the  tension 
between  due  process  and  crime  control  but  the  law  seems  to  achieve 
crime  control  wbile  keeping  the  ideology  of  due  process  in  play; 
LAI 
it  seems  to  achieve  in  some  measure  at  least  the  impossible  task 
of  maintaining  two  contradictory  ideas  at  once.  How  are  the 
ideological  gap  and  the  ideological  contradictions  managed? 
Part  of  the  answer  lies  in  the  mystique  and  inaccessibility 
which  protects  the  detail  of  lav  f  rarn  the  mass  of  people  It  is 
the  rhetoric  rather  than  the  law  that  is  public  knowledge.  Indeed 
One  can  observe  defendants  lostigtheir  case  precisely  because  they 
-LAe  00-  arguinj  it  on  the  basis  of  L  rhetoric  rather  than  the  law. 
One  needs  a  knowledge  of  both  law  and  rhetoric  before  the  gap 
between  them  becomes  evident  - 
What  is  more.,  a  good  deal  of  what 
OCcUM  in  the  courts,  as  argued  in  tbapter  5,  MY  aPPear  to 
fit  the  rhetoric  of  justice  only  because  the  organisatiOn  of  the  facts 
into  not  only  black  and  white  cases  but  into  black  and  white  cases  that 
a"e  likely  to  persuade  ordinary  people  of  guilt  haS  taken  Place  out --ý  S-1) 
of  the  public  eye.  The  ideological  shutters  around  the  magistrat(-,  s 
courts  (chapter 
. 
-1  )  and  the  difficulties  attached  to  even 
getting  leave  to  appeal,  have  the  same  effect.  7he  division  of 
the  process  into  public  and  private  faces  helps  in  itself  to 
maintain  the  ideology. 
Part  of  the  answer  lies  too  in  the  techniques  of  judicial 
reasoning.  Judges  deciding  a  point  of  law  routinely  reiterate 
the  rhetoric  in  resounding  prose,  yet  decide  the  case  in  such  a 
way  that  the  rhetoric  is,  for  this  individual,  effectively  denied. 
7hroughout  we  have  seen  exanples  of  how  this  apparent  contradiction 
is  calmly  and  routinely  acccmplished.  Judges  may  draw  literal 
distinctions  which  reiterate  the  principle  but  make  it  simultane- 
ously  irrelevant  or  indeed  uphold  the  principle  but  give  such 
specific  reasons  that  it  cannot  be  generalised,  as  in  Lawrie  v.  Muir 
or  Aitken.  They  may  avoid  the  applicability  of  the  rhetoric  by 
redefining  the  situation  in  such  a  way  that  it  is  no  longer  covered 
by  the  principle,  for  example,  creating  the  lirrbo  of  the  p 
suspect 
who  was  thus  not  protected  by  the  rhetoric  or  lav  on  arrest  and 
61 
interrogation.  They  may  uphold  the  rhetoric  by  expressing  dis- 
satisfaction  with  the  questionable  mans  used  to  acquire  evidence, 
but  simultaneously  allow  that  evidence  to  be  used  to  convict 
On  other  grounds,  maintaining  that 
the  trial  judge  has  discretion  in  such  matters  as  to  precisely  how 
it  should  be  applied  as  in  the  Lenisatef  case, 
-7 
or  deciding  -  on 
no  rational  empirical  grounds  at  all  -  that  the  conviction  by  the 
iUrY  did  not  depend  on  that  piece  of  evidence  anyway.  All  kinds 
of  techniques  of  reasoning  allow  the  rhetoric  to  be  both  eulogised 
and  denied. k 
11  ýý 
But  structural  f  actors  also  provide  scnýe  of  the  nxmns  c)f 
bridging  the  ideological  gap.  rMe  dc)ctrine  of  the  separation 
of  powers  provides  a  multiheaded  state  and  with  it  the  potential 
to  extol  the  rhetoric  in  one  sector  and  deny  it  in  another. 
Statutes  may  provide  rights  in  general  ternr-,  -  the  1887  Ret, 
for  exarrple,  made  provision  for  a  defendant  to  consult  a  solicitor  - 
only  to  have  the  judges  refine  the  right  out  of  existence. 
9 
The 
ibetoric  lives  on  in  the  statute  but  is  routinely  negated  in 
the  courts  by  judicial  reasoning. 
Be-neath  judicial  reasoning  kV  se  structural  f  actors  are  also 
at  work.  Just  as  the  techniques  of  advocacy  are  therrselves  only 
adaptations  to  a  particular  form  of  proof,  so  the  techniques  of 
judicial  reasoning  are  themselves  significant  only  in  a  particular 
fonn  of  law.  Law  is  made  through  the  case  law  method  both  in  the 
devApme-nt  of  corymon  law  and  the  application  of  statutes.  The 
itetoric  of  justice  in  the  fom  of  general  abstract  rules  is  quite 
sinply  inccnpatible  with  the  notion  of  case  law.  Levi  notes  that 
a  general  overall  rule  is  useless  in  law  because: 
It  will  have  to  operate  at  a  level  where  it  has 
no  meaning  ... 
The  legal  system  does  not  work  with 
the  rule  but  at  a  much  lower  level  - 
(1949  :  9) 
A  legal  system  based  on  case  law  (and  even  the  states  that  boast 
Lkk  S%.  -  00dified  law  use  case  law  in  a  modified  form)  operates  ai  the 
level  of  the  concrete  case:  is  is  high,, 
_Iy 
particularistic. 
Hence 
the  justification  of  excepting  the  specific  case  frm  the  application 
Of  the  general  rule  without  destroying  the  general  rule  per  se.  The 
rhetoric  and  the  law  ope-rate  at  -two  dif  ferent  levels,  the  abstract 
and  the  concrete,  and  the  contradiction  is  operationally  negated  and qýl 
a  clear  clash  prevented  by  ea(-%  being  Pigeonholed  out  of  the 
otherts  realm  of  discourse.  The  rhetoric  is  rarely  actually 
denied,  it  is  simply  whittle 
,,  ý\  _%  . 
d  away  by  exceptions,  provisos, 
Law  in  this  form  is  rather  like  a  Russian  dc)ll. 
You  begin  with  the  rhetoric  and  a  single)  apparently  definite, 
C,  ondition  which  on  closer  inspection  turns  Out  to  mntain  another 
less  clear  condition  which  in  turn  opens  up  to  reveal  even  mc)re 
ifs  and  buts  and  vaguenesses,  reducing  so  often  to  the  unpredict- 
ability  of  lit  all  depends  on  the  circurrrtances'  -  what  criteria 
we  use  in  your  case  depends  on  your  case.  Ibis  fom  provides 
an  extrerrely  potent  way  of  maintaining  the  facade  of  civil  rights 
ideology  -  the  first  doll  -  while  in  fact  allowing  extensive  legal 
police  powers.  Cases  can  readily  acconnodate  both  staterrients  of 
general  principle  and  the  exceptions  of  particular  circumstances. 
7hus  an  appeal  on  the  grounds  of  abuse  of  a  legal  right  can  be 
rejected  because  of  the  circurrstances  of  the  particular  case,  while 
at  the  sarre  time  a  grand  statement  reiterating  that  right  is  made. 
The  conflicting  rhetoric  of  due  process  and  practical  demands  for 
criMe  control  a-re  thus  both  simultaneously  maintained  and  the  gap 
between  rhetoric  and  practice  is  managed  out  of  of  existence- 
"  ýq  v 
C,  ýZl  Lawyem  may  boast  of  the  flexibility  and  individualised  ('VL 
case  lav  but  it  also  plays  a  potent  role  in  maintaining  the  ideologY 
11 
Of  justice. 
This  has  inplications  for  policy  for  it  sets  paramett+n  any 
Possibility  of  lasting  reform.  Recorrineendat  ions  for  changes  in  the 
181ý  Made  by  the  Royal  CaTynission  on  Criminal  Procedure,  the  Fisher 
Report  tr  W  4X-A  t  C-: 
then-selves  Subj("'I 
,  conTnittees  on  law  refomkmust  be  seen  as 
to  future  change,  future  change  which  if  the  hypothesised  developrwnt --L  ýI 
of  case  law  noted  in  the  previous  section  is  anything  tO  go  by, 
all  too  often  mans  a  whittling  away  of  the  original  principle. 
The  spirit  lingers  in  the  rhetoric  of  justice  but  the  qualifications 
and  provisos  Of  case  law  render  it  rather  less  effective  Lasting 
refom  cannot  be  possible  without  some  deeper  change  in  the  fom  of 
law  itself  - 
But  the  nature  of  case  law  has  irrPlications  not  only  for  policy 
but  for  sociological  understanding  of  the  role  of  law  in  society, 
for  the  operation  of  dominant  ideology  and  the  democratic  state.  It 
has  implications  in  particular  for  one  area  in  which  these  three 
coalesce,  in  the  idea  of  the  rule  of  law. 
The  case  1,  %v  fonn  and  the  rule  of  law 
The  principles  of  justice  are  part  of  the  ideology  of  the 
demcratic  state  not  only  in  their  substance  b  u.  t  in  a  much  more 
fundm-ental  way,  in  the  very  idea  that  there  should  be  principles 
at  all,  that  those  vvho  wield  the  power  of  the  state  should  not  do 
so  arbitrarily  but  should  themselves  be  governed  by  law.  r1be  idea 
of  legality  itself  is  an  essential  ideological  fom  of  the  democratic 
state;  its  rule  is  the  rule  of  1-mv 
- 
The  idea  of  the  rule  of  law  is  central  not  just  to  the  arena 
of  criminal  justice,  perhaps  the  most  explicitly  coercive  asPect  Of 
8tate-individual  relations,  but  to  sociological  theories  of  law  in 
general  in  capitalist  society.  One  strand,  epitomised  by  Weber  and 
NeunarWlftý;  MI)  enphasises  dependability  or  certainty  as  its  one 
'ýSselltial  element;  the  rule  of  law  is  the  rule  Of  known  law-  concerned 
"n0re  with  civil  than  criminal  law,  they  relate  the  develOPment  Of 
10  in  capitalist  society  to  'the  need  for  corlrnerce  to  operate  in  a 
8'tllatiOn  of  certainty,  in  the  knowledge  that  contracts  could  be 2ýý 
relied  c)n  to  be  ful  fiI  led  or  en  f  orced.  Second, 
has  sparked  of  f  debate  by  challenging  the 
that  the  rule  of  law  is  merely  a  mask  f  or 
class.  Though  he  qualified  his  argument 
applic,  able  to  eighteenth  century  England, 
ir,  debate  to  the  question  of  the  function 
ID 
crude  Ma-rxist  notion 
the  rule  of  the  dominant 
as  being  only  certainly 
it  has  been  generalised 
Of  law  in  capitalist 
society  in  general.  He  argues  that  the  ideology  of  justice  is  no 
wre  mask  but  also  a  potential  for  genuine  transcendence  of  class 
interests: 
The  law  may  be  rhetoric  but  it  need  not  be 
enpty  rhetoric  (1975:  263) 
I\ 
There  are  two  reasons  for  this.  Class  relations  are  expressed  in 
law  "through  the  forms  of  lav"  (1975:  262)  'Mese  are  independent 
of  class  interests,  and  Tbompson  irrplies,  a  constraint  upon  them. 
What  is  more,  people  a-re  not,  says  Ihorrpson,  mystified  by  the 
first  man  to  put  on  a  wig.  The  principles  of  justice,  once 
6-,  clared,  take  on  a  force  of  their  own  in  that  they  have  to  be 
lived  up  to  if  their  ideological  functions  are  to  succeed.  The 
rulers  thus  become  "prisoners  of  their  own  rhetoric.  "  (1975:  263) 
The  essential  issue  here  is  the  autonorW  of  law,  the  idea  of  the 
rule  of  law  above  man  as  of  theoretical  as  well  as  ideological 
validity. 
For  both  these  strands  of  theorising  and  debate  on  the  rule  of 
law  the  form  of  case  law  must  raise  serious  questions, 
ýý% 
.b  'IcýQ 
12  %.,  X'tký,  ý,  jký  (3,  V  tý  \..  ýZ 
% 
nUý  %*".  UYJL 
()ne  C-M  f  ind  quotations  from  judges  on  the  need  for  certainty  in 
the  laW.  In  1754  Lord  Hardwicke  noted: 
I  think  authorities  established  are  so  manY  laývs; 
k'ý 
and  receciing  f  rom  them  unsettles  PrOPertY;  and uncertainty  is  the  unavoidable  consequence 
1ý  (cited  in  Holdsworth  1934:  188) 
But  such  statements  jar  so  clearly  not  just  with  the  practice  of 
judges  but  with  the  form  of  the  case  12av  rrethod,  that  one  cannot 
help  but  speculate  that  Weber's  description  of  a  move  to  'rational, 
law  for  the  sake  of  certainty  traces  the  developnent  of  an 
ideology  Of  law  rather  than  a  description  of  either  its  pra(.  tice 
or  i  ts  form  - 
1. 
Case  law  is  discretionary  and  particularistic;  it  does  not 
operate  at  the  level  of  general  rules.  What  is  more,  as  noted  in 
chapter  .  . 
'-ý 
-., 
it  only  operates  post  hoc  -  it  does  not  make  law 
until  after  a  dispute  has  made  it  into  an  issue.  Of  course  there 
a.  re  precedents  to  constrain  judgments.  But  they  need  only  constrain 
the  justification  of  the  decision  rather  than  the  decision  itself. 
Indeed  the  discretion  invested  in  judges  and  the  f  act  that  the  case 
come-s  before  thern  only  after  dispute,  only  because  "infonned 
disagree"  and  can  make  out  a  case  for  both  sides,  rwans 
a  judge's  decision  either  way  will  not  be  considered 
a  failure  to  perform  his  judicial  responsibilities 
(Greenawalt  cited  in  Cross  1975  :  221) 
What  Hart  calls  the  open  texture  of  lav  allows  wide  scope  1T\the  use 
-Vk-  NCL.  V  t  0",  --j  Of  prece&eý-ijbýQ.  Indeed  precedents  can  be  eMloyed  to  do  the 
exact  opposite  of  their  original  use,  as  examples  in  this  stu(JY  sIlOw. 
WO  7he  meaning  attached  to  precedent  deserves  attention  too.  Holds  rth 
V,  k  Cý  Ivr-  , 
argues  that  the  method  of  ý1ýlvy  precedent  was  only  accepted  histori- 
C,  aIIY  by  the  judiciary  on  condition  that  it  was  not  an  overbearing 
-j(  ir  I-Omtraint.  (1934  :  180)  Ibis  was  accoýplisfd  by  developing  Ti 
Own  ideology  of  law.  Coke,  Hale  and  Blackstone  were  all  fi"yn 
N)Onents  of  the  view  that  decisions,  precedents  were  not  Jmv  but merely: 
evidence  of  what  the  law  is 
The  result  is  that: 
The  courts  must  decide  what  \,.  3Q  is  to  be 
attached  to  the  evidence  in  different  sets  of 
circumstances 
Holdsworth  concludes: 
The  manner  in  which  they  have  decided  this 
question  has  lef  t,  them  many  means  of  escape 
f  rcm  the  necessity  of  literal  obedience  to 
the  general  rule  that  decided  cases  must 
always  be  followed  (1934  :  185) 
Structurally  indeed  there  could  not  historically  have  bc,  *--n 
a  systematic  following  of  precedents  quite  sirrply  because  there 
was  no  systematic  reporting  of  cases  until  the  end  of  the  nine- 
teenth  century,  w\r.  Zo,,  provided  further  justification  for  the 
judges  to  ignore  precedent  on  the  basis  that  reports  were  not 
13 
authoritative.  Cross  suggests  that  with  more  systematic  1MV 
reporting  and  the  restructuring  of  the  courts,  by  the  nineteenth 
century  the  idea  of  binding  precedent  had  becOrre  mOre  rigid.  (1975: 
23)  But  it  did  not  last  long,  for  he  also  observes  that  the  English 
cbctrine  of  precedent  is  current  in  a  state  of  f  lux  (1975  :  6) 
IhOugh  the  Court  of  is  still  in  theory  bound  by  its  own  and 
the  House  of  Lords  I  decisions,  there  are  several  well-known  cases 
'-n  Which  it  has  not  followed  them 
k4 
while  in  1966  the  House  of  Lords 
7 
stated  quite  explicitly  it  need  not  be  bound  by  its  Own  Vrecedents. 
Ais  is  not  to  say  that  precedent  is  never  followed  in  the  making  of 
It  is  merelv  to  Fsaý-  that 
lyy  be  followed.  Case  law;  it  may  even  usuall q)--l 
it  need  not  be  a  rigid  constraint.  Indeed  the  very  degree  of 
constraint  involved  is,  it  would  seem,  subject  to  the  changing 
decisions  of  the  judges  therrselves,  the  people  it  is  supposed  to 
cor&ra,  in.  Me  doctrine  of  precedent  may  thus  be  placed  more  aptly 
in  the  rhetoric  rather  than  the  actual  procedure  of  justice.  'Me 
doctrine  of  precedent  may  tell  us  where  the  ideology  of  the  rule 
of  law  is  grounded  and  how  it  is  maintained  but  it  tells  us  very 
little  about  the  practice  of  case  law  -  not  just  because  of 
judicial  techniques  to  use  and  avoid  precedent  but  because  of 
the  nature  of  deology  of  precedent  and  the  post  hoe  discretionary 
particularistic  form  of  the,  case  law  method. 
The  result  is  that  the  law  is  so  far  from  being  certain  as  to 
be  almost  irrpossible  to  pin  down.  This  study  would  never  have 
taken  the  shape  it  has  if  I  had  been  able,  as  an  observer  in  courts 
unread  in  law  at  all,  to  get  a  precise  answer  from  the  lawyers  I 
eagerly  asked  what  the  law  of  search,  or  arrest,  or  the  right  to 
silence,  actually  was.  The  answer  was  a  list  of  cases  all  with 
v 
di  f  ferent  specific  lines  -  in  (ý  v  Gi  rez-  the  decision  was  X  but 
of  course  idR.  v.  Brawrý  it  was  Y-  and  so  on.  7he  text  books 
offered  the  same,  noting  scrrietimes  that  the  lm  on  that  point  may 
be  so  and  so.  And  soon  it  became  clear  that  it  was  not  my  lack 
of  legal  learning  that  made  the  law  so  elusive:  that  was  the  nature 
of  the  lav,  a  will-o-the-wisp  pausing  but  a  mameant  before  the  next 
decision,  and  then  only  'clear'  for  the  particular  circurstances  of 
that  particular  case. 
When  lmv  takes  such  a  form,  there  can  be  no  f  ixed  or  certain 
rule  of  law.  The  Weberian  thesis  of  the  bourgeois  need  for  certain 
law  must  be  challenged  by  even  a  perfunctory  analysis  of  the  form 
of  law,  especially  in  the  conmn  law  systems  of  both  the  first  capitalist 
society,  Britain,  and  the  most  advanced,  rIbe  United  States,  which  illustrate I  ý-l 
the  case  law  method  par  excellence.  13ut  it  is  not  just  eý'nlrOn  law  that  is 
based  on  cases  modern  law  per  se,  however  codified  in  general 
,  cc"Ies 
dooll  in  the  end  to  application  to  concrete  situations,  to  case  law.  Iý 
Law  in  modern  society,  far  frcrn  being  certain,  is  as  elusive  arld  a8  adaPtable 
as  a  chameleon. 
Ihis  elusiveness  also  plays  its  part  in  the  nstique  of  law. 
What  can  be  more  nystical  than  a  staternent  of  what  the  law  is 
which  is  not  only  veiled  by  the  need  to  know  where  and  how  to  look 
for  it  but  which  turns  out  when  YOU  find  it  to  be  Provisional, 
particulax  and  only  really  ascertainable  for  your  specific 
question  if  you  take  it  to  court?.  The  portrayal  by  Thompson  -  and 
others  -  of  the  mystique  of  law  is  too  simple.  People  may  not  be 
bmtoozled  by  the  wigs  and  ceremony  and  ja-rgon  of  the  law,  but  they 
are  quite  likely  to  be  bamboozled  by  the  law  itself.  It  is  not  just 
that  they  are  in  their  ignorance  puzzled  by  the  law,  it  is  also 
quite  simply  that  the  law  is  a  puzzle.  Its  particularistic  post-hoc 
form  inevitably  makes  it  so. 
But  analysing  the  fom  of  law  undemines  Thompson  Is  argument 
in  deeper  ways.  lbonpson  discusses  the  I  forns  of  law'  by  which  he 
means  procedures,  but  not  the  basic  'form'  of  law,  the  nature  of 
1,  %v  itself  Nor  does  his  analysis  really  distinguish 
IG 
between  the  general  rhetoric  and  the  specific  rules  of  law.  He 
equates  them  -  'the  law  may  be  rhetoric  -.  -'- 
but  be  is  really 
talking  only  of  the  ideology  of  justice-  On  that  level  his  Point 
On  the  ideological  availability  Of  'justice'  to  all  of  society  is 
beYond  reproach.  Of  course  t  justice,  I  'equality,  'liberty'have  all 
been  bEmners  for  all  classes:  it  is  the  meaning  they  are  invested 
'ý'th  that  ties  them  to  one,  and  it  is  in  the  specific  rulings  of 
18'v  that  those  meanings  are  def  ined  and  ref  ined  into  the  Particular 7  9ý 
shape  endorsed  and  enforceable  by  the  state. 
it  is  at  that  stage  that  7horrPson  would  see  class  interests 
cc)nstrained  by  the  need  to  abide  by  the  rhetoric  for  ideological. 
pulposes,  and  by  the  'fomis  of  law,  I  its  logic,  Procedure  and 
rules.  But  the  theory  is  too  simple.  It  is  not  enough  to  say 
the  rulers  are  I  prisoners  of  their  own  rhetoric,  I  that  the  law 
cannot  seern  just  'without  upholding  its  ()wn  logic  and  criteria  of 
equity.  I  Studying  the  content  of  the  law  shows  this  is  not 
necessarily  what  happens.  The  logic,  rules  and  procedures  of  the 
lay,  as  this  study  has  shown,  f  ar  f  rom  being  f  ixed  constraints  , 
are  highly  maýkQe6DW-  -  Me  question  that  must  arise  is  rather: 
how  is  it  possible  for  the  ideological  function  to  be  fulfilled 
without  overly  constraining  the  rulers?  What  this  study  has  tried 
to  show  in  exan-dning  the  management  of  the  ideological  gap  betNv(-,  (-n 
the  rhetoric  of  justice  and  the  content  of  law  is  precisely  how 
judges  can  both  uphol  ,  even  eulogise  the  rhetoric  yet  simultaneously 
deny  its  applicability.  Me  'can'  is  inWrtant,  since  they  can  also 
do  quite  the  opposite,  as  the  brief  discussion  in  this  study  of  the 
eighteenth  century  judges,  or  the  fuller  one  in  Hay's  of  the 
eighteenth  century  courts  (1975)  shows.  But  the  opportunity  is 
always  there,  and  it  is  there  not  just  in  hypocrisy  or  reasoning 
POwem  of  rulers  but  in  the  structure  of  legal  procedures  and  the 
of  law,  not  onlY  Ex  reý  (ýc)nstraints  they  P-  fOm  of  law.  The  ,  fomr 
include  methods  for  negating  them. 
This  has  a  further  implication.  General  theories  of  laiv  too 
Ofterl  analyse  the  role  of  law  as  though  it  were  an  ideOlOgic'al 
rflOrl0lith.  What  this  study  underlines  is  the  need  to  analyse  the , 7(00 
different  aspects  and  levels  of  law  Ivith  greater  Precision.  if 
we  separate  out  the  rhetoric,  substance  and  -  much  deeper  than 
lbompson's  'folms'  -  the  basic  fom  Of  12ON 
,  we  find  not  only 
that  they  are  different  elerwnts  but  that  the  articulation  of 
the  different  elements  helps  explain  how  the  ideOlOgY  can  cperate 
successfully  without  making  the  rulers  of  the  state  too  extensively 
the  prisoners  of  its  rhetoric. 
Returning  to  the  debate  between  7hompson  and  a  more  directly 
economistic  Marxism  as  to  whether  law  is  a  mre  mask  for  class 
interests  or  not,  or  indeed  to  any  of  the  Polarised  conceptualis- 
ations  of  law  posed  in  the  sociological  debates  over  lav,  one  can 
perhaps  conclude  that  the  polarities  lie  not  in  the  theoretical 
perspectives  so  much  as  in  the  law  itself 
. 
7he  question  may  be 
less  a  matter  of  which  of  two  alternative  theories  of  the  role  of 
in  society  is  right,  but  of  how  it  is  possible  for  the  law  to 
present  itself  plausibly  in  such  opposing  ways,  how  it  is  possible 
for  the  contradictory  theories  to  be  posed  in  the  first  place  - 
TO 
examine  the  fom  of  lav  in  relation  to  the  ideology  of  the  rule  of 
law  is  to  gain  some  insights  into  how  the  law  is  able  to  contain  -  in 
both  senses  -  internal  contradictions.  It  may  help  us  understand 
not  Only  how  the  legal  system  can  simultaneously  maintain  both  due 
Process  and  crime  control,  the  prime  concern  of  this  study,  but 
more  broadly,  how  it  can  reproduce  the  ideology  of  justice  while 
denYing  it,  and  how  the  state  through  Im  can  Ove  class-based  ideas 
'the  form  of  universality  I  (I.  Lu-x  and  Engels  1965  :  66). 
7here  have  been  criticisms  of  the  uncertainty  of  the  aim= 
0 
'ethOd.  ]Bentham  likened  it  to  making  law  for  a  dog  -  "YOu  wait '1  (-0  ý 
till  he  does  it  and  then  beat  him.  "  The  Police 
Icbby  of  the  1970s  -  just  like  that  in  1912  seeking  guidan(3e 
Q-Jm  (-  %k  !ý 
overýbat  powers  were  available  to  the  police  in  doing 
their  job  after  two  contradictory  decisions  in  the  courts  -  echo 
this,  for  it  is  in  a  sense  seeking  not  so  mu(,  h  wre  P()we,  7s  (they 
so  often  do  have  them  de  facto  in  case  law)  but  certain  powem. 
Academic  lawyers  still  analyse  specific  areas  of  law  and  express 
anxiety  over  the  gaps,  loopholes;  uncertainties  they  find  there. 
Ashworth  for  example,  (1979)  criticises  loose  phraseology  in  the 
law;  he  describes  anbiguities  in  the  operation  of  crirrdna-I  justice, 
traces  them  to  arrbiguities  in  the  conceptual  isation  of  what 
crirrdnal  justice  is  for,  and  implies  they  must  be  mde  explicit, 
discussed  and  resolved.  For  the  policeman  and  the  lawyer  anbiguity 
in  law  is  an  arxxnaly  to  be  clea-md  up.  From  a  sociological 
perspective  however,  such  gaps  and  uncertainties  are  not  contingent 
or  anomalous  but  the  inevitable  product  of  the  , 
form  of 
lav  -  these  are  not  weak'  points  in  the  system  but  a  source  of 
oPerational  strength  -a  crucial  rreans  by  which  the  legal  system  is 
ah  ble  to  work  at  all  -  and  of  ideological  strength  -  precisely  what 
allOwS  the  law  to  be  all  things  to  all  men,  to  contain  contradictions, 
tO  Manage  the  gap  between  What  it  does  and  vdiat  it  should. 
The  rhetoric  of  law  in  capitalist  society  can  thus  safely  extol 
the  Principles  of  legality  or  the  rule  of  law,  of  a  concept  of 
i'J8tice  geared  to  safeguarding  the  citizen  from  the  state,  of  an 
i'Wtial  and  universal  classlessness  in  the  idea  of  the  equal  legal 
s1biect.  It  can  do  so  safely  not  only  because  the  rhetoric  of 
criRdnal  justice  is  routinely  subverted  in  practice  by  its 
ILýý 
-I -7  (--ý  -ý- 
practitionersy  whether  through  the  non-legal  motivation  of  the 
policeman  on  the  beat  or  through  the  reasoning  ix)wers  of  the 
&gý  Cburt  judges.  Nor  indeed  only  because  the  rhetoric  of 
equality  is  negated  by  the  economic  structure,  by  the  disconsonance 
between  legal  ideology  and  social  reality  epitcmised  in  Anatole 
Francels  much  quoted  observation  that  the  law  equally  forbids 
rich  and  poor  to  sleep  under  bridges  and  beg,  by  the  fact  that 
the  law  cannot  allocate  equal  rights  in  an  unequal  society  (Marx 
1815  :  16  ;  Corrigan  and  Sayer  1979:  NIL  ).  Me  disconsýmance  can 
also  exist  and  be  resolved  witbin  the  law  itself;  the  ideology  can 
also  be  managed  out  of  existence  within  the  lav's  own  institutional 
k-1 
structure.  It  is  certainly  true  that  the  law  or  any  other  ideology 
must  not  be  dismissed  as  merely  eirpty  rhetoric;  it  nust  be  taken 
seriously  as  a  set  of  ideas  with  its  own  caTlex  structure,  substance 
and  methods.  The  operation  of  dominant  ideology  must  be  studied  not 
only  in  tem-s  of  how  it  is  put  into  practice  in  social  interaction,  %,,  < 
bi\lý  in  terrm  of  its  interrelationship  with  the  social  and  econorrdc 
structure  of  society,  but  also  in  term,  of  its  own  internal  fom  and 
)I 
dynardes. Ö 
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